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

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE EFFECTS OF SUPPORT WITHDRAWAL IN URUGUAY'S POLITICAL SYSTEM
THE TUPAMARO GUERRILLA WARFARE, 1960-1973

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

CARLOS GUILLERMO RIZOWY

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

JUNE 1981

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DEDICATION

"And I alone, escaped to tell you"
Job 1:16

In memory of my dear Mother, Eva
for Her Wisdom, Faith, Love and Guidance

"A Woman of Valor who can find?"
Proverbs 31:10

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF SUPPORT WITHDRAWAL/ POLITICAL VIOLENCE/GUERRILLA WARFARE

In this chapter I will attempt to present a comprehensive and analytical account of the relationship between support withdrawal, political violence, and guerrilla warfare. It will be an attempt to conceptualize guerrilla warfare more as a means of violent political change than as pure military tactic or strategy. From the systems perspective, Easton argues that political systems are able to maintain the processes of authoritative allocation of values because they can call or rest upon the support of their members. My approach to the study of support withdrawal will be based on David Easton's conceptualization of the input of support for the political system.[1] This will enable us to place guerrilla warfare in perspective of the broad spectrum of support withdrawal.

---

[1]David Easton, "An Approach to an Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics 9 (1957): 383-400, and A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), and A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), and "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," a paper presented to a Conference on Political Support, Chicago, Illinois, 1974.

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Support and Persistence

The input of support is a summary variable that translates environmental effects into information for the political system in relation to the possibility of system stress. If either an attitude or an action does not perform this function, it is not 'support' in the system's analytic sense of the term. Only those activities (overt) and attitudes (covert) that are relevant to 'system persistence' should be considered as support variables. In this regard it would be a mistake to consider all violent behavior as an input of support or support withdrawal. I will consider only some violent political activities as one type of political participation.

The study of political support is oriented toward an understanding of both political change and political stability.[1] The study of political support is thus linked to theories concerning the persistence of political systems. The difference between the concepts of 'persistence' and 'maintenance' is fundamental for the study of political support. 'Systems persistence' refers to the societal capacity to provide the processes through which political decisions can be made, i.e., the authoritative allocation of values for the society, regardless of the specific type of authorities, regime, or political community involved.[2] 'Systems maintenance' on the other hand refers

---

[1]From a systemic perspective sometimes substantial political change is necessary in order to maintain the level of support in its normal range in order to insure the persistence of the political system. See Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, ch. 16.

[2]David Easton, "Reflections on Criticisms," Social Science Information 12 (1973): 39.

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to a specific type problem (e.g., maintenance of specific authorities and/or regime). The persistence of processes for the authoritative allocation of values in a society may be contingent, at least theoretically, on either maintenance or change in the type of political system (i.e., the type of authorities, regime or political community).

Easton argues that political systems are able to maintain such processes of authoritative allocations of values because they can call or rely upon the support of their members.[1] The non-acceptance of its decisions as binding threatens the very persistence of the political system. In other words the lack and/or withdrawal of support from the political system by its members beyond the 'minimum level' threatens the political system and the society as a whole.[2]

The decline and/or withdrawal of support for some or all the objects of the political system (authorities, regime, political community) beyond the critical minimum does not necessarily mean the collapse of the political system. But the fluctuations in the input of support[3] does cause stress to the system. "It is through fluctuations in the inputs of demands and support that we shall find the

---

[1]Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, and A Systems Analysis of Political Life.

[2]In this sense it will be rather difficult to perceive the study of persistence of political systems without taking into consideration the input of support as an explanatory variable.

[3]The input of support is considered as a summary and explanatory variable. See Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, pp. 154-157.

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effects of the environmental systems transmitted to the political system."[1]

We may envision different situations of decline or support withdrawal from the different objects of the political system. This may happen for different reasons[2] and its systemic consequences will be different, as well as its means of expression. Therefore the system may cope with this stress differently.

Changes may happen at all levels of the political system.[3] They may be peaceful, incremental, or violent. Most of the political systems devise different responses to the threat of support withdrawal.

Some of the dimensions of support withdrawal are related to environmental determinants--linked to the political system through the input of demand.[4] Easton recognized the fact that these environmental influences account for some or even most of the variance in support, but left open the various categories of environmental variables that may influence the inputs of demands and support.

---

[1]Ibid., p. 27.

[2]As for example due to 'output failure,' 'cleavages,' etc.

[3]David Easton, "Systems Analysis and its Classical Critics," Political Science Reviewer 3 (1973): 295-301.

[4]Those determinants may be economical, cultural, religious, etc. Their weight in support withdrawal may vary not only from one political system to the other, but also intrinsically in a certain political system from T to T+1. See Easton, "Reflections on Criticisms," p. 42.

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Frame of References for the Study of the Input of Support

The frame of reference will be constructed by the use of a computer program. It will provide us with the range of possible alternatives of support and support withdrawal. We will obtain that range by the combination of some of the basic concepts of support for the political system as expressed by David Easton:[1]

Objects of Political Support Withdrawal,
States of Support Withdrawal,
Indicators of Support Withdrawal,
Degrees of Support Withdrawal.

Objects of Political Support Withdrawal

The study of political support withdrawal must be directed towards the different objects of the political system[2] (authorities, regime, political community); otherwise the concept of support is narrowed in scope and may be confined mostly to the allocative aspects of politics.[3]

---

[1]Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, and A Framework for Political Analysis.

[2]For a definition of those concepts see Easton, Systems Analysis of Political Life.

[3]This is the case with Talcott Parsons and William Gamson. Parson's 'action analysis' overlooks the regime and the political community as objects of support. He deals mostly with support toward the authorities. Similarly W. Gamson's Power and Discontent (Homewood IL: Dorsey, 1968), conceptualization of support refers mostly to the authorities and democratic systems. See David Easton, "Theoretical Approaches to Political Support," mimeographed paper prepared for a Conference on Political Support, University of Wisconsin, Madison, August 1973.

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A clear distinction should be made between support withdrawal from the authorities, regime, political community or any combination of them. These represent the political aspects of a revolution, as distinct from changes in the social and economic environment. Conceptually at this point we differentiate between political and social 'revolutions.'[1]

Withdrawal of support from the various objects and forms of the political system could be considered as a mechanism of expression for basic political change at the different political levels, without favoring one way of change over another. In other words support withdrawal can be considered one among many 'mechanisms of regulation'[2] that a political system (and its members) possesses in order to persist, i.e., to provide for some kind of authoritative allocations of values.

Thus some change (regardless of the type of change) must occur at some or all of the levels of the political system in order for the system to cope with the stress caused by the threat that the level of support may drop beyond the minimum.

---

[1]Easton, "Reflection on Criticisms," p. 23.

[2]By considering support withdrawal as 'mechanism of regulation' at no moment do I attach to it any moral value. It is only a theoretical tool. I do not mean that the maintenance of certain regimes, authorities, or political community is the goal of change. But certain changes at one or all of those objects is necessary for the persistence of the political system for the society (authoritative allocations of values for the society). For different possible types of changes see Easton, "Systems Analysis and its Classical Critics," pp. 295-300.

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Given the three objects of the political system: authorities, regime, and political community we obtain seven theoretically possible alternatives of support withdrawal. It is possible to withdraw support from only one object at a time, which we will call 'one-dimensional support withdrawal'; or from two objects at a time--'two-dimensional' or to withdraw support from all the objects of the political system simultaneously--'three-dimensional.'[1] Thus:

'One-dimensional support withdrawal' from:
Authorities, or
Regime, or
Political Community

'Two-dimensional support withdrawal' from
Authorities and Regime,
Regime and Political Community,
Political Community and Authorities

'Three-dimensional support withdrawal' from
Authorities and Regime and Political Community

States of Support Withdrawal

At the theoretical level David Easton discusses four 'types' of support: on the one hand 'overt' and 'covert' support, and on the

---

[1]The strategies of support offered (see Table 2) are based on the holistic character of the concept of support. In every study of support withdrawal we must take into consideration all the objects of the political system. This does not mean that it is 'necessary' to withdraw support 'tri-dimensionally' all of the time. The three objects of the political system are part of "a tightly interconnected support universe in which the support relationship among all of the objects and their components influence the support for any single major component." See Easton, "Theoretical Approaches to Political Support," p. 46.

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other 'specific' and 'diffuse' support.[1] "I shall designate supportive actions as overt support and supportive attitudes or sentiments as covert support."[2] 'Diffuse support' could be considered as a general reservoir of support available to the system not directly and/or necessarily linked to certain outputs,[3] i.e., it encompasses affect for authorities in general, for the values, norms, and institutions of the regime, and for the political community. Legitimacy for example is considered as an important component of diffuse support.[4]

'Specific Support' on the other hand

> is an input to a system that occurs as a return for the specific benefits and advantages that members of a system experience as part of their membership. It represents or reflects the satisfaction a member feels when he perceives his demands as having been met.[5]

---

[1]For a definition of those concepts see Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, and A Framework for Political Analysis.

[2]Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 159.

[3]Ibid., pp. 249 and 278, and David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," British Journal of Political Science 5 (October 1975): 443.

[4]'Legitimacy' is defined as the belief that the authorities and regime

> "in some vague or explicit way [conform to a person's] . . . own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere. The strength of support implicit in this attitude derives from the fact that it is not contingent upon specific inducements or rewards of any kind, except in the very long run. On a day to day basis, if there is a strong inner conviction of the moral validity of the authorities or regime, support may persist even in the face of repeated deprivations attributed to the outputs of the authorities or their failure to act" (Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 278).

[5]Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 125.

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At the theoretical level, overt and covert support towards the different objects of the political system are equally important, i.e., political participation and political attitudes are means of communication available to the individual to communicate support to the political system. As seen in the frame of reference overt and covert support may be directed to the three objects of the political system. The members of a political community (individuals and/or groups) have many different alternatives or means through which to express their support for the political system. One of them is political participation or overt support.

Each one of these pairs 'overt-covert' and 'specific-diffuse' support brings us to different problems of means, measurement, outputs, sources, and the like. It is possible to combine and correlate them in one matrix of alternatives of the type of possible support withdrawal.

By combination and permutation of the two kinds of support (specific-diffuse) with the two forms of support (overt-covert) we obtain nine 'states' of support withdrawal. It is possible to withdraw specific support overtly, covertly, or overtly and covertly together. The same applies in regard to diffuse support. It is also possible to withdraw diffuse and specific support simultaneously in an overt-covert form. Thus our alternative 'states' of support withdrawal are as shown in Table 1.

Indicators of Support Withdrawal

At this point we will proceed to combine the objects (authorities, regime, political community) with the nine states of support

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withdrawal. This will provide us with the range of alternative 'indicators' of support withdrawal that total 729.[1] These indicators can be considered as a static picture of the support situation in the political system at a given point in time, but they do not provide us with any information regarding the direction of such support.

Up to this point the frame of reference can be considered static, even though it offered us the range of alternative indicators of the input of support for the whole political system.

Degrees of Support Withdrawal and Dynamism of the Frame

In our systemic view of the political system, political activity exists only when there are means to allocate scarce values to the society, and when those allocations are accepted as binding by most of its members. According to David Easton[2] there are two essential variables of the political system, i.e., a) the capacity of the political system to allocate values and, b) the capacity of the political system to insure the acceptance of its allocations by most of the members, most of the time, as binding. When one of these essential variables of the political system falls below the 'normal range' or 'minimum level of effectiveness,' then the political system is considered to be under stress.

---

[1] $$\binom{9}{1}\binom{9}{1}\binom{9}{1} = \left(\frac{9:}{(9-1):\ x\ 1!}\right)\left(\frac{9:}{(9-1):\ x\ 1!}\right)\left(\frac{9:}{(9-1):\ x\ 1!}\right) = 9 \times 9 \times 9 = (9^3)$$

[2] Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, Chapter 6.

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The political system can be under two kinds of stress: 'authority' and 'allocative.'[1] The non-acceptance of the decisions as binding by its members threatens the very existence of the political activity, and since one of the main functions of the political system itself is to achieve at least a minimal integration for social life, the threat to the persistence of the political system is a threat to the existence of society itself.[2]

Without discussing the empirical measurement of the 'minimum level of support' required for the persistence of a political system, we will proceed to combine the 729 indicators of support with three basic degrees of support: 'above minimum' (S), 'minimum' (M), and 'below minimum' (B). Each one of these 729 indicators of support can be at each one of these degrees at different periods of time.

So far the frame of reference continues to be static, but it provides us with the direction of support, considering each indicator as a coherent indivisible unit. Theoretically this provides us with a range of alternatives of particular cases of support or support withdrawal, i.e., those where the direction or level of support is the same for all the objects of the political system at a given period of

---

[1]William Coleman, "The Empirical Study of Political Support: A Theoretical Overview," mimeographed paper prepared for a meeting of the Research Group on Political Alienation and Support, San Francisco, California, September 1975, p. 3.

[2]David Easton, "The Perception of Authority and Political Change," in Authority, ed. C. Friedrich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

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time. But the 'net balance'[1] of support, opposition or indifference does not imply the 'uni-directionality' of the input of support.[2]

At the theoretical as well as at the empirical level we admit that each one of the three components of every indicator may have a different degree at a given period of time, thus broadening our range of alternatives of degrees of support and/or support withdrawal. We cannot assume that all the behavior and attitudes of a member or group of the political system moves in one 'coherent' direction regarding the authorities, regime and political community. Members or groups may move in different directions or may hold different levels of support simultaneously regarding the different components of each indicator, but they cannot simultaneously move in opposite directions regarding one and the same part of the indicator (see 'Strategies,' Table 2).

Thus when each one of the three parts of the 729 indicators is combined with one of the three basic degrees we will obtain 19,683 different strategies of support and/or support withdrawal.[3] Table 2 provides us with those theoretically possible strategies. Through careful analysis of these alternative strategies we may reduce the

---

[1]Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, pp. 168-170.

[2]The 'uni-direction' of support can be considered as one of the major weaknesses of the literature on political violence.

[3]For each indicator when combined with the degree of support we obtain 27 (3^3) strategies, thus for 729 indicators we obtain 19,683 (729 x 27) strategies. See Table 2.

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number of relevant strategies according to the aim of our study and related hypothses.[1]

By considering a high level of continuous and widespread violent political actions (toward one or a combination of political objects) as an indication that the level of support (toward that political object or a combination) is below the minimum, we will be able to eliminate a few thousand alternative strategies. Grouping the relevant strategies by the use of different variables we may be able to 'discover' some pattern and/or correlation between them.[2] It seems that studies of certain political phenomena, as our case study will show, will need to concentrate on a certain set of strategies, their correlations and shifts.

So far we have added not only direction to support, but we have also achieved some dynamism for the frame of reference by allowing shifts and changes in the components of the indicators which provide us with the strategies. From a systemic point of view the shift and correlation between the strategies can be modified in mainly two ways: (a) endogeneously: by the process of feedback among variables that

---

[1]If for example we are interested in 'nationalistic types of Revolutions,' we must take into consideration at least those strategies with 'below' level of diffuse support for the political community.

[2]Some attempts were made for example by Muller and Jukam but using only two objects (Authorities-Regime). Edward Muller and Thomas A. Jukam, "On the Meaning of Political Support," mimeographed paper presented at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1975.

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were already affected in the process; (b) exogeneously: independent from the process studied.[1]

The use of the dynamic frame of reference should be done in conjunction with the identification of the 'political relevant members'[2] of the political system and their means and willingness to put their potential or actual threat of support withdrawal into action. In this sense the frame of reference could be used as a guideline in the comparative analysis of the strategies held by the 'elites' and the 'masses.' Only then will we be able to determine the net potential impact of support withdrawal in the persistence of a political system. The frame of reference will also be used for other purposes.

Uses of the Frame of Reference

The frame of reference presented will be used to analyze the process of political change in Uruguay caused in part by support withdrawal (through guerrilla warfare) from the authorities, the regime, and for a short period of time from the political community as well, and its impact on Uruguay's political system. Low political support is a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain violent political participation. The frame of reference will be useful to

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[1]For example the transformation of new wants into demands, or the introduction of unexpected variables as for example a foreign intervention.

[2]Easton, Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 166.

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'localize' guerrilla warfare in the spectrum of alternative strategies of support withdrawal, to analyze the conditions that favored the outbreak of guerrilla activities from the support standpoint; to analyze the process and development of the guerrilla movement into a relevant political force; and to study the process by which the armed forces were 'brought' into the realm of politics. We should, however, be aware that the frame of reference is not intended to give a rigid prescription either for the outbreak of guerrilla warfare or for its success, nor the establishment of military dictatorships.

Guerilla warfare became a widespread phenomenon in the twentieth century. In Uruguay guerrilla warfare has had a particularly high impact on the existing political system. Guerrilla movements are political organizations that seek to achieve political and social revolution (i.e., a redistribution, reorganization, or restructuring of political, economic, social, and value resources in the society) through the use of armed warfare in the countryside and/or urban centers.[1]

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[1]A similar definition is used by Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 10. (He does not include urban guerrilla warfare in his definition.)

What follows are terms generally used to describe 'guerrilla warfare.' Sometimes, those terms have a positive or negative connotation.

'Under-Limited War'--This term is often used by the American strategic thinkers. It denotes a kind of war that is placed under the limited war which is considered the conventional war. Above the conventional level is placed the nuclear war.

'Revolutionary War,' 'Popular War,' 'War of National Liberation,' 'Revolution'--These terms generally have a positive connotation. They are kinds of war that are generally fought with guerrilla methods. Their objectives are the expulsion of a foreign

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Guerrilla organizations exert a definitive influence on the political system in those countries in which they have succeeded in becoming politically relevant groups, such as in Uruguay. The unique situation of Uruguay is a good illustration of one of the very few cases in which an urban guerrilla organization, namely the Tupamaros, succeeded in becoming a real contender for political power, having a deep impact on the political system. This happened in a democratic country without an immediate past history of political violence and with a long tradition of a highly developed welfare system.

The systemic use of political violence mainly through urban guerrillas was intended primarily to create a 'power duality'--a duality that would on the one hand accelerate the process of support

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ruler and/or a change in the political system. These kinds of war are usually associated with leftist groups.

'Resistance War'--This term refers to the forces and warfare together. This was the name used to describe forces that were active against the German occupation. The intention of the 'resistance war' is to change the status-quo and although this is an 'offensive war,' it is described as a 'defensive war.'

'Subversive War'--Generally connotes a negative attitude. It is a term associated with activities directed toward the disruption of the government and a disintegration of the society with the objective of 'conquering' the government from within and imposing another kind of regime (generally with the help of a foreign government). The term 'war by proxy' is often used as a synonym of 'subversive war.'

'Terror'--Term used to describe activities whose objectives are to disrupt the normal functioning of the government and/or society.

'Insurgency,' 'Insurrectionary Warfare'--These are terms with negative connotation. These terms are frequently found in the literature dealing with anti-guerrilla activities.

'Commando Activities,' 'Paramilitary Activities'--Generally used to describe activities done to help the regular armed forces. These terms are used by both the guerrillas and the official armed forces.

'Internal War'--Describes the separation and polarization of the society in which at least two different sides are fighting one another. It can be fought in a conventional or guerrilla form.

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withdrawal from the existing political system and on the other hand transfer loyalty and support to themselves. Every activity of the Tupamaros was carefully considered from the military point of view, but even more so for its political impact on the level of support of relevant members of the political system as well as the population at large. The frame of reference presented earlier will also be used to monitor this process of support withdrawal.

The main hypothesis underlying the frame of reference is that only by studying the strategies of support withdrawal as a whole will we be able to understand the total measure of support and/or support withdrawal, "the support relationships among all of the objects and their components influence the support for any single major object."[1]

In the next chapters we will be identifying the set of support withdrawal strategies, their shifts and relationships applicable to our case study. We will try to identify strategies as a whole, based mainly on documents published by the Tupamaros. "The input of support is a function of an intricate set of relationships, the reciprocal effects of each of which has to be taken into consideration in assessing variations not only in the total level of support in a system but in the level of each object."[2]

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[1]David Easton, "Theoretical Approaches to Political Support," mimeographed paper prepared for a Conference on Political Support, University of Wisconsin, Madison, August 1973, p. 46.

[2]Ibid., p. 44.

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Literature Review

Because of the vast amount of existing literature, I have selected some particular authors and problems in order to try to point out some of the difficulties I have consistently found in the literature. One set of studies on support is concerned with the definition of the dimensions and optimal indicators of the concepts of political support as for example, the concepts of trust, legitimacy, alienation, etc. and the consequences for the different objects of the political system. This debate is linked to the ongoing discussion in relation to the differentiation between specific and diffuse support,[1] as well as their determinants. Another set of studies on support centers around its empirical uses, dealing with problems of optimal indicators, measurements in the fluctuations of support, the relationship between the different types of support, etc.

The theoretical and empirical study of support withdrawal is in part an attempt to discover processes, factors, variables that facilitate or hinder the persistence of political processes required for social life. From a systems viewpoint it is accepted that in

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[1]For a further clarification on those problems see: Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," pp. 1-19; A. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-70," American Political Science Review 68 (1971): 951-972; J. Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," American Political Science Review 68 (1971): 973-988; W. Coleman and D. Easton, "Support for the Political Community Reconsidered," mimeographed paper, University of Chicago, Department of Political Science, 1975; A. Miller, "Change in Political Trust: Discontent with Authorities and Economic Policies 1972-73," a paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1975.

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certain cases at least theoretically, political change will be required in order to maintain the level of support in its normal range.[1]

In part, some of the research on support withdrawal is trying to 'discover' those conditions "where the only response remaining to a political system that will stem the tide of declining support is one of substantial structural change."[2]

The Social Sciences have developed different theories to explain and account for political violence. The theories of 'relative deprivation,' 'rising expectations,' 'repression of instincts,' and the like, are but just a few examples which can be labelled the 'psychological approach,' and are concerned in general with the individual's perception of society.

David C. Schwartz gives us some insight about the relationship between political alienation and revolutionary behavior. 'Relative deprivation' (referring in broad terms to the gap between achievement optimum and achievement) is for Ted R. Gurr, the psychological precondition for violent political behavior, as 'political alienation' is for David C. Schwartz. The theories of Gurr and Schwartz are based upon the 'frustration-aggression theory' and 'conflict theory,' respectively. These are adaptations of psychological theories for the

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[1]Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," pp. 2-11.

[2]William D. Coleman, "The Empirical Study of Political Support: A Theoretical Overview," a mimeographed paper, University of Chicago, September 1975.

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analysis of political violence. Nesvold and the Feierabends[1] use the concept of 'systemic frustration' that is similar to Gurr's concept of 'relative deprivation.' This is the basis for the frustration-aggression theory, i.e., social discontent followed by the rise of anger which in turn results in political violence. In other words, the main assumption is that a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind.[2]

In their studies, the authors analyzed different variables that facilitate or obstruct the violent behavior caused by 'systemic frustration' or 'relative deprivation.' (It would be a mistake, however, to see these theories as equally applicable to the same cases.) It may also be the case, though, as pointed out by Berkowitz[3] that frustration creates only a readiness for aggressive acts. This readiness can also be established by previously acquired aggressiveness habits and not only by frustration.[4]

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[1]Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns" and "Aggressive Behavior within Politics 1948-1962: A Cross National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolutions 10 (September 1966): 249-271.

[2]T. R. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," American Political Science Review 62 (December 1968): 1104.

[3]Leonard Berkowitz, "The Concept of Aggressive Drive: Some Additional Considerations," Experimental Social Psychology, (New York: Academic Press, 1965), 2: 306-309.

[4]In this sense it may be equated with the experimental type of diffuse support. Diffuse support may also be acquired through the socialization process. For empirical findings pertaining to the development of diffuse support see David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

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Following Samuel Huntington and Gurr,[1] it is possible to outline four models of 'relative deprivation':

a) when people's expectations rise and their capabilities remain the same;

b) when people's expectations outpace their rising capabilities;

c) when expectations stay the same and capabilities drop; and

d) the J curve phenomenon.[2]

Other authors have concentrated on sociological preconditions to explain revolutionary behavior. The societal factors judged to be important may vary from author to author, but in all cases they focus on these factors and assume that the 'revolutionary act' follows from the occurrence of societal conditions. For Joan Galtung, the social status discrepancy, and for Harry Eckstein, the inconsistency of

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[1]See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), especially pp. 53-56, and Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). The following works by Gurr are central to the development and testing of his theory: "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics 20 (January 1968): 245-278 and "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review 62 (December 1968), pp. 1104-1124. On relative deprivation see also Louis H. Massoti and Don R. Bowen, eds., "Deprivation, Mobility and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor," in Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1968), and Thomas J. Crawford and Murray Naditch, "Relative Deprivation, Powerless and Militancy: The Psychology of Social Protest," Psychiatry 33 (May 1970): 208-223, and Denton E. Morrison, "Some Notes Toward a Theory on Relative Deprivation and Social Change," American Behavioral Scientist 14 (May-June 1971): 675-690.

[2]James C. Davies, "The J Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Violence in American Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Hugh D. Graham and T. R. Gurr (New York: Signet Books, 1969), and J. C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review 27 (February 1962): 5-19.

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authority patterns are the sociological preconditions for the outbreak of violent behavior. Eckstein also draws a distinction between structural (objective circumstances, processes, institutions, etc.) and behavioral (expectations, frustrations, etc.). These different variables may complement each other.

Those studies are narrow in the sense that they do not clearly identify the objects from which support is withdrawn. They usually refer only to violent acts against the regime and particular authorities occupying positions in the regime. They fail to recognize the potential influence or 'spill-over' effect of support withdrawal from one object of the political system to the other.

On the other hand they are too broad, in that they consider those violent political acts as equally important to the input of support, and their potential stress upon the political system. Not all types of political participation, including violent political activities, should be considered as an input or withdrawal of support. Only those activities and attitudes that are relevant to system persistence should be considered as support variables. In this sense it will be a mistake to consider all protest or violent behavior as input of support withdrawal.

It is plausible, however, that a high degree of correlation may exist between such potential determinants of support withdrawal. The study of systemic frustration, relative deprivation, alienation, may be a very useful tool for the study of or conditions for fluctuations in the degree of support. Thus the study of those attitudinal variables can be incorporated into the systemic use of the concept of support as

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important potential determinants of support towards the authorities, regime, political community, or any combination of them.

Regarding the concept of alienation it could be included as a dimension of support withdrawal, "if we were to use it unambiguously to refer to two ideas only: that a person feels disassociated or estranged from an object, that simultaneously he rejects the object and, therefore, evaluates it negatively."[1] Ada W. Finifter[2] tries to develop some empirical indicators of support using the concept of alienation. One of Finifter's main contributions to the study of alienation lies in her attempt to narrow the concept in order to operationalize the concept of alienation regarding specific political institutions and processes.[3]

For that purpose she distinguishes four different ways in which alienation towards the political system may be expressed: 'political powerlessness,' 'political normlessness,' 'political meaninglessness,' and 'political isolation.'[4] These four 'categories' are in a sense

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[1]Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," p. 30.

[2]Ada W. Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," American Political Science Review 64 (1970): 389-411. On alienation see also A. W. Finifter, ed., Alienation and the Social System (New York: Wiley, 1972), and D. C. Schwartz, Political Alienation and Political Behavior (Chicago: Aldine, 1972).

[3]See also H. Edward Ransford, "Isolation, Powerlessness and Violence: A Study of the Attitudes and Participation in the Watts Riot," American Journal of Sociology 73 (March 1968): 581-591.

[4]Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," pp. 390-391.

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feelings which compose her main definition of alienation. The mere fact that an individual may have such feelings (or any combination of them with different correlation values) does not necessarily imply the individual's rejection or negative evaluation of an object of the political system. In other words there is no direct causal relationship between Finifter's dimensions of alienation and support withdrawal. At least theoretically those attitudes as described by Finifter may or may not have an important relationship to the study of the input of support.

Á priori I tend to believe that there is a high degree of correlation between such potential determinants of support and support withdrawal. In other words, the study of such feelings of alienation may be a very useful tool for the study of fluctuations in the degree of diffuse support.

Another explanation of potential for political violence is based on the 'social learning theory.'[1] To a great extent this trend of thought represents a major critique to the frustration-aggression theory. Potential for political violence is mainly explained by the fact that experiencing 'goal attainment' by means of political violence, or the perception that 'others' with whom one identifies have achieved their goals, produces a readiness to engage in political violence. Thus there is no direct causal relationship between frustration and aggression. The response to frustration will depend on the

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[1]See Albert Bandura and Richard Walters, Social Learning and Personality Developments (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963), especially chapter 3.

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prior 'social training' and/or 'socialization' of the frustrated subject, through which the potential for political violence may increase or decrease.

These 'social learning' theories refer mainly to the potential conversion from covert to overt support. In this sense with certain variations they could also be included as an important determinant in the study of the experiential type of diffuse support. However, they do not deal with the specific type of support, thus failing to recognize that a drastic drop in specific support may also cause potential for political violence.[1] Also, because they are not clear in their differentiation of the political objects towards which political violence is directed (authorities, regime, political community) one of their basic assumptions is that an individual can move in only one direction at a certain point in time. But theoretically and empirically we may conceive, for example, of an individual or group with high diffuse support for the regime and political community and low diffuse support for the authorities.

Still, other explanations of potential for political violence[2] center around what we may call the 'environmental aspects' of a given political system such as: social stratification, land tenure system, economic inequality in the society, and the like. It is

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[1]The Nicaraguan authorities mishandling of the relief program after the earthquake is an example of this situation.

[2]There are many more theories that try to explain political violence from different viewpoints: philosophical, ideological, functionalist, mass society, leadership, etc. In this chapter I am presenting a few of these alternative explanations.

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plausible that indicators such as these may or should be considered potential determinants in the level of support toward the different objects of the political system. The 'environmentalists' by studying changes in the economic, social, etc., conditions of a given society try to explain those 'objective' conditions that create a favorable climate for the development of violence. But they fail to distinguish violence in general from political violence in particular. Most of the studies on political violence, and revolutions, however lack a basic definition of political violence, as well as a perspective on how to view political violence in terms of the totality of the political system.

Some authors like Muller, Jukam, Finifter, Citrin, and others, have tried to a certain extent to apply the concepts of 'relative deprivation,' 'alienation,' 'systemic frustration,' and the like to the input of political support in order to offer an alternative approach to account for the potential for political violence as a function of Easton's conceptualization of support.

These authors[1] try to demonstrate that the level of political support is associated with broadly defined modes of political behavior. Their general working hypothesis is that low political support is a necessary condition of violent or 'unconventional' political participation. "When political support is low, the likely result is

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[1]For example Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," and Schwartz, "Political Alienation and Political Behavior," p. 156. See also Jeffery M. Paige, "Political Orientation and Riot Participation," American Sociological Review 36 (October 1971), esp. p. 812.

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either withdrawal or else participation in 'unconventional' forms of protest and aggressive political behavior."[1]

According to the political trust theory developed by Gamson and refined in certain respects by Paige[2] if political trust is at a low level it may lead either to aggressive political participation or to alienation. The direction of political participation in this case will depend upon whether the impact of political efficacy is high or low. Finifter's theory of political alienation corroborates the findings of Gamson and Paige. Finifter uses the concept of 'political normlessness' which is similar to the political trust-mistrust variable developed by Gamson-Paige. "When political efficacy is low, the predicted result of high political normlessness is extreme disengagement, either in the form of revolutionary opposition or complete withdrawal, depending upon whether sense of personal efficacy is high or low."[3]

Muller concludes that when political support declines and the citizens

> believe that aggressive political behavior has not been detrimental to other groups in the society, they will be expected to move toward adoption of the more aggressive, mixed types of behavior. Finally, if belief in the efficacy of past aggression becomes quite high while personal political influence remains low, _and_ if there

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[1]Edward Muller, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support," _American Political Science Review_ 71 (June 1977): 454.

[2]Paige, "Political Orientation and Riot Participation," pp. 810-812.

[3]Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," pp. 459-460, quoted from Muller, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support," pp. 459-460.

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are no antiregime political parties perceived as attractive, then Nonconformative Opposition is expected to take place.[1]

Violent political behavior (a particular type of political participation) can be considered as an input of support for the regime, authorities, and the political community. Muller and Jukam refer to the relationship between support for the authorities and the regime, though they do not consider support for the political community. By following their approach it would be difficult, for example, to study the violent political behavior of separatist movements. They examine a wide and diversified range of acts of political participation--political participation itself considered as one among numerous means of expressing support for the different objects of the political system. Specifically considering those forms of participation which involve aggressive political behavior, however, it may be misleading to concur with Muller and Jukam who look upon all such aggressive behavior as a means of expressing 'negative' support for the regime. The difficulty probably stems from their failure to consider all the objects of the political system, or at least to make explicit the basic theoretical assumptions which underlie--and in this case restrict--their conclusions.

Muller and Jukam's propositions and corrolaries[2] according to the frame of reference presented may be 'boxed' into the set of

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[1]Muller, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support," pp. 467.

[2]Edward Muller and Thomas A. Jukam, "On the Meaning of Political Support," a mimeographed paper presented at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1975, pp. 6-8.

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strategies where support for the authorities and regime fluctuates from 'above minimum' (S) to 'below minimum' (B) dealing only with support--diffuse and specific--(1-2-3). They do not deal either with covert support or the political community[1] (see Table 2).

Their propositions leave unexplained some instances of 'coup d'état,' where political violence is an expression of support withdrawal from the authorities even when support may be high for the regime and the political community. They also underestimate the theoretical possibility that extended withdrawal of specific support from the authorities may have influence on the level of diffuse support withdrawal from the authorities and eventually from the regime, as was the case with the Tupamaros in Uruguay. At least theoretically a drastic drop in specific support[2] due to output failure may override high diffuse support for the regime and political community and may produce a potential for violent political action.

Shanks and Citrin[3] find that dissatisfaction with the incumbent authorities is as good a variable to predict violent protest behavior as dissatisfaction with the regime. Marsh[4] also has found

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[1]We assume 'Above Minimum Support for the Political Community.'

[2]Muller and Jukam as well as Parsons undermined the importance of specific support over diffuse support.

[3]Coleman, "The Empirical Study of Political Support: A Theoretical Overview," pp. 9-11.

[4]A. Marsh, "The Dynamics of Dissatisfaction and Protest in British Politics," a paper presented to a Conference on Political Alienation and Support, Iowa City, 1975.

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that in England low specific support for the authorities is a good predictor of violent protest behavior. This kind of protest behavior may be precipitated by the individual's perception that the incumbent authorities by their policies are disrupting regime norms which the members strongly support. Citrin[1] in this respect observes that support for the regime (at least in democratic systems) does not necessarily preclude criticism (even in protest form) of specific policies and/or the authorities. This in part expands Muller and Jukams's findings that aggressive political behavior is mostly a means of support withdrawal from the regime.

From his own theory Muller derives some consequences, for example, the contagion effect upon the population that may be caused by the successful use of violent tactics. "If political alienation were relatively widespread to begin with, then the contagious effect of the successful use of aggression by an initial few could well spread to unmanageable proportions, resulting in the outbreak of full-fledged internal war."[2] In a sense this is also one of the main elements of the 'foco' theory that the Tupamaros tried to implement as we will analyze in the subsequent chapters (especially Chapter XI).

> Eventually, as the contagion spreads, and more and more of the alienated are mobilized, the authorities normally begin to crack down more and more severely. Then as belief in the efficacy of past aggression wanes, the contagion effect subsides, and those who are alienated either withdraw again or else shift to working for

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[1]J. Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," American Political Science Review 68 (1971): 973-988.

[2]Muller, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support," p. 467.

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desired political change only within the established political party system.[1]

This proposition supports our hypothesis regarding the defeat of the Tupamaros. To a large degree, as we will argue in Chapter XI, the Tupamaros tried on the one hand to foster the process of political alienation among the population, and on the other hand to achieve what they called the 'militarization of the conflict' that eventually was supposed to accelerate the identification of the 'alienated citizens' with the Tupamaro movement. The outcome of this particular strategy while succeeding ideologically, failed from the military point of view. As the authorities started to crack down on the Tupamaros as well as their sympathizers the belief in the efficacy of violent political participation waned--thus creating a result opposite to the one expected by the Tupamaros.

It is interesting to observe that the Tupamaros never wholly rejected the idea of conventional political participation, even though they believed that those types of activities were not efficient or viable enough in order to bring about the desired political changes. Most of the members of the Tupamaro movement were previously members of political parties who grew disenchanted with the traditional forms of political participation. Before they tried violent political activities in the form of guerrilla warfare, the Tupamaros experimented with other types of political participation such as 'marches,'

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[1]Ibid.

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'occupations,' and 'property re-distribution.'[1] The Tupamaros' sense of efficacy and their accomplishments through these and more conventional forms of political participation decreased not only because of their inability to obtain any significant political gain, but also because of the authorities' reactions. Thus the level of support of the Tupamaros was low, their sense of personal political influence decreased and their belief in the efficacy of past collective violent political activities increased, considering Cuba as their basic example.

In sum, violent political behavior (legal or illegal) is but one means of communicating support withdrawal from the different objects of the political system.[2] The correlation between support withdrawal from the authorities, regime, political community may vary from one political system to the other and within each political system in different periods of time. The frame of strategies presented

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[1]During the last election in Uruguay, before the military takeover, the Tupamaros supported the 'Popular Front' party. By some this was considered to be a mistake that contributed, among other reasons, to the defeat of the 'Popular Front' in the national elections. Conceptually the differences between the Popular Front and the Tupamaros were minimal. The main difference was in the means and evaluation of the efficacy of those means to achieve the desired goals. The support by the Tupamaros to the Popular Front, in a sense polarized the society in two camps, those in favor of violent political behavior and those against, thus relegating the content of the demands of the different political parties. Thus many citizens that were in favor of the political platform of the Popular Front, shifted their support to the other traditional parties because of their fear of violent political activities.

[2]For an interesting table of behavior that conforms to 'legal and customary regime norms,' see Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), Table 3, p. 18.

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earlier provides the possibility of studying those relationships, in order to 'discover' some correlation patterns. Thus, these different theories, and the variables they employ, do not necessarily contradict each other, and may even complement each other at times. The study of the concept of 'political support' in its systemic perspective provides us with an interesting way of incorporating such variables in a systemic-political perspective.

Our Approach and the Existing Literature

In our study we will not consider violent political behavior in the form of guerrilla warfare as a 'problem.' To do so is to take an ideological stand implying the deviance from 'normal' political participation (voting, parties, etc.), thus threatening the stability of the political system. Guerrilla warfare, or any other form of violent political behavior can be considered 'statistically deviant' and/or uncommon, but as stated earlier we will consider this type of political participation as normal in the political process and in some instances, at least theoretically, the persistence of the political system may be contingent upon it.[1]

As Nieburg puts it,

> the threat of violence . . . and the occasional outbreak of violence that gives the threat credibility, are essential elements in peaceful social change . . . Individuals and groups exploit the

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[1]For a theoretical distinction between 'stability' or 'maintenance' and 'persistence' of political systems, see section earlier in this chapter on "Support and Persistence."

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> threat as an everyday matter. This induces flexibility and stability in democratic institutions.[1]

In a sense we push this argument further in that we are not concerned with the maintenance of any particular political system, but with its persistence; thus change through political violence, or guerrilla warfare, at times, may conceivably be a necessary element for the persistence of the political system. In Uruguay drastic changes in the authorities and regime were brought about by the Tupamaros' activities, but the political system persisted.

From the political point of view, it is very important to link the feelings of dissatisfaction, deprivation, and the like, to the political system, i.e., those feelings, in order to be considered as inputs for the political system, must be politicized--otherwise their political consequences are minimized. Thus for our purpose the importance of the psychological variables in the linkage process between the environment and the political system is maximized. The same should be considered regarding the 'objective' or 'physical' variables, as for example the economic, military, social situation, land tenure system of the country, etc. Thus the importance of what we will call the 'subjective environment' and the 'objective environment' is increased in the linkage process. Parts II and III will be devoted to the analysis of this linkage process.

This study represents in part a break with the traditional literature on the study of change in Uruguay's political system. The

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[1]See H. C. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process (New York: St. Martin's, 1969).

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environmental variables, 'objective' and 'subjective,' become politically relevant only to the extent that they are politicized. Thus, for example, we will argue that the deteriorating economic situation in Uruguay was not a factor in the origins of the Tupamaro movement until the economic crisis became politicized, among other ways, through the welfare system (Chapter IV). The time lag between the actual change in demands (from economic to political, for example) and the authorities' awareness of those changes accelerated and prolonged the process of output failure. The continuous decline in support for the incumbent authorities among relevant members of the political system as well as large strategic sectors among the population, created in part the conditions for the Tupamaros' birth.

In Uruguay, before the birth, and during the growth of the Tupamaro movement, many other methods of political participation were tried by different segments of the population. Through the period under study we can perceive a process of shifting from 'more traditional' ways of political participation towards more direct, violent and 'unorthodox' forms of political participation (e.g., strikes, boycotts, invasions of property), and eventually guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is but one means of violent political behavior. This process is in part related to the gradual shift of support withdrawal from the authorities to the regime.

> It is becoming more and more evident that protest behavior has permeated mass political consciousness and has become a component of most peoples' views of the political scene and of their ideas concerning the conduct of the political community. Having some attitude towards protest has become part of our political culture;

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> and this is true even if much of that body of opinion is negatively inclined.[1]

Evidence is available that changes in mass public opinion will result in changes in protest behavior in the same direction. Skolnick[2] concludes that the slow but steady growth of negative public sentiments was a major factor in launching protest movements. Thus in a sense it is possible to argue that the population at large and the activists were responding independently to the same data concerning the performance of the authorities. While the majority of the population reacted toward a certain set of incumbent authorities, the activists considered the set of authorities as being a product of the regime, thus 'secondary' as a 'target' for support withdrawal.

This brings us to our next hypothesis: that the growth of the Tupamaro guerrilla organization was at least one indication that support withdrawal from the authorities by certain sectors of the population spilled-over into support withdrawal from the regime too. The acceleration of this process enabled the Tupamaros to become a relevant political contender for power in Uruguay's political system. With the Tupamaro leadership, however, the reverse seems to have occurred--their support was withdrawn first from the regime and then from the authorities.

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[1]Allan Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness, Sage Library of Social Research, no. 49 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), p. 14.

[2]J. H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (New York: Ballantine, 1969).

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One of the misconceptions of the Tupamaros was to consider the widespread feelings of lack of confidence, mistrust, disquiet, etc., among large sectors of the population (especially the urban population) as directly dependent on the Tupamaro activities. What the Tupamaros also failed to recognize, was that while they themselves were ready to engage in the activities recognized to be at the end of the spectrum of violent political behavior, i.e., guerrilla warfare, the population at large was not. Different segments of the population were ready to engage and/or to support more 'traditional' or 'moderate' kinds of violent political participation (demonstrations, sit-ins, etc.). As we will analyze in Chapter XI those different types of activities do not necessarily contradict each other, but may even complement each other at times.

To the Tupamaro leadership and activists it appeared as if those segments of the population were supportive or 'ready' to make the 'qualitative' shift of support withdrawal from the authorities to the regime and political community. This leads us to our next hypothesis that the downfall of the Tupamaros was caused not only by the armed forces, but mainly because the drastic drop in support for the authorities did not override the high diffuse support for the regime in the majority as well as relevant members of the political community.

Michael Lipsky stresses that protest targets consist, almost invariably, of some agent or institution of authority. The target is influenced, constrained, and in many cases coerced by expressions and

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acts of dissent by activists.[1] It is being proposed, then, that there exist in the population 'invisible boundaries' of behavioral license that play an important role in regulating the behavior of active partisans in the political arena. Thus, violent potential may be conceived of as a property of both the individual and of the political community.

In a sense this brings us to our next hypothesis that the perceived structural coercion in certain aspects of Uruguay's political system, mainly the 'electoral process,' was one of the major reasons for the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. Interestingly enough, here again the Tupamaros were confronted with a difficult paradox, namely that certain of the same aspects of the regime that they considered as 'weaknesses,' i.e., the electoral system, were considered a 'strength' by strategic and large segments of the population.

The activities performed by the Tupamaros (Chapter XI) were not only amplified, but also modified by the media (the communication process), as were the activities performed by those agencies and institutions of authority. But while the Tupamaros saw in those agencies and institutions just symbols of the regime, the population at large perceived the Tupamaros' activities and their disclosures of the corruption of the authorities as mismanagement and thus did not directly link the regime with the authorities.

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[1]Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," American Political Science Review 55 (1959): 68-105.

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At a later stage when the Tupamaros seriously attempted to create a 'duality of power' the connection between authorities and regime became more evident. Until then the majority of people perceived the authorities as the only choice for political change. As the duality of power became more real, certain segments of the population started to consider not only the authorities but also the regime, and the political community as another potential for support withdrawal and political change. Even though the awareness among large strategic sections of the population that the activities required to produce a change in the authorities were not necessarily the same as those required for a change in the regime, most of the population was not ready to implement or become involved in the alternative being offered, namely guerrilla warfare. That brings us to our next hypothesis, that there is a direct relationship between the increasing pressure on the military to intervene actively in the political process and sustained or growing withdrawal of support from the authorities, the regime, and for a while also the political community by strategic sectors of Uruguay's political system.

Muller and Jukam[1] demonstrate that it is possible to distinguish empirically between affect for the incumbent authorities and system affect.

> If system affect is negative among powerful or sizable segments of a polity, the threat to the stability of the prevailing regime will be great, even if affect for a particular incumbent administration is positive; conversely, if system affect is positive among powerful or sizable segments of a polity, the threat to the

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[1]Edward Muller, "On the Meaning of Political Support," American Political Science Review 71 (December 1977): 1561-1595.

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> stability of the prevailing regime will be small, even if affect for a particular incumbent administration is negative.[1]

What their theory states is that

> if affect for an incumbent administration declines from positive to negative, the stability of a regime will not be threatened by virtue of aggressive political protest and violence, no matter how powerful or sizable the segment of the population registering this decline, as long as their affect for the political system is positive. But if affect for the political system were to decline from positive to negative, the threat to the stability of a regime posed by aggressive political protest and violence would be, at the very least, moderate, if powerful or sizable segments of the population were registering this decline; and the threat would become strong, if affect for the incumbent administration also turned negative.[2]

Muller and Jukam conclude that

> affect from an incumbent administration and affect for the system of government is important empirically because it affords a more precise explanation of aggressive political behavior than would be possible if political affect were treated as a single entity.[3]

Affect for the system of government is a more powerful explanatory variable than affect for an incumbent administration when we deal with violent political participation. In the case of Uruguay, the Tupamaros had a low affect for the political system as well as of the incumbent authorities, but the majority of the population, while having a low affect for the incumbent authorities, maintained a moderate affect for the political system.

Muller and Jukam conclude by proposing that 'ideological commitment' and 'community context' should be taken into account in explaining violent political activities. In Chapters IX and XII we will deal with those two variables when we analyze the ideological

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[1]Ibid., p. 1563. [2]Ibid., p. 1564. [3]Ibid., p. 1588.

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evolution of the Tupamaros and their acceptance by the different sectors of the population (rural, urban, middle class, students, etc.). In the succeeding chapters we will also analyze among others the hypotheses stated in this chapter.

Summary and Restatement of Hypotheses

This chapter focused on the conceptual analysis of support withdrawal, political violence, and guerrilla warfare. This was accomplished by establishing a frame of reference for the study of the input of support. The frame of reference provided us with the range of possible alternatives of support and support withdrawal. That range was obtained by the combination of some of the basic concepts of support for the political system as expressed by David Easton. In this context we analyzed the objects, states, indicators, and degrees of support withdrawal from a systemic point of view.

The frame of reference presented will be used to analyze the process of political change in Uruguay from 1960 to 1973. The main objective of the dissertation is to show that the process of political change that led to the military takeover was caused in part by support withdrawal (through guerrilla warfare) from the authorities, the regime, and for a short period of time from the political community as well, and its impact on Uruguay's political system. The frame of reference will be useful to locate guerrilla warfare in the spectrum of alternative strategies of support withdrawal available to the membership of Uruguay's political community.

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Guerrilla warfare is carried out by political organizations that seek to achieve political and social revolution (i.e., a redistribution, reorganization, or restructuring of political, economic, social, and value resources in the society) through the use of armed warfare in the countryside and/or urban centers. In the succeeding chapters the frame of reference will help us analyze the conditions that favored the outbreak of guerrilla activities from the support standpoint, to analyze the process and development of the guerrilla movement into a relevant political force, and to study the process of the 'gradual coup' by the armed forces.

Some of the dimensions of support withdrawal are related to environmental determinants--linked to the political system through the input of demand. David Easton recognized the fact that these environmental influences may account for some or most of the variance in political phenomena, but left open the various categories of environmental variables that may influence the inputs of demands and support. We maintain that the environmental variables ('objective' and 'subjective') become politically relevant only to the extent that they are politicized. In this sense this study represents in part a break with the traditional literature on the study of change in Uruguay's political system.

Following this line of thought the main hypothesis that we will test in the subsequent chapters are:

1) That the perceived structural coercion in certain aspects of Uruguay's political system, mainly the electoral process, was

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one of the major reasons for the outbreak of guerrilla warfare (Chapters II and III).

2) That the economic crisis of the early 1950s accelerated the development and growth of the Tupamaros, but was not as generally claimed the main reason for the outbreak of guerrilla activities. Thus, for example, we will argue that the deteriorating economic situation in Uruguay was not a factor in the origins of the Tupamaro movement until the economic crisis became politicized, among other ways, through the welfare system (Chapters IV and V).

3) That the growth of the Tupamaros was at least one indication that support withdrawal from the authorities by certain sectors of the population spilled over into support withdrawal from the regime too. The acceleration of this process enabled the Tupamaros to become a relevant political contender for power in Uruguay's political system. With the Tupamaro leadership, however, the reverse seems to have occurred--their support was withdrawn first from the regime and then from the authorities (Chapter X).

4) Before the birth and during the growth of the Tupamaro movement, many other strategies of political participation were tried by different segments of the population. Through the period under study we perceive a process of shifting from 'more traditional' ways of political participation toward more direct, violent, and 'unorthodox' forms of political participation (e.g., strikes, boycotts, invasions of property), and

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eventually guerrilla warfare. This process is in part related to the gradual shift of support withdrawal from the authorities to the regime (Chapter XII).

5) That the downfall of the Tupamaros was caused not only by the armed forces, but mainly because the drastic drop in support for the authorities did not override the high diffuse support for the regime in the majority as well as relevant members of the political community. The Tupamaros 'misinterpreted' the population's widespread feelings of mistrust and illegitimacy. While the Tupamaros were ready to engage in activities recognized to be in the end of the spectrum of violent political behavior, i.e., guerrilla warfare, the population at large was not. Different segments of the population were ready to engage and/or support more 'traditional' or 'moderate' kinds of violent political participation (Chapters XI and XII).

6) That there is a direct relationship between the increasing pressure on the military to intervene actively in the political process and the growth of the Tupamaros 'dual power capability' that symbolized an increased and complete withdrawal of support from the incumbent authorities and the existing regime (Chapters VI and XII).

In the succeeding chapters we will test these hypotheses. Methodologically this will be accomplished by the study of Uruguay's political system. The input of support or support withdrawal does not exist in the vaccuum. Fluctuations in the level of support are in part

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determined by the objective and subjective environments. The succeeding chapters will deal with the influence of these environmental variables in the level of support for Uruguay's political system and the Tupamaros.

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PART II

THE OBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT

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CHAPTER II

STRUCTURAL COERCION IN URUGUAY'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Introduction

As discussed in Chapter I, some of the dimensions of support withdrawal are related to environmental determinants--linked to the political system through the input of demand. Part II of the dissertation will deal with the influence of the variables comprising the objective environment in the input of support. Part III of this study will deal with the influence of the 'subjective' environment in the input of support. These environmental variables ('objective' and 'subjective') become relevant to the study of support withdrawal only to the extent that they are politicized.

The Environments

The existence of an 'objective' setting or conditions for guerrilla movements is not enough for the actual outbreak of guerrilla activities. Certain correlations must exist between the two environments (objective and subjective) to enable their outbreak. "For the outbreak of a Revolution, the creation of a 'guerrilla foco' [subjective conditions] is not enough, but it is necessary to start with a

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systematic structural crisis that will encompass everything [objective conditions]."[1] People do not react to reality, but react according to their perception of what reality is.[2] To some degree the study of the gap between the objective and subjective environment can give us a certain criteria for predicting the success or failure of guerrilla warfare.

The political variable included in the objective environment or setting, relevant to the study of guerrilla warfare in Uruguay, will be analyzed in this chapter.

For the purpose of analysis, the objective environment should be divided into two sets of variables: a) internal and b) external.

a) dealing with the internal situation of the country (Part II),

b) referring to the country's position in the international system.

The internal variables are:

PS--Political Organization

MC--Military Capacity

ESS--Economic and Social Situation

The external variables are:

SP--Super-Powers

RR--Regional Relations

GR--Global Relations

GC--Guerrilla Countries.

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[1]Abraham Guillén, Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana (Montevideo, Uruguay: Ediciones Liberación, 1966), p. 18. All the references to this book are my translations.

[2]Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolutions 3, no. 2 (June 1959): 120-131.

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These variables are closely interrelated. In certain instances it may be helpful to look at some basic properties of a country which have a simultaneous impact on the environmental variables. For example, geographical proximity of a certain country to a great power will probably have great impact upon the other variables of both environments; it may influence the strategy, the economy, the political development, the level of technology, and the like. The study of the objective environment will help to build a set of necessary but not sufficient conditions for the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. The study of the subjective environment and the communication process must be added.

In the chapters of Part II of the dissertation the influence on support withdrawal exerted by each one of these variables will be discussed separately.

This chapter of Part II will assess the influence that the inner stress in the development of Uruguay's political system had in the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. For this purpose the study will focus on the authorities and aspects of the regime such as the party system and the electoral process. In chapters II and III of Part II we will test the propositions that the Tupamaros are a response to several factors:

1) the political structure which represented a coercive force because of the way it was organized, mainly the electoral process and the two-party system.

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2) that support withdrawal from the authorities by certain segments of the population spilled over into support withdrawal from the regime as well.

The corroding effect of support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime through the sustained use of political violence from 1960 to 1973 produced basic changes in Uruguay's political system. This corroding effect eventually penetrated the armed forces and led to a military takeover. In Uruguay a direct relationship existed between the increasing pressure on the military to intervene actively in the political process and sustained withdrawal of support from the authorities and the regime by strategic sectors of Uruguay's political community (see Chapter XI).

The growth of the Tupamaros into a relevant political contender for power in Uruguay's political system was at least one indication that support withdrawal from the authorities by certain sectors of the population spilled-over into support withdrawal from the regime as well.

> The regime as sets of constraints on political interaction in all systems may be broken down into three components: values [goals and principles], norms, and structure of authority. The values serve as broad limits with regard to what can be taken for granted in the guidance of day-to-day policy without violating deep feelings of important segments of the community. The norms specify the kinds of procedures that are expected and acceptable in the processing and implementation of demands. The structures of authority designate the formal and informal patterns in which power is distributed and organized with regard to the authoritative making and implementing of decisions--the roles and their relationships through which authority is distributed and exercised. The goals, norms, and structure of authority both limit and validate political actions and in this way provide what tends to become a context for political interactions.[1]

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[1]Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 193, and also Chapter 12.

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As analyzed in Chapter I, the regime is one of the basic components of all political systems. "If the members of a system consistently failed to support some kind of regime, this lack of support would drive the essential variables beyond their critical range and would thereby prevent a system from operating."[1] One of the main reasons for the outbreak of Tupamaro guerrilla activities was the perceived 'coercion' or 'exclusiveness' in Uruguay's regime by certain sectors of the population (see "Structural Coercion and Democracy: The Electoral Process and the 'Ley de Lemas'" below). This 'exclusiveness' in Uruguay's political system was linked directly to the electoral process and the constitutional arrangements for the authoritative allocation of values for the society. In order to understand this 'exclusiveness' of Uruguay's political system, we must historically analyze the developments which provided the background and setting for the outbreak and growth of guerrilla activities. The following sub-sections of this chapter analyze the historical data of those aspects from the regime necessary for the study of the Tupamaros.

Historical Overview

Since the nineteenth century, Uruguay's regime was dominated by the two major parties: Blancos and Colorados[2] (see "The Traditional

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[1]Ibid., p. 191.

[2]The names 'Blanco' (white) and 'Colorado' (red) were first used in 1936 to differentiate between the two rival groups: 'Lavallejistas' and 'Riveristas' respectively. Since then it has become a tradition.

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Political Parties and the Institutionalization of the Two-Party System" below). In broad terms, they represented the interests of the rural and urban population, respectively.[1] The Colorados had been in power continuously for more than ninety years, until 1958. From 1958 to 1966, the Blanco party was in power. In 1966 the Colorado party regained the power that it held until ousted by the armed forces.

The different Constitutional reforms in Uruguay in 1830, 1836, 1918, 1934, 1952, and 1966 perpetuated the power of the two traditional parties.[2] The process of disintegration of the traditional parties started in 1922 for the Colorados, and in 1933 for the Blancos.[3] Those splits and many others since then, did not have a serious weakening influence on the two-party system because between 1934 and 1939, the 'Ley de Lemas' was approved, thus perpetuating the two-party

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[1]For a study of the relationship between political parties and social classes in Uruguay see Aldo Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya (Montevideo, Uruguay: Ediciones Arca, 1965), II: 123-170. All quotations from this book are my translation.

[2]This perpetuation of power had a great influence in the image formation process of the Tupamaros. They saw those changes as a manipulation by the majority parties to avoid a broader representation from the minority parties. See Oscar Dueñas Ruiz, Tupamaros, libertad o muerte (Bogotá: Ediciones Mundo Andino, 1971), pp. 102-116. The constitutional reform approved by referendum in 1951 changed the presidency by a governing council of nine members (six from the majority party and three from the second largest party). This arrangement was once again changed in 1966 in favor of a presidential system, which remained Uruguay's constitutional framework until the military takeover (1973). See Chapter III.

[3]In 1922 the Colorado party split into two: 'Partido Colorado Batllista' and 'Partido Colorado.' In 1932 the Blanco party split into two: 'Partido Nacional Independiente' and 'Partido Nacional Herrerista.' More splits occurred later. The different factions of the Blanco and Colorado parties joined together for electoral purposes.

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system against the danger of continuous splits in the majority parties (see "Structural Coercion and Democracy: The Electoral Process and the 'Ley de Lemas'" below).[1] This law made it very difficult for minority parties such as Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democratic to gain substantial representation (see "The Minority Parties: Communist, Socialist, Christian Democrats" below and Table 9).

The transfer of power from party to party was usually accomplished through peaceful means after an election. Uruguay has had a long tradition of constitutional rule, with only one coup in the last century.[2] Until 1973, the armed forces did not interfere with the leadership of the country.

An important reason for the outbreak of guerrilla activities in Uruguay was the frustrating inability of the potential guerrilla to influence either of the major parties and the unlikelihood of one of the minority radical parties achieving power through 'parliamentarism' due to the perpetuated two-party system.

During the 1950s with the worsening of the socio-economic crisis (see Chapter IV), an accelerated process of disintegration of the traditional parties took place. "This process of disintegration, and the fact that the political groups of the opposition saw their way

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[1]For an explanation of the 'Ley de Lemas' and an example of its workings see Table 3, "Ley de Lemas and Proportional Representation."

[2]The coup was performed with the support of the police forces, and not the armed forces. It enjoyed the support of the major leaders of both parties.

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blocked in seeking power through elections, favored the rapid development of the guerrilla movement."[1]

> The original decision to found the MNL[2] was taken after the failure of the left-wing Popular Alliance in the elections of November 1962. Some of the first Tupamaros were members of the Uruguayan Socialist Party who had concluded that they could never win power through elections.[3]

But the Tupamaros did not totally reject the idea of a non-violent political process. In 1970 an alliance of left-wing parties (Frente Amplio)[4] encompassing very different viewpoints was created. It included the Moscovite Communist Party, Trotskyites, Maoists, Christian Democrats, dissident splinters from the traditional parties, etc. The Frente Amplio led by General Liber Seregni had some chance for success. This was the first time in Uruguayan politics that an alliance of parties appeared to challenge the traditional 'two-party system.'[5]

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[1]Dueñas Ruiz, Tupamaros, libertad o muerte, p. 108. All quotations from this study are my translation.

[2]MNL refers to 'Movimiento Nacional de Liberación' (National Movement of Liberation) or 'Tupamaros.'

[3]Robert Moss, "Uruguay: Terrorism versus Democracy," Conflict Studies 14 (August 1971): 13.

[4]The Communist Party headed by Rodney Arismendi constituted the major force in the 'Frente Amplio,' which was molded in a similar pattern to Allende's 'Popular Front.'

[5]There have been a series of public opinion polls conducted in Montevideo regarding the electoral chances of the major parties. The results have been inconsistent and often hotly disputed. A poll reported by the daily newspaper El Popular (Communist party) on June 24, 1971, predicted that the 'Frente Amplio' would get 37.87 percent, the Colorados 36.4 percent, and the Blancos 25.73 percent of the total vote. By contrast, a survey conducted by the University of Uruguay gave the Frente Amplio only 25 percent of the vote. See Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," Problems of Communism 20, no. 5 (September/ October 1971): 22.

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It was also the last time this occurred due to the ban on all the political parties since the military takeover.

Before the last elections (1971) the Tupamaros issued a communiqué[1] insisting that the people could win power only through armed struggle but welcomed and supported the Frente Amplio as an efficient instrument for rallying mass support. During this time the political situation in Uruguay was very tense, because of the continuous enforcement of the 'medidas prontas de seguridad' (emergency powers) by the President as a counter-guerrilla measure--superseding the civil law.

As the activity of the Tupamaros increased, the internal rule of the regime became more oppressive. This had essentially a paradoxical consequence for the Tupamaros. On the one hand it followed Guevara's[2] and Marighella's 'predictions,' i.e., the perception by the population of the existence of an oppressive rule (including economic oppression) as a 'necessary minimum condition for the support of guerrilla warfare by the population.' In other words, popular support would not go to the existing regime but to the guerrillas. Guevara recognized that this was a minimum condition, since it enabled the population to perceive the guerrillas as a viable alternative. The population's image of an oppressive government was a very important factor, because it was only then that the population "could see clearly

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[1]For the full text of the communiqué, explaining the Tupamaro position in regard to the 'Frente Amplio' see Dueñas Ruiz, Tupamaros, libertad o muerte, p. 22.

[2]Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Vintage Press, 1968), p. 2. The first edition of this book was issued in 1961.

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the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate."[1] Guevara in his Summary of General Vo Nguyen Giap stresses that "it is possible to engage in armed struggle under specific conditions when nonviolent methods of achieving liberation have failed." This image of repression was also clear in Carlos Marighella's description: "the Brazilian state was transformed into a bureaucratic and military police machine with an open and direct repressive character."[2]

On the other hand, when the regime became more oppressive, although the Tupamaros were able to recruit more members into their organization it nonetheless made it much more difficult for them to act. More oppressive regimes usually have a stronger military capacity which makes it harder for the guerrilla to function and fight successfully (see Chapter VI).

This paradoxical consequence leads to the conclusion that the Tupamaros were not strong enough (even though some of their activities made them appear really strong; for example the 'liberation of Pando City') to absorb the 'bad' consequences of an oppressive regime and 'exploit' the 'good' aspects an oppressive regime could have in the strengthening of guerrilla movements.

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[1]Ernesto Guevara, "People's War, People's Army," in _Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara_, ed. R. E. Bonachea and N. P. Valdes (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1969), p. 150.

[2]Carlos Marighella, "Operaciones y tácticas guerrilleras," in _Teoría y acción revolucionarias_ (Mexico D.F.: Editorial Diógenes, 1971), p. 33.

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The inability of the Tupamaros to influence the political life of Uruguay by means of a democratic process was a necessary but not sufficient reason for the outbreak of their activities. The oppressiveness of the Uruguayan regime due to the two-party system and the politicization of the deep economic crises (ESS) that began in the 1950s, created the conditions necessary for the outbreak of guerrilla activities. This will be studied in Chapters IV, V and VI. While the Tupamaros in part succeeded in producing drastic changes in the structure of authority in Uruguay, they failed, at least in the short run to produce parallel changes in the values and norms of the regime.

As mentioned earlier, Uruguay's political system was dominated by the two traditional parties. A brief historical analysis of the Blanco and Colorado parties is necessary for understanding the origins and perpetuation of the two-party system.

The Origins of Structural Coercion: The Political Parties

The Traditional Political Parties and the Institutionalization of the Two-Party System: Blanco and Colorado

The two traditional parties[1] (Blanco and Colorado) were formed as rival forces during the period of the Civil War dating back to the 1830s, and remained in existence until the military takeover in

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[1]'Traditional' does not refer to their ideologies, but to their origins dating back to the independence of Uruguay.

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1973. These two parties dominated Uruguayan political life until recently.

The combined vote of the two traditional parties, always represented a wide majority of votes (see Tables 5-10). Although both parties had the support of different segments of the population, the Blanco party historically represented the interests of the 'upper classes' and the rural areas, while the Colorados attracted more the votes of the urban middle class. In very general terms it could be said that the Colorado party was less 'conservative' than the Blanco party.

The Colorado party controlled the Uruguayan government from 1865 to 1958 and from 1966 until the military takeover. The policies and organization of the party demonstrated the tremendous influence of José Batlle y Ordoñez, who led the party for the first thirty years of the century. The highly developed social welfare programs, the plural executive system of government and proportional representation of political parties, had their origins during the Batlle era.

> Batlle's ideals advocated understanding between the different social sectors in the framework of a democratic-representative system, where the most ample freedoms of thought and political expression would be guaranteed. Although in his time those ideals were very progressive, 'batllismo' maintained unchanged the agrarian structure that in the long run resulted in stagnation of the productive process.[1]

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[1]Hugo Lustemberg, Uruguay: Imperialismo y estrategia de liberación. Las Enseñanzas de la huelga general (Buenos Aires: Editorial Achával Solo, 1974), p. 15. All quotations from this work are my translations.

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The Blanco party was in the opposition until 1958. They won the 1958 and 1962 national elections.[1] The Blanco party had historically been more conservative than the Colorado party. "Its strength comes from the landowners and rural population of Uruguay, but it does have considerable strength in Montevideo among many businessmen and the conservative 'upper-class.'"[2] (See Table 4)

Several pressure groups exercised their influence on the political parties and the authorities. The interests of the 'upper' social classes were represented among others by the following organizations: Junta de Hacendados, Asociación Rural, Cámara de Comercio, and Cámara de Industrias. The 'lower' rural classes were not organized. The land exploitation system, the isolation of the rural workers, the large rural-urban migration, and the intention by the migrant rural worker of becoming a 'small owner,' in part explained the lack of organization in this sector of the population.[3]

The urban working class, especially those in the service and industrial sectors (public and private) were highly organized in unions. "This organization enabled the union movement to have a

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[1]Mainly because of the support of the 'social-liberals/ economic conservatives' among the Colorado party rank and file, and also the support of the 'Rural Federation.'

[2]Operations Policy Research, Inc., Uruguay, Election Factbook, November 27, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967, p. 9.

[3]Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya, II: 126. Also see Chapters IV and V below.

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strong influence on the political parties."[1] Although the different unions lacked unity (until around the 1960s), their potential strength made them a strategic target for the different political parties trying to obtain their support.[2] The minority parties, especially the Socialists and Communists and the Tupamaros in the late 1960s were among the most active political forces trying to obtain the unions' support (see Chapter XI).

> The themes of the protection of the 'worker' against the exploitation of the 'capitalist' or the 'bourgeois' is common to almost all the political parties. . . . Terms such as 'capitalist,' 'bourgeois,' 'oligarchy' acquired such perjorative connotations that no party was able to declare itself publicly in favor of those groups . . . On the contrary there is no party that will not postulate itself in favor of the 'worker,' the 'small producer,' and the 'small rural proprietary' . . . This 'mythology' is sacred, thus making it impossible to even conceive of the idea of a party in Uruguay called 'Conservative.'[3]

It was not until the politicization of the socio-economic crisis that the theme of 'classes' per se became important for the Blanco and Colorado parties. For the left wing minority parties the issue of classes was always important.

The traditional political parties in Uruguay[4] tried to include among their rank and file members of all the social segments of

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[1]Ibid.

[2]The pattern in Uruguay was for the different pressure groups to 'work' from the inside in the political parties in order to maximize their influence. The unions were also a target for the Tupamaros who tried with some degree of success to obtain their support. See Chapter XI.

[3]Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya, II: 129.

[4]For an excellent analysis of the political parties in Uruguay see Juan E. Pivel Devoto, Historia de los partidos políticos del Uruguay (Montevideo: Editorial Claudio García y Cía., 1943), vols. I and II.

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the society. Their platforms were so inclusive that they gave every citizen the possibility of voting comfortably for them, and most of the working class did vote for the traditional parties. This was possible partially because of the existence of different factions (sub-lemas) and tendencies (lists) in each one of the traditional parties (lemas) which narrowed the differences between the Blancos and Colorados enabling each of them to recruit support from different segments of the population. While the political platform of each party (lema) was very general in nature, that of the faction (sub-lema) was more particular. The program of each tendency (list) was the most specific in nature appealing to certain sectors of the population. Each one of the traditional parties had factions and lists covering a wide range in the political spectrum.

The traditional political parties claimed to represent interests from different segments of the population. In reality, however, the different pressure groups were the central foci. While the 'objectives' of the political parties were general, those of the pressure groups were very specific. The pressure groups exercised their influence continuously upon the political parties. National elections were held every four years. The daily influence of the pressure groups, however, increased citizen's identification with those groups and in a sense decreased the importance of the electoral process. Simultaneously due to the large increase of the public

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sector the traditional parties had great difficulties in their attempt to accomodate the opposite interests they claimed to represent.[1]

> Nobody seriously believed that with his vote every four years he was committing the future of the country. They all knew that they would be electing a certain set of authorities, but the real future of the country would be 'played' in the inter-election period, by confronting each concrete situation, through the overt or covert influence exercised by the pressure groups upon the authorities and the political parties.[2]

Aldo Solari also pointed to an interesting paradox:

> every four years the majority parties carried most of the votes, almost the unanimity of the country; but as soon as they were in power, they met tremendous difficulties in resolving the problems posed by the same people that voted for them.[3]

The crisis of the political parties was one aspect of the general crisis. The politicization of the socio-economic crisis permeated the political parties, accelerating their fragmentations (see Chapters IV and V).

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[1]Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya, II: 132. One strategy developed by the traditional parties in order to accomodate opposite interests was the creation of an elaborate network of 'clubs' through which personal favors were performed by the political leaders.

> "These political centers performed social, fraternal, and cultural functions as well. . . . Often a voter goes to the local club official to get help in obtaining a pension due according to law, but not yet initiated because of red tape, a government job, or an interview with one's legislative or departmental representative."

See also Philip B. Taylor, Jr., Government and Politics of Uruguay, Tulane Studies in Political Science, no 7 (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1960), p. 44, and Table 21 of this thesis.

[2]Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya, II: 133.

[3]Ibid.

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The Minority Parties: Communist, Socialist, Christian Democrats

The minority parties in Uruguay could be called 'ideological parties.' The combined vote of these parties was under 10 percent of the votes in the national elections (see Table 9). Each one of them had its own newspaper, and they were very active especially among the intellectuals, students, unions, and the young age population.

The Communist party[1] was organized in Uruguay in 1921. From its beginning it was closely associated with the Third International. Its electoral strength was small, and it followed the 'Moscow line.'

> The Communist party was thoroughly controlled by the international Soviet position, but Uruguay's climate of freedom of political action and the maintenance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union most of the time since the 1917 Russian Revolution allowed the Party to operate in nearly any way it wished.[2]

Ideological differences between the 'pro-Soviet' and 'pro-Chinese' lines weakened the party internally. Its newspaper, El Popular, became one of the first victims of censorship in the mid-1960s.

For many years Uruguay was considered to be a center from which Communist materials were distributed among the Latin American nations, and also that "party's funds largely came from outside the hemisphere."[3] "Although the Communist party had never been a serious electoral threat in Uruguay, it had considerable influence on the labor

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[1]For a more detailed history of the Communist party in Latin America and Uruguay see Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957).

[2]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 51.

[3]Ibid.

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union activities. Strikes and work stoppages had an indirect effect on the elections."[1] In the 1971 election the Communist party joined together with other minority parties in order to create the lema 'Frente Amplio' (see Chapter III). They did not support the Tupamaros.

The Socialist party had always been a minority party and was not considered a threat to the democratic tradition of the country.[2] It was formally organized in 1910 and changed its name to 'Unión Popular' in the election of 1962. It was the frustration of the Unión Popular in the 1962 election that gave birth to the Tupamaro movement (see Chapter III). In 1971 the Socialist party joined the 'Frente Amplio' lema. Most of the support for the Socialist party came from professionals, intellectuals, teachers, university professors, students, and some workers. As will be analyzed in Part III, the composition of the Socialist party was very similar to that of the Tupamaros.

The Socialist party

> is very modestly supported from locally available funds, and receives some from abroad as the headquarter group for the Latin American secretariat of the Second International. The party has never achieved major electoral standing for the obvious reason that José Batlle enacted policies which were virtually identical in effect, if not in theory, with moderate socialism.[3]

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[1]Uruguay, Election Factbook, pp. 22-23.

[2]For a more detailed history of the Socialist party in Uruguay, see Emilio Frugoni, "Partidos de Ideas y Partidos Tradicionales," Revista del centro de estudiantes de derecho (publication of the Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay in Montevideo) 19, no. 86 (September 1958): 885-903.

[3]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 51, and also Carlos M. Rama, "José Batlle y Ordoñez y el Movimiento Obrero y Social en el Uruguay," in Battle, su obra y su vida, ed. Jorge Batlle (Montevideo: Editorial Acción, 1959), pp. 39-59.

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They published the Boletín del Secretariado[1] and the daily El Sol.

The Socialist party had varying degrees of influence in the labor movement at different periods of time. The Socialist and Communist parties combined were never a threat to the traditional parties in the national elections (see Table 9) until mid-1971. But their influence among the labor unions, students, intellectuals, and professionals, was greatly felt during the years of the socio-economic crisis. They provided the leadership for the politicization of the crisis as well as that of the Tupamaros.

The 'Unión Cívica' party existed in Uruguay since 1872 with a social-liberal tendency. "Its support came mainly from the Catholic Church, which was never a very powerful organization in Uruguay."[2] Most of its strength came from the early european immigrants. They published the daily newspaper El Bien Público. "The permanently minor following of the party and the fundamentally anti-clerical national ideology of the country, assure that it will never gain control."[3]

In 1960 the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was organized as an attempt to offer a third alternative to the traditional parties on the one hand and the radical parties on the other. In order to achieve this goal it adopted a democratic left position ('revolution without violence,' 'reform yes, revolution no'), but it never reached the

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[1]Periodical publication of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International.

[2]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 22.

[3]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 52.

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dimensions that Christian Democracy achieved in Chile under Frei.[1] In 1971 it joined the 'Frente Amplio Lema.'

In summary, Uruguay's political system since the late 1800s was dominated by the two traditional parties: Blanco and Colorado. Although each one of the traditional parties had to cope with deep internal disagreements that fragmented and factionalized them, the two party system persisted and continued to control Uruguay's political system. The Colorado party which ruled Uruguay most of the time, followed Batlle's ideals and developed a highly sophisticated welfare state and an economy increasingly dependent upon the political system (see Chapters IV and V).

The minority parties which enjoyed most of the freedoms most of the time were not a threat to the two-party system. They were never able to challenge the supremacy and control of the traditional parties. The next section, "Structural Coercion and Democracy," will analyze some of the main characteristics of Uruguay's electoral law that perpetuated the two-party system, i.e., the 'Ley de Lemas.'

The 'law of lemas' minimized the risks of the process of internal fragmentation that were taking place in the traditional parties. This law succeeded in transforming the internal weaknesses of the traditional parties into electoral strength thus perpetuating the two-party system and the supremacy of the traditional parties. This

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[1]In a sense the 'Christian Democracy' in Latin America tried to offer an alternative to the disintegration of the traditional parties and the radical swing towards the left. Interestingly enough in Uruguay they obtained a wide support from high school and university students.

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law was engineered and manipulated by the traditional parties through a series of party-pacts expressed in constitutional reforms. It not only perpetuated their political power but their control of the public sector (industry and services) as well. This 'law of lemas' for all practical purposes not only weakened but in essence excluded all potential influence by the minority parties. The understanding of the development of this law is essential for the comprehension of the 'coercion' and 'exclusiveness' of Uruguay's political system which was one of the main reasons for the outbreak of guerrilla activities.

Structural Coercion and Democracy: The Electoral Process and the 'Ley de Lemas'

It may appear as though the two traditional parties enjoyed internal unity. The contrary seems to be true.

> Uruguayan election law allows factions or sub-lemas to organize within the party (lema). The sub-lemas have their own organizations, leaders, and candidates, but their votes all accumulate for the lema. The various sub-lemas reorganize and shift strength in almost every election. Politicians move from faction to faction in order to obtain the highest number of votes within the lema.[1]

This electoral system had many direct consequences in Uruguay's political system. Among those consequences was a de facto multi-party organization internally confined to the two-party system, thus not only limiting the existence of other small parties but their potential influence as well. Despite the ease with which groups and parties

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[1] Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 18. See Table 3.

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could be organized and present candidates for election, due to the 'law of lemas' no other party except the traditional parties gained more than a small voice in the government of Uruguay since its independence.

While the traditional political parties had a wide and general appeal the 'sublemas' and/or 'factions' had a more particularized appeal. Some of the different 'sublemas' were not permanent, but were in a continuous process of alliances, realignments, etc.[1] The traditional parties were able to exist for more than one hundred years, withstanding continuous disagreements and splits, due to the constitutional arrangements that guaranteed their success while maintaining 'diversity in unity' or the 'plurality of one.'[2]

In the electoral process the 'ley de lemas' produced a two-party system. Each party had factions from the 'right' to the 'left,' and usually the disagreement among them was very deep. During election years Uruguay has this bi-partisan system, but during inter-election

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[1]For a brief description of the realignments and splintering of the traditional parties, see Carlos Real de Azúa, "Política, poder y partidos," in Uruguay hoy (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, Argentina, 1971), pp. 300-301.

[2]Julio T. Fabregat, Los partidos políticos en la legislación Uruguaya (Montevideo: Editorial Medina, 1949). Fabregat states

> "one votes for the party . . . for a tendency within the party, and for a faction within the tendency. There is no expressed preference for a specific candidate, but for a tendency which cannot be, many times, fundamentally different from the others; and one even votes within a tendency for a faction which is not distinguished from the others by any appreciable political condition save that of personalities" (pp. 73-74).

See also Héctor Gross Espiell, Los partidos políticos en la constitución Uruguaya (Montevideo: Centro de Estudiantes de Derecho, 1965).

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periods the system resembled a multi-party system. The 'multi-party' system inside each party was evidenced by "the existence of at least one newspaper for nearly every permanent party or sublema."[1] The newspapers were subsidized by the authorities. In the beginning this was considered to be an act that guaranteed freedom of the press, allowing every opinion to be expressed. In the 1960s, however, the subsidy became a means of pressure, threat, and censorship. In the 1970s the Uruguayan authorities achieved the bankruptcy of several opposition newspapers by withholding their subsidies.

The major legal aspect that perpetuated the power of the two traditional parties was the 'ley de lemas.'[2] This same law also acted as a safeguard for the traditional parties against the potential weakening effect of their continuous splintering.[3] The 'ley de lemas' was complemented by the laws of proportional representation, thus guaranteeing to each list of each sublema some representation according to the votes it received. In this way the influence of the minority parties was minimized. The traditional parties manipulated

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[1]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 43.

[2]For an excellent analysis of the 'ley de lemas' see Alberto Pérez Perez, La ley de lemas (Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria, 1970).

[3]For example, in the elections of 1954 the Colorado party (lema) presented 9 lists grouped under 4 sub-lemas. The Blanco party presented 19 lists grouped under 3 sub-lemas. In the 1966 elections the Colorado party presented 23 lists under 7 sub-lemas. The Blanco party presented 63 lists grouped under 10 sub-lemas.

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the 'ley de lemas' in such a way that they "blocked the emergence of new political forces separated from the dominant structure."[1]

The law of lemas had a clear orientation principle and a specific goal. It was oriented towards strengthening the traditional parties, and its goal was to block coalitions of minority parties that might endanger the traditional bipartisanism.[2]

> The experience of the country under the party pacts, the rather laissez-faire system which has developed regarding the formation of political groups, and the durability of the quasi-socialist economic system under which the country has lived for some fifty years, have convinced him [the citizen] that the parties do not differ enough among themselves to offer significant choices in many respects.[3]

The electorate had already experienced the rule of the Colorado and Blanco parties and realized that the results were similar and the policy changes minimal. The 'Frente Amplio' in the 1971 election and the Tupamaros since 1962 tried to offer that 'viable significant choice' that was lacking in the political spectrum. This challenged the conviction of the traditional parties that political and socio-economic change could only be accomplished through them and under their control. By virtue of the 'ley de lemas' the majority list of the majority sublema of the majority party (lema) is the one that was

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[1]Real de Azúa, "Política, poder y partidos," p. 214.

[2]Editorial of daily newspaper Extra, October 31, 1968 (my translation).

[3]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 61.

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victorious. This in fact represented only a plurality of the electorate.[1]

The system of proportional representation used in Uruguay until the military takeover in 1973

> was established in the 1920s and 1930s as a result of José Batlle y Ordoñez influence on the political life. The law of lemas assures that factionalism within the two major parties will not destroy each party's strength. This law states that votes cast for sublemas [factions] within each lema [party] are added together to determine which lema has the most votes. In the same manner, votes for distinct lists of candidates within a sublema accumulate for that sublema. A voter selects both the lema of his choice and a list of candidates within that lema. Essentially, this combines a party primary election and a national election.[2]

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[1]In 1950, Mr. Martínez Trueba was elected President of Uruguay with 19.5 percent of the total vote (162,262 votes from 823,829). The Colorado party of which he was a part received 52 percent of the total vote (433,454). In 1954 the 'Batlle Berres' faction was elected to the National Executive Council with 28.9 percent of the total vote. The Colorado party received 50.5 percent of the total vote cast in the national election. In 1958 the Blanco party received 49.6 percent of the total vote. The 'Herrera-Ruralista' faction that was elected to the National Executive Council received 24 percent of the national vote. In 1962 the Blanco party received 46.5 percent of the national vote, and the 'UBD' faction that was elected to the National Executive Council received 27 percent of the national vote. In 1966, the Colorado party received 49.3 percent and retired General Gestido was elected President. His faction received 21.3 percent of the national vote.

[2]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 47.

> "Under the Uruguayan electoral system, which provides for the presentation by political groups of lists of candidates for all available elective offices, the voters are unable to split their votes among two or more lists. Since it is very easy for a group of voters to organize a list to suit themselves, even though they remain within the purview of the parent party, a single party may find itself presenting a good many lists on election day. Distinct tendencies or permanent splinters may develop within the parent parties, as well, and the individual lists will normally be clustered within these splinters. The election laws give the name 'lema' (literally, motto) to the parties, and 'sublema' to the more-or-less permanent splinters. The construction of the election

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In this way the traditional parties maintained their unity in spite of their disagreements thus perpetuating the two-party system for electoral purposes.

The system of proportional representation and the 'ley de lemas' clearly gave the advantage to the two traditional parties. This deliberate perpetuation of the two-party system made it almost impossible for minority parties to obtain any sizeable representation in the institutions of the regime. As mentioned earlier, because of the existence of different sublemas within each party (lema), Uruguay's electoral system was on the one hand an internal multi-party system at the lema level and on the other hand a bi-party system at the national level. The historical antagonism between the traditional parties softened to such an extent that it even evolved into a system of co-participation. The maximum expression of this political co-participation policy was reached with the approval of the 'Poder Ejecutivo Colegiado' (National Executive Council) in the 1951 referendum (see Chapter III).

This perpetuation of political power by the traditional parties was corroborated by the 'Pacto del Chinchulín,'[1] which de facto

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law provides that the most-voted list of the most-voted sublema of the most-voted lema shall have superior standing over all others, since all votes cast for lists and for sublemas within a lema are accumulated to the benefit of the leading list. The result is that such a winning list will undoubtedly have only a plurality of votes cast 'in toto,' and may frequently have received fewer votes than list in the second most-voted lema" (Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 171).

[1]This law was approved in October of 1931. It apportioned seats in the Board of Directors of the government enterprises among the

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distributed the seats in the public sector ('decentralized services,' 'bureaucracy,' 'national industries,' and the like) by a very similar system to that of the law of lemas. The 'pacto del chinchulín' achieved in the socio-economic sphere what the 'ley de lemas' accomplished in the political system, i.e., the perpetuation of the control of most of the aspects of life in Uruguay by the two traditional parties.

With the increasing importance of the public sector in national life, the 'pacto del chinchulín' and the 'ley de lemas' assured the control of Uruguay's government by the traditional parties in a very 'peaceful' and 'democratic' way. The 'ley de lemas' and the 'pacto del chinchulín' were among the main political reasons for the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in Uruguay. The election of 1971 was the first time in Uruguay's history that a third party (lema), 'Frente Amplio,' challenged the two traditional parties, the 'ley de lemas' and the 'pacto del chinchulín.' This was also the last election held in Uruguay.

Conclusions

This chapter analyzed the mechanical aspects of the system of co-participation devised by the traditional parties. The 'ley de lemas' and the 'pacto del chinchulín' perpetuated the power of the

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traditional parties. See John Street, Artigas and the Emancipation of Uruguay (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1959), and also Eduardo Acevedo, Anales históricos del Uruguay, 7 vols. (Montevideo: Barreiro y Ramos Editorial, 1933-34), III: 1013-1023.

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Blanco and Colorado parties, excluding the minority parties from obtaining any sizeable influence and representation. The elected candidate, although obtaining a plurality of votes in his lema, represented a minority (20 to 30 percent) of the total votes cast. This 'exclusiveness' created elements of 'constraint' and 'coercion' in Uruguay's political system leading to the creation of the Tupamaros. The next chapter will analyze the 'praxis' of this system of co-participation until the military takeover in 1973, and its influence on the development of the Tupamaro movement. Chapter III will analyze the implications of the principles underlying the organization of the regime. This organization produced systemic coercion leading to support withdrawal from the regime and the authorities and the development of the Tupamaros.

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CHAPTER III

ELECTORAL COERCION IN URUGUAY'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Introduction

The structural coercion in Uruguay's political system analyzed in the previous chapter produced paradoxical consequences. On the one hand it provided for more than one hundred years of political stability through an elaborate two-party system. On the other hand, as studied in Chapter II, the same organization of the electoral process, the two-party system, the 'ley de lemas,' 'proportionate representation,' and the 'pacto del chinchulín' excluded any meaningful participation by the minority parties, creating stress in the political system.

This chapter will test the proposition that the frustration of the minority parties to obtain any sizable influence in Uruguay's political system created a favorable setting for the development of the Tupamaros. The creation of the Tupamaros was an indication of support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities, but more so from the regime. The incumbent authorities tried to cope with the decline in support from the regime by means of constitutional reforms. The systematic exclusion of the minority parties through continuous manipulations of the electoral process for the sake of systems-

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maintenance, transformed the inner coercion in Uruguay's political system into overt repression. This process escalated as the Tupamaros became a relevant political force in Uruguay's political system. The level of support for the political community remained high at all times.

For the sake of clarity this chapter will analyze the 'workings' and development of Uruguay's democracy and its inner-coercive mechanisms that historically frustrated the participation of minority parties and viewpoints. Historical data has to be used in order to analyze this coercive democratic mechanism. Although the Tupamaros were a product of the '60s, the environmental political setting developed much earlier. In the 1930s similar constraints in Uruguay's political system produced the only dictatorship in Uruguay in the last hundred years before the military takeover of 1973. Uruguay's traditional political parties, while succeeding in maintaining the political system almost intact through constitutional reforms, were unable to cope with the demands of strategic sectors of the population.

Constitutional Reforms and Co-participation as Systemic Coercion: 1903-1973

The Institutionalization of the Two-Party System The Batlle Era: 1903-1930

It was during this period that the constitutional arrangements institutionalizing the two party system were established. José Batlle y Ordoñez was twice President (1903-1907 and 1911-1915), and dominated the political life of Uruguay until his death in 1929. "His faith in collective goverment, proportional representation, and a social welfare

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system from cradle to grave, continue to influence the nature of both the Colorado party and the country."[1]

During his years of Presidency[2] the welfare state was developed and major industries were nationalized (see Chapters IV and V). From the constitutional point of view his major contribution was the 'collegiate' form of government (National Executive Council--'Colegiado').[3] Although, as a compromise the Presidency was retained, most of its powers were given to the newly formed National Executive Council which consisted of nine members. At least one-third of its representatives had to belong to the largest opposition party. The smaller opposition parties were excluded. "The constitution included an extreme form of proportional representation whereby not only each party (lema), but each faction (sub-lema), would acquire congressional seats in accordance with its electoral strength."[4]

Among the major consequences of this constitutional reform of 1918 was the perpetuation and strengthening of the two-party system and the curtailment of the political influence of the Church and the Army,

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[1]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 8.

[2]Domingo Arena, Batlle y los problemas sociales en el Uruguay (Montevideo: Claudio García y Cía,., 1939); Roberto Guidice M., Los fundamentos del Battlismo (Montevideo: Barreiro Ed., 1946); Roberto Guidice and Efrain Gonzales Conzi, Batle y el Batllismo (Montevideo: Editorial Medina, 1959); Batlle, ed., Batlle, su obra y su vida. See also the bibliography.

[3]This form of government was inspired after the Swiss system. This was the root of the phrase 'Uruguay, the Switzerland of Latin America.'

[4]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 8.

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as well as the minority parties. Paradoxically, while the constitutional reform strengthened the two-party system, each party in itself was weakened by continuous splits. The 'ley de lemas,' developed from the first agreement between the majority parties in 1851 that ended the civil war known as 'Guerra Grande.'[1] From the legislative point of view the election and representation systems (until the military takeover in 1971) were based on the constitution of 1918 and the laws enacted in 1924 and 1925.[2]

The de facto pact of the parties became an instrument whereby the Blancos and Colorados precluded entrance of minority groups into the circle of political power.[3] The constitution of 1918 had provisions which were designed to prevent capture of Executive Council seats by any but the two major parties. Any organized opposition was frustrated by the inability to reach some sizeable influence due to the pact of the major parties. The pact continued to be effective until the last elections in 1971.[4] It was the arrangement between the majority parties that enabled the approval of the new constitutional

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[1]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, pp. 17-18. Many other pacts among the traditional parties were signed in 1872, 1897, 1913, 1918, 1929, 1934, etc. They led to the 'institutionalization' of the 'ley de lemas' that perpetuated the two party system.

[2]1924 Registro nacional de leyes y decretos de la Repûlica Oriental del Uruguay (Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional, 1925), pp. 81-122.

[3]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 21.

[4]See "From Organizational Coercion to Institutionalized Repression," below, which deals with the historical process from General Gestido to the military takeover (1966-1973).

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reform and the creation of the National Executive Council in 1951[1] (see "Co-participation and Systems Maintenance," below).

This system developed by the different agreements among the major parties produced paradoxical consequences. On the one hand, it introduced an element of coercion in Uruguay's political system restricting the influence of minority parties. On the other hand, the system permitted the development of extensive personal and group freedoms, the proliferation of pressure groups, and accelerated the inner splintering of the majority parties. When this system of co-participation was challenged its by-products quickly disappeared.

From Systemic Coercion to Overt Repression
The Presidential Period: 1930-1950

In 1930, the year after Batlle's death, Gabriel Terra won the Presidency.[2] Although Gabriel Terra (Colorado) received fewer votes than Herrera (main Blanco leader), he took office due to the 'ley de lemas.'[3] During this period the 'control' of Uruguay's society by

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[1]For an account of the agreements involved, see Milton I. Vanger, "Uruguay Introduces Government by Committee," American Political Science Review 48 (June 1954): 500-513, and Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Adoption of a Collegiate Executive in Uruguay," Journal of Politics 14 (November 1952): 616-642.

[2]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 9.

[3]Results of the 1930 national elections:

Total votes cast for the Presidency:	318,760
Terra's sub-lema from Colorado party:	105,625
Herrera's sub-lema from Blanco party:	132,345
Total votes for Colorado party	165,827
Total votes for Blanco party:	150,642

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the two traditional parties accelerated, in spite of their continuous splintering.

The 'Pacto del Chinchulín'[1] introduced a new element of 'exclusiveness' and 'coercion' into Uruguay's political aystem. By virtue of this law a further step was taken toward the exclusion of the minority parties from Uruguay's regime. This law, which in fact was an agreement between the two traditional parties, stipulated that the seats on the board of directors of the 'entes autónomos' (government industrial enterprises)[2] had to be divided among the majority parties. This law for all purposes practically excluded the influence of the minority parties not only from the political system, but also from the socio-economic spheres, where the authorities' impact was continuously increased through the expanded role of the public sector.

Gabriel Terra was opposed to the 'collegiate' reform.

> He tried unsuccessfully to get congressional support for a return to presidential government. He thereupon entered into an agreement with Herrera [main Blanco leader], which laid the groundwork for Terra's coup d'état of 1933.[3]

During this coup d'état the armed forces did not play a crucial role. It was a direct consequence of the agreement reached by the leaders of

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[1]The 'Pacto del Chinchulín' was a law approved under Terra's Presidency in October 1931.

[2]For studies dealing with the importance of the 'entes autónomos' in Uruguay, see Pamela de Castro, Entes autónomos. Organización administrativa del dominio industrial del estado, con una colección de Leyes sobre la materia (Montevideo: Librería de Maximino García, 1923), and Enrique Laso Sayagués, "Los Entes Autónomos," Revista del Centro de Estudiantes de Derecho 86 (September 1958): 589-626.

[3]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 9.

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the majority parties (Terra-Herrera), and it had the support of many other politicians.[1] The coup d'état of 1933 led to the constitutional reform of 1934.

After the coup the National Executive Council was abolished, thus restoring the Presidential system of government. The Congress was also dissolved. Terra's coup d'état and the new constitution of 1934, including these changes, had the approval of the Blanco party. In exchange for its support, Herrera's Blancos received half of the Senate seats.[2] With only a few modifications and adaptations the constitutional principles of the 1830 and 1918 documents remained in force[3] until the last elections of 1971.

The constitution of 1934 further strengthened the two-party system by the above mentioned changes and also by stating that only 'permanent'[4] parties could have candidates for the Senate. Terra repressed Communists, Socialists, and the labor movement[5] thus weakening the minority parties not only constitutionally but also by the use of violence. While Terra's policies increased the level of coercion and repression in Uruguay's political system, from the

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[1]For books dealing in detail with the coup of 1933, see the bibliography.

[2]The constitution of 1934 provided for thirty senators.

[3]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 21.

[4]'Permanent' refers to those parties that had participated in at least one previous national election.

[5]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 9. Terra broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1935.

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socio-economic point of view, however, he followed Batlle's ideals of welfare.

> In 1932 Uruguay became the second country in Latin America to grant women the right to vote. The welfare system was expanded to include children. The regime nationalized several industries and subsidized low-cost housing through the newly established National Institute of Economic Housing (INVE).[1]

The situation of Uruguay in 1933,[2] although it was less severe, resembled that of the 1960s. Uruguay was undergoing economic crisis, the Treasury has reported deficits, foreign confidence in the stability of the peso had fallen, export markets had almost entirely disappeared, and the President was prevented from taking remedial action by the cumbersome structure of the 1918 constitution.[3] Carlos Quijano in 1960 described the possibilities for the future of Uruguay pointing out the dangers of the repetition of a coup similar to that of 1933.[4]

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[1]Ibid. See Chapter IV below.

[2]On Terra's period, also see Philip B. Taylor, Jr., "The Uruguayan Coup d'Etat of 1933," Hispanic American Historical Review 32, no. 3 (August 1952): 301-320.

[3]According to the 1918 Constitution the National Council of Administration--which became the precedent for the National Executive Council--controlled most of the executive functions dealing with the internal situation of the country. The President had only the control of foreign affairs and the armed forces. In a sense the President was limited by the Legislature and its Council which resembled another legislature. This resulted in output failure, inefficiency, etc. See Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 23.

[4]Ibid., p. 25. From Carlos Quijano's editorial, "27 años después," Marcha, April 1, 1960. In this editorial Quijano refers to the fact that certain sectors of the population wanted a coup d'état. He also stressed the fact that people felt secure enough against the dangers of another coup.

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As mentioned earlier, the constitution of 1934 further strengthened the two-party system constitutionally and weakened even more the minority parties through repression. Terra's successor Alfredo Baldomir[1] strengthened the Presidency and on February 21, 1942 dissolved the Congress.[2]

> President Baldomir and his successors, Juan José de Amézaga and Luis Batlle Berres, continued the policies of the latter's uncle, José Batlle y Ordoñez, but used a presidential form of government. Minimum wages, standards of work laws, and social security were extended to agricultural workers, and the suffrage was broadened . . . After Hitler's invasion of Russia, Uruguay recognized the Soviet Union, and Communists and Socialists were allowed to organize openly. In the elections of 1946, the Communists reached their maximum strength, electing one senator and five representatives.[3]

In 1942 a new constitution was adopted which in essence was very similar to the one approved in 1934,[4] but initiated the return to a pluralistic Executive power without loosening the privileges

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[1]Alfredo Baldomir was a General. He was Terra's brother-in-law. Baldomir was 'hand-picked' by Terra as his successor.

[2]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 9. The coup was instigated by the pro-fascist activities of the Blanco party leaders. During World War II Uruguay supported the Allies and broke relations with the Axis.

[3]Ibid., p. 4.

[4]Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Cullen B. Gosnell, William A. Strozier, and William B. Stubbs, eds., The Constitution of the Americas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). In regard to the Constitution of 1934, Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga wrote:

> "The Constitution of 1934 is the translation into our public law of a political pact through which the two parties that had perpetrated the coup d'état of 1933 intended to maintain, in a regime of balanced forces, their hegemony over all the national political organization" (quoted from Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 29).

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granted to the majority parties. The country returned to a constitutional democracy under Amézaga's caretaker government in 1942. In 1946 the Colorado party again won the elections due to the 'ley de lemas.'[1]

Co-participation and Systems Maintenance The Return to the 'Colegiado' (National Executive Council): 1950-1958

In 1950, as in 1946, the national election was again a disappointment for Herrera. In 1946 Herrera received a plurality of votes, but the Colorado party remained in power because its total party vote was greater than the total vote of the Blanco party. In 1950, although Herrera received a plurality of 92,000 votes over the leading Colorado list, he was prevented from taking office because the total vote for the Colorado lema was 433,454 against 254,834 for the Blanco party. Herrera received a plurality of votes in each of the nineteen 'departments' of Uruguay (see Table 5).

> In the election of 1950, Andrés Martínez Trueba defeated the more conservative Colorado Batllista faction of Lorenzo and César Batlle Pacheco, the sons of José Batlle, and began a campaign for a constitutional reform aimed at creating a weaker decentralized government. Herrera, although formerly a supporter of the presidential system, threw his support to the reform bill. The bill was passed by a narrow majority in a plebiscite in which 63 percent of the electorate abstained.[2]

The Constitution of 1951 marked the return to the National Executive Council ('colegiado'). It was the consequence of another party pact.

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[1]The Blanco list which Herrera-Echegoyen led received 205,923 votes, while the Colorado list led by Berreta-Batlle received 185,715 votes. The Colorado lema, however, received 310,496 votes to the Blanco's 208,120. The total vote cast in this election was 649,405.

[2]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 10.

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In 1951 Herrera[1] perceived that in order to achieve some kind of representation in the executive branch he needed to support a return to the Executive Council system. For the Blanco party which had not won a national election since 1903,

> the solution seemed to be participation in another pact of parties, by which the constitution could be changed so as to permit him [Herrera] limited success. When it became known through approaches by spokesmen for the winning Colorado candidate, Andrés Martínez Trueba, that the restoration of the Executive Council would receive his support, Herrera jumped at the chance.[2]

The new constitution which was submitted to a national plebiscite on November 25, 1951 was very similar in principles to the main outlines from the terms of the party agreement which had been signed a few months earlier.[3] Although the constitutional reform was approved by a majority of 54.2 percent, only 37 percent of the electorate participated, thus the population at large either did not support the new constitution or was apathetic towards it.[4]

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[1]Herrera was already very old. He was called 'caudillo' (leader) as was José Batlle y Ordoñez. In Uruguay a strong loyalty existed toward certain political leaders (caudillos). That was in part a legacy from the 'caudillismo' period in Uruguay's history.

[2]There is considerable debate in the bibliography as to Martínez Trueba's interests in the return to the National Executive Council. It seems that the general consensus was that Martínez Trueba really believed that José Batlle y Ordoñez's ideals of a Collegiate Executive Branch were the best. He was an admirer of José Batlle y Ordoñez and his ideals. Other authors suggest that Martínez Trueba felt that the Blanco party was close to winning the national election, and that he wanted to insure a position for himself.

[3]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 35.

[4]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 50. The lack of support for the constitutional reform that resulted from the 'pact of the parties' is evidenced even more considering that more than 70 percent of the eligible voters usually went to the polls.

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The purpose of the new pact[1] between the two traditional parties was not only an attempt to reform the 1942 constitution. It also "offered incentives to the minor splinter groups of both major parties to return to the fold."[2] This aim was achieved by allowing coalitions "among the competing factions within a single lema to combine their forces, but this would not be permitted for groups which never had been combined at some time in the past."[3] This pact further strengthened the Blanco and Colorado parties by attracting the 'independent' factions of the traditional parties. On the other hand it weakened even further the minority parties by precluding such coalitions and combinations from Communists, Catholics, and Socialists.[4]

The National Executive Council (Colegiado) was approved. It consisted of

> nine popularly elected members, six from the party receiving the largest number of votes and three from the party with the second highest number of votes. The presidency of the Council rotates annually among members of the majority party . . . Six members are elected from the sub-lema (faction) with the highest vote in the leading party. The other three are elected from the second party--two from its sub-lema having the highest number of votes and one from its sub-lema having the next highest.[5]

As part of the pact, after the plebiscite approved the National Executive Council, Martínez Trueba remained as caretaker President of Uruguay until March of 1955. In 1954 the Colorados again won the

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[1]The new 'party-pact' was signed by Martínez Trueba (Colorado) and Herrera (Blanco) on July 31, 1952.

[2]Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay, p. 34.

[3]Ibid. [4]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 10. [5]Ibid.

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national elections (see Table 6), and they held office until 1958. Herrera, the leader of the largest Blanco faction, served in the National Executive Council from 1955 to 1958 thus achieving the main goal of maintaining the supremacy of the traditional parties through co-participation, and excluding the minority parties from any meaningful participation.

Change of Authorities and Regime Maintenance
The Blancos in Power: 1958-1966

The national elections of 1958 were held in the midst of a deepening economic recession (see Chapter V). "Continuing economic unrest, corruption and mismanagement in the government, and feuding between the Colorado factions resulted in the first Blanco electoral victory in Uruguayan history."[1] The dissatisfaction with the Colorado party was expressed in overt support withdrawal that resulted in the Blanco victory, causing a major political surprise.

Although the Blanco party received a plurality of votes, the winning sub-lema received only about 25 percent of the total votes cast (see Table 7). The Blanco victory was understood by many as being a repudiation of the economic policies of 'batllismo' that favored urban over rural interests. "It was certainly a victory for rural interests against the urban oriented industrialization policies of the Colorado party"[2] (see Chapter IV).

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Martin Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 113-114.

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The Blanco administration was unable to cope with the problems caused by escalating inflation, unemployment, trade balance deficits, and the like. By the time of the 1962 elections the socio-economic crisis was accelerating.

> The 1962 elections thus took place under a growing pessimism concerning the Blanco administration's ability to turn the economy around. While they had won control of the Colegiado by 120,000 votes in 1958, they managed to retain control by only 24,000 votes in 1962.[1]

The two most interesting results of the 1962 elections were on the one hand the failure of the independent minority left wing parties, especially the 'Unión Popular' (Socialists), and on the other hand the 'extraordinary' advance of the left wing sub-lema of the Colorado party headed by Mr. Michellini. This was an affirmation of the principle underlying the 'ley de lemas,' i.e., that dissidence inside a certain lema, under certain conditions, was highly remunerative from the electoral point of view, while dissidence outside of the lema was conducive of disaster. The first rule had exceptions, the second was universal.[2]

Dissidence inside the traditional parties (Mr. Michellini) resulted in a strong comeback for the Colorado party. The elections of 1962 (see Table 8) demonstrated once again that although the traditional parties had severe internal disagreements due to the 'ley de lemas,' they still accounted for over 90 percent of the total vote. One of the reasons for the large increase of votes for the left wing

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[1]Ibid., p. 114.

[2]Solari, _Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya_, II: 135-137.

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sub-lema of the Colorado party may be attributed to the support Michellini received from ex-socialists unhappy with the new orientations of their party, and those left wing individuals, who, understanding the principle underlying the 'ley de lemas,' knew that in order to influence the results of the election it would have to be through one of the traditional parties, voting for the candidate they felt the most comfortable with, inside the traditional political organization.[1]

The extreme left alliance 'FIDEL,'[2] controlled by the Communist party, performed well in the 1962 elections compared with that of 1958. The Christian Democratic party which tried to offer a moderate left alternative to the traditional parties, as Frei had done in Chile, was a disappointment, performing worse than it had done in 1958. The biggest frustration was for the 'Unión Popular' party (Socialist) (see Tables 7 and 8).

The decline of the independent left wing Unión Popular party was a big surprise. Before the elections it seemed that the continuous deterioration of the economic situation, the increasing social unrest, strikes, etc., would cause an increase in the electoral strength of the Unión Popular by those segments of the population most affected by the crisis.

The electoral failure of the Unión Popular in part demonstrated that dissidence outside the traditional parties could be 'disastrous.'

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[1]Ibid., p. 138.

[2]FIDEL stands for 'Frente Izquierda de Liberación' (Left Front for Liberation).

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The alliance of the Unión Popular with Mr. Erro[1] was a big disappointment. While Mr. Erro enjoyed very strong support as a left wing dissident inside the Blanco party (as Michellini did in the Colorado party), when he joined the Unión Popular he was unable to carry its support with him outside the framework of the Blanco party. The failure of the Unión Popular can also be attributed to their public statements claiming that their differences with the Communist party were only tactical. Thus many voters preferred to vote directly for the Communist Party.[2] This caused a leadership split that adversely affected their electoral results.[3]

The experience of the Unión Popular convinced many voters that any independent, non-Communist left had very little chance of success outside the framework of the majority parties. It also cast doubt on traditional parliamentary methods in general. Although it is believed that the Tupamaros first organized after the 1962 defeat of the Unión Popular in the national elections,[4] it was not until 1966 that their activities became really noticeable (see Chapter XI).

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[1]Mr. Erro was a very prestigious left wing leader of the Blanco party. Many people considered his faction in the Blanco party similar to that of Mr. Michellini in the Colorado party.

[2]This in part may explain the vote increase for the Communist Party.

[3]A leadership split weakened the Socialist party in the national elections. The socialists were divided into the Frugoni faction, the Authentic Socialists of Vivian Trías, and the group incorporated in the FIDEL alliance.

[4]The defeat of the Unión Popular was not only relative to the other parties but also in absolute terms as indicated by the index of growth of the different political parties. See Tables 9 and 10.

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The Blanco dominated Colegiado proved unable to find solutions to the continuously worsening socio-economic conditions of the country. The cost of living which had doubled three times since 1945 (1945-1955; 1959-1962; 1962-1964) increased again 100 percent in 1965.[1] Ronald H. McDonald[2] calculated that while Uruguay's GNP declined by about 12 percent between 1955 and 1974, per capita income declined about 15 percent.

> As labor found its purchasing power seriously threatened, union unrest increased and the more than 200,000 individuals on retirement or old age pensions found their security threatened by the galloping inflation.[3]
>
> In 1965, the government budget doubled, despite a 20 percent deficit, and circulating currency increased by 58 percent. Uruguay could not afford the extensive welfare state and bureaucracy that had developed for half a century. The desperate financial situation forced the government to initiate an austerity program. A bank scandal led to the closing of five banks and created severe difficulties for business. Two coups were attempted, and in 1965 a general strike threatened the entire economy. The government had to call upon the army to end the strike, which had allegedly been organized by the Russian Embassy.[4]

The years of the Blanco government were marked by continued support withdrawal from the authorities and its policies expressed by constant turmoil, strikes, and demonstrations. During these years the

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[1]See CIDE, Plan nacional de desarrollo económico y social (1965-1974) (Montevideo: Centro de Estudiantes de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración, 1966), I: 188.

[2]Ronald H. McDonald, "Electoral Politics and Uruguayan Political Decay," Inter-American Economic Affairs 26 (Summer 1972): 34-35.

[3]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 115. See also Chapters IV and V below.

[4]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 11.

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union demands began to be politicized and, simultaneously, the armed forces began to play a more active role in Uruguay's political life. Several times the armed forces were called upon to help restore 'law and order.'

Sometimes, especially in welfare states, conflicts between trade unions and private employers are trials of 'economic strength.' This is not necessarily the case when government is the major employer. In a welfare system like Uruguay, one of the important factors in determining the outcome of a strike against the authorities' policies as an employer was public support for the public employees' demands. In this sense, public support for the demands of organized labor could be considered an indicator of the 'size' (quantity and quality) of government concessions. This was one of the main aspects by which organized labor and the incumbent authorities mixed their industrial claims with political demands. The unions of public employees also organized public sector industrial workers. Uruguay's election laws and especially the 'ley de lemas' and the 'pacto del chinchulín' in essence favored private political bargains with the existing political parties and their numerous factions. Thus the demands of the public employees' unions were political in nature and directed against the incumbent authorities as well as aspects of the regime that the unions considered to have inhibited the authorities' policies (e.g., land tenure system, bargaining mechanism, etc.).

Many union leaders as well as strategic sectors of the population increasingly believed that the key problem was not only the inefficiency, and corruption, of the authorities that plagued the

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country; they felt that some change should be made in the institutional organization of the regime, mainly that of the National Executive Council. The Colegiado rarely agreed on controversial policy matters, thus causing output failure. "The political and economic shortcomings of recent years have resulted in new proposals for constitutional reform to return the country to a presidential system."[1]

The Blanco party, since it won the 1958 elections, favored a return to the presidential system and the abolition of the National Executive Council. As support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime continued to increase, many segments of the population as well as many politicians of all political persuasions increasingly called for constitutional reform as the answer to Uruguay's problems.[2] Apparently, it was easier to blame the failure to develop and execute effective national policy on a multi-headed executive than to remember who created that executive and to recognize that the factional nature of Uruguayan party politics made coherent action by the executive or legislature difficult. Thus, the Colegiado was made the scapegoat for the failure of national leadership, and 'constitutionalitis' became the surrogate for effective national leadership.

The constitutional reform approved in 1966 marked the return to the presidential system thus strengthening the Executive branch. The

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[1]Ibid.

[2]See "From Organizational Coercion to Institutionalized Repression" below).

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Colorado party won the elections in 1966. Retired General Gestido assumed the Presidency and Mr. Pacheco Areco became vice-president.[1]

From Organizational Coercion to Institutionalized Repression
From General Gestido to the Military Takeover: 1966-1973

The elections of 1966 were conducted under an atmosphere of overt support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the regime.

> A number of strikes occurred when the election campaign was getting under way and became an important issue. A one day general strike in September involved many sectors of industry and commerce. Transport workers, primary teachers, and public bank employees called strikes that severely disrupted daily life in Uruguay. The public bank strike practically paralized the country.[2]

The increasing inability of the authorities to meet the workers' demands shifted the relationship between organized labor (public and private) and government from 'cooptation' to confrontation and repression. This shift was in large part the result of the continuous and increasing interpenetration of economic and political conflicts

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[1]According to the new constitutional reform, if the electorate approved the presidential reform, the presidential and vice-presidential candidate of the party who received the highest number of votes would take office. Thus retired General Gestido and Mr. Pacheco Areco assumed the Presidency and vice-Presidency respectively.

[2]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 31. For a more detailed study of Uruguay's deteriorating economic situation and its socio-political implications, see Chapters IV and V below. The following articles are relevant: M. D. C. Redding, "The Economic Decline of Uruguay," Inter-American Economic Affairs 20, no. 4 (Spring 1967): 55-72; Eric N. Baklanoff, "Notes on the Pathology of Uruguay's Welfare State," Mississippi Valley Journal of Business and Economics, vol. 2 (Spring 1967); S. Shapiro, "Uruguay: A Bankrupt Welfare State," Current History LVI 329 (January 1969): 36-41; James P. Bell, Jr., "Uruguay's Economic Evolution: 1900-1968," SAIS Review 25 (Spring 1971): 27-35.

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through the channels created by the welfare system. The authorities blamed 'subversive interference' from the Soviet Union in the ever increasing number of strikes by the labor unions.[1] The authorities blamed the growing support withdrawal and their output failure on the constitutional arrangements that paralyzed the decision making institutions. Constitutional reform became the main issue of the national elections.[2] The National Executive Council was considered the main reason for Uruguay's crisis.

Several proposals for constitutional reform were submitted to a plebiscite that was held simultaneously with the national elections. Four main proposals for constitutional reform were presented to the electorate: those of the Blanco party, the Colorado party, the Communist party, and an interparty group including members of both traditional parties.[3] The interparty constitutional reform proposal

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[1]To back up this charge, the National Executive Council declared as 'persona non-grata' four Soviet diplomats.

[2]Héctor Gross Espiell in "El Proceso de la reforma constitucional," Estudios Sobre la Reforma Constitucional, Cuadernos 19 (Montevideo: Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 1967), pp. 9-38, critically discusses the reform process.

[3]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 31.

> "The present constitution provides four methods for initiating amendments or reforms. The Blanco party and interparty reforms were proposed by a two-fifths vote of the General Assembly. A petition of 10 percent of the electorate initiated the Colorado party and Communist party reforms. In order to be ratified, one of the reforms must receive a majority of the votes cast and the support of 35 percent of the registered votes, or approximately 580,000 votes. If the vote is divided among the various proposals, it is possible that no one proposal will receive sufficient votes for ratification, even though most people favor a reform. Although the Colorado reform is legally on the ballot, it is not a topic of much discussion, and the party may not print many ballots for it."

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was approved. It represented another political pact between the traditional parties. In their campaigns both parties tried to convince the electorate that a reform in the organization of the Executive would solve Uruguay's crisis.[1]

The debates surrounding the constitutional reform centered around the failure of the National Executive Council and the organizational mechanics of the new Presidential system. Very little attention was paid by the traditional parties to the basic changes of the socio-economic conditions of the country. Similarly the 'ley de lemas' and the system of proportional representation was left almost untouched. The constitutional reform tried, however, to deal in a very mild and paradoxical way with two basic issues of public concern: public administration and land nationalization.

Uruguay's bureaucracy was very politicized due to the 'pacto del chinchulín' that allocated vacancies in the public administration of the state enterprises according to the election results. Although exact figures of government employees are difficult to obtain, it was

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[1]A public opinion poll conducted by IUDOP (Instituto Uruguayo de Opinión Pública, which is affiliated with Gallup) in August of 1966 showed that,

> "while 71 percent of the public as a whole was in favor of reforming the constitution, 85 percent of those respondents classified as upper class favored the reform. Differing class perception of the effect of a reform is signified by the fact that while 46 percent of the upper class respondents thought the reform would help the country overcome its economic crisis, only 29 percent of the lower class respondents expressed a similarly favorable opinion" (Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 115).

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estimated that out of a total work force of 900,000, there were over 250,000 public employees.

> Many are employed with unmarked funds allotted to the various government agencies and decentralized services. Such proliferation has created a huge bureaucracy, not including a sizeable group of expeditors, who seem to circulate papers for a fee. The unwieldy and expensive bureaucracy has been attacked frequently during the campaign.[1]

In an attempt to depoliticize public administration, the old system that distributed seats between the Colorados and Blancos was replaced. Instead, Congress was given authority to allocate directorships of public administration. But the old system was in fact not changed due to the requirement of a 60 percent confirmation vote by Congress; thus the traditional parties continued to have control of public administration.

In regard to land ownership (see Chapter V), two very paradoxical articles were included in the new Constitution.[2] Those articles dealt with land expropriation and indemnification. Accordingly the Legislature had the authority, under certain conditions, to nationalize privately owned land. But the nationalizations could only be done in exchange for indemnifications to the owner. The Legislature was limited even further by stipulating that land could only be nationalized after paying the owner at least 25 percent of the total value of the indemnification with the rest of the payment to be completed in ten

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[1] Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 32.

[2] Articles 231 and 232. For an article by article comparison of previous Constitutions and the Constitutional reform approved in 1966, see Dr. Pablo N. Belderrain Razquin, Constitución de la República (Montevideo: Cámara de Representantes, 1968). Also see Julio María Sanguinetti and Alvaro Pacheco Sere, La Nueva Constitución: Ensayo (Montevideo: Editorial Alfa, 1967).

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years. Thus, these articles, while showing some concern for basic economic reforms, also constitutionally protected the landowners from future land reform programs.

In conclusion, although the interparty constitutional reform was approved, for all practical purposes it was another successful attempt by the traditional parties to retain their control. Except for the changes in the executive branch the rest of Uruguay's socio-economic-political organization remained almost unchanged.

> The adoption of a presidential system would not in itself solve any problems. What it might do, however, is signify the beginning of a concerted attack on such grievous troubles as a nearly immobile economy, an even more damaging inflation, an expensive program of social services, and a mammoth bureaucracy. In the eyes of many Uruguayans, these and related difficulties have reached crisis proportions.[1]

The Colorado party won the 1966 national elections.[2] The continuous increase in support withdrawal from the authorities was one of the reasons why the Colorado party presented a candidate like retired General Gestido for the Presidency. He was not a politician, enjoyed the reputation of being a good honest man and father, and was an efficient administrator, qualities that were scarce amongst politicians. Although General Gestido died nine months after taking office, his election was an indication of the politicization process in the

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[1]Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 30.

[2]With voter turnout over 70 percent, the Colorado party obtained 607,633 votes and the Blanco party 496,910. The Colorado party received about 49 percent of the total vote. Gestido's sub-lema (the most voted for in the Colorado party) represented 21.3 percent of the total vote (262,040 from 1,231,762 votes). This was possible because of the 'ley de lemas.' See Table 33.

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armed forces. Mr. Pacheco Areco, the elected vice-President, became President.

In 1966, as the socio-economic crisis of the country accelerated and the activities of the Tupamaros became more noticeable, support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime increased. Continuous strikes paralyzed the country. Strikes and demonstrations by different segments of the population became a daily event in Uruguayan life. During this period labor organizations developed from a few weak and divided trade unions into a strong organized labor movement encompassing some of the most vital sectors of the economy, thus threatening to paralyze Uruguay's entire economy. Uruguay's government was the single largest employer. The implications of this process will be studied in more detail in Chapters IV and V.

If Gestido's nine months in office could be characterized as fluctuating, hesitating, and compromising, those of Pacheco Areco were the opposite. He was very resolved and uncompromising. Beginning with Pacheco's inauguration as President a continuous escalation of political violence occurred as well as the erosion of democratic institutions and civil-political liberties. This led to the eventual collapse of the regime with the military takeover, the consequences of which are still being unfolded today.

The new Constitution of 1966 opened the door for legal dictatorship.[1] By giving the President the possibility of using

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[1]Alfonso Fernández Cabrelli, De Batlle a Pacheco Areco (Montevideo: Imprenta Norte, 1969), p. 213.

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'extraordinary powers' it tried to avoid in Uruguay the same kind of military dictatorships that existed in other Latin American countries. Those powers were regularly used by Presidents Pacheco Areco (1966-1971) and Bordaberry (1971-1973), the last two elected Presidents of Uruguay before the military takeover.

Pacheco's period as President is known in Uruguay as the 'pachecato' which was a legal dictatorship. The 'pachecato' was not a coup d'état in the strict sense of the word, but started a gradual process towards the 1973 military coup d'état. This process of 'gradualismo golpista' (gradual coup) was accelerated by Mr. Bordaberry.[1]

After only one week as President, Pacheco Areco on December 12, 1967 issued a decree temporarily outlawing the Socialist party and several small leftist and anarchist groups. The leftist newspaper Epoca, and the Socialist party's newspaper, El Sol, were permanently

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[1]'Gradualismo golpista,' see Lustemberg, Uruguay: Imperialismo y estrategia de liberación, pp. 19-25. Many reasons could explain the difference between the 'gradual coup' in Uruguay and the more direct coup d'état in Brazil and Argentina. For an excellent analysis of some of these reasons, see Cuadernos de Marcha 23: 5-31, and Carlos Bañales articles in Marcha 1967-1969. Among the reasons studied were the socialized loyalty attitudes of the armed forces after ninety-three years of Colorado government, the lack of external danger, physical integration of the country, etc. While in Brazil and Argentina the initiative for the coup came from the armed forces in Uruguay they were 'invited' by the authorities beginning with the granting of 'emergency powers' to the President. Thus, in a sense, the constitutional arrangements that tried to avoid military dictatorships (by limiting military intervention) like in Brazil or Argentina 'backfired.' Instead of keeping the armed forces out of the realm of politics, it allowed their gradual control of the decision-making process.

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closed.[1] The reasons given by the authorities to justify these measures were that those newspapers had published a manifesto which in principle supported the resolutions of the first OLAS Conference.[2] The authorities felt threatened by this endorsement of the ideological objectives and the means of action proclaimed by the OLAS Conference, which proposed the unification of political groups in order to destroy the capitalist regimes by the use of political violence. They were overtly withdrawing support from the incumbent authorities as well as the regime.

On June 13, 1968, based on article 168, section 17 of the new Constitution, Pacheco Areco invoked the 'medidas prontas de seguridad' (emergency powers). He used this law to establish a 'state of siège' in Uruguay under the pretense of restoring 'law and order.' From 1966 until 1971, during most of his Presidency, Pacheco Areco made use of the extraordinary powers as an effective anti-guerrilla measure.[3] Thus a mechanism of repression allowed by the Constitution only for extraordinary situations became a regular part of the political system, limiting individual liberties.

The first time Pacheco Areco invoked the 'medidas prontas de seguridad' was to declare a freeze on wages in order to reduce the

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[1]Among the extreme left wing parties that were outlawed were MIR (Independent Revolutionary Movement), MRO (Oriental Revolutionary Movement) and the Anarchist Federation of Uruguay.

[2]Organization of Latin American Solidarity.

[3]The 'emergency powers' were in effect from June 1968 until 1971 except for a short interval from March 1969 to June 1969.

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galloping inflation. He also ordered the military mobilization ('militarization') of the striking bank workers. The only body that could nullify the President's measures was the Congress, but it was unable to do so.[1]

> With the exception of a brief period in the second quarter of 1969, Pacheco used (and some would say abused) these special faculties throughout the remaining four years of his administration. In addition, on two occasions an acquiescent Congress suspended all constitutional civil liberties, once for twenty days following the assassination of US police agent Daniel Mitrione (August 1970), and again for forty days after the kidnapping of British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson (January 1971).[2]

Among the consequences of the emergency powers was the ending of the workers' cooperation with the authorities in order to find a solution to their demands. Until the inauguration of the emergency powers a committee composed of representatives of the labor confederation, the government and management were in continuous bargaining sessions. These negotiations ended abruptly, when the President, invoking the emergency powers, declared a freeze on wages and made

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[1]The President's decree could have been nullified by Congress with a simple majority (sixty-six votes) that was obtainable. But although a simple majority was required, the vote could only be taken in the presence of two-thirds of the members of Congress. Every time the issue came to vote the pro-government Congressmen walked out, thus depriving Congress of the necessary quorum to take the vote.

[2]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 117. See also Chapter XI below.

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illegal public assemblies, demonstrations, and strikes. Many union and political leaders were imprisoned.[1]

The 'militarization' of workers, although allowed by law[2] under certain extraordinary circumstances was another step toward mounting repression by the authorities. In this case it was used in order to break strikes by government employees especially in banks that were threatening to paralyze the country. Thus about five thousand union leaders were arrested and 'militarized.' The unions retaliated by striking in solidarity. The meat freezing industry (frigoríficos) as well as the telephone workers (UTE) solidified against the repressive measures. The authorities in turn retaliated by sending in navy personnel to restore telephone services.

During this process of escalating repression the armed forces were called more and more often to help implement policies of the authorities. The armed forces began to increase their arsenal, training, and manpower (see Chapter VI).

The 'medidas prontas de seguridad' were used not only as a constitutional anti-guerrilla method limiting the potential sources of support and dissemination of information concerning the Tupamaro ideology and activities, but also against the media and segments of the

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[1]Lustemberg, _Uruguay: Imperialismo y estrategia de liberación_, p. 22.

[2]Article 27 of the Law 9943 stipulated that under certain circumstances when the emergency powers were in effect, the citizens could be placed under military authority and jurisdiction in order to provide for the functioning of indispensable services for the life and health of the citizens.

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population that did not support the authorities and the regime. Thus, for example, the newspaper Extra was outlawed because it published a letter from an army colonel who privately made hostile remarks regarding the authorities. He was discharged. The De Frente newspaper was closed down when it published a letter by a committee of opposition and religious leaders condemning the police and military tortures of union members.[1]

One method the media used to avoid censorship and still be able to express its ideas and opinions was by quoting past great leaders of the nation.

> Oppressive regimes are the ones that suggest and feed revolutionary ideas. Far from abating protest, these regimes give life and many times thrust the revolutionary ideas into violence.[2]

This quote from Batlle legitimized and historically linked the Tupamaros' activities to Uruguay's 'father' of democracy and welfare state. The same statement was censored in 1971.

Freedom of the press was further restricted by a decree on July 4, 1969 establishing prior censorship concerning guerrilla activities. Six months later, due to the authorities' ban on the use of words concerning the guerrillas,[3] the Tupamaros became known in the media

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[1]The authorities were also continuously accused of the widespread use of torture and police brutality. This was documented by independent international organizations and by the 1970 bi-partisan Senate congressional committee. Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 70.

[2]Epoca newspaper (independent left-wing), December 7, 1967. This quote is from Batlle's speech of July 20, 1919.

[3]Words and terms such as 'tupamaros,' 'commands,' 'cells,' 'national liberation movement,' and the like, were prohibited in all the media.

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as the 'unmentionables,' 'seditious,' 'conspirators,' 'those that took their name from the Inca Tupac Amarú,' etc. In April 1971, another presidential decree announced that only official communiqués issued by the police department could be published. The media were threatened with being outlawed if they did not obey. On December 14, 1971, an almost complete censorship on "themes of armed violence, of rural and urban guerrillas, of the tactics and strategy of insurrection in Latin America and on other continents and, in general, of anything that develops the theory of armed subversion"[1] was imposed by presidential decree.

Indiscriminate repression and violence by the authorities, tighter censorship decrees, continuous torture reports,[2] and the like began to violate the limits established by the 'norms' and 'values' of the regime, thus in a sense legitimizing the Tupamaros' activities.[3]

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[1]Marcha weekly newspaper (independent left wing), December 30, 1971, p. 23 (my translation).

[2]El Popular newspaper (Communist), November 5, 1968, and also document published by the Uruguayan Medical Syndicate.

[3]Among the 'norms' and 'values' of Uruguay's regime that were violated by the authorities and in part explained the support given to the Tupamaros by certain segments of the population were: violation of the right of habeas corpus; freedom of the press; freedom of public meetings, political and syndical association; the right to strike; separation of 'justice' from other branches of the regime; autonomy of the educational establishment; restrictions on military involvement in socio-economic and political systems; and freedom of political thought and action. With the changing pattern of 'authority structure' many 'norms' and 'values' of the regime were being violated increasing the level of support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime. Some of the measures taken by the incumbent authorities that were violating the above mentioned 'norms' and 'values' were: restriction of the freedom of movement by imposition of a 'neighborhood registry';

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The authorities' repressive policies achieved an opposite effect than was intended. As the political and socio-economic conditions of the country continued to deteriorate, support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime increased. The authorities' strongest confrontations were with labor, students, and the ever increasing number of unemployed. In 1967 inflation in Uruguay exceeded 125 percent (see Chapter IV), but was reduced by about half by the imposition of a wage freeze (see Figure 3). The authorities' growing reliance on coercion, force, and repressive legislation increased the level of conflict with traditionally autonomous groups in the society.

Students were among those who withdrew support from the authorities and the regime. The University enjoyed 'autonomy' and 'co-government' since 1958. The student mobilizations in 1958 permitted the development of critical consciousness toward the regime.[1] Those rights did not last long, however, and they became one of the main targets of the emergency powers. "The young who want to study . . . when they decide to affirm their constitutional right to education are repressed by the police and the regime."[2] University

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imposition of taxes to subsidize the fight against the guerrillas; modification of the criminal code lowering the legal age to stand trial; law of 'internal security' that converted into crime 'any attack against the social and political order'; and strong media censorship. Those and other measures resulted in the legal escalation of violence.

[1]Lustemberg, Uruguay: Imperialismo y estrategia de liberación, p. 21.

[2]Cabrelli, De Batlle a Pacheco Areco, pp. 258-259.

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professors and students traditionally associated with left wing ideologies provided the leadership against the authorities' repressive measures.

Another segment of the population who withdrew support from the authorities and the regime were 300,000 unemployed,

> these unemployed who wanted to work . . . decided to march in the streets and to ask the state to fulfill their obligation. They were confronted by the armed forces of the regime.[1]

Thousands of Uruguayans who found neither a possibility of working nor prospects of any kind emigrated to other countries.[2]

In 1966, in part as a response to the economic situation and the repressive measures by the authorities, the National Workers Convention (CNT)[3] was organized. This National Convention was a more powerful organization than the previous General Workers Union (1942) and the Syndical Confederation of Uruguay (1951). Labor unions played an important role in Uruguay's political system, especially when they withdrew their support from the authorities and the regime. The workers also "became exposed to the bloody mercy of the popular repression."[4]

> Increasing dependence on public employment, huge government payrolls, and retirement and social security payments created a situation in which public employees and increasingly, private workers found it necessary to make direct demands upon the government.[5]

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[1]Ibid., p. 258. [2]Ibid., p. 259.

[3]Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT).

[4]Cabrelli, De Batlle a Pacheco Areco, p. 259.

[5]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 119.

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The demands on the authorities were mostly economic, involving increased salaries and fringe benefits[1] in order to offset the effects of inflation in the declining real income per capita.[2] But these demands were coupled with demands for radical political change, especially in the organization of the regime.

The most affected segments of society were those on the public payroll (teachers, bank clerks, state industrial and service workers, and the like), and especially those individuals living on retirement whose median income declined more than 50 percent from 1963 to 1973.[3] The worsening economic situation and the authorities' inability to meet workers demands increased the level of support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime as evidenced by the increasing number of political demonstrations and strikes.[4]

During this process of escalating social unrest and mounting political repression the demands of students and unions became politicized. The demands at this time were not only for economic benefits as

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[1]For example, the student strikes and demonstrations began as a protest against the increase of the special student fee for transportation. The three month strike by frigorífico workers (meat freezing industry) was in retaliation to and in protest of the cancellation of the benefit that allowed them to receive 4.4 pounds of beef.

[2]See Table 34.

[3]See Table 35.

[4]In order to improve their position, labor used the strike as their major activity. "Total men-days of labor lost through strikes is estimated at 1,200,000 per year during the 1950s, but jumped to 2,500,000 for 1963" and doubled again in 1967-68. In Daniel Costabile and Alfredo Erronenea, Sindicato y Sociedad en el Uruguay (Montevideo: Universidad de la República, 1969), p. 136, quoted from Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 119.

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before; more important were demands for the restoration of historical 'norms' and 'values' of the regime and for basic changes in Uruguay's political and socio-economic systems.[1] Large sectors of the population began to perceive that in order to meet the union's demands, some basic changes were required.

After 1954 (end of Korean war) the welfare system started to collapse and the continued decline in the standard of living of the middle and lower classes accelerated the process of turmoil, that dominated the national scene until 1973. The authorities' dramatic increase of the tertiary sector, designed in part to alleviate unemployment and to generate political support, had adverse economic and political consequences. (In 1971 the percentage of public employees reached 53 percent of the active population.) With the deterioration of the economic situation some trade union leaders began to realize that in order to obtain their economic goals some changes were required in the structure of society (e.g., land tenure system). The economic and political conflict between organized labor (industrial and civil service) and government intensified and the level of violence rapidly increased. As this happened, the existing democratic means for settling these disputes were changed to give the incumbent authorities the dominant role, thus labor became a powerless bloc. These processes that led to the radical shift in the relationships of government and

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[1]Example of demands that were voiced: 'land reform yes, latifundia no,' 'popular representation yes, law of lemas no.' Anti-imperialist and anti-American slogans were often voiced in demonstrations.

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labor ended with the dissolution of all traces of legal organized labor. While this process of transformation in organized labor from a powerful to a powerless bloc was taking place, the Tupamaros went from an insignificant organization to a serious contender for political power. This process will be studied in more detail in the chapter dealing with the socio-economic situation and the Tupamaro activities.

Beginning in 1966 the Tupamaros' activities became more noticeable and their first clashes with authorities occurred. The Tupamaros received support from segments of the population that withdrew support from the authorities and regime due to output failure, indiscriminate repression, and related causes.

> The interinstitutional strife had been compounded for several years by the emergence of a new and important political force--urban guerrillas. The existence of an organized revolutionary movement officially calling itself the 'National Liberation Movement--Tupamaros' was an indication that growing divisions could not be contained at the institutional level and were spilling over into basic value conflict concerning the nature of the national community.[1]

The Tupamaros in an open letter to the police announced some of their reasons for the use of political violence in the form of urban guerrilla warfare.

> For these reasons, we have placed ourselves outside the law. This is the only honest action when the law is not equal for all; when the law exists to defend the spurious interests of a minority in detriment to the majority; when the law works against the country's progress; when even those who have created it place themselves outside it, with impunity, whenever it is convenient for them.

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[1]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of a Failure, p. 120.

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> The hour of rebellion has definitively sounded for us. The hour of patience has ended. The hour of action and commitment has commenced here and now. The hour of conversation and the enunciation of theory, propositions and unfulfilled promises is finished.
>
> We should not be worthy Urguayans, nor worthy Americans, nor worthy of ourselves if we do not listen to the dictates of conscience that day after day calls us to the fight. Today no one can deny us the right to follow this dictate, wherever it might lead. No one can take the sacred right of rebellion away from us, and no one is going to stop us from dying, if necessary, in order to be of consequence.[1]

Although the Tupamaros recognized the importance of the 'law,' they decided not to respect it because they perceived it as not fulfilling its objectives. The experience of the repressive policies of the authorities convinced them that only through armed revolution would the 'oppressors' relinquish their power. The Tupamaros also believed that their activities would enlist the support of large segments of the population. This would be achieved by revealing the inefficiency and corruption of the regime and by the creation of a 'parallel power' within the nation in order to demonstrate their own responsibility and raise the population's consiousness.

During the late 1960s the Tupamaros had already become a strong political force challenging the authorities and the regime. Most of their support was recruited from the university and high school populations as well as from organized labor (mainly from the public sector). In the 1971 national elections the Tupamaros decided to support the 'Frente Amplio' as a tactical measure, thus in a sense not rejecting completely the electoral process (see Chapter XI).

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[1]"Carta abierta a la policía," printed in Epoca newspaper, December 7, 1967.

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From 1966 to 1971 there was an increase in Tupamaro activities as well as escalating repression by the authorities. The process of support withdrawal from the authorities began to spill-over into support withdrawal from the regime, with the politicization of the unions' demands. The armed forces were called upon more and more often to help implement the authorities' policies. Their budget for training, equipment, manpower, etc., increased considerably (see Chapter VI). Although Uruguay's regime continued to be democratic, the armed forces began to influence decisively the political decision-making process. This will be dealt with more systematically later in this section and also in Chapters IV and V.

Pacheco Areco recognized the growing political influence of the armed forces by naming two generals to his cabinet. Generals Antonio Francesse and Borba were nominated Ministers of the Interior and National Defense respectively. Congress was intimidated in its attempts to revoke the emergency powers. Pacheco Areco insinuated many times the possibility of a coup d'état if Congress nullified his extraordinary powers. He did so by visiting installations of the different branches of the armed forces (navy, air force, army), the day before Congress was to vote on the revocation of the emergency powers. The President's visits to the armed forces bases were supported by General Francesse, who on the same day in a speech to Congress remarked, "I am not here as a Minister, but as a General; the armed

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forces are the guardians of the nation's institutions."[1] Congress' failure to take a vote can be in part explained by their unwillingness to test the President's implied threats.

Some segments of the population began demanding a coup d'état or an even stronger Executive to control Uruguay's political and socio-economic crisis. Thus, for example, on June 9, 1969, Dr. Eugenio Baroffio, the managing editor of the newspaper El Diario, who supported the authorities' policies, called for the supremacy of the executive over the legislative and judicial branches of government.[2]

Specific support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities spilled over into diffuse support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime. In May of 1969 the newspaper 'BP'[3] found in a public opinion poll that 50 percent of the public felt that politicians pursued personal interests; 43 percent felt they were dishonest and 45 percent considered them a 'shame' to the country.[4]

Cabrelli concluded[5] that through public opinion polls, slogans shouted in demonstrations, conversations, and the like, people were judging not only incumbent authorities but also the regime. Different segments of the population by withdrawing support from the

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[1]Alan Labrousse, Les Tupamaros (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1971), p. 168.

[2]New York Times, August 14, 1969.

[3]'BP' (Bien Público) newspaper is of conservative tendency, May 11, 1969.

[4]Cabrelli, De Batlle a Pacheco Areco, p. 224.

[5]Ibid., pp. 224-234 (my translation).

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authorities were also withdrawing support from the regime that allowed such politicians to exist.

> The people through the politicians are judging the regime, the system that authorizes those misbehaviors . . . of treason to popular representation . . . It is in the regime where the latent seeds of injustice lies . . . the politicians only represent the regime.[1]

Thus the regime was blamed for the abuses of the politicians.

Some activities of the Tupamaros exposing corruption[2] caused some conservative politicians and the media to recognize what they had denied previously and to withdraw support from the authorities and the regime. Thus major leaders from the traditional parties also withdrew their support. For example Mr. Enrique Beltrán (Blanco leader) declared, "the executive has completely lost the public trust."[3]

The conservative newspaper La Mañana which originally supported the new strong government measures wrote

> there are reasons to believe that a growing nucleus of Uruguayans have lost their confidence in the effectiveness of politics as an adequate instrument for the operation and recovery of the country . . . It is also true that for some time now, there have been large doses of corruption in national politics.[4]

The newspaper Acción said in its editorial (May 12, 1969), "the loss of confidence by the public does not refer only to the politicians, but in

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[1]Ibid., p. 227.

[2]For example, the activities 'financiera Monty,' 'Mailhos,' etc. See Chapter XI.

[3]From an interview by BP newspaper to Mr. Enrique Beltrán on May 19, 1969.

[4]La Mañana newspaper, May 17-19, 1969.

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general to all the leaders of the social organization, and the organization itself."[1] Other newspapers and leaders representing different viewpoints in the political spectrum accused the authorities and began to demand basic changes in the regime.

The documents of the meetings of the Catholic priests in a sense summarized the declining state of support towards the authorities and the regime.

> Consciousness of the crisis is not identical in all the sectors; there are those that want to negate its existence and take advantage of the situation. There are those that 'live in the best of both worlds,' not concerned with the national situation. There are others that understand that the country's crisis is purely moral, 'of the men' and analyze the national situation only in terms of honesty and dishonesty. There are still others that believe that the crisis is only political and that all depends on the ruling political party and the national political structures. The most accurate ones, however, point out that the origin of the crisis is structural, and while not ignoring the above mentioned aspects and their moral and political implications, find the root of the crisis elsewhere. They find it in the historical process of nations that in the world of political and economic structure form the group of underdeveloped and dependent countries. Underdevelopment and dependency in turn have their origin in national and international economic individualism.[2]

As mentioned in Chapter I, a political system in order to persist must have the support of at least certain segments of the population. In Uruguay as support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime increased, so did repressive measures against those sectors suspected of withdrawing support (overt-covert). The authorities' repressive measures, however, found some support in some segments

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[1]Acción newspaper was affiliated to the Colorado party.

[2]"Documentos del Encuentro Socio-Pastoral" (doc. 1, p. 7) cited in Cabrelli, De Battle a Pacheco Areco, pp. 233-234.

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of the population. Among those supporting the authorities' repressive measures and the emergency powers given to the President were the interest groups representing industry, commerce, and landowners.

> On Friday afternoon a delegation representing industry, commerce, and landowners of the country met with the President. The delegation consisted of the representatives of the following organizations: Armando Jansen Bidegary, for the Association of Commerce; Arturo Lerena Acevedo, for the National Chamber of Commerce; Francisco Haedo Terra, for the Rural Association; Juan José Anchorena, for the Rural Federation; Héctor Sarno Beramendi, for the Merchantile Chamber of the Products of the Country; Mario A. Predari, for the Confederation of Commercial Entities and Industries of the Interior.[1]

In general terms, the note given to the President by those representatives stressed the "chaos, anarchy, and disorder affecting the country . . . requesting measures that will end with this state of affairs."[2] This request was given to the President on the afternoon of Friday the fourteenth when the emergency powers were already in effect.

The unions rejected the authorites' escalation of the level of repression and coercion, which surpassed their constitutional limits. This was claimed to legitimize the use of violence by the Tupamaros. Certain sectors of the population (especially the unions who in one way or another depended upon the authorities and the regime) supported the Tupamaros' demands. The union activists were not as intimidated by the Tupamaros' selective use of violence as they were by the authorities' non-selective repression. This in part explained the support for the Tupamaros among union members.

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[1]*La Mañana* newspaper, June 16, 1968. [2]Ibid.

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The authorities' repression was directed not only against the Tupamaros, but also against the leaders and members of the syndical and student movements. The activities of the unions were severely limited. Legally, unions could no longer hold public meetings, demonstrations, and strikes. Through different institutional mechanisms (in which union representation was always in the minority) the authorities tried unsuccessfully to coopt the unions.

The peak of activities by the Tupamaro movement was between 1968-1970. These years corresponded to the maximum intensity of social and political repression launched by Pacheco Areco's administration through the institutionalization of the 'medidas prontas de seguridad.'[1]

> With the increasingly popular resistance, and the actions of the guerrilla group, they [the authorities] turned to raids, to traffic blockages and road spike operations, to the methodic use of torture and to the suspension of individual freedoms. Street demonstrations were suppressed with dogs and bullets, instead of the usual water hoses and tear gas, thus causing the murder of many students and workers.[2]

In June of 1968 the student Liber Arce[3] was killed by the police in a demonstration. He was the first victim of the escalating police repression, and more than 300,000 Uruguayans participated in his funeral. Liber Arce's funeral became a symbol of overt support

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[1]Carlos Real de Azúa, "Política, Poder y Partidos en el Uruguay," Uruguay hoy, p. 241.

[2]Lustemberg, Uruguay, imperialismo y estrategia de liberación, p. 22.

[3]'Liber-Arce' in Spanish sounds like the word 'liberarse' (to free oneself). He became a symbol of freedom against the authorities' repression.

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withdrawal from the authorities' repressive measures. More killings followed. The authorities and the 'conservative' media tried to justify the killings by declaring that those victims were Communists that were already against the regime.

> Those that fell in the fight were first line communists . . . they were not lovers of social justice. Until this moment, and in former years, tear gas and water were used in order to maintain the public order, unfortunately those weapons were not effective.[1]

Thus the escalating violence was legitimized. It is important to stress that the Communist party did not support the Tupamaros (see Chapter XI).

Because the strengthening of the Executive branch by virtue of the constitutional reform was not sufficient to 'solve' Uruguay's problems, Pacheco Areco needed to depend continuously upon the extraordinary emergency powers. Although Pacheco Areco's term could not be considered a military government in the strict sense of the word, the 'pachecato,' however, was the beginning of the 'gradualismo golpista' which began the process of military participation in politics. During Pacheco Areco's administration a law on 'state security' ('seguridad de estado') was proposed to Congress. This law would have expanded even further the authority of the Executive and the armed forces over the other branches of government.[2] It was rejected several times until 1972, when the process toward the military takeover accelerated. It

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[1] El País newspaper (conservative, Blanco party), November 20, 1968.

[2] This 'State of Security Law' was in order to authorize military courts to bring to trial civilians accused of political crimes.

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was under this climate of continuous unrest, and repression, that national elections took place in 1971.

Once again the traditional parties manipulated the election laws in order to secure victory in the 1971 national elections. The traditional parties feared that low turnout in the elections might favor the left wing parties. In order to minimize this risk, authorities decided for the first time in Uruguay's history to enforce the obligatory vote clause of the Constitution by imposing penalties and fines on those who did not vote.

The 1966 constitutional reform limited the challenge of a third party alternative. This was achieved by a constitutional distinction between 'permanent' and 'temporary' parties.[1] By virtue of this distinction the 'Frento Amplio' party in the 1971 elections had to run under a single list, offering only one presidential candidate. Thus they were unable to accumulate votes for different candidates according

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[1]Article 79 of the 1966 Constitution clearly specifies that: "To be considered permanent, a party must have participated in the preceding national election and must have attained parliamentary representation."

> "As a new electoral group, the Frente Amplio could not qualify as a permanent party and would thus be denied the right to accumulate the votes of its various factions (sub-lemas), a right reserved to permanent parties by Article 79. Forced to run a unified list of candidates for congress, the Frente's various factions would have jeopardized their individual identities. More important, they would have been unable to determine their individual electoral strength and contribution to the ticket. Such determinations would be crucial in the upcoming election and the future political moves of the factions. The only way to overcome this prospect was to run under the lema of a permanent party" (Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 124).

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to the 'ley de lemas.'[1] The Blanco and Colorado parties presented three and five presidential candidates respectively, backed by many lists.

This election was the first time in which the voter was faced with a new third party alternative. The 'Frente Amplio' was a coalition of Socialists, Communists, Christian Democrats, Independents, and dissident factions of the Colorado and Blanco parties. The 'Frente Amplio' emerged as a serious alternative to the traditional parties and the two-party system. Their presidential candidate was retired General Liber Seregni who enjoyed the reputation of being 'legalista' while serving in the armed forces.[2]

The period of political campaigning that preceded the election was "accompanied by a level of violence unparalleled since the Civil War period at the beginning of the century."[3] Continuous clashes between right and left wing organizations were reported. 'Scare

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[1]See Martin Weinstein, "The Uruguayan Constitution and the 1971 Elections," in The Constitutions of the Countries of the World, ed. Gilbert H. Flanz and Albert P. Blaustein (Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceana Press, 1972).

[2]At the end of 1968 the 'Officers Club of the Army' proposed to call a general assembly in order to "honor the dead soldiers against the guerrilla in Latin America." General Liber Seregni was at that time Chief of the Number One Military Region (which included Montevideo) and opposed such a general assembly due to the political nature of the topic. Many times he reaffirmed that the sole role of the armed forces was the defense of national sovereignty against the dangers of foreign intervention. This episode was a sign of the changing 'attitude' of the armed forces.

[3]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 123.

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tactics'[1] were used by both traditional parties in order to dissuade the citizens from voting for the Frente Amplio. The Tupamaros issued a communiqué supporting the Frente Amplio and unilaterally refrained from all type of violent activities in order to allow the peaceful development of the elections. The Tupamaros wanted to demonstrate to the public at large that the authorities' repression was directed against most segments of the population and not only against the guerrillas.

Two months before the November 1971 elections President Pacheco Areco, following the escape of more than one hundred Tupamaros from jail,[2] placed the armed forces in direct control of the anti-guerrilla activities. Due to the unilateral truce declared by the Tupamaros during the election period in 1971 the impact of the armed forces' new role was minimized until April 14, 1972, when suddenly the Tupamaros ended the truce.

The results of the elections were a disappointment to the Frente Amplio.

> President Pacheco's handpicked candidate, Juan María Bordaberry, was unofficially declared the winner as the Colorado party outpolled the Blanco party whose reformist candidate, Wilson Ferreira

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[1]The traditional parties united against the Frente Amplio tried to convince the public at large about the imminent 'dangers' of Communism, of nationalizations, infiltrations, etc. Another method used by the traditional parties was, for example, to demonstrate to the population that they are united in 'defense of democracy.' Many large demonstrations by the two traditional parties combined, with this topic were held.

[2]September 9, 1971. The Tupamaros escaped through a tunnel from the Punta Carretas jail. See Chapter XI.

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Aldunate, was actually the 'most voted' for candidate, having received 26 percent of the vote to Bordaberry's 24 percent.[1] The Frente Amplio performed well in Montevideo, obtaining close to 30 percent of the vote. Their performance in the traditionally Blanco interior was very poor. They obtained only 18 percent of the total national vote.[2] The honesty of the elections was seriously questioned by most political parties and factions. However, the charges and accusations of fraud, and irregularities, did not prevent Mr. Bordaberry from taking office on March 1, 1972.

With the introduction of the emergency powers that were followed by the 'militarizations,' and the nomination of Generals to the Cabinet, the 'pachecato' gradually brought the armed forces into the political decision-making process. Until September 1971 the Intelligence Department of the police and the Ministry of Interior were in charge of the anti-subversive activities. The armed forces, by request of the authorities and the police, performed certain complementary tasks (e.g., militarizations). Gradually, however, with the increasing Tupamaro activities[3] and the police inability to cope with

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[1]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 126. This was possible due to the 'Ley de Lemas' and is similar to the pattern of previous elections. See note 2, p. 99.

[2]The official results were as follows:

Colorado party	681,624
Blanco party	668,822
Frente Amplio	304,275

Mr. Bordaberry won by some 13,000 votes. For an analysis of the 1971 elections see Marcha newspaper, February 25, 1972, pp. 6-11.

[3]Activities such as 'occupation of Pando City,' 'the murder of Mr. Morán Charquero' accused of being one of the armed forces' personnel in charge of tortures; 'execution' of Mr. Dan Mitrione' the alleged American advisor to Uruguay's armed forces on anti-guerrilla activities. See Chapter XI.

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the guerrillas, the armed forces assumed definite control of all anti-guerrilla activities.[1]

One month after the new President took office, the Tupamaros suddenly ended the truce.[2]

> The dramatic Tupamaro escalation on April 14 was met by a firmly entrenched new administration backed by a well-equipped and adequately prepared military which needed but three months to crush the guerrilla movement--a movement which found itself abandoned by the liberal groups that it had surfaced to support in the elections.[3]

The armed forces which had been given direct control of anti-guerrilla activities, immediately escalated the level of violence and repression. Congress approved the 'Ley de Seguridad del Estado' (Law of State Security) as requested by the President. This law which had been rejected several times during Pacheco's administration in essence placed Uruguay under martial law, suspending all constitutional guarantees of individual liberties.[4] (While the Constitution had

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[1]This was following the escape of more than one hundred Tupamaros from the Punta Carreta jail. See Chapter XI.

[2]Several officials were killed by the Tupamaros in different sections of Montevideo. See Chapter XI.

[3]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 129.

[4]This law strengthened even more the President's powers under the 'emergency powers.' The 'Ley de Seguridad del Estado' placed under the jurisdiction of the military court, offenses that were previously under the jurisdiction of civil courts. The penalties became stronger for all those accused of 'subversion,' and 'crimes against the state.' Censorship was also to be controlled by the military courts. By virtue of this law the President acquired the power to dismantle and deny the right of public assembly to groups suspected of producing an undefined 'alteration of public order.' For more details dealing with the implications of this law, see El Día newspaper (Colorado) of July 7, 1972.

This law obtained the necessary votes due to an agreement among the minority factions of the traditional parties. The 'Pacto Chico'

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provisions for 'emergency powers' it did not have any provisions for the 'Law of State Security' which was unconstitutional.) The armed forces implemented the new law against the Tupamaros and increasingly against others who opposed the authorities and the regime. A few months after the declaration of 'internal war' the armed forces succeeded in seriously weakening the Tupamaro organization to the point where the military defeat of the guerrillas was almost imminent.[1]

The repressive measures of the authorities and the armed forces were applied not only against the Tupamaros but also against those segments of the population and organizations that opposed the authorities and the regime. The main targets were the opposition political parties, the unions, and students.

> The government also moved against the autonomous structure of education. In the past, it had limited its reprisals against the university and secondary schools to a cutting of funds for scholarships and operating expenses. This policy was reflected in the changing priority for education in the national budget. While total current peso expenditure increased 5.8 times between 1968 and 1973, the education budget only increased some 4 times. During this same period, defense expenditures multiplied by 12. While the education component of the budget fell from 24.3 percent to 16.6 percent between 1968 and 1973, the military component increased from 13.9 to 26.2 percent.[2]

('Small Pact') reached by Bordaberry and the minority factions of the traditional parties was not supported by the majority factions of the Blanco party (Wilson Ferrerra Aldunate). The dissolution of this agreement ('pacto chico'), which ended Bordaberry's fragile majority in Congress, is considered by some authors as one of the main reasons for the 1973 military coup.

[1]Hundreds of Tupamaros, as well as thousands of sympathizers were jailed. See chapter XI.

[2]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 129. See also Marcha newspaper of November 3, 1972.

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The economic situation of the country continued to worsen; increasing unemployment, inflation close to 100 percent, labor (public and private) unrest expressed in wildcat strikes, demonstrations, etc. From March to June 1972, four general strikes including the public and private sector paralyzed Uruguay. The authorities limited the right to strike, abolished educational autonomy, and passed legislation that allowed parents to be punished for their children's activities. The primary goal of the authorities and the armed forces was to destroy all pockets of resistence and depoliticize the unions and the educational systems which they claimed were controlled by the Communists.

A further step towards the institutionalization of the presence of the armed forces was taken in July 1972, when

> over five hundred officers met and issued a strong statement condemning congressional charges of armed forces brutality against prisoners. The officers declared such attacks to be an unpatriotic smearing of the defenders of the nation.[1]

This statement was followed by the imprisonment of prominent political leaders[2] who opposed the latest escalation of repression. In February 1973 the National Security Council was created. It was controlled by the military, and its function was to oversee the policies of the authorities.

The creation of the National Security Council maintained the 'democratic façade' in Uruguay. It was the result of a compromise

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[1]Ibid., p. 130.

[2]One of the imprisoned was Luis Batlle Berres. He was a senator and leader of the '15 list' of the Colorado party. He represented one of the strongest factions of the Colorado party.

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between Bordaberry and the military which had occupied Montevideo's harbour following a disagreement over the appointment of the Minister of Defense.[1] Thus Bordaberry stayed in power, but was controlled by the armed forces which publicly announced the direction in which new policies would lead. It was already evident that the military was in control of policy making at the executive level.

The armed forces institutionalization of their presence was not as big a surprise to the public as their basic political platform expressed in their public communiqué. The impression given in the beginning was that the armed forces would follow a similar course to the one followed by the military in Peru.[2]

> The ideological foundations of the military action appeared, at first blush, to be of a left-nationalist variety. The commanders issued a communiqué calling for a 'revolución a la uruguaya,' and demanded a host of reforms. The reforms included reorganization of the public administration, distribution of land, stimulation of the export sector and employment, and investigation of illegal economic activities. The statement indicated that the armed forces' activity against the Tupamaros had made them conscious of the deep problems facing the country and that, with this new awareness, they

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[1]Bordaberry announced the appointment of retired General Antonio Francesse as Minister of Defense (he served as Minister of Interior during Pacheco Areco's administration). This appointment was opposed by the armed forces. Many authors considered this rift as an excuse by the armed forces to institutionalize their presence and oversee national policies. The Navy was the last branch of the armed forces to join with the Army and Air Force in their rebellion against Bordaberry.

[2]For an analysis of the communiqué, see Clarín newspaper (Buenos Aires), February 11, 1973. The military's declaration gave the impression that they would follow the 'Peruvian model,' i.e., left wing-nationalist. Some intellectuals referred to 'el peruanismo in Uruguay.'

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had decided to give a firm direction to the solution of these problems.[1]

A great gap developed between the public statements by the members of the armed forces and their policies which increased the level of repression against any existent or potential opposition. The plans for reform were not implemented. Although the Tupamaros were virtually defeated militarily large segments of the population continued to covertly withdraw support from the authorities and the regime as evidenced by the large emigration of Uruguayans to other countries and the elimination of all political participation of those opposing the military dictatorship.

The State Security Law approved earlier was reinforced by the 'Law of the Consolidation of the Peace' which was strongly backed by the armed forces and Mr. Bordaberry.

> The heart of the proposal empowered military courts to order the 'indefinite detainment' of persons whose conduct suggested they might be inclined to commit crimes against the state, persons who had legally or illegally assisted others accused of planning to commit crimes against the state, persons who frequented the same places as persons accused of committing crimes against the state, and persons who might be associated with subversive elements through possession of some object which had belonged to the subversive elements.[2]

The introduction of this law justified the new measures by condemning the Tupamaros. It is important to remember that the Tupamaros were virtually defeated militarily, thus the new law was directed against other sources of support withdrawal using the Tupamaros as 'scapegoats.'

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[1]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 131.

[2]Ibid.

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The armed forces' leaders moved towards discrediting the politicians in order to legitimize their increasing influence. The political leaders were accused of failing to lead the recovery of the country, implying their conspiracy with the guerrillas in order to destroy the regime.[1] The armed forces requested Congress to remove the immunity of Senator Enrique Erro (former presidential candidate of the Unión Popular). This act would have allowed the military courts to sentence the congressman by accusing him of conspiring with the guerrillas. The armed forces, frustrated by the denial of this request, issued another public statement accusing Congress of failure to destroy subversion and corruption. It also strongly condemned Congress for its continuous accusations against the armed forces.[2]

Tensions between Congress and the armed forces continued to escalate. Realignments in Congress threatened not only Bordaberry's majority but also the extension of repressive laws as well as the armed forces' backed legislation concerning the reorganization of the union and educational systems.[3] An increasing number of congressmen were 'rebelling' against the interference of the armed forces in the political process. In June of 1973 in almost simultaneous moves the

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[1]El País newspaper (Blanco), March 22, 1973.

[2]Ibid., May 14, 1973.

[3]The delicate alliance between different Blanco and Colorado factions which enabled Bordaberry to enjoy a slim congressional majority was disintegrating. The last extension of the repressive measures was approved by Congress with a plurality of only two votes (65-63). Thus when Jorge Batlle (leader of one of the majority factions of the Colorado party) withdrew from the coalition at the end of May 1973, Bordaberry lost his fragile majority in Congress.

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Chamber of Deputies refused to lift Erro's immunity and the Senate created a committee to investigate the allegations of torture and support of clandestine paramilitary organizations by the armed forces.

Aware of the existence of clandestine paramilitary organizations the Tupamaros through a series of activities exposed the connections between these organizations and the armed forces. In April of 1972, with the end of the truce, the Tupamaros 'executed' several members of the 'death squad' whose relationship with the authorities and armed forces was evident.[1] These paramilitary organizations continued to be active against individuals and organizations even after the Tupamaros' defeat.

Charges of torture and the armed forces' support of clandestine paramilitary organizations continued to be common in Uruguay during this period of time. Their existence was evidenced by different investigations conducted by national and international organizations. The clandestine paramilitary organizations became more active during Bordaberry's administration. Their primary goal was to

> create terror through armed attacks against the student movement, union militants, and opposition political leaders. They undoubtedly had a connivance with the police forces. The formation of the 'death squad' ('escuadrón de la muerte'), reiterating the experience of similar groups in Brazil and other countries in an

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[1]Among those murdered were an ex-government secretary, a member of the department of police intelligence and a marine officer. On the same day the Tupamaros sent to Congress and the media the declarations of an ex-police officer revealing the activities and some of the members of the 'death squad.' The Tupamaros attached to this declaration a list of names of individuals 'convicted' by the guerrillas.

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> attempt to annhilate the social fighters, was a further step in the escalation of violence by the armed forces.[1]

The armed forces not only retaliated against the Chamber of Deputies' unwillingness to lift the immunity of Mr. Erro, but also against the Senate attempt to investigate their activities.

> This growing tension between congress and the presidential-military confluence culminated in a military-backed presidential coup in the early morning hours of June 27, 1973. Bordaberry closed congress, prohibited the dissemination of any information implying dictatorial motives to the government, and empowered the police and armed forces to take whatever measures necessary to ensure continued public services.[2]

In his speech to the nation Bordaberry tried to legitimize the coup by blaming Congress for inefficiency, corruption, and conspiracy with the Tupamaros to destroy the regime. He outlined the new policies that would be directed towards the creation of a 'free-enterprise' economic system and the depoliticization of the labor and student organizations. The proposed reforms to depoliticize the union and student movements previously rejected by Congress would be implemented in order to eliminate the 'communist infiltration' and to insure they would not conspire against the regime.[3]

In response to the coup the National Workers Convention (CNT) decided to implement the contingency plans they had developed. They

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[1]Lustemberg, Uruguay, imperialismo y estrategia de liberación, p. 23.

[2]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 132.

[3]El País newspaper, June 29, 1973, pp. 4-6.

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called for a general strike[1] that lasted fifteen days, almost completely paralyzing the country. Through different decrees, militarizations, arrests, firings, etc., Bordaberry backed by the armed forces succeeded in breaking the general strike. Hundreds of political, student, and syndical leaders were arrested,[2] others emigrated. The National Workers Convention was declared illegal.

> Action against the public at large was limited until the night of July 9, when a peaceful demonstration by several thousand opponents of the regime was violently dispersed by the police and army with several individuals shot, scores injured, and hundreds arrested.[3]

From 1973 until today the armed forces continue to hold power in Uruguay. All political parties have been disbanded and repression continues against potential pockets of resistence. Thousands have emigrated from Uruguay. Civil liberties and freedom of the press have not yet been restored, unionism is prohibited, and some estimate that as many as about 10 percent of Uruguay's citizens are imprisoned.

Conclusions

Since Uruguay's independence, the traditional parties have dominated Uruguay's political process. The Blanco party's constituency

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[1]For a very detailed analysis of the general strike and its implications, see Lustemberg, Uruguay, imperialismo y estrategia de liberación. He also provides a day by day chronology of events from 1968 until the coup of June 1973.

[2]Among the arrested were the leader of the Blanco Party and others from the Colorado and opposition parties. Retired General Liber Seregni, former presidential candidate of the Frente Amplio, was also arrested together with many congressmen.

[3]Weinstein, Uruguay, the Politics of Failure, p. 133.

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included the more conservative sectors of Uruguay's population, mainly in the interior of the country. The Colorado party's constituency was composed mostly of the urban population. Although there were some ideological and membership differences between the Blanco and Colorado parties, both appealed and obtained votes from different segments of the population thus minimizing their differences.

The Colorado party that ruled continuously for ninety-three years until 1958 was responsible for the creation and development of the welfare state. José Batlle y Ordoñez was credited with being the father of Uruguay's welfare system. The rural population of Uruguay, which financed the welfare state, did not enjoy its benefits, however. Although Batlle nationalized most industries and public services, the land tenure system and agricultural production organization was left intact.

The historical antagonism between the traditional parties was mitigated to such an extent that a system of co-participation between the Blancos and the Colorados developed. Through a series of pacts between the traditional parties they insured their continuous control over most of the aspects of Uruguay's political and socio-economic systems. Batlle's philosophy and policies as well as those of his successors tied Uruguay's polity and economy closely together. The highest expression of this co-participation was achieved during the period of the national Executive Council (Colegiado).

The continuous constitutional reforms, the 'ley de lemas' and the 'pacto del chinchulín' assured both traditional parties of their unchallenged supremacy. While the 'ley de lemas' on the one hand

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created an incentive for dissidence and splinter groups inside the traditional parties, on the other hand it strengthened even further the two-party system by not allowing inner-party disagreements to weaken the traditional parties in the national elections. Factionalism inside the political parties enabled the traditional parties to get support from different segments of the population.

The 'exclusiveness' or 'coercion' of Uruguay's political system frustrated the continuous attempt by the minority groups to obtain a greater share of political power. This was demonstrated through historical analysis of the origins and development of the structural coercion in Uruguay's political system. Although the minority political groups could not influence the policies of the authorities directly, they did so, however, through the union and student movements more so than through the minority parties which we demonstrated were void of any meaningful political influence. This influence was felt much more strongly beginning in the 1950s with the deteriorating economic situation.

Increased support withdrawal from the incumbent Colorado authorities' policies that were unable to solve the economic crisis resulted in surprising political changes. The Blanco party and its leaders were also unable to turn the economy around. Continued support withdrawal from the authorities that were unable to meet the content and quantity of demands, was expressed in increasing labor and student unrest.

The failure of the minority parties to gain considerable influence, the intensification of the socio-economic crisis, and the

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growing workers' protest increased the level of repression and violence by the authorities. The politicization of the demands and the authorities' inability to meet those demands contributed to the spill-over effect of support withdrawal from the authorities to the regime. This support withdrawal from the regime was expressed by emigration, political and violent strikes, and demonstrations, as well as guerrilla warfare. These forms of violent political participation were an attempt by the different segments of the population to influence politics and public policy. The level of Tupamaro activity, violent strikes, and the like increased when traditional forms of political participation appeared to be ineffectual and later unavailable.

Continuous turnover of authorities and constitutional changes that were the result of agreements among the traditional parties in order to perpetuate their supremacy did not produce satisfactory policies. The real changes occurred only in the organization of the executive branch, which in a sense promoted 'changes without changing' or regime maintenance. Prolonged poor performance by the incumbent authorities led many segments of the population to realize that certain aspects of the performance were linked to various aspects of the regime such as the electoral process.

From 1950-1970 Uruguay followed a pattern of decreasing capabilities while expectations remained almost unchanged. This gap between capabilities and expectations continued to deepen during the years under study. As the capabilities of the system as a whole continued to decline over the years, greater pressure was directed at

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the political system in order to allocate the ever more scarce resources.

The authorities were unable to cope successfully with the increasing number and 'radical' content of the demands, because of their inability or unwillingness to change the organizational basis of Uruguay's political and economic systems. Neither of the traditional political parties could have done so without risking its own existence. This, in part, led to the internal fragmentation of the traditional parties. The weakening effects of this fragmentation process were minimized by the intricate pattern of relationships in Uruguay's political system which concentrated political and economic power in the hands of the traditional parties.

The minority parties were practically excluded as viable contenders for political power by virtue of the same constitutional arrangements that perpetuated the power of the traditional parties and the two-party system. In most of Uruguay's elections, the 'ley de lemas' produced distortions in the allocations of political power. These distortions favored only the traditional parties at the expense of the minority parties. The executive branch always belonged to the list of candidates that obtained a plurality of votes inside the traditional parties. This, however, only represented a small proportion of the electorate, usually ranging between 20 percent to 30 percent of the total vote cast.

These laws and party pacts, as we have demonstrated throughout this chapter, blocked the way of the minority parties trying to obtain a 'share of the pie.' Their influence was always minimized. This in

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part explains the creation of the Tupamaros, who reached the conclusion that through 'parliamentarism' and the union movement they would never be able to obtain a sizeable influence on the political system. The Tupamaros perceived the regime as being the main 'producer' of outputs and the authorities as the 'implementators.' Thus only a change in the regime could lead Uruguay to its 'recovery' or 'liberation.' The necessary changes in the regime according to the Tupamaros could only be achieved by the systematic use of political violence through urban guerrilla warfare.

The Tupamaros not only believed that political violence was justifiable, but also that it was likely to succeed. The Tupamaros viewed the regime as well as the authorities as illegitimate and directly responsible for their political frustrations. They perceived guerrilla warfare as the only means to political change in a regime that, due to its inner coercion, did not allow for peaceful alternatives to violent political participation. This attitude was strengthened by the prevailing political, socio-economic, and military setting of Uruguay in the 1960s. The Tupamaros' belief in the illegitimacy of the regime was fostered by the regime's inability to cope with popular discontent stemming from output failure. The 'attitudinal prism' of the Tupamaros will be systematically dealt with in Part III below.

The majority of the population, as evidenced by the results of the 1971 elections, continued to perceive the authorities as the 'active producers' of outputs. With increased repression by the authorities, the politicization of the socio-economic crisis (Chapter V), and the increasing influence of the Tupamaro activities (Chapter

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XI), the process of shifting support withdrawal from the authorities to the regime accelerated. This was a necessary condition for the growth of the Tupamaros into a serious contender for political power, as will be analyzed in Parts III and IV.

The presence of the Tupamaros on Uruguay's political scene as well as the corroding effects of continued support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime increased the pressure on the armed forces to intervene actively in the political process. The gradual intervention by the armed forces in Uruguay's political system resulted in the military takeover in 1973. This chapter analyzed the political setting for the creation and development of the Tupamaros. The next two chapters will study the influence of the socio-economic and military settings of Uruguay that favored the development and growth of the Tupamaros into a relevant political force.

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CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SETTING

SOCIAL FACTORS

Introduction

In Chapters II and III we analyzed the inner stress in Uruguay's political system. This stress produced a drop in the level of support for the authorities and the regime. We demonstrated that the perceived structural coercion in certain aspects of Uruguay's political system, mainly the electoral process, was an important variable in Uruguay's political setting leading to the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. In Chapters IV and V we will analyze economic and social conditions in Uruguay during the period under study. The economic and social situation has an important environmental influence that may account for some variance in political phenomena. The socio-economic situation is linked to the political system through the input of demands.

We maintain that environmental variables, including the socio-economic setting become politically relevant only to the extent that they are politicized. In Chapters IV and V we will test the proposition that the socio-economic crisis of the early 1950s accelerated the development and growth of the Tupamaros by increasing the level of support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the regime. We

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will argue, for example, that the deteriorating economic situation in Uruguay became a factor in the origins of the Tupamaro movement, only when it was politicized. This politicization process was mainly accomplished through the development of a national economy and the extended welfare system. The highly developed welfare system increased the interpenetation of economic and political conflict in Uruguay. Due to the tradition of democracy and the government's large role in the economy, most of the demands of labor, students etc. (even those that had a purely economic content) tended to be political in nature. These demands were directed at the regime and directly involved the incumbent authorities.

As the economy went into a state of crisis, a sense of political powerlessness developed (due to the inner-coercion and later repression in Uruguay's political system--see Chapters II and III). The feeling of political powerlessness together with a deteriorating economic situation led to widespread discontent, distrust of the incumbent authorities, and the regime. This offered the Tupamaros an opportunity to develop into a relevant contender for political power. The Tupamaros tried to achieve this growth by their deliberate strategy of fostering support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime while simultaneously trying to become the main recipient of the support withdrawn from the authorities and the regime. Their strategy of dual power was designed specifically for this purpose (see Chapters XI and XII).

The socio-economic system in Uruguay was one of the main sources of stress in the political system. Theoretically not all of the

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'disturbances'[1] in the socio-economic system caused stress in the political system. As defined earlier we will deal only with those disturbances that did cause stress and produced a decline in the level of support for the authorities and the regime. "Stress will be said to occur when there is a danger that the essential variables [of the political system] will be pushed beyond what we may designate as their critical range."[2]

The political system in Uruguay in the period under study was subject to stress that in part arose from the politicization of the severe socio-economic crisis. However, the intensity of the stress was not sufficient to cause the collapse of the political system. Most political systems have the capacity (or they develop it) to cope with stress.[3] "The authorities must be able to build or maintain structures that can contribute to the level of support by encouraging the adequate satisfaction of demands."[4] Satisfaction of demands is only one among many different ways available to the authorities to maintain an adequate level of support.

It is important to study the process by which social wants are transformed into demands. "By definition demands are articulated statements, directed toward the authorities, proposing that some kind of authoritative allocation ought to be undertaken."[5] Thus it is

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[1]For a definition of the concept of 'disturbance' see Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 22.

[2]Ibid., p. 24. [3]Ibid. [4]Ibid., p. 452.

[5]Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 120.

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only "when our social wants or hopes are voiced as proposals for decision and action on the part of the authorities--that we need label them as political demands."[1]

The social impact of the deep economic crisis in Uruguay was translated politically on the one hand by increasing support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities, the traditional parties, and the regime, and on the other hand by the politicization of specific environmental conditions favorable to the development of guerrilla warfare. An analysis of the most affected social classes and the social organization of the society will reveal the social composition of the Tupamaros (see Chapter VIII). The analysis of some aspects of Uruguay's social system is required in order to understand Uruguay's peculiar economic/political balance. The analysis of this relationship is necessary for the study of the politicization of the economic crisis leading to the development of the Tupamaros.

While most of Uruguay's economic power rested in the hands of the land-owners in the country-side, the political power increasingly shifted to the middle class located in Montevideo during the twentieth century. This relationship between economic and political power was created in part by the great demographic imbalance in favor of the urban population and the relative weakness of the landowners as a consequence of the crisis in the British empire. This trend toward increasing the middle class and the tertiary sector was very

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[1]Ibid., p. 122.

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significant in the consolidation of the 'Batllista' faction of the Colorado Party (see Chapter III).

The 'Batllismo' movement which on the one hand appealed to the middle class, on the other hand also appealed to the lower income sectors of the population through policies of 'nationalization,' labor laws, and welfare schemes. These policies strengthened the political basis of support for the welfare state. Many 'pro-labor' laws were approved in anticipation of the demands of the labor unions, thus obtaining their full support de facto. Uruguay, for example, was the first country in the American continent to adopt the '8 hour labor day,' in 1913. In 1917 the 'universal vote' was approved. Due to the 'ley de lemas' the labor unions began to exercise political influence through the traditional parties (see Chapter II).

The 'middle class' was ready to give those 'concessions' to the 'lower income classes' because their support was necessary in order to accelerate the shift of political power that in part still rested in the hands of the landowners (ranchers and farmers). The welfare system that was being developed in Montevideo was late in reaching the rural areas. The urban middle class continued to gain political power through the 'Batllista' faction in the Colorado Party, and also obtained the support of the 'lower' classes by means of establishing a welfare state.

The policies of 'nationalization' diminished the importance of foreign capital in national development. The expansion of national enterprises fostered the creation of a high civil service elite

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recruited mainly from the urban middle class that slowly replaced the 'landowners elite.' All those policies were implemented without changes in the 'core' of the rural economy, i.e., the land tenure system dominated by large latifundios. Thus, while political power was shifting from the rural to the urban elite, the economic bases remained unchanged. Batllismo developed a welfare system that expressed the interests of the urban middle class. Batle was very careful not to touch the traditional rural economic system of the country. He neither tried to nationalize the land nor to enforce the social laws on rural workers.

The deteriorating socio-economic situation was accentuated even more by two main factors: a) the immigration toward Montevideo of the rural population,[1] b) displacement of the active population toward the tertiary sector.[2] As a consequence of the economic crisis certain socio-economic laws that were applicable during prosperous times became a great burden on the economy. The welfare system began to collapse financially as well as organizationally leading to support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime. This in turn created a favorable setting for the development of the Tupamaros.

This and the following chapter will study some of the disturbances of the socio-economic environment that increased the stress in Uruguay's political system. This is relevant for understanding the drastic drop in support leading to the development and growth of the

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[1]See Table 15. [2]See Table 16.

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Tupamaros. This chapter will analyze the 'social factors' and Chapter V the 'economic factors.'

The Inter-penetration of the Economic and Political Systems Origins and Development of the Welfare State

We will deal with some elements of Uruguay's social system (including geographic and demographic composition and distribution of the population in the society), that are relevant for the study of the input of support for the regime and authorities. In order to understand Uruguay's actual social and economic system we must refer first to the origins of the welfare state. José Batlle y Ordoñez[1] began his presidency in 1904 and started to organize Uruguay as a welfare state.

Batlle is considered the 'founding father' of Uruguay's welfare system. His ideals were carried on by the Batllista faction of the Colorado party. Some of the social legislation of his period included the eight-hour day, worker's accident compensation, mandatory days of rest with pay each week, minimum wage, social security and retirement benefits, free, compulsory, secular, state supported education.

By 1925 Uruguay already had laws regulating an eight-hour work day, free education, workers compensations and insurance; juvenile labor was forbidden; a labor office was created. By approximately 1950

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[1]On the Batlle period see Roque Faraone, El Uruguay en que vivimos (Montevideo: Imprenta del Norte, 1969).

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other kinds of social benefits were introduced, for example, paid holidays, job compensation, 'asignaciones familiares,' and the like.

From the economic point of view, Batlle originated government monopolies in many sectors of the economy. This process was continued by the Batllista faction of the Colorado Party. The authorities' control of certain sectors of the economy was accomplished through the so-called 'autonomous agencies' (entes autónomos). By 1960 they controlled:

> railways, airlines, trucking, bus lines, petroleum refining and distribution, cement production, alcohol production and importation, meat packing, insurance, mortgage and commercial banking, maritime shipping, administration of the port of Montevideo, electricity, telephone and telegraph, water and sewage services.[1]

The control of these autonomous agencies was highly political (pacto del chinchulín, see Chapter II). Although they were characterized by inefficiency, corruption, and waste, their scope and impact on Uruguay's social and economic life was very great.

From the political point of view, as studied in the preceding chapters, during the Batlle period the 'collegiate executive' (Poder Ejecutivo Colegiado) was established by which the Colorado majority party shared power with the minority Blanco party.

The power of the Executive branch was very diluted due to the 'colegiado' system (National Council of Government). The Colegiado was conceived as a power-sharing arrangement between the two major

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[1]Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York: Stonehill Publishing Co., 1975), p. 330. For the study of the image of a CIA agent in Uruguay see the chapter in this book dedicated to the activities of the CIA in Uruguay.

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parties. It consisted of nine members, six from the majority party and three from the minority party. Political power was not only shared by the two major parties but also by different factions of each one of the parties. The different factions of the parties had their own platforms and organizations. The executive branch's ability to make decisions was considerably limited by its plurality, and that resulted in output failure (see Chapter III). The atomization of the executive branch was a safeguard against the abuse of power and a way of perpetuating the rule of the two main parties. The legislature was also very atomized.

Starting about 1954, the welfare system began to collapse financially, and the continued decline in the standard of living of the middle and lower classes precipitated a process of turmoil, constant agitation, strikes, and guerrillas, that dominated the national scene from 1960 to 1973. There were many reasons for the deep economic crisis in Uruguay such as the decline of world's prices for Uruguay's principal exports (beef, hides, wool), decreased capabilities for competition in international markets and policies of the authorities that dramatically increased the tertiary sector designed in part to alleviate unemployment and generate political support. The economic crisis will be studied in Chapter V.

By the late 1960s, the system of social security was financially unsound due to the economic crisis (reduced export trade, very high percentage of public employees which reached 53 percent in 1971[1],

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[1]Robert Moss, "Uruguay: Terrorism vs. Democracy," Conflict Studies, no. 14 (August 1971), p. 2.

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etc.); thus the welfare and educational state machinery became one of the main budgetary strains and burdens on the economy. The authorities were also increasingly unable to maintain their commitment to education. For example, Uruguay spent approximately 34 percent of its budget on education, but by 1970, due to the crisis, the authorities had a three million (£) deficit in debts to the University in Uruguay.[1]

At a glance it might appear that a country like Uruguay with such well developed social institutions would be least vulnerable to the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. Even though Uruguay enjoys such socially well developed institutions, Uruguay's economy was very 'underdeveloped' and flourished artificially as a consequence of World Wars I and II and the Korean War. The economic system of the country was not able to support the welfare state as will be studied in Chapter V. The social problems created by the socio-economic crises were reflected in the political process. This was probably the main reason for the growth of guerrilla warfare. The bureaucracy was amongst the first to feel the economic crisis, and this in part explained why the Tupamaros found support within the civil service.[2]

Most of Uruguay's rural sector dominated by the landowners controlled Uruguay's economy. The countryside was the core of Uruguay's economy. Political power, however, shifted to the middle

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[1]Ibid.

[2]For vivid accounts of the social impact of the economic crisis, see María Esther Gilio, La guerrilla Tupamara (Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1970), pp. 13-53.

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class located in Montevideo. This relationship between economic and political power was made possible by the great demographic imbalance in favor of the urban population and the relative weakness of the land-owners. Batlle exploited this situation by developing a welfare system that expressed the interests of the urban middle class, while leaving untouched the traditional rural economic system of the country. Uruguay's flourishing economy and the great European immigration, together with a process of rapid industrialization[1] resulted in a great increase in the middle class.[2] Uruguay's social problems became acute in 1954, and accelerated greatly in the '60s. It was the Korean War that temporarily permitted Uruguay to maintain its favorable position. But after the war was over, symptoms of the crises became visible (see Chapter V).

Sectoral Distribution of the Population

The sectoral distribution of the active population[3] can be considered an important link between the socio-economic environment and the political system. It was also a main source of stress on the Uruguayan political system. The estimates for Uruguay in regard to population in active age was relatively high, about 60 percent.[4] The

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[1]See Table 12. [2]See Table 13.

[3]It is important to differentiate between the population in active age and the active population proper. The former relates to those persons that according to their age are able to work; the latter refers to those persons actually holding jobs.

[4]The estimate is based on the population between the ages of 15-60 years old. See Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya, I: 55-65.

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actual active population in 1964 was estimated to be around 35 percent to 40 percent.[1] The population of Uruguay in 1964, according to sectors was divided as follows:[2] 28 percent in the primary sector; 24.5 percent in the secondary sector; and 47.3 percent in the tertiary.[3] (In the period under study the percentage of the tertiary sector continuously increased.) This sectoral distribution of the labor force was not the product of economic strength and development, but rather a direct consequence of its own weakness.

The large percentage of the tertiary sector in Uruguay was historically linked to the importance of commerce (commercialization and export of raw materials and import of finished goods). Montevideo, the largest city and capital of Uruguay, was for a long period of time one of the most important harbors of the area. Thus commerce dominated the national economic scene for a long period of time.

Other causes for the great increase in the tertiary sector could be attributed to the condition of the rural economy that displaced the

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[1]The difference depends on the definition of 'active population.' The lower figure is given by those that adopt the less enclosing definition, i.e., those that have a remunerative position. Ibid., p. 48.

[2]The primary sector is defined as agriculture, livestock farmers (cattle and sheep ranchers), fishing. The secondary sector includes construction, manufacturing industries, electrical energy. The tertiary includes commerce, public and private services, transportation, banking.

[3]Carlos Quijano, "Población activa y renta nacional del Uruguay," _Revista de Economía_, no. 42-44 (Montevideo: Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay, 1964), p. 343.

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active population, not because of development and increased productivity, but by the limitations imposed by the rural economic system. The system of 'land exploitation' in rural Uruguay was based mainly on 'extensive livestock farms' (cattle and sheep farmers) and 'extensive agriculture' of very few basic products. In this system very few people could take care of large areas--thus the inability to increase the rural labor force due to stagnation and non-rising productivity in the rural economy.

> The migration toward Montevideo (from the rural areas) originated from all the states [Uruguay was divided into nineteen states] but not homogeneously. It was more intense from those states where the contribution of livestock in the formation of the state budget was proportionally higher.[1]

The industrial sector in Uruguay for different reasons such as limited internal market capacity, high production costs, imports limitations on new machinery, inability to compete in the international market, etc. (see Chapter V), was able to absorb only a very limited amount of the labor force displaced from the primary sector.[2]

Because the tertiary sector was in close contact with the political system, mainly through the public administration and the autonomous services, they were very much affected by the economic crisis. The possibility of reducing the tertiary sector and its

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[1]Luis C. Benvenuto, in "La tierra y los hombres," Uruguay hoy, ed. Luis C. Benvenuto, Luis Macadar, Nicolas Reig, José E. Santias, Carlos Real de Azúa, Angel Rama, Carlos M. Moreno (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Argentina, 1971), p. 25. All quotations from this book are my translation from the original Spanish textbook.

[2]The stagnation of the primary and secondary sectors limited even more the quantity of consumers, thus constraining even more the already limited internal market.

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consequent burden on the national economy depended mainly on the ability to produce jobs in other sectors. This would have entailed major transformations in the rural economic sector and a major redistribution of the labor force. The Tupamaros demanded this type of socio-economic restructuring and redistribution and the authorities were not ready to implement it. This peculiar distribution of the labor force provided an important element for the politicization of the social condition in Uruguay.

Upward social mobility in Montevideo was low and the trend was diminishing.[1] There was a continuing increase in the percentage of the population holding 'salaried' positions to the detriment of those considered 'independent.' Due to the stagnation of the primary and secondary sectors of the economy, the only real possibility for social mobility, although very limited, was in the tertiary sector and in Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay.

Historically the rapid development of the middle class had important political consequences. "In 1908 about 25 percent to 30 percent of the population of Uruguay was already included in the middle class; in Montevideo the percentage was even higher . . . about 40 percent."[2] It is estimated that by 1908 about 36 percent of the active population was already in the tertiary sector. The tertiary

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[1]Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya, pp. 84-112 presents extensive tables with statistics in order to reach that conclusion.

[2]Ibid., p. 119.

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sector served as the 'safety valve' for the political control by the traditional parties.

The stagnation of the primary sector was mainly due to the land tenure system. Uruguay had a very high level of concentration of ownership of the land (latifundium).

> Some 5 percent of the latifundia holds about 60 percent of the land, while about 75 percent of the latifundia holds less than 10 percent of the land.--Batlle left untouched the 'latifundia-minifundia' rural economic system. Also because over 40 percent of the land was exploited by a very primitive lease/tenure system, there was very little incentive for rural capital formation and technological improvement.[1]

The upper class in the rural sector was very small and very well represented and organized politically through organizations like 'Asociación Rural' and the 'Rural Federation.' Although their economic holdings lay in the countryside, they usually resided in Montevideo and were actively involved in the commercial and financial life of the country, but very rarely in industry.[2]

The rural institutions, defending the interests of the rural elite (but claiming to defend the interest of rural society) succeeded in 'socializing' the population at large under the slogan 'the land is the basis of our economy.'[3] This in part explained the fact that for a long period of time this elite was regarded very favorably and

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[1]For a detailed account of the land tenure and lease system in Uruguay and its impact on the economic system, see Danilo Astori, Latifundio y crisis agraria en el Uruguay (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1971).

[2]Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Urguaya, p. 126.

[3]Children since school age are taught this basic premise. Ibid., p. 128.

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commanded a high level of support. When the economic situation deteriorated, demands for reorganization, redistribution, and restructuring of the rural land tenure system were voiced. Some of the first activities of the 'potential' Tupamaros were aimed at the implementation of those changes (see Chapter XI).

'Horizontal mobility' in Uruguay was high, especially from the rural to the urban areas. The rural migrants' lack of basic skills and preparation was part of the lower income classes in the cities. In this context the internal migration to the cities provided the authorities with a 'safety valve' against the threat of possible demands for basic changes in the socio-economic environment. To stop this internal migration implied intensification of stress on the political system. In order to cope and divert this threat the authorities 'absorbed' the displaced labor force into the tertiary sector, mainly the bureaucracy.

This was one of the major political reasons for the disproportionate growth of the tertiary sector, mainly the bureaucracy. The authorities were able to cope 'successfully' with the stress of the displaced labor force for more than seventy years by increasing the importance of the public sector in the socio-economic environment. Those were also years of economic prosperity. It is important to recall and emphasize that the welfare system did not reach the rural areas. The rural economy supported the welfare system. While the basic industries and services in the cities were 'nationalized' the rural economic system remained almost untouched during this entire period.

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Vertical mobility in rural Uruguay was almost nonexistent, and in the cities was achieved mostly through the public sector. The hope of upward mobility in the cities provided an incentive for rural migration to the cities. The potential rural migrant knew that with the same limited amount of resources he owned in the countryside, his standard of living in the city would improve in absolute (but not relative) terms due to the social welfare system (better education, health care, etc.) and the public services the level of which (quantitatively and qualitatively) was much lower in most of the rural areas, and almost nonexistent in other areas.

Social tensions and conflicts were aggravated during periods of economic stagnation. The authorities tried to reduce the social tensions, because of the threat that those social tensions might increase the level of stress to the political system leading to a decline in the level of support. By absorbing the manpower 'liberated' from the primary and secondary sectors the authorities sought to divert the stress. This 'solution' accelerated the process of galloping inflation (see Figure 3) which in turn aggravated even more the existing social tensions. Thus the authorities by trying to 'solve' the socio-economic problems helped to polarize the existing social tensions, thereby accelerating the economic crisis and its politicization. This socio-economic role assumed by the authorities was translated in part by political affiliations with the existing political parties and pressure groups (unions, etc.). The traditional parties favored the increase in the tertiary sector in order to avoid drastic changes in the socio-economic environment of the country. Thus

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while in the short run these policies helped to increase the level of support for the regime and the authorities, in the long run, however, they achieved the opposite result.

Another source of stress for the political system, which contributed to the decline in the level of support for the authorities was the financial collapse of the social security system. Uruguay is a country with very low birth and mortality rates. One of the consequences of this process was the 'aging' of the population, i.e., the percentage of people that belonged to the upper age brackets increased in relation to the overall age composition of the society.[1] This phenomena had a significant impact on the socio-economic situation of the country and it became politicized through the social security system (pensiones and jubilaciones) and aggravated by inflation and urbanization.

This trend caused severe problems in the national budget. In 1953 it was estimated that the retirees (jubilados and pensionistas) comprised about 200,000 people, while the active population comprised about 1,000,000 people, or 40 percent of the total population.[2] Many of the retirees were under the age of sixty and were able to retire due to the social security system which encouraged early retirement (in part to alleviate the problem of unemployment and underemployment).

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[1]Ibid., p. 57 presents some statistics regarding the age composition of Uruguay. See also United Nations, The Population of South America 1950-1980 (New York: United Nations, 1955).

[2]Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Urguaya, p. 60.

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The problem was aggravated when the economy became incapable of supporting this system.

The real income of the retired people was reduced by more than one-third of its original value[1] due to inflation. This created constant social tensions among this large group of the population that constantly demanded pay raises from the authorities in order to keep up with inflation. The authorities were unable to meet this demand, thus a large number of retirees returned to the labor market (legally or illegally) in order to supplement their income, adding another dimension to the problem of unemployment.

The active population at large opposed an increase in the retirement age. The increase in the age of retirement can only be efficient when accompanied by developmental policies geared toward the expansion of the primary and secondary sectors. The authorities were unable to implement radical changes in the economic system of the country.

The economic stagnation of the primary and secondary sectors combined with the disproportionate increase of the tertiary sector and the number of retirees, accelerated the socio-economic crises. This process strengthened the activism of the labor unions who saw their real wages and mobility drastically reduced. The 'aging' of the population became an obstacle for the solution of the problems that created it.

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[1]Ibid., p. 62.

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Politically Uruguay was a 'moderate' country where neither the 'extremes' from the 'right' nor from the 'left' were very strong. The two main political parties were able to obtain the support of the vast majority. But while Uruguay enjoyed this apparent political tranquility, the labor unions were very active and powerful, especially during periods of economic stagnation. Sometimes the labor unions, including the union of public employees, were able to master such support for their demands that they at times conflicted with the policies of the incumbent authorities. The unions, in defense of what they considered their rights, committed 'violent' political activities (strikes and demonstrations).

Until about 1965 the demands of the unions were mostly economic, but in the process they became political. Separate demands were usually voiced by the individual unions, but later these unions organized and cooperated. Also due to the fact that among the largest and strongest unions were the 'Union of Public Employees,' the 'Meat-packers Union' (frigoríficos) and the unions of the 'autonomous agencies,' their economic demands were directed toward the authorities, thus politicizing the economic demands and causing stress to the political system.

In a sense the labor unions were for the most part concerned only with the maintenance of the existing political system that enabled them to hold their positions. They did not demand a basic reorganization, or restructuring of resources in the society. In the process of negotiating with the incumbent authorities the union leaders and their constituencies became aware that some changes in the socio-

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economic setting were required in order for them to maintain their previous position in the system. At this political juncture most of the unions withdrew support not only from the incumbent authorities, but also from some aspects of the regime in an overt-covert form. While the capabilities of the incumbent authorities dropped, the expectations of the majority of the population remained the same, i.e., to restore their previous position in the socio-economic environment and the political system.

While from the private sector there was an indirect call for the intervention of the authorities, the call from the public sector was direct. The acceleration and politicization of the socio-economic crises produced many violent outbursts which the authorities were for a short time able to contain. With the deepening of the economic crisis the authorities' ability to meet the demands (quantitatively and qualitatively) decreased.

The politicization of the crisis enhanced the process of support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the regime. Those that blamed the crisis on the performance of the incumbent authorities withdrew specific support from the authorities. This is evidenced by the Blanco victory (see Chapter III). Those that perceived the inability of the incumbent authorities to perform due to the existing regime withdrew their support not only from the authorities, but also from the regime, as was the case with the Tupamaros. This is evidenced by the documents and the activities of the Tupamaros aimed at fostering this process of support withdrawal (see Chapters IX and XI). The continuous fragmentation of the traditional political parties, the

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outbreak of guerrilla activities and the strengthening of the Tupamaros were some of the indicators of support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime.

The intervention of the authorities in the socio-economic environment in Uruguay was 'ingrained' or 'intrinsic' in the organization of the regime due in part to the nationalizations of major industries and services as well as the increasing importance of the public sector. The vast majority of the urban population in Uruguay was socialized into looking to the authorities for the solutions of the socio-economic disturbances. The authorities assumed that responsibility by enhancing, through the years, a highly developed social welfare system.

During the years of economic prosperity the authorities and the regime obtained wide support, legitimizing its political power and consolidating the two traditional parties. This is evidenced by the result of the national elections (see Tables 3-10). But when the socio-economic situation deteriorated, so did the level of support for the regime, the authorities, and their respective political parties. This was evidenced by Terra's coup in 1930 (Chapter III). This coup in a sense was a prelude to the political developments of Uruguay in the 1970s.

Geographical Distribution of the Population

As discussed earlier, the deteriorating socio-economic situation was aggravated by the geographical distribution of the population.

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Historical as well as economic and political reasons (see "The Inter-Penetration of the Economic and Political Systems," above) contributed to Uruguay's distorted distribution of the population. The politically motivated welfare system in Montevideo accelerated the process of rapid urbanization at the expense of the rural population. The implications for support withdrawal and the development of an urban guerrilla group will be analyzed in this section.

The concept of 'population implosion' introduced by Hauser[1] is useful for our study. It refers to the "increasing concentration of the world's peoples onto a relatively small proportion of the earth's surface, a phenomenon perhaps better known as urbanization or metropolitanization." The greater the population implosion 'increasing concentration in cities' (Hauser uses the term for world population; in this study we use it for national population) or 'urbanization,' the greater the probabilities are for the outbreak and success of urban guerrilla warfare.

Montevideo is not only the largest city in the country, it is also the capital and the center of political activity. The gravitation to the capital city is so large, its size so disproportionate in relation to the other cities ranked below in population that the expression 'montevideanization' of the country is preferred over the term 'urbanization.' This was the main reason for the Tupamaros' concentration in Montevideo (see Chapters XI and XII).

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[1]Philip N. Hauser, "The Population Explosion, Implosion, and Displosion," mimeographed paper, University of Chicago, 1970, pp. 1-4.

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In 1963 Montevideo had a population of approximately 1,160,000 inhabitants. The second largest city in Uruguay was Salto with a population of approximately 58,000 inhabitants. Tables 11 and 15 provide us with the population distribution in Uruguay according to the size of the populated centers. From Table 11 we learn that the population of Montevideo is larger than all the populated centers in Uruguay excluding those with a population of 250 inhabitants, thus the magnitude of the 'montevideanization' of Uruguay is explicit.

Urbanization in Uruguay relates also to the interior of the country and not only to the capital Montevideo. Uruguay is divided into nineteen states (departmentos) ten of which have more than 40 percent of their population concentrated in the states' capitals. Three of these ten states have more than 60 percent of their inhabitants in their capital cities. "It is no exaggeration to affirm that Uruguay's countryside continues to be a desert, but--the irritant paradox is--it is a desert of fertile land and is insufficiently exploited."[1]

In order to dramatize even more the urbanization situation in Uruguay, the twenty-eight centers with populations over ten thousand contain about 70 percent of the total population (see Table 11). This was the main reason for the Tupamaros' choice of urban over rural guerrilla warfare.

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[1]Luis C. Benvenuto, "La tierra y los hombres," Uruguay hoy, pp. 25-26.

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One of the by-products of the process of urbanization was the centralization of key strategic sectors; thus a very small number of people could paralyze massive services. For example an explosion in a telephone central, or computer terminal, or a central station of energy, could paralyze a large sector of the phones, or electricity, of the city. The guerrilla fighters were aware of the vulnerabilities of the urbanization process as stated by Carlos Marighella, "the railways, . . . the highways, . . . the phones and telegraphic lines, . . . the means of transportation and communications, . . . the pipelines, . . . , etc., must be attacked.[1] Thus we can assume that the greater the centralization, the more vulnerable the regime, the more effective could be the guerrilla activities (if effectiveness is measured by the quantity of persons involved). In many of the airports in countries where guerrilla groups exist, or where there exists the threat of activities such as plane hijackings, strengthened controls evolved causing delays in flights, discomfort for passengers, and so on. This has also happened in other countries where guerrilla groups did not exist, but the suspicion and threat that they would use airports as bases of activities has caused similar preventive measures. The delivery of letter-bombs is a clear example of the use guerrillas can make of mass services:

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[1]Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual del Guerrillero Urbano," in Teoría y acción revolucionarias (S.A. Mexico: Editorial Diógenes, 1971), p. 106.

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> the use of telephones and mail to announce false leads to the police and to the government, including announcements of the planting of bombs and acts of terrorism in public offices or other places, threats of kidnapping and murder.[1]

Engels, Debray, Castro, Guevara, and Mao, do not believe in the possibilities of urban guerrilla warfare. Their ideas were based on the failure of urban guerrilla warfare in the past, but perhaps the processes and developments of the late twentieth century point to the city as the principal area for guerrilla warfare. Martin Oppenheimer in his book, Urban Guerrilla, concludes that there is little possibility of successful guerrilla warfare in the United States. Although developed countries such as the United States can provide techniques to control and repress guerrilla warfare in the developing countries, they cannot prevent the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in these countries.

Urban guerrilla warfare can be viewed by the guerrilla group as a strategy (the main and principal instrument for struggle) as is the case of the Tupamaros in Uruguay, or as a tactic for helping the rural guerrilla through the dispersion of the government forces, etc., as is the case of Carlos Marighella.

> We must make of the urban guerrilla an instrument of disturbance, distraction, and retention of the armed forces . . . to avoid the concentration of their repressive activities against the rural guerrilla.[2]

Urban guerrilla warfare has generally taken the form of terrorist activities (see Chapter XI).

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[1]Ibid., p. 110.

[2]Carlos Marighella, "Sobre problemas y principios estratégicos," Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 12.

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As a consequence of this 'urbanization' trend in Uruguay, Abraham Guillén concluded that the "revolutionary war should be eminently urban and not rural, in countries where more than 50 percent of the national population live in the cities.[1]

The process of social polarization and support withdrawal (with the consequent reduction of the middle class) that began in the late '50s because of the socio-economic crisis, was accelerated by the urbanization process.[2] A great expansion of the 'villas miserias' (slums) increased discontent among various sectors of the population (students, workers, public servants), increased the level of tension in the social system, and caused stress on the political system.

Another important aspect of the social system in Uruguay was the level of frustration. The level of frustration of a social system, which many theorists believe to be more a reflection of rates of change than of levels of system development, may be a facilitative condition for guerrilla warfare. Two propositions in particular make use of the assumption that at the (analytic) level of the social system a low ratio of want satisfaction to want formation will result in high frustration. In one, derived by Davies from de Toqueville and Brinton, it is contended that the higher the long-term rate of achievement and aspirations preceding a revolution, and the sharper the reversal of

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[1]Abraham Guillén, Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana, 2nd ed. (Montevideo: Ediciones Liberación, 1969), p. 87.

[2]Due also to the 'latifundista' land tenure system, see Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 18.

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expectations immediately prior to the revolution, i.e., the greater the 'revolutionary gap,' the greater the intensity of the revolution.[1]

Uruguay seemed to be a case where the expectations of the people did not increase in absolute terms, but the capabilities of the political system to fulfill their demands decreased drastically (see Chapter V). In relative terms the situation that was created was that of a large gap between expectations and capabilities, increasing the feeling of 'relative deprivation,' but mainly 'political powerlessness' due to the maintenance of the status-quo through the 'ley de lemas' (see Chapter II).

In a second proposition, developed with particular reference to regional development in Brazil by Soares, it is argued that the adoption of modern life ways and the creation of new wants in the process of urbanization will result in systemic frustration unless there is a corresponding growth in productivity.[2] Where productivity falls behind social mobilization there exists an 'urbanization-industrialization lag.' These propositions have special reference to

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[1]James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review 27 (1962): 5-19. Tanter and Midlarsky tested Davies' theory and obtained fairly high correlations on the revolutionary gap for Asian and Middle Eastern countries, but an insignificant correlation for Latin America. See Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 1967, Table 6.

[2]Glaucio A. D. Soares, "The Political Sociology of Uneven Development in Brazil," in Revolution in Brazil, ed. I. L. Horowitz (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 164-195; and Glaucio A. D. Soares, "Economic Development and Class Structure," in Class, Status, and Power, ed. R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 190-199.

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Uruguay's society since it had tended to urbanize rapidly without real systemic changes in the economy.

One further strategic factor was the presence of sectors within a population that were likely to be a source of recruitment or at least support for the guerrilla group, as a consequence of their frustrations, discontent, economic deprivation, and political alienation. One sector, that of university students and holders of university degrees, made up a large part of the guerrilla forces not only of Uruguay, but also of Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.[1]

> Virtually all revolutionary organizations were composed both of persons 1) who had been previously socialized to accept a political system from which they became alienated, and 2) whose loyalties had never been effectively tied to the polity.[2]

One of the reasons why intellectuals became alienated was that they became frustrated when their skills were not fully utilized by a society slowly adapting to modern technology. When they were underemployed, they were dissatisfied at work and this led to a revolutionary potential.[3] In this context Uruguay was a good example.

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[1]James Petras, "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru," in Latin America: Reform or Revolution, ed. J. Petras and M. Zeitlin (New York: Fawcett Publications Inc., 1968), pp. 329-369.

[2]David C. Schwartz, "Political Alienation: The Psychology of Revolution's First State," in Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research, ed. Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted R. Gurr (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 58-67.

[3]Many works have been published in regard to alienation, see for example Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," pp. 67-85. He sustains a frustration-aggression-displacement theory. Other useful

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Many young intellectuals in Uruguay became leaders of the guerrilla movement, including its main leader Raúl Sendic (lawyer). Even though the first Tupamaros were of mixed backgrounds (cane-cutters, disappointed unionists, frustrated political 'leftists,' and others) they

> were essentially a middle-class movement recruited from the ranks of disaffected students, minor civil servants and professional men[1] . . . The Tupamaros were the progeny of an overwhelmingly urban society and they appealed both to romantic middle class youth and to white-collar workers whose economic expectations had been disappointed.[2]

Another sector, the middle peasants and the poor peasantry had been the object of much theoretical speculation but remained apathetic

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works on the subject include Gaylord C. LeRoy, "The Concept of Alienation," in Revolution and Alienation, ed. Herbert Aptheber (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 1-14 and Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review, vol. 24, no. 6 (December 1959).

[1]Moss, "Uruguay: Terrorism versus Democracy," p. 4.

[2]Police dossiers on the 150-odd Tupamaros arrested in the years since 1965 reveal the 'bourgeois' origins of a majority of the guerrillas and the fact that several had led double lives as highly regarded professional men. Captured Tupamaros include Julio Marenales Saenz, a professor of fine arts; Pedro Almiratti, a prominent engineer and building contractor; José Manuel Lluveras, another engineer; Raúl Bidegain Creissig, an advanced student of agronomy, the son of a police chief, and a member of a very wealthy family; and a significant number of journalists, bank employees, and minor bureaucrats. There has also been some support from the lower ranks of the clergy, although not on the same scale as in Brazil or Argentina. It would be fair to generalize that the rank and file of the movement are young, with some university education, and of middle-class antecedents. See Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," p. 17.

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or hostile to actual guerrilla movements.[1] Wolf[2] argued that the middle peasant, i.e., the peasant who owned a small plot of land, found himself in uncertain social and economic relations because of his personal autonomy (relative to the tenant farmer) and his dependence on the market for a single cash crop. When market conditions deteriorated he was sufficiently insecure and autonomous to support a revolutionary movement. In Uruguay the rural areas were almost alien to the Tupamaro movement and the peasants' attitude was apathetic (or even hostile) to the guerrilla movement with some exceptions in the northern part of the country (Artigas). From the record of student participation one social condition favorable to the outbreak of guerrilla warfare could be considered, namely that the higher the number of radical university students in a country, the higher the probabilities for an outbreak of guerrilla warfare.

It is possible that there was a relationship between the age of the population and the process of guerrilla formation. A priori, it was possible to observe that guerrillas developed in 'young age population'[3] countries, but it was hard to establish if there was or

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[1]David D. Burks, Insurgency in Latin America, prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, January 15, 1968 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1968).

[2]Eric Wolf, "Peasant Problems and Revolutionary Warfare," Third Annual SSC, New York City, September 10, 1967; and "Peasant Traditionalism and Modern Revolutions," annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Washington DC, December 1, 1967.

[3]Uruguay suffered a great loss in young people who left the country.

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was not a causal relationship between the two factors. It was also possible to observe that young people and students were involved in guerrilla groups in countries like Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, Guatemala, Ecuador, etc.[1]

In 1946 the percentage of university students in Uruguay was among the highest in the world.

> Solari established that there was one university student for each 222 inhabitants, which was four times higher than in England (which had one student for each 885 inhabitants). In France the proportion was about one student for each 500 inhabitants.[2]

But while the number of students that were admitted to the University was increasing, the number of graduates was decreasing. The percentage of those graduates that were underemployed was also increasing.[3] The choice of professions was very much directed toward obtaining a position in the bureaucracy, one of the few places where positions were available due to stagnation of the primary and secondary sectors. The majority of professionals in Uruguay exercised bureaucratic functions.[4]

Young people have more incentive to participate in guerrilla activities because for them the benefits are higher while the costs are lower. The benefits are higher for the following reasons: first, a

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[1]According to Marighella, "the great majority of the militants in the revolutionary movement are under the age of twenty-five," in "Entrevista con Carlos Marighella publicada por la revista francesa Front" (November 1969), Teoría y Acción Revolucionarias, p. 134.

[2]Aldo Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya (Montevideo: Editorial Arca, 1965), II: 26.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., p. 27.

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young person generally owns less resources than an older person since he has not had the opportunity to accumulate resources. Second, if the redistribution desired by the guerrilla movement occurs, the young person will benefit from a longer stream of additional income due to the redistributed resources he will receive. (The stream covers the remaining work life, which is longer for a young person.) Therefore, since a young person will generally be among the beneficiaries of the redistribution, and those benefits will be long-lasting, he has more incentive to withdraw support from the regime and the authorities and participate in guerrilla activities.

The direct costs to young people are lower, since the value of their time is lower. This is particularly true for students whose investment pace is regulated by school rules and may therefore have periods of low productivity in study so that the value of their time is relatively low. The time value of a working person is his earning rate, in equilibrium, and the earnings of a person while he is young are lower.

The value of a young persons' time is also lower because he is generally not responsible for dependents. Students may also be more inclined to attach value to the social benefits of the revolutionary activity,[1] even beyond their own immediate interest. They may also be more interested in the future of their own society. Students also

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[1]For an analysis of the relationship student-guerrilla, see Oscar Dueñas Ruiz, Tupamaros, libertad o muerte (Bogotá: Ediciones Mundo Andino, 1971), pp. 97-102, and Guillén, Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana, pp. 127-178.

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form a rather homogeneous group[1] which is able to articulate distinct demands. However, their percentage in the population is low, and they cannot obtain very much through the voting mechanism. They will therefore be 'tempted' by guerrilla organizations.

Conclusions

The social impact of the deep economic crisis in Uruguay was translated politically on the one hand by increasing support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the traditional parties, and on the other hand by the politicization of specific environmental conditions favorable to the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. A study of the social origin of the Tupamaros reveals that they mostly belong to the most affected social 'classes,' and the social structure of the society. Most of the Tupamaros' active members were students, 'white collar' employees, liberal professionals, workers, and the like, i.e., a middle class composition par-excellence.

The Tupamaro relation with the interior of the country was very weak. The rural population in Uruguay represented approximately 15 percent of the total population. Essentially they were alienated and isolated from the political and economic developments of Montevideo. They were least touched by the welfare state. They did not have any 'class consciousness' and were politically inactive, with the exception

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[1]Generally, members of guerrilla groups are also members of the same 'age group,' and we must analyze to what extent the age composition of the population has an effect in the outbreak or developing of a guerrilla warfare, which age is the 'crucial' age, from where the recruits come, why they join, and so forth.

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of the '<u>cañeros</u>' (cane-cutters) in the north part of the country, who continued to supply recruits to the Tupamaros. It was here where Sendic started the Tupamaro movement.

The urban middle class of the small towns in the interior of Uruguay[1] was extremely conservative[2] and attached to the 'traditional order' and the 'Uruguayan way.' Opposition by this segment of the population to guerrilla warfare was one of the main obstacles to the Tupamaros' activities in the interior of the country.

The main stronghold of the Tupamaros was within the urban population of Montevideo. In general and a priori[3] it seemed that the population that was under twenty years of age tended to be favorable to the Tupamaros. They perceived the Tupamaros as a viable alternative to the incumbent authorities. For them the 'regime' was the main reason for widespread and continuous economic, social and political deterioration of the country. This will be analyzed in detail in Chapters X and XI. The middle aged population (between thirty and fifty) had mixed feelings about the Tupamaros, and their attitude probably depended more on other factors (as occupation, social 'class,' etc.) than on the age variable.

The support of the Tupamaros by Montevideo's 'middle classes' was not homogeneous either. For example, the merchants in general

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[1]For example, Paysandú and Salto with 50,000 and 57,000 inhabitants respectively. See Figure 2.

[2]It is important to remark that a great percentage of the votes for the 'Blanco' party comes from this section of the population.

[3]According to my observations in Montevideo till 1967 and then in 1969, 1971, 1975, and 1976.

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believed that the disorder, tension, and violence caused by the Tupamaros was one of the main reasons for the economic crisis.[1] They supported a certain set of authorities that would be able to restore order as a pre-condition for 'prosperity.' The Tupamaros found strong support mainly among the intellectuals, liberal professionals, students, bureaucracy, and the public sector.

The students (most of them from the 'middle class')[2] were very dynamic and politicized, and as a consequence their support was not only quantitatively but also qualitatively important to the Tupamaro movement. It is important to note that the University in Uruguay (including students and professors) was one of the main 'legal bastions' of opposition against the authorities' repressive measures, thus ideologically a tacit 'common language' existed between the Tupamaros and the University.[3]

In respect to the working class, their support of the Tupamaros was not homogeneous either. It was amongst the working class that the impact of the Communist party was felt mainly through the unions (see Chapter II). The Tupamaros were able to obtain strong support in some

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[1]Many activities of the Tupamaros were in fact directed toward the deterioration of the economic situation of the country. See Chapter XI.

[2]According to Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 76, the middle class students were about 48 percent, and 12 percent from the 'popular classes' in 1969.

[3]The students were active also against censorship, and repression. They enjoyed academic, administrative, and financial autonomy, but in part it was lost as a repressive measure applied by the authorities to curb the student unrest.

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syndicates, but not in the Labor Federation. Although the working class withheld support from the incumbent authorities and some aspects of the regime, they were not ready to lend their support to the Tupamaros, but a great deal of 'passive resistence'[1] and 'sympathy' (without involvement) was given by the working class to the guerrilla movement.

The social system of the country and the high concentration in Montevideo (in terms of population, political centers, etc.) were some of the main reasons for the Tupamaros' early decision to choose urban over rural guerrilla warfare. It was in Montevideo where the impact of the economic crisis and its consequent social and political disturbances were greatly felt, thus creating a more favorable environment for the outbreak and growth of the guerrilla movement. Chapter V will be devoted to the study of the economic factors that favored the development of the Tupamaro urban guerrilla warfare.

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[1]In the sense 'if you do not do anything for it, do not do anything against it.'

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CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SETTING

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Introduction

Chapter IV studied the long-term social factors that created a favorable setting for the development of an urban guerrilla warfare. We demonstrated that the development of the welfare system produced distortion in Uruguay's social setting. We argued that the welfare system on the one hand was established in order to consolidate the political power of the traditional parties, mainly the Colorado party. The traditional parties by means of the 'ley de lemas,' the 'pacto del chinchulín,' the development of the welfare system, and the disproportionate increase in the tertiary sector, were able to maintain a high level of support towards the authorities and the regime as evidenced by the relative social calm and the election results (see Chapters II and III). On the other hand, during extended periods of economic recession the authorities were unable to maintain the same level of support towards themselves and the regime. As a consequence of the economic crises the welfare system and the public sector became unaffordable. The middle class and the public sector are the most affected sectors leading to support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime.

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This was evidenced by Terra's coup in the '30s and the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in the '60s. The deteriorating economic situation was politicized mainly through the channels of the welfare system and the public sector of the economy.

This chapter will deal with the economic crisis. The politicization of the economic crisis was one of the main reasons for the growth of the Tupamaros' activities during this period of time, i.e., the rigidity of the regime and the inability of the authorities to maintain the liberal traditions and welfare state institutions in a period of economic decline. This background of economic decay and increasing social unrest caused a high level of stress in Uruguay's political system leading to a decline in the level of support for the authorities and the regime. It also enabled the Tupamaros to develop from a small group into a serious contender for political power.

Background of the Economic Crisis

To be able to understand the development and growth of the Tupamaro guerrilla activities it is necessary to look closely at the politicization of the deteriorating economic crisis in Uruguay and its impact on the input of support from various sectors of the population.[1]

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[1]A detailed analysis of the economic process of Uruguay is out of the scope of this study. For different detailed studies concerning the economic processes in Uruguay see the bibliography.

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Uruguay had enjoyed prosperity as a consequence of World War I, World War II, and the Korean War which produced increased demands for meat and wool. This resulted in higher exports and higher revenues. It was during these prosperity periods that the welfare system developed and consolidated. The key sector of Uruguay's economy was livestock (see Figure 8), but the revenues from beef and wool exports were not reinvested in the rural sector, instead they were invested in the development of related industries[1] (frozen meat, canned meats, etc.), but especially in the financial and commercial sectors of the economy (see Table 12).

The development of Uruguay's rural economy was historically linked to the increased demand of beef and raw materials (wool, hides, etc.) in the world market (see Table 14). This early dependence on the world market demand also 'molded' the mode of production and organization of Uruguay's rural economy (latifundia and extensive land use). Technological improvements were not introduced in the livestock farms until the 1930s. Agricultural production developed as a secondary activity (see Table 18).

Fluctuations in the world market demand for beef, wool, and hides, determined the internal balance of production of these basic products. Table 17 and Figure 8 indicate that in spite of fluctuations in the demands for these products they always comprised the bulk of Uruguay's exports.

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[1]Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 19.

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From 1900 to 1930 due to these exports Uruguay enjoyed economic prosperity. During this period of time Uruguay was the recipient of large amounts of foreign capital (mainly from England). This capital was invested in the development of industries designed to increase the export capabilities (railroads, meat freezing, textile, and the like, see Table 12). It was during this period of economic prosperity that José Batlle y Ordoñez developed the welfare state in Uruguay, shifting the political power to Montevideo. The basic industries were later nationalized.

The political system became directly involved in the socio-economic environment. This dynamism of public sector intervention was encouraged by the period of economic growth. The authorities began to take command of the economic surplus that was distributed among the urban population through the welfare state mechanisms and the newly created public services (see Table 16). The expansion of the traditional functions of the state and the nationalization of the basic industries and services were an important part of the Batllista program.[1] Through these programs they were able to maintain a high level of support for the authorities and the regime evidenced by almost one hundred years of uninterrupted Colorado rule (see Chapter III).

The Uruguayan authorities by means of different economic policies (taxation over imports, fixing the rate of exchange in relation to the dollar, reduction of public expenditures, freezing

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[1]Luis Macadar, Nicolás Reig, José Enrique Santias, "Una economía Latinoamericana," in Uruguay Hoy, p. 50.

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of salaries, and the like) were able to deal economically with the recession of the '30s. Politically the recession of the '30s produced a drop in the level of support for the authorities and the regime. This was evidenced by the constant turmoil unprecedented in Uruguay's history. The traditional parties coped with this support withdrawal through a 'pact of the parties' leading to Terra's coup until the reversal of the economic situation (see Chapter III). At about the same time livestock and agricultural sectors introduced technological innovations into their means of production, thus creating a rise in productivity. The energy and textile industries became productive and competitive. Between 1920-1930 a great european immigration to Uruguay provided 'human reserves' to be used by the accelerated industrialization process.

This period of prosperity created by World War I was accelerated by World War II. The benefits acquired during this period resulted in a rapid increase in the industrial sector (see Table 12). Some of the most dynamic industries were the textiles, food, and electricity. This prosperity was reflected in a great increase in the 'middle class' (see Table 13). Simultaneously, the authorities greatly expanded the areas of education, socialized medicine, social security, and family allocations. The Korean War enabled this prosperity and welfare expansion to continue until 1954, when the symptoms of potential economic crisis began to be felt. The crisis has accelerated since 1960.

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The Economic Crisis

After the Korean War, the international prices of meat and wool began to fluctuate continuously thus creating large deficits in the commercial balance of payments and a drastic drop in Uruguay's gold and dollar reserves (see Table 19). Meat and wool accounted for about 76 percent of Uruguay's exports.[1] By about 1955 Uruguay began to experience a new phenomenon, that of economic stagnation.

Most of Uruguay's land was allocated to livestock (see Table 18). Historically the proportion of land devoted to livestock was very large. Further economic expansion in this sector could not be achieved by the use of more land for livestock. This could be accomplished by the introduction of new technology or by the reorganization of the rural economic system.

The land tenure/lease system was left untouched and technological improvements were not introduced in the twenty years from 1940 to 1960. This triggered the economic and social problems discussed in the earlier chapter (rural migration, growth of the tertiary sector, etc.). Industrial production also slowed down. In 1963, for example, industry functioned at about 50 percent of its productive capacity.[2]

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[1]Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence (London: Temple Smith, 1972), p. 212. See Figure 8.

[2]Macadar, Reig, Santias, "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 84.

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In 1969 due to 'unsanitary conditions' in the meat packing plants, the British authorities placed a ban on imports of Uruguayan beef. Despite this ban Uruguay increased its meat exports in 1970, but at a very high social cost due to a drastic cutback in internal meat consumption.

The lack of technological improvements in the stock farm and agriculture sectors led to stagnation in the production.[1] Table 14 shows the relative deterioration of the situation, combined with a decline in world market prices and natural disasters (floods in 1959, plagues in 1962, 1965) that caused an immense loss in cattle and sheep. These accelerated the economic crisis. Agricultural production also declined drastically. For example, by 1969, sugar beet production had fallen by 55 percent and the acreage under wheat had shrunk by nearly 40 percent.[2]

Faced with this new situation the policy of the authorities was to tax imports heavily in an effort to reduce the balance of payment deficit. This policy had negative effects on the industrial sector due to its dependence on imported raw materials and inputs and the high cost of renewing installations with imported equipment (see Figure 9). Many small factories stopped their operations and the big factories slowed down their production thus increasing unemployment and social

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[1]One sheep in Uruguay produced between 3.5-3.9 kilos of wool and in New Zealand, for example, it produced 5.0 kilos. Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 19.

[2]Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence, p. 213.

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unrest. The rate of gross reinvestment in the economy as a whole decreased between 1955 and 1970 (see Table 20).

Simultaneously, the authorities tried to increase exports by repeated devaluation of the Uruguayan peso (see Figure 6). At the same time they imposed a high export tax in an effort to smooth the effects of increased exports on the internal price of meat. That policy caused much 'organized' smuggling of cattle to Brazil where stock farmers were able to obtain better prices for their cattle, thus causing an increase in the price of meat in the internal market.

> The cattle and sheep ranchers resisted taxation to support the Montevideo government bureaucracy and welfare system. The result in recent years had frequently been for ranchers to withhold wool and cattle from the market or to sell their products contraband--usually across the unguarded border to Southern Brazil.[1]

This evidenced the drop in specific support for the authorities.

Even though one of the reasons for the repeated devaluations of the peso was to improve the economy by favoring exports, it had a bad psychological effect, i.e., the people thought that the real value of their money was falling (see Figure 10).

This situation of continuous economic deterioration led to a large outflow of capital from Uruguay to other countries. Foreign companies were reluctant to invest in Uruguay, due to the uncertainty caused by the social and political instability (strikes that effected profitability, etc.), thus aggravating the situation even more and forcing the authorities to engage in large scale borrowing to cover

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[1]Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, p. 328.

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balance of payments deficits. Uruguayan capital placed in foreign countries during the period of 1962-67 was approximately $292 million, i.e., five times more than the deficit of the commercial balance for the same period of time ($58.9 million) and 50 percent more than the gross investment during 1968.[1]

The cost of living between 1954-61 rose on an average of 20 percent per year, and 60 percent between 1961-67, with a record of 136 percent in 1967. By 1967 Uruguay was the country with the lowest rate of growth and the highest level of inflation in Latin America.[2]

From 1955 to 1960 the rate of inflation increased continuously. In 1962 the inflation rate accelerated very rapidly, with a peak over 125 percent in 1967. Monetary factors (see Figure 7) contributed to the high rate of inflation. In 1962 we observed an acceleration in the supply of money. (Unfortunately, the data until 1964 and from 1965 are not comparable because each is extracted from different sources.)

Because inflation was not totally anticipated by all the population, persons with fixed nominal incomes had a loss in real terms. In general low income 'classes' were recipients of wages, salaries, and welfare benefits that were not constantly adjusted. In other words when inflation is not anticipated the consequence is a new redistribution of income hurting the low income 'classes.' In this period of great inflation Uruguay's social system polarized drastically.

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[1]Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 20.

[2]Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence, p. 213. See Figure 3.

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The continuous devaluations of the peso (see Figure 6)--combined with inflation produced negative psychological effects on large segments of the population that felt that their money was worth less in the country and internationally. The continuous devaluations inreased the price of imported consumer goods considerably (see Figure 10). The abrupt decline in income per capita and the absolute deterioration of the economy are explicit in Figure 4. This indicator is aggravated even more by taking into consideration the very slow increase in population for the same period of time. Uruguay was the only country in Latin America to experience such a drastic decline in income per capita in this period.

The lack of growth and development in Uruguay's economy deepened the economic crisis even more through evasion of capital, statism, and no-reinvestment. Real income per capita in pesos (see Figure 5) had great fluctuations but the general trend was downward.

One of the by-products of the acceleration of the inflation and the authorities' control over the interest rates, was a large increase in the private financial system between 1954-61.[1] The banking industry tried to remain competitive by increasing the services rendered to the public especially by opening new agencies and subsidiary establishments. This increase in the private banking system, made it more difficult for the Banco de la República (Central Bank) to control speculation.

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[1]By the end of 1961 Uruguay had 61 main banks and 557 agencies, i.e., one establishment for each 4,500 inhabitants. Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 20.

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The Tupamaros attempted to show the general public that one of the main reasons for the worsening economic situation was the role played by the speculators in the private and public sectors. One of the Tupamaros' most notorious activities in this respect was the disclosure of the 'Monty Society' accounting books. Frick Davis, then Minister of Agriculture, was compelled to resign as he was found linked to the Monty Society through the contacts his private bank had with the Society.[1] The Society was found guilty of most of the Tupamaros' accusations: tax fraud, speculations with foreign currency, smuggling operations, usurious interest charges on loans, etc., amounting to millions of dollars. Many other private banks and public figures were found connected with this scandal.[2]

As discussed in Chapter IV, the economic crisis was aggravated even more by the internal migration from the countryside to the cities, especially to Montevideo and the massive increase of the public service sector (see Tables 15-17, respectively). At the same time Uruguay was confronted with a brain drain: people with professions who preferred to emigrate to Australia, USA, Brazil, and elsewhere.

"The Government's lack of ready cash led to skimping on services and infuriating delays in the payment of civil service

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[1]For a detailed account of this activity, see Carlos Suarez and Ruben Anaya Sarmiento, Los Tupamaros (Mexico City: Extemporáneos, 1971), pp. 222-227.

[2]For other accounts on speculations and links between authorities and private enterprises involved in frauds, tax evasions, etc., see Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, pp. 59-66. See also Chapters XI and XII below.

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salaries, social benefits, and the completion of Government projects like the proposed university city."[1] In 1967 President Pacheco Areco tried to fight the chronic inflation by holding down wages, prices, and social benefits.[2] The bureaucracy (more than 300,000 persons) and the unions were consequently among the first and most severely hurt. Their anger, frustration, and sense of deprivation produced a series of violent strikes in many sectors of the economy. This in part explained the support the Tupamaros were able to obtain from the bureaucracy and trade unions, especially those directly linked to the institutions of the regime (see Chapter XI).

Paradoxically, while the real income of public sector employees continued to decline and their salaries did not keep pace with inflation, the bureaucracy continued to grow. Even though the bureaucracy constituted an important portion of the tertiary sector they did not command much support from the primary and secondary sectors of the population. The public administration was often criticized for inefficiency, corruption, and endless 'red tape.'

Certain social laws and privileges granted by the welfare state that were applicable during prosperous times became burdens for

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[1]Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence, p. 213.

[2]For more details, and personal accounts on how those cutbacks in social benefits and the inflation hurt the senior citizens, families with many children, teachers, public service, etc., see María Esther Gilio, La guerrilla Tupamara (Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1970), pp. 13-43.

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the economy during crisis times. This caused social unrest and political upheaval in large segments of the population. Simultaneously with the crisis certain sectors of the population continued to do excellent business and gain large profits.

"It is against this background of economic decay and mounting social unrest that the Tupamaros evolved from an isolated band of conspirators into a genuine revolutionary force with plans for armed insurrection."[1] The Tupamaros furthermore had as one of their main strategies the aggravation of the economic crisis, to worsen conditions so that people would blame the authorities and/or regime and perhaps support the guerrillas. For example, in 1971 the Tupamaros decided to launch the 'Hot Summer Campaign'[2] to destroy the tourist season and thus aggravate even more the economic crisis. "The number of tourists visiting Uruguay was said to have dropped by at least 40 percent over the first half of 1971."[3] This type of activity designed specifically to foster support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime will be studied in Chapter XI.

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[1]Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence, p. 214.

[2]See Ocar Dueñas Ruiz and Mirna Rugnon de Dueñas, Tupamaros (Bogotá: Ediciones Mundo Andino, 1971), pp. 9-11.

[3]Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence, p. 214.

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The 'Conservative' Alternative

The deep economic crisis was politicized by the different channels of the welfare system, the unions, etc. The Colorado party which was in power almost one hundred years lost the national elections in 1958 to the Blanco party thus showing a shift in specific support for the incumbent authorities. The economic program of the Blanco party was more 'conservative,' calling for less government intervention. In spite of the continuous worsening of the economic situation, the Blanco party succeeded in retaining power in the elections of 1962. The Tupamaros appeared at this time on the political scene. The Colorado party returned to power in the 1966 elections, and they retained power until ousted by the armed forces in 1973 (see Chapter III).

The rural sector was opposed to the policies of the Colorado Party which advocated the shifting of economic revenues from the rural to the urban centers. This opposition was translated politically when the rural sector (ranchers and farmers) organized the 'ruralist' movement.

In 1958 the Blanco party won the national elections supported mainly by the ruralist movement thus ending almost one hundred years of rule by the Colorado party. The ruralist movement succeeded in convincing a sizeable majority of the population that the present economic stagnation and deterioration resulted from policies of the Colorado party, i.e., the shifting of rural revenues to Montevideo and the disproportionate increase of the public sector. The ruralist

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movement claimed that the solution to the economic crisis lay in the prosperity of the rural sector.

The process of economic deterioration was by this time too far advanced. The tensions among the social groups competing to maintain or increase their share in the national product was very high. Inflation was galloping. The Blanco party was elected to power in a 'desperate' effort to solve the rapid deterioration in socio-economic conditions (see Chapter III). Their political views were similar to those of the ruralist movement, i.e., anti-industry, anti-protectionism, reduction of government expenditures and intervention in the socio-economic environment, redistribution of revenues in favor of the rural economy.

The 'conservative' economic policy of the Blanco party left untouched the rural economic system. It limited itself to some changes in monetary and fiscal policies in an attempt to shift the main economic burdens from the rural to the urban middle class. The continuation of the economic stagnation and the opposition by the urban middle class to the new economic policy accelerated the process of political unrest.

Farmers and ranchers continuously pressed the authorities in order to obtain a larger share of the economic surplus. The new economic policies were opposed by the industrialists, the urban middle 'class' and the urban working 'classes.' They perceived those economic policies as a threat to their profits, salaries, and sources of employment respectively. The authorities encountered many difficulties and opposition in their attempt at implementing the new economic

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policies. The authorities were the main arbiters of these confrontations, thus strengthening the political dimensions of the socioeconomic disturbances.

As mentioned earlier, the public sector had an important influence in Uruguay's socioeconomic environment. After the Korean War, due to the acceleration of the economic stagnation, the increasing unemployment in the industrial sector, etc., the authorities assumed a larger role as employer. Thus while on the one hand they tried to reduce the socio-economic tensions, on the other hand they increased the authorities' and regime's intervention in the socio-economic environment. The Blanco party while trying to reduce 'state interventionism' was unable to avoid the 'legacy from the past,' i.e., the role the 'state' had as a major employer with all the related consequences (see Table 16).

The aggravation of the productive decline implied that the new economic program that postulated the redistribution of income in favor of the ranchers and farmers threatened to freeze or reduce the income of salaried urban groups. The unions, prominently urban in character, emphatically opposed the new economic policies. In 1961 the major unions organized into a Confederation ('Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores' or CNT), and together with the different unions of the public sector (teachers, bank employees, civil service) cooperated in their activities.[1]

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[1]Macadar, Reig, Santias, "Una economía Latinoamericana," _Uruguay hoy_, p. 103.

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The activities of the unions and the CNT were 'defensive' in character, i.e., to defend and/or maintain their employment and income levels. Through strikes, demonstrations, and slow-downs, the unions expressed their overt support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the new economic policies. They perceived the economic policies of the Blanco party to be detrimental to themselves. This contributed to the process of spiraling inflation (see Figure 3). In order to cope with a level of inflation higher than ever before experienced in Uruguay, the authorities 'froze' the salaries of all the 'salaried' people.

The degree of covert-overt specific support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities as well as the level of tension and unrest reached unprecedented levels. During this process of escalating violence the demands from the unions that originally were 'economically defensive' became 'politically offensive,' i.e., demanding of the incumbent authorities some basic changes in the regime.

The 'traditional' bargaining methods used by the unions to express their support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime failed; so did the policies of the incumbent authorities unable to meet the demands of the working population. This in part explained the growth of the Tupamaros whose main supporters were from the unions in the public sector who though directly linked to the authorities' policies and the institutions of the regime, were among the most badly hurt by inflation.

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The 'Stabilizing' Program

The period between 1960 to 1968 could be considered one of economic and political chaos previously unknown in Uruguay. The authorities were unable to cope successfully with the stresses caused by unemployment, underemployment, inflation, devaluation, financial speculation, economic stagnation, deficit in the balance of payment, reduction of the national gold and foreign currency reserves, increasing dependence on foreign loans, bankruptcies in the banking sector (1965), massive contraband of wool (1964) and beef (1965), the flight of national and international capital, natural disasters that decreased exports, and so on. This output failure by the Blanco party resulted in support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime. This is evidenced by the electoral results in 1967.

In 1967 the Colorado party regained power. The change in authorities was carried out in conjunction with institutional changes in the regime intended to strengthen the power of the executive branch in order to cope with the mounting social and political unrest.[1] In 1968 the new authorities adopted a 'stabilizing' program with very important economic and political consequences.

Although there was a general awareness of the economic crisis there was not a general consensus on questioning the 'system' as the root of the crisis. To a certain degree the causes of the crisis were obscured by the galloping inflation. Many groups 'learned' how to live

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[1] Ibid., pp. 115-116. See also Chapter III above.

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with inflation and also to blame it for the deteriorating economic situation. The Tupamaros through their strategy for action tried to 'educate' the population at large about the 'roots' of the crisis in order to foster the process of support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime (see Chapters IX and XI).

The financial scandals uncovered by the Tupamaros involving prominent political figures, the continuous deterioration of the economic situation of the country, as well as the general political unrest and the strengthening of the Tupamaros were setting the 'scenario' for the authorities' 'counter-offensive.'

In June 1968 the authorities decreed the 'Medidas Prontas de Seguridad' (Emergency Powers) and the 'freezing' of prices of goods and services as well as salaries for the entire economy. This was done through the 'Comisión de Precios e Ingresos' (Committee on Wages and Price Controls) which was directly controlled by the executive branch and did not have any workers' representation.[1]

Politically it meant that the authorities had now merged the political and economic power, thus achieving the complete politicization of the economic crisis. From this date every socio-economic 'want' was automatically translated into a political demand. The authorities assumed the direct role of negotiator between the conflicting interests, and administrator of the income distribution. This was achieved by new policies and the inclusion of ranchers, farmers,

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[1]A similar organization existed in Uruguay for about thirty years, but it was voluntary and had representatives from the labor unions. It was not directly linked to the authorities.

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bankers, and industrialists in the executive branch. They held the key positions dealing with economic matters.

Simultaneously the authorities in conjunction with the armed forces began a repressive campaign against the unions and 'popular' movements, which had withdrawn support from the authorities and the regime below the acceptable level. Union leaders and students were imprisoned. Public employees, members of the unions were 'militarized'[1] and thousands of public service employees were 'detained' in military camps.[2] Public protests, demonstrations, workers' assemblies, and strikes were forbidden, and repressed with unusual violence.

The 'stabilization' program adopted by the authorities in 1968 succeeded in the short run to slow down the increase in prices.[3] This 'success' also produced a polarization between 'producers' and 'consumers' as symbolized by the 'Comisión de Precios e Ingresos,' and the repression of union activities. This marked the end of 'trade-unionism' in Uruguay, and the strengthening of the Tupamaros who became the only viable and organized opposition to the incumbent authorities.

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[1]According to the 'Emergency Powers' decreed by the executive branch, the authorities had the constitutional right to conscript people to the armed forces. The conscription was very selective, i.e., mainly leaders from the public service unions. We should, however, remember that the armed forces in Uruguay were voluntary.

[2]Macadar, Reig, Santias, "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 118.

[3]The success of the stabilization program, in the short run, was favored by the increase in the demand and price of beef in the international market.

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Thus, the 'stabilization' program implied some institutional changes in the regime as discussed in Chapter III. These institutional changes embodied in the new Constitution maintained the façade of a democracy but shifted toward an eventual dictatorship by strengthening the executive and granting extraordinary powers to the Presidency. The fight against the urban guerrillas provided the authorities with the necessary 'excuses' indiscriminately to reduce the bargaining power of the 'working' classes, the unions, and the opposition forces, mainly those questioning the political system. This is evidenced by the outlawing of unions, and opposition newspapers, and the jailing of leaders accused of being Tupamaro supporters. In sum, while the main economic structure was left untouched, the impact on the political system was great and produced basic changes in the regime whose consequences are still being unfolded today.

As mentioned earlier, the 'positive' economic affects of the 'stabilizing' program were short-lived. By 1970 the most visible aspects of the economic crisis as currency speculations, devaluations, inflation, and unemployment, reappeared. This time support withdrawal by certain segments of the population was expressed also by a large emigration from Uruguay. It is estimated that around half a million Uruguayans left the country mainly to Argentina and Brazil. This was unprecedented in Uruguay's history. It is also estimated that approximately 20 percent of the Jewish community in Uruguay emigrated, mainly to Israel, the United States, and Canada. In previous years the emigration from Uruguay was minimal.

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Politically the changes in the regime led toward the military coup ('gradualismo golpista'). The armed forces were brought into the decision making process (see Chapter XI). The new answer of the authorities to the 'renewed' crisis was to disengage the state from the economic environment. The public sector was largely reduced, formerly nationalized industries and services were sold to the private sector, subsidies were eliminated, and so on. The social and political price of the 'New Economic Policy' was the elimination of all organized opposition. This process will be studied in detail in Chapter XI.

Conclusions

Uruguay's economy depended very heavily on livestock, agricultural exports (meat, wool, etc.), and their derivatives. The export of those products gave Uruguay prosperity and the possibilities to develop a welfare state. The beneficiaries of the welfare state were mainly the urban population. In periods of prosperity the traditional parties were able to maintain a high level of support for the regime and the authorities as evidenced by the results of the national elections and the relative socio-political calm. During these periods the welfare state developed. The welfare system, the nationalization of important sectors of the economy, as well as the disproportionate growth of the public and tertiary sector, resulted in the interpenetration of the socio-economic and political systems.

The interpenetration of these systems produced the politicization of the crisis. During periods of economic decline and support

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withdrawal from the authorities and the regime, the authorities coped with these disturbances through institutional changes. These changes enabled the movement of the regime from inner coercion to repression as a response to the drop in the level of support mainly by the same population that benefited from the welfare system during more prosperous times (see Chapter III). Repression was one of the forms the incumbent authorities coped with the declining level of support. This will be studied in Chapter VI. No attempt was made to change the economic system of the rural sector. A decline in production, the fall of world market prices of wool, etc. produced a crisis in the agricultural sector, thus hurting directly the core of Uruguay's economy and the welfare state.

Since the 1960s real income per capital fluctuated with a general declining trend and the cost of living increased very rapidly as inflation reached points similar to hyper-inflation. Unemployment rose steadily in part due to the continuous migration from the countryside to Montevideo which could not fully absorb the displaced labor force mainly due to the stagnation of the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy. The first to suffer from this crisis were those dependent on the welfare state and the large bureaucracy, as well as the tertiary sector.

Other factors as well contributed to the worsening of the economic situation as, for example, the fact was that more than 50 percent of the working population was employed in the public sector, less than 20 percent in the agriculture sector, and only 28 percent in

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industry. Speculations, corruption, evasion of capital, crisis in the tourism sector, etc. added to the worsening economic situation.

Up to this point the main discussion stressed the consequences of the economic crisis on the urban population. The rural population represented only 12 percent of the total, and its deplorable conditions remained unchanged in spite of the economic and political fluctuations. They were never benefitted by the welfare state, and they had no 'class consciousness.' The center of the real 'scenario' of the economic, social and political tensions was and remained Montevideo. This in part also explained the Tupamaros' choice of urban over rural guerrilla warfare (see Chapter XI).

A deep sense of political powerlessness developed in large sectors of the population as a consequence of the economic crisis. Expectations did not rise as much as capabilities dropped. The politicization of the economic crisis was one of the main reasons for the outbreak of the Tupamaros' activities in this period of time, i.e., the impossibility of the authorities to maintain the liberal traditions and its welfare state institutions in a period of economic decline. This background of economic crisis enabled the Tupamaros to grow into a significant political force in Uruguay's political system as will be studied in Chapter XI.

So far we have dealt with the political and socio-economic settings that favored the outbreak and development of the Tupamaros. The next chapter will analyze the military variable and the influence on the outbreak of guerrilla warfare as well as the resulting military coup.

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CHAPTER VI

MILITARY CAPACITY

Introduction

This chapter will analyze the way Uruguay's military capacity contributed to fluctuations in input or withdrawal of political support from the various political objects. In Chapter III we discussed the process of transformation from organizational coercion to institutionalized repression in Uruguay's political system. We demonstrated that this process was the result of increasing stress in Uruguay's political system produced in part by the drop in the level of support for the authorities and the regime.

In Chapters IV and V we analyzed the politicization of the socio-economic crisis and its impact on the level of support for the authorities and the regime. We argued that this politicization process was facilitated by the prior development of the welfare state and the nationalized economy which produced an interpenetration of the socio-economic and the political systems. Politicization in turn increased the level of stress in Uruguay's political system, leading to further support withdrawal, especially after the failure of the stabilizing program. But while the stabilizing program failed economically the

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institutional changes remained and opened the way toward 'gradualismo golpista.'

Uruguay's weak military capability until the mid '60s indicates the success of the authorities in maintaining the regime politically. This weak military capacity influenced the images of the Tupamaros as will be studied in Part IV. As the Tupamaros became overtly active and as support withdrawal from the regime and the authorities increased, the authorities strengthened Uruguay's military capacity in order to deal with the mounting stress.

One of the short run goals of the Tupamaros (see Chapter XII) was to achieve the militarization of the political crisis. While the Tupamaros succeeded in this goal, the increased military capacity contributed to the Tupamaros' defeat. The military defeat of the Tupamaros also brought about political transformations leading to the 1973 military coup. This chapter will deal with the increasing military capacity that resulted from policies of the incumbent authorities to deal with the decline in support. The outbreak of guerrilla activities as well as the politicization of the socio-economic crisis surprised the incumbent authorities. This in part explains the low military capacity until 1965 and the rapid buildup of this capacity from 1965-1973.

Chapter VI is included in Part II of the dissertation. Part II of the dissertation deals with the objective setting that favored the outbreak and growth of the Tupamaros. The chapters in Part III will deal with the subjective setting that favored the outbreak and growth of the Tupamaros. For example, we will study the images that the

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Tupamaros had about Uruguay's political system, the socio-economic setting, the military capacity, and the like.

Factors in the Military Capacity

Dealing with military capacity implies analyzing the capacity of the military of a specific state to deter an attack or invasion of its land, as well as its capacity to maintain internal order and to repress guerrilla groups. This last function of the army is strongly related to the police services, including the secret police and paramilitary forces.

The police forces must be analyzed with criteria similar to those applied to the army. In some cases we must include the analysis of paramilitary and/or private armies, and the relations between all these mechanisms of repression. In Uruguay, the 'Command of United Forces' was in charge of the fight against the guerrilla movement. Its function was to coordinate the activities of the mechanisms of coercion: police, army, paramilitary forces, secret services.[1] In Brazil, to cite another example, "the armed forces were transformed into 'Police Forces' for the internal repression, and they continue to

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[1]Paramilitary forces exist in many countries and for different purposes, but

> "certain paramilitary police forces exist for purely strategic reasons unconnected with the dominance of one political party, and are designated to fight a full-scale war against guerrilla forces, for which they are considered to be in some ways superior to the military."

See Peter Calvert, A Study of Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 19.

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prepare themselves to combat the guerrillas and not to defend the national sovereignty."[1] For the purposes of this study 'armed forces' is defined to include the military, police forces, paramilitary forces, and secret services.

Generally, in most of the Latin American countries, military capacity cannot be measured only according to its potential to defend the country from outside aggression. More important is its ability to maintain internal order. It is clear that there is no direct relationship between those two functions of the army. In Uruguay, the army does not have the strength to deter an attack from neighboring countries, but does have the capacity to maintain internal order. For the study of most of the guerrilla wars in the developing countries, and the case of Uruguay in particular, the most relevant criteria for the measurement of military capacity is the ability to maintain 'internal order.'[2]

The capacity to maintain internal order depends among others, on the following elements:

a) the amount of resources spent on the production of military capacity,

b) quantity of manpower (taking quality into account),

c) quantity of armaments (taking quality into account),

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[1]Marighella, "Operaciones y tácticas guerrilleras," Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 33.

[2]See Gertrude E. Heare, Latin American Military Expenditures 1967-1971 (Washington DC: Department of State Publications 8720, December 1971), Part II, p. 4.

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d) international military cooperation,

e) information about the enemy.

These factors are interrelated in the following way. Let us assume that the incumbent authorities want to maximize their capacity to maintain internal order through the armed forces. The authorities are limited mainly by two constraints:

1) The way the capacity to maintain internal order can be produced, i.e., what is the production function of this capacity, and what are the factors entering in its production.

2) The amount of resources available for this purpose.

Systematically we are maximizing the objective function Y, 'the capacity to maintain internal order,' which is subject to a production function constraint (F) and to a resource constraint (I), or:

maximum Y
subject to: 1) $Y = F(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5)$

where x_1 = quantity of manpower (taking its quality into account)

x_2 = quantity of armaments (taking its quality into account)

x_3 = international military cooperation

x_4 = information about the enemy

x_5 = other factors of production

2) $$\sum_{i=1}^{5} p_i x_i = I$$

or $I = p_1x_1 + p_2x_2 + p_3x_3 + p_4x_4 + p_5x_5$

where I = amount of resources available to the armed forces for this purpose

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$P_1 \cdots P_5$ = the respective prices of the factors of production. (Those prices are not only monetary prices, but also prices in political terms, as for example political dependence.)

The maximization of Y, the capacity to maintain internal order, is made over time. The authorities have to determine a level of capacity Y in each period of the planning horizon (the role of time and mobilizational flexibility becomes important). The technology of the production function F is of special importance, and it should be stressed that technological change may occur. (The authorities may also induce technological change by investing in new processes of production or in the improvement of existing processes.) This point will be clarified while dealing with the different factors.

In Uruguay, at least in the short run, an inverse relationship existed between the capacity of the armed forces to maintain internal order and the probability of the outbreak and success of guerrilla warfare.

> The Tupamaros' initial advantage was that the government forces were few and inexperienced: there were only about twelve thousand men in the Urguayan armed forces, and the police had more experience in traffic control than in countersubversion.[1]

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[1]Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," Problems of Communism 20, no. 5 (September/October 1971): 21.

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The Amount of Resources Spent on the Production of the Military Capacity to Maintain Internal Order

The amount of resources spent on the armed forces depends on the size of the total budget of the authorities and its allocation between the different institutions of the regime. Thus, ceteris paribus, the greater the portion of the budget available to the authorities for investing in the armed forces, the greater their capacity to maintain internal order (given a constant production function F and amounts of factors x_1 to x_5), and the smaller the probability of military success for the guerrilla.

Once the authorities are confronted with the existence of guerrilla activity or with a potential threat of its existence, we expect, at least theoretically, two changes to occur. First, the authorities will considerably increase the amount of financial resources diverted to the armed forces (see Table 23). In 1966 Uruguay spent 1.02 percent[1] of its GNP in the armed forces, and in 1971 a total of 2.7 percent.[2] The sum spent on the armed forces in 1971 amounted to 15.7 percent of total of government expenditures, as compared with 7.2 percent in 1965. In 1971 in terms of the percentage of total government expenditures Uruguay's military budget was among the highest in Latin America (see Table 24). In terms of total military expenditures in US dollar equivalents at constant prices, the

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[1]Lawrence L. Ewing and Robert C. Sellers, eds., The Reference Handbook of the Armed Forces of the World (Washington DC: Robert C. Sellers and Associates, 1966).

[2]Heare, Latin American Military Expenditures, p. 4.

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amount spent by the Uruguayan authorities increased steadily from 1967 to 1971(see Table 25).

Secondly, the production function F will probably be changed: the armed forces may try to adopt new fighting techniques, using the existing factors to maximize the capacity to maintain internal order. There are at least two ways financial resources can be obtained: domestically and from foreign sources. Foreign military aid can be given either in a specific or a non-specific form. Specific foreign aid is used to finance well-defined materials, training, advisors, etc. (This includes factors and techniques of production of military capacity.)

After the outbreak of the Tupamaros' activities, the Metropolitan Guards (a special anti-guerrilla police corp) was created by the authorities and "the United States has provided counterinsurgency training."[1]

Domestic and non-specific foreign financing has a clear opportunity cost: the alternative contribution these funds could make to the development of the country.[2] (In Chapter V we dealt with the economic variables and the impact that a stagnant or regressive economy can have on the outbreak and success of guerrilla warfare.) This

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[1]Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," p. 21; and for a more detailed account of American military presence in Uruguay, see Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, pp. 136-139.

[2]This is probably why Marighella writes: "Those activities [the anti-guerrilla activities] will motivate exaggerated levels of expenditure for the dictatorship, raising for them new problems and demoralizing them more and more." Marighella, "Operaciones y tácticas guerrilleras," p. 39.

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means a conflict between the strengthening of military capacity, which can be effective against the guerrilla in a relatively short time, and between the 'strengthening' or change of some of the aspects of the objective environment. These funds could be for example alternatively used in order to 'avoid' or 'divert' the politicization of the economic crisis, which may decrease the possibility for the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in the long run, by changing aspects of the objective and psychological settings. In Uruguay, the authorities opted for the former.

Specific foreign military assistance does not necessarily have the same opportunity cost since the funds provided may be used only in a well-defined way (for example, a foreign loan with the specific purpose of creating a specific police corp). This may not be the optimal way the authorities would otherwise choose to increase their military capacity. More funds must be provided to finance total military activities than would be necessary if the military assistance were non-specific, and therefore fewer domestic resources are available for development purposes. Specific aid may be very effective in certain cases, and this is an important factor the guerrillas must take into consideration. For example, Che Guevara in his guerrilla action in Bolivia miscalculated the quantity and quality of special anti-guerrilla material that was given by the American to the Bolivian authorities. In Uruguay, one of the activities of the Tupamaros was to kill the chief American advisor to the Uruguayan 'Command of United Forces' in anti-urban guerrilla warfare, and in this way they tried

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also to dissuade other foreign advisors from assisting the authorities. However, this foreign aid can only be a factor aiding local forces to fight, it can rarely be a substitute for local forces.

There is also a 'cost' to this foreign aid. It can increase the level of 'xenophobia,' and resentment of the population, or strategic sectors of the population, against such manifest dependence. This reaction, at least theoretically, could be favorable to the guerrillas by contributing to a decrease in support for the authorities and some aspects of the regime, as was the case in Uruguay (see Chapter XI).

Manpower

Quantity and Distribution of Forces

Here we must compare the number of the armed forces in proportion to the population and the guerrilla forces. The absolute number is perhaps not so important, but the size in relation to the other factors of the capacity production function is of considerable importance. Other things being equal, we can assume that the smaller the armed forces ratio to the guerrilla forces, the greater the possibility of military success for the guerrillas (especially if they adopt a tactic of dispersing the armed forces), and also the greater the possibilities of starting a potential or real guerrilla warfare (by influencing the image of the potential guerrilla members). The Tupamaros opted for the opening of a rural 'second front' as a tactic

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to disperse the armed forces. They also felt that their chances of getting 'caught' were minimal (see Chapter XI).

'Distribution of Forces' means their distribution according to different branches (air force, infantry, police, and the like). In dealing with the quantity and distribution of the armed forces we must also take into consideration the location of those forces--countryside, cities, and the like.

In 1966 the population of Uruguay was estimated to be 2,800,000 inhabitants. The total of the Uruguayan armed forces by then was estimated to be 17,000 or 0.6 percent of the population.[1] In 1973 the total of the armed forces amounted to 43,000 men,[2] without a major increase in population. The increase in quantity and quality of the armed forces was, among others, one of the main reasons for the authorities' success in defeating militarily the Tupamaro guerrillas (see Chapter XI).

We assume that the greater the accessibility of the armed forces to all the areas of the country, the less the possibility of starting rural guerrilla warfare. In this sense the existence of a guerrilla group or the danger of its existence acts as a motivation for the different branches of the armed forces to demand specific development from the authorities (for example, the Trans-Amazonian highway in

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[1]See David Wood, "Armed Forces in Central and South America," Adelphi Papers, no. 34, Institute for Strategic Studies, London (1967), p. 22.

[2]See The Military Balance 1973-74 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 64.

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Brazil). As Guevara wrote, the best conditions for a rural guerrilla warfare will be in "zones difficult to reach [for professional armed forces], either because of dense forests, steep mountains, impassable deserts, or marshes."[1]

In the case of Uruguay, where an urban guerrilla warfare was developed also due to geographical conditions and urban concentration of population, the greatest increase in the armed forces occurred in the army and police forces. In 1965 the army consisted of twelve thousand men[2] and by 1973 it rose to sixteen thousand. The police forces increased more drastically, from about three thousand in 1965 to twenty-two thousand in 1973-74. This is directly related to the escalation of Tupamaro activities. The Tupamaros became more visible in 1965, and by 1973 were defeated. In the chapter dealing with the Tupamaro activities this escalation process will be analyzed.

Quality of the Armed Forces

Even though this variable is difficult to quantify, it is important to analyze the morale of the armed forces, i.e., to what extent the armed forces are ready to fight without surrender, ready to sacrifice their lives, and to pursue blindly the policies decided by the incumbent authorities. It is also important to observe what kind of draft policy (voluntary, compulsory, etc.), the authorities

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[1]Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Vintage Press, 1968), p. 19.

[2]Wood, "Armed Forces in Central and South America," p. 18.

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implemented. Let us assume that voluntary recruitment policy will bring into the armed forces people who are more ready to accept and defend the policies of the authorities, i.e., the loyalty of a voluntary army will be greater than that of an army based on compulsory recruitment. (An exception is Israel where both compulsory recruitment and high loyalty are found.) Moreover, the number and quality of the soldiers in a voluntary army will be greatly affected by the status and prestige the armed forces enjoy in the population, and by the mobility mechanism inside the armed forces' hierarchy. Ironically, for example, the Brazilian army prides itself for being the most democratic and mobile institution of the regime.

Usually the higher the morale of the armed forces the less asymmetric is the relation with the guerrilla (at least theoretically). For the individual guerrilla who is ready to trade his life for an ideal, life per se is not so important as for the individual soldier. But for the guerrilla group the 'price' of the life of one member is higher than the 'price' of a soldier to the armed forces, because of the scarcity and difficulty of finding a new recruit. Thus the more ready the armed forces will be to undertake high-risk activities, the harder it will be for a guerrilla movement to be militarily successful.

In Uruguay the morale of the armed forces before and during the outbreak of the guerrilla activities was very low. At the 'top' there were differences in relation to the policy to pursue against the Tupamaros. This discrepancy led to the resignation of General Liber

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Seregni (Inspector General of the Army)[1] and of Police Commissioner Otero. Both of them resigned in protest against the authorities' repression.[2] After his resignation, General Liber Seregni became the presidential candidate of the left wing parties' coalition 'Frente Amplio,' which was supported by the Tupamaros (see Chapter III). It is interesting to observe that in Latin America officers did desert their armies and join the ranks of the guerrilla group. Sometimes those officers created guerrilla 'focos,' as for example, the guerrilla movements in Guatemala that have been led and organized by ex-military men.

At the 'bottom' the low morale was also felt. Until 1969 the Tupamaros avoided killing policemen. In late 1969 a shift in the Tupamaros' tactics led to the assassination of police agents.

> The first man they [Tupamaros] assassinated was a police agent, Carlos Ruben Zambrano, who was shot while traveling on a bus on November 15, 1969 . . . In April 1970 Héctor Morán Charquero--a police inspector accused of torturing prisoners--was murdered in a Montevideo street. There were more murders of police agents in June.[3]

Those incidents and a series of 'psychological activities' by the Tupamaros, helped to create the feeling of low morale in the armed forces. On June 17, 1970, the Tupamaros issued a declaration saying they were ready to observe a truce with the armed forces until July 1970. During this month the authorities were supposed to reconsider

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[1]General Liber Seregni became the presidential candidate of the left-wing coalition 'Frente Amplio.'

[2]Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," pp. 20-21.

[3]Ibid., p. 21.

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their repressive policies. By mid-June the policemen went on strike demanding 'danger money' and the right to work in civilian clothes. As a consequence many policemen left their positions and the government arrested sixty-six policemen for 'insubordination.'[1] In April 1971 the Tupamaros issued an 'open letter' addressed to the armed forces in which they declared that every time soldiers "defend the regime, in one way or another, they are defending an anti-national and anti-popular policy."[2] Through this action the Tupamaros tried to link feelings towards the authorities with those towards the regime and the political community, in order to influence the level of support toward those objects of the political system (see Chapter XI). But probably the most effective 'demoralizing' tool the Tupamaros employed was their continuous and relatively easy evasion of police units.

The authorities coped with this problem of low morale by raising the salaries, social benefits, the general standard of training and equipment in the armed forces, specifically of those divisions whose objective was anti-guerrilla warfare. The United States played an important role in the training, advising, and financing of those divisions.[3]

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[1]Le Monde, June 14, 1970.

[2]For the entire text of the document, see Antonio Mercader and Jorge de Vera, Tupamaros: Estrategia y acción (Montevideo: Editorial Alfa, 1969), pp. 65-76.

[3]Gabriel Ramirez, Las fuerzas armadas uruguayas en la crisis continental (Montevideo: Biblioteca Mayor, 1971), pp. 95-102.

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In Uruguay's voluntary military service, the number and quality of its members were greatly affected by the low status the armed forces had in the country's population. The large increase in size of the armed forces was a direct consequence of a rise in prestige as a result of successful activities against the Tupamaros. No doubt the authorities' new program of monetary and social benefits along with a rise in unemployment at this time in part explains the growth of this voluntary force. The rise in the morale, loyalty, and quality of the armed forces was one of the main reasons for the military failure of the Tupamaros.

The process of politicization of Uruguay's armed forces that eventually led to the military takeover started over differences regarding policies of how to deal with the Tupamaros. The question of the policies against the Tupamaros caused serious differences between the political and military authorities, leading to the military coup.

Quantity of Armaments

'Technology' is used here in relative and not absolute terms. More specifically, it refers to the adaptation of certain technological developments to anti-guerrilla warfare and to the specific needs of the fight. For example, the United States with its superior nuclear capability was unable to fight successfully where a different kind of technology was needed. To some extent guerrilla warfare is a technique or tactic to overcome technological inferiority, fighting in an antigame, thus enabling the guerrilla group to fight against

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technologically superior armed forces. Guerrillas try to achieve tactical superiority in each action while avoiding strategic confrontations where the regular armed forces may have a clear advantage.

Both Carlos Marighella[1] and Abraham Guillén[2] were aware of the technological difference between guerrillas and the armed forces. "The weapons of the urban guerrilla are inferior to those of his enemy; but from the morale point of view, the urban guerrilla has a clear superiority."[3]

International Military Cooperation

This factor deals with the influence of other countries on the military capacity of the country under study. Geopolitical relations with the adjacent countries are relevant in the study of guerrilla movements. This factor can aid in the evasion efforts of the guerrillas by the creation of guerrilla bases in neighboring countries. This factor can also have serious consequences for the relationship between the two adjacent countries.

Originally, Uruguay was set up as a 'buffer' state between the two regional leaders, Brazil and Argentina. Both of them claimed Uruguay's territory. This fear is still felt occasionally in Uruguay.

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[1]Marighella, "Minimanual del guerrillero urbano," _Teoría y acción revolucionaria_, pp. 65-76.

[2]Guillén, _Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana_, pp. 95-101.

[3]Marighella, "Minimanual del guerrillero urbano," _Teoría y acción revolucionaria_, p. 68. See Chapter XI below.

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> This was shown in 1964, when, following disturbances in Uruguay and the visit of the Argentine Commander in Chief to Brazil, it was seriously feared that the Argentine and Brazilian General Staffs might be contemplating a joint intervention and occupation of Uruguay on the pretext of restoring law and order.[1]

At the beginning the Tupamaros believed that they would provoke foreign intervention from the Brazilians and/or Argentinians (see Chapter IX). This would have been of great value to the Tupamaros, because they then could have presented themselves as the vanguard of nationalist resistance. The population at large during this period maintained a high level of diffuse support for the political community; but while some sectors of the population perceived the Tupamaros as a threat to the political community, others perceived them as a defense against the threat of foreign intervention. The Tupamaros were aware of this dichotomy, and even though they maintained close links with guerrilla organizations in Brazil and Argentina, they were very cautious in pronouncing themselves as 'agents' of a continental rather than a national revolution.

By the second half of 1967 the Tupamaros began diplomatic kidnappings. The first to be kidnapped was Aloysio Dias Gomide, the Brazilian Counsul General to Uruguay. It seems that the main reason for selecting a Brazilian official was because the policy of the Brazilian authorities to 'bargain' with guerrillas.[2] Uruguayan

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[1]Wood, "Armed Forces in Central and South America," p. 6.

[2]In 1968-1969, the Brazilian government released fifteen and forty political prisoners in exchange of Burke Elbrick (American ambassador) and Herr von Holleben (West German ambassador), respectively.

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President Pacheco Areco's policy was not to deal with the guerrillas at all.[1] This act created tension in relations between Brazil and Uruguay. Dias Gomide was released after his wife collected $250,000 from sympathizers in Brazil.

Information About the Enemy

Guerrilla warfare, from the military point of view, represents a distinctive level of violence (see Table 22). In most levels of violence (nuclear, conventional, guerrilla), sources of information are of primary importance. To a great extent, the success of the guerrillas or the armed forces depends on good and reliable information. Information is one of the key factors for the guerrilla. It allows him to surprise the enemy and to avoid being surprised. It also permits the choice of the most advantageous time and place to fight. The ability of the guerrillas to obtain reliable sources of information is an indicator of the level of support. The guerrillas can obtain information from the population either voluntarily or by means of 'coercive terrorism' (see Chapter XI).

In Marighella's image,

> The urban guerrilla's sources of information are potentially larger than those of the armed forces. The enemy is observed by the people, but he does not know who among the people provides the information to the urban guerrillas. The military and the police are hated by the people because of the injustice and violence they apply against them, and this helps us to obtain information from

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[1]For an analysis of the Tupamaros' several kidnappings and their rationale, see Part IV.

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> the people against the activities of the government's agents. The information, that represents only a small part of the popular support, represents an extraordinary potential in urban guerrilla hands.[1]

Information is also vital for the guerrilla to solve many of the problems caused by his inferiority (technical, quantitative, financial, etc.), and, simultaneously, helps the armed forces to overcome their inferiority caused by the high mobility of the guerrilla forces, and other factors. Both the armed forces and the guerrilla forces combine the use of reward and punishment in relation to the population. Every side will reward the population that provides information and punish those who provide information to the enemy (see Chapter XI).

There are also other methods of gathering information. For example, the infiltration of the enemies' ranks, technological methods (generally not available to the guerrilla), torture, extortion, blackmail, etc. "Many of the Tupamaros' operations would clearly not have been possible if they had not managed to establish a network of secret agents inside the administration and the armed forces."[2] The occupation by the Tupamaros of the naval training barracks in May 1970 is a clear example of the guerrillas' infiltration (see Chapter XI).

The Uruguayan authorities were weakened by their inability to pursue a sustained and intelligent counter-guerrilla program. One of

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[1]Carlos Marighella, "Entrevista con Carlos Marighella publicada por la revista francesa," Front (November 1967), p. 88.

[2]Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," Conflict Studies, no. 8 (October 1970), p. 8.

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the main problems of the armed forces was inadequate intelligence reports, the lack of reliable information to enable the armed forces to destroy the guerrillas' cadres. Most of the police raids until 1968-69 failed mainly because of their lack of information and the Tupamaros' effective network of information within the security forces that gave them advance notice of the armed forces' raids.

The Way the Factors Combine to Produce a Certain Level of Capacity

Here one must deal with the technique used by the armed forces to maximize their military capacity to maintain internal order. For example, in which geographical environment do the anti-guerrilla activities occur? How long will it take for the armed forces to be ready to fight in environments where they have had neither training nor previous experience? At this point, one must stress the importance of the leadership because military leaders have the direct responsibility for combining resources for maximum effectiveness. One must also look at certain attitudes of the armed forces. Even though they are difficult to measure, these attitudes are very important because they influence the behavior of the military establishment[1] in relationship to civilian authority, the degree of the armed forces' involvement in

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[1]Many of the sociological criteria relevant to the study of military elites are presented by Morris Janowitz--see bibliography.

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the development of the country[1] (in the broadest sense), the extent of military intervention in the decision making process and its political influence.

In Brazil

> the centers of political decisions were transferred to the hands of the military . . . the principal decision making posts of the government occupied by military men or by men of their confidence who are unconditional followers of their orders.[2]

In Uruguay the army was brought into the decision making and implementation process in order to lead the offensive against the Tupamaros. The military then became an integral part of the decision making process, including other matters not directly related to the anti-guerrilla fight.

Paradoxically, increasing the influence of the military in civilian areas of government is a short-term goal of guerrilla movements. According to Marighella, it is necessary to turn political and social crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation in the country into a military situation. The urban guerrilla tries to provoke the kind of repression that will turn the people against the

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[1]Many books and articles have been published in relation to the political role of the army; for example, see William Gutteridge, Armed Forces in New States (London: OUP, 1962); Michael Oward, Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957); Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State; The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

[2]Marighella, "Operaciones y Tácticas Guerrilleras," Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 34.

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authorities and regime, to accelerate the process of support withdrawal. The Tupamaros helped to undermine the constitutional organization of the country and to polarize the political forces by putting the authorities and the regime on the 'defensive.' Thus the Tupamaros may have achieved an ideological success, but in praxis they contributed to their own weakening and military defeat (see Chapter XII). This is evidenced by the decreasing number and effectiveness of the Tupamaro activities as Uruguay's military capacity increased. Thus while the Tupamaros succeeded ideologically in militarizing the political crisis, as deemed necessary by their strategy, they were unable to exploit the conditions in their favor.

Conclusions

In the case of Uruguay the military capacity variable was an important one for the initial military success of the Tupamaros.[1] The outbreak of the Tupamaros' activities was influenced by their image of a very small, badly trained, and badly equipped armed force. This is evidenced by their documents which will be studied in Part III. The initial military success of the Tupamaros was, among other reasons, due to the weak military capacity of the Uruguayan authorities (see Chapter XI).

When the authorities decided to invest more in the armed forces, increasing its capability to maintain internal order, the

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[1]Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, expanded edition), p. 68.

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Tupamaros found it more and more difficult to succeed militarily in their activities. The creation of a reliable network of information for the armed forces and the simultaneous dismantling of the Tupamaros' information network was probably one of the most important reasons for the Tupamaros' military defeat.

The United States played an important role in increasing the military's capacity to maintain internal order. The adjacent countries of Uruguay (Brazil and Argentina) by not supporting the guerrillas, contributed to the Uruguayan armed forces' curb of the Tupamaros.

Uruguay was a country with strong traditions of civilian control and long welfare-state experience. Thus the military in the beginning only reluctantly accepted internal intervention. The failure of the incumbent authorities and the repressive mechanisms at their disposal to contain urban guerrilla warfare led to expanded intervention by the army.[1] This, then, provided the necessary elements for the politicization of the military, leading to the military coup. The military documents studied in Part III as well as the growing participation by the armed forces in the decision making process supports the concept of 'gradualismo golpista' linked to the declining level of support for the authorities and the regime.

In broad terms, one of the main reasons for the military to intervene was their perception of a drastic drop in diffuse and specific support for the authorities by large and strategic sectors of

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[1]For Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Standford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1964), pp. 22, 58, the military capacity variable is one of the most important.

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the population. This drastic and continuous drop in support for the authorities, even though it was not expressed overtly by the majority of the population, was 'spilling over' to support withdrawal from the regime too. The armed forces' level of support for the political community remained high.

As support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities continued to increase, as indicated by the growing number of strikes, political violence, and violent disruptions unparalleled in Uruguay's history, the armed forces pressed by the Tupamaros were required to 'choose' between support for the authorities or support for the regime and political community. Uruguay's armed forces perceived that the regime and the political community were in 'danger' because of the mismanagement, corruption, and output failure of the incumbent authorities, fearing the eventual collapse of the political system and the society. This is evidenced by the documents published by the armed forces (see Part IV).

The Tupamaros through their activities succeeded in accelerating the process of overt-covert support withdrawal <u>from</u> the authorities. In this process they succeeded in part in increasing the level of diffuse support, but mainly specific support <u>for</u> themselves. There is no linear relationship between those two simultaneous political phenomena however. The armed forces shared in specific support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities, first covertly, and later overtly, but their level of diffuse support for the authorities remained high. Thus from the armed forces' viewpoint a change in the incumbent authorities would 'benefit' the political system as a whole.

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Up to this point the armed forces were concerned with systems maintenance, i.e., they perceived systems maintenance as a safeguard for systems persistence.

In the process of intervention the armed forces, during the period under study, became 'aware' that some changes in the regime would be required in order to keep in power the new incumbent authorities[1] and to increase the level of support for these authorities. Thus in a sense they coopted some of the programs for change proposed by the Tupamaros. The new incumbent authorities, as well as the 'old' ones never explicitly recognized the political existence of the Tupamaros. In 1973 the armed forces took over political power and suspended the parliament in order to begin with the implementation of the changes they believed necessary. Certain segments of the population (businessmen, farmers, etc.), while supporting the replacement of

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[1]We can call this explananation of 'coups' as provoked by extreme popular disapproval of the incumbent authorities the 'populistic' theory, indicating a military reaction to specific-diffuse support withdrawal (overt-covert) from the incumbent authorities, and the threat of 'spill-over' support withdrawal from the regime too. The broad proposition that political activity in the civilian sphere is an underlying or generating force for military coups has been quite widely advanced and documented. See, for example, Arturo Bray, Militares y civiles (Buenos Aires: Andino, 1958); Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics; Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962); Theodore Wyckoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly 3 (September 1960): 745-763; William H. Brill, Military Intervention in Bolivia: The Overthrow of Paz Estensoro and the MNR (Washington DC: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967); Arnold Payne, The Peruvian Coup d'Etat of 1962: The Overthrow of Manuel Prado (Washington DC: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1968).

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the incumbent authorities by the armed forces did not support the subsequent changes in the regime.

The Tupamaros succeeded in one of their main ideological objectives, namely the 'militarization' of the political conflict. This tactic was supposed to accelerate the process of support withdrawal. During this process they also politicized the armed forces who had a high level of diffuse support for the regime and the political community, and very low specific support for the incumbent authorities. The Tupamaros, while succeeding in their tactic of 'militarization,' failed in turning its consequences in their favor. On the contrary they accelerated the process of their own military defeat (see Part IV).

The traditional political parties in Uruguay, 'Blanco' and 'Colorado' as well as the 'Popular Front' party (see Chapter III) had among their top ranks people who retired from the armed forces. This opened more avenues for the politicization of the armed forces,[1] enhancing the process of 'co-participation' of the armed forces in Uruguay's political process and narrowing the gap between political and military institutions.

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[1]Ramirez, Las fuerzas armadas Uruguayas en la crisis continental, pp. 325-326.

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PART III

THE SUBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT

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CHAPTER VII

THE PROCESS OF SUPPORT WITHDRAWAL

Introduction

At the theoretical level David Easton discusses four 'types' of support. On the one hand 'overt' and 'covert' support, and on the other 'specific' and 'diffuse' support.[1] "I shall designate supportive actions as overt support and supportive attitudes or sentiments as covert support."[2] 'Diffuse support' could be considered as a general reservoir of support available to the system not directly or necessarily linked to certain outputs,[3] i.e., it encompasses affect for the authorities in general, for the values, norms, and institutions of the regime, and for the political community. Legitimacy, for example, is considered as an important component of diffuse support.[4] 'Specific support' on the other hand

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[1]For a definition of those concepts see Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, and a Framework for Political Analysis.

[2]Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 159.

[3]Ibid., pp. 349, 278, and "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," British Journal of Political Science 5 (October 1975): 443.

[4]'Legitimacy' is defined as the belief that the authorities and regime

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> is an input to a system that occurs as a return for the specific benefits and advantages that members of a system experience as part of their membership. It represents or reflects the satisfaction a member feels when he perceives his demands as having been met.[1]

At the theoretical level overt and covert support towards the objects of the political system are equally important, i.e., political participation and political attitudes are the means available to the individual to communicate support or support withdrawal from the political system. The members of a political community (individuals or groups) have different means through which to express their support or support withdrawal. One of them is political participation in the form of guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare became a widespread phenomenon in the twentieth century. In Uruguay, guerrilla warfare has had a particularly high impact on the political system. Guerrilla movements are political organizations that seek to achieve political and social revolution (i.e., a restructuring, reorganization, and redistribution of political, economic, social, and value resources in the society) through the use of armed warfare in the countryside or urban centers.

> "in some vague or explicit way [conform to a person's] . . . own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere. The strength of support implicit in this attitude derives from the fact that it is not contingent upon specific inducements or rewards of any kind, except in the very long run. On a day to day basis, if there is a strong inner conviction of the moral validity of the authorities or regime, support may persist even in the face of repeated deprivations attributed to the outputs of the authorities or their failure to act."

See Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 278.

[1]Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 125.

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In those countries such as Uruguay, in which guerrilla movements have succeeded in becoming politically relevant groups, they exert a definite influence on the political system. The unique situation of Uruguay is a good illustration of one of the very few cases in which an urban guerrilla movement succeeded in becoming a real contender for political power, and in having a deep impact on the political system. As studied in the chapters of Part II (dealing with the 'objective setting'), this happened in a democratic country without an immediate past history of political violence and with a long tradition of a highly developed welfare system.

The Tupamaros' systematic use of political violence, mainly through urban guerrillas, was intended primarily to create a 'power-duality'--a duality that would, on the one hand, accelerate the process of support withdrawal from the existing political system, and on the other hand command loyalty and support to themselves. Most of the Tupamaros' activities were carefully considered from the military point of view, but even more so for their political impact on the level of support of relevant members of the political system as well as the population at large.

From the political point of view, it is very important to link the feelings of dissatisfaction, powerlessness, and the like, to the political system. Those feelings, in order to be considered as inputs for the political system, must be politicized, otherwise their political consequences are minimized, thus, the importance of the 'subjective

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variables' is maximized because they form the links between the environment and the political system.[1] The chapters of Part III will deal with the 'subjective setting' and its linkage to the political system in order to understand the process of support withdrawal by the Tupamaros and other segments of the population. The study of the Tupamaros' political attitudes, sentiments, and activities will be done through the analysis of their published documents. We will study the strategy, program, and ideology of the Tupamaros. Combined, they were designed to undermine the legitimacy of the incumbent authorities and of the regime.

The Subjective Setting

The subjective setting or environment of the members of the guerrilla group and their leaders is composed of two sets of variables: "one may be designated as the 'attitudinal prism,' the other as 'elite images.'"[2] It is through the attitudinal prism that the elite's perception of the physical environment is filtered to form their images about the variables of the physical environment.

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[1]A careful distinction must be made between the analysis of the 'subjective environment' and the psychological influence of the guerrilla activities. This will be dealt with in Chapters XI and XII.

[2]Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Conflict Resolution 12, no. 1: 86.

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The attitudinal prism is composed of several elements. Among these elements we include ideology, past political experiences, the personal predispositions of the members of the guerrilla group as well as the 'societal factors.'[1] The analysis of 'societal factors' implies the study of the social origins, education, age of the guerrilla members. Guerrilla leaders grow out of particular political, socio-economic and historical contexts. Thus it is important to study their social background as well as their political experiences. Historically in Uruguay, as evidenced by the coups of the '30s and '70s, the greater the intensity and interpenetration of the socio-economic, political, and military crises, the higher the likelihood of political violence.

> For though the banker and the guerrilla have to operate with the same data, these are different kinds of people, who bring different kinds of interpretations to the facts. They mean different things to each, have different life-consequences, and each draws different conclusions for action.[2]

In this passage, Worsley is discussing the difference in the attitudinal prism and images of different persons. Thus in a sense it is possible to argue that certain segments of the population on the one

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[1]One of the explanations given to account for the Tupamaros' option of urban over rural guerrilla warfare was that the internal balance of power in the organization changed. Sendic's faction which favored rural guerrilla was defeated. See Chapter XI.

[2]Peter Worsley, "Revolutionary Theory: Guevara and Debray," in Regis Debray and the Latin American Revolution, ed. Leo Huberman (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 126.

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hand and the Tupamaros and militants on the other, were responding independently to the same data concerning the performance of the incumbent authorities, the regime, and the political community. While the majority of the population reacted toward a certain set of incumbent authorities, the 'activists' considered the set of authorities as being a product of the regime, thus 'secondary' as a 'target' for support withdrawal.

The growth of the Tupamaro guerrilla movement was at least one indication that support withdrawal from the authorities spilled-over into support withdrawal from the regime. The acceleration of this process enabled the Tupamaros to become a relevant political contender for power in Uruguay's political system. With the Tupamaro leadership, however, the reverse seemed to have occurred. Their support was withdrawn first from the regime and then from the incumbent authorities. The study of the 'attitudinal prism' will primarily focus on the leaders of the Tupamaros, since available material relates mostly to them.

The factors composing the attitudinal prism are highly related to each other,[1] and they are independent variables for the image-formation process, i.e., the guerrilla's images could change independently from developments in the objective environment. For example, a change in the leadership or composition of the group, can have an

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[1]Many studies about guerrilla warfare movements had centered on the different components of the guerrilla's attitudinal prism.

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important influence in the changing or formation of the group's image of the political system (see Part IV). The guerrilla's image can also change as a consequence of the feedback originated from the success or failure of his activities. The information processed by the leaders is filtered through the attitudinal prism. The analysis of this prism is necessary for the understanding of the leader's images about the objective environment. Thus they are one of the bases for understanding the outbreak and development of guerrilla activities.

In order to reconstruct the guerrilla leader's images, it is necessary to analyze documents, letters, biographies, autobiographies, journals, and the various publications of the guerrillas. People do not react to reality, but to what they think the reality is.

> It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior. . . . The 'image' must be thought of as the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe."[1]

Che Guevara's failure in Bolivia was in great part due to the wide gap between his images (subjective environment) and the objective environment. In his journal he recognized that his images of the objective setting were incomplete and inaccurate.[2] This turned afterwards to be fatal to his experimental 'foco.' Guevara's decision to start the foco in Bolivia was based on his own perceptions and not on research about the objective environment. On the other hand,

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[1]See Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 (June 1959): 120-121.

[2]For example, his lack of knowledge of the acquisition of helicopters by the Bolivian armed forces, the resistance of the native Indian populations, etc.

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> while Mao's doctrines and precepts are by no means profound, they were perfectly adapted to the objective conditions confronting him and were in the best tradition of Realpolitik and the age-old military political wisdom in China.[1]

> Of course we can crudely and usefully distinguish such physical elements as the nature of the terrain, the equipment available to each side, and the density of population from social factors, such as their class composition. However, I emphasize the subjective variability of response to the same physical and social facts, because it is the human response [author's emphasis] to those quite plastic facts that is crucial . . . and the physical facts are always subjectively interpreted, according to the mental set, cultural assumptions, predispositions, degree of politization, social experience, and ideological exposure of the actors.[2]

Peter Worsley recognized the existence of the objective and subjective environment, but he failed to connect those variables. The facts and changes in the objective environment are relevant to the guerrilla only to the extent that they are communicated to him.

In Uruguay, the continuous output failure of the authorities originated in part from the drastic drop in their ability to maintain the previous political, economic, and social welfare level. This failure helped legitimize the Tupamaros' images about the objective environment. The Tupamaros' ideology, strategy, and activities were influenced by their images of the accelerating political and socio-economic deterioration of the country.[3] The programs presented by the Tupamaros were aimed at a redistribution, reorganization, and restructuring of economic-social-political and value resources in the

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[1]Tang Tsou, "Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," p. 81.

[2]Worsley, "Revolutionary Theory: Guevara and Debray," p. 126.

[3]See Gilio, La guerrilla Tupamara, pp. 13-43, and chapters dealing with the socio-economic situation of Uruguay.

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society in order to redress the path of Uruguay's historical development.

The development and conditions in the objective environment that favored the outbreak and growth of guerrilla activities were studied in the chapters of Part II. Those aspects of the objective environment were relevant for the image formation process of the potential guerrillas. Given the conditions in the objective environment and the guerrillas' images about them they developed an ideology of 'popular support' and a 'strategy of militarization.'

The Tupamaros' 'strategy of militarization' was an attempt for turning the political crises into armed conflict, hoping in this way to polarize the political support of the population ('we' or 'them'). For example, by pressing for the adoption of repressive policies they sought to erode the population's specific support for the incumbent authorities. As the level of 'legal' violence escalated, they hoped the population not only would lose trust, but would also begin questioning the legitimacy of the regime. This drop in the level of diffuse support for the regime, according to the Tupamaros, would result in widespread diffuse support (legitimacy and trust) for 'revolutionary' violence. Thus the Tupamaros wanted to become the main recipient of the specific and diffuse support withdrawn from the authorities and the regime.

In 1967-68, at the peak of the economic crisis, the Tupamaros represented a strong political alternative for large sections of Montevideo's population. This widespread feeling of sympathy and support for the Tupamaros was short lived. The Tupamaros enjoyed a

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high level of specific support, i.e., their support was contingent on their activities. Among the reasons for the loss of popular support was the negative psychological effects of certain activities they performed (see Part IV).

Judging by the subsequent political developments in Uruguay, the Tupamaros' image about the militarization of the political conflict was correct, but their assessment of the 'polarization effect' was not. Most of Uruguay's population, as evidenced by the results of the 1973 national elections, continued to support the liberal tradition and democratic process.

The image of 'popular support' was central to Mao and Guevara's writings. For them it was a sine-qua-non condition for the success of a guerrilla warfare. Che Guevara attached great importance to popular support. "It is important to emphasize that guerrilla warfare is people's war; to attempt to carry out this type of war without the population's support is the prelude to inevitable disaster.[1] However, the covert support and/or apathy of a great proportion of the population was as important as the overt support of certain segments of the population. Marighella was aware of this phenomenon: "those that don't want to do something in favor of the revolutionaries, don't do anything against them."[2]

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[1]Guevara, "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method," pp. 89-90.

[2]Marighella, "Minimanual del guerrillero urbano," Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 109.

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Chalmers Johnson considered the image of 'popular support' as the 'irreductible characteristic' of 'successful' and 'true' guerrilla warfare.[1] For Chalmers Johnson, the criteria of popular support was the principle one which defined guerrilla warfare and differentiated it from other kinds of revolutionary activity.

It is important to recall that Fidel Castro's guerrillas did not receive mass overt popular support till the last stages of the revolution. 'Popular support' can be just one among the numerous requirements and measurements for the success of guerrilla warfare. Most of the guerrilla movements that were active in Latin America during the 1960s did not receive widespread mass popular support.[2] For the Tupamaros 'popular support' was important but only at certain stages in the process of revolutionary warfare.

This introductory section defined and explained the importance and components of the subjective environment. The proceeding chapters of Part III deal with the 'attitudinal prism' and the 'images' of the guerrillas as expressed in their documents.

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[1]See Chalmers A. Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict," World Politics 14 (July 1962): 646-661, and Revolution and the Social System (Stanford: Hoover Institute on War, Revolt and Peace, 1964), pp. 57-67.

[2]From 1959 to the present, the military performance of Latin American guerrillas has been impaired by their inability to gain popular support, and there is illustrative evidence that the guerrillas resorted to terror as a means of neutralizing peasant hostility and gaining recruits. See Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 37-59.

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The Attitudinal Prism

This study of the 'attitudinal prism' will focus on the Tupamaro leadership, especially its main leader Raúl Sendic. This is prompted by the availability of material. We will study the development of his ideology and changing perceptions due to reality testing. Changing perceptions led to the shift of tactics from conventional political participation to guerrilla warfare. Raúl Sendic Antonaccio is considered the 'founding father' of the Tupamaros. The cane-cutter workers (cañeros) of the northern states of Uruguay were among his first followers.

Raúl Sendic[1] was born in 1925 to a family of small proprietors in the Department of Flores (see Figure 2). He graduated from the University in Montevideo, where he received a law degree (procurador). While a student he became an active member of the Socialist party advocating 'syndicalism.' In 1958 he traveled to Cuba and Paris where he represented Uruguay in the convention of the Socialist International.

In the late 1950s the Communist and Socialist parties began organizing groups for 'technical instruction' among rural workers in order to increase their rural constituencies. The Communist party centered its efforts among the dairy (tambo) workers, and the Socialist party among the rice and sugar cane workers. In 1960, influenced

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[1]Most of the information regarding Raúl Sendic, I found in Marcha Weekly; Labrousse, Les Tupamaros; Moss, Urban Guerrillas; and Dueñas Ruiz and Rugnon de Dueñas, Tupamaros.

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probably by Julião's[1] example in Brazil, Raúl Sendic took charge of the challenging enterprise of the Socialist party.

It is important to remember that in contrast to the situation in Montevideo, rural workers were never before unionized, did not enjoy the same benefits as the workers in Montevideo, were alienated from the political process and until the late 1950s were almost completely neglected by the left wing parties. Sendic left the University and arrived in the State of Paysandú (see Figure 2) where he began organizing the 'remolacha' (sugar beet) workers. Later he moved to the State of Artigas in order to organize the sugar cane cutters.

In Artigas Sendic succeeded in organizing the sugar cane cutters union (UTAA).[2] The production at the plants of the American owned sugar companies CANISA and AZUCARLITO, as well as the nationally owned ANCAP,[3] depended heavily on Artigas' sugar cane harvests.

> Something happened in 1962 in Bella Unión. Everything seemed quiet, although the 'gringos' with their bad habits, controlling and abusing our ignorance, neither paid us the minimum wages, vacations, bonuses, nor unemployment compensation.
>
> They laughed at Uruguay's laws. And a group of Uruguayans, traitors to their country, got together with the gringos in order to exploit us.

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[1]Julião organized and led the 'peasant leagues in the poor Brazilian Northeast.

[2]UTAA--Unión Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas. The sugar cane-cutter workers are also known as the 'peludos' (hairy ones).

[3]ANCAP--Administración Nacional de Combustibles Alcohol y Petróleo (National Administration of Fuel, Alcohol and Petroleum).

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> Then a man arrived at Bella Unión. He was a law student . . . his name was Raúl Sendic. He opened our eyes, explained to us our rights, and thanks to him we unionized and presented our demands to the gringos.[1]

The first organizational meetings and activities of the UTAA were peaceful and intended primarily to achieve for the rural workers similar benefits and conditions to those enjoyed by the urban workers. The cañeros attempted by peaceful, traditional, and legal means to improve their living conditions. Their union demanded from the landlords and sugar companies implementation of the national labor laws (e.g., minimum wage, weekly rest, eight hour labor day, pension plans, abolition of child labor, and the like). Working conditions in the sugar planations violated these laws. "And we presented our demands to the gringos. We were treated with contempt, as in the time of the slaves."[2]

The UTAA leadership, frustrated with their inability to obtain any meaningful concessions from the local landowners and companies through the bargaining process, decided to voice their demands to the national authorities. Sendic was considered to be the main sponsor of the politicization of the conflict.

> There was no agreement . . . Undoubtedly the callous gringos thought that at the end we will get tired and disband, but the opposite was true. Each time we were rebuked we united more, and on April the second, after having already exhausted all the peaceful and legal resources, we decided to begin the ACTION. . . . We do not want charity, we are only asking what is rightfully ours,

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[1]From a document published by the sugar cane-cutter workers. See Carlos Aznares and Jaime E. Cañas, Tupamaros, fracaso del Ché? (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Orbe, 1969), pp. 12-18.

[2]Ibid.

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> otherwise Montevideo and its politicians will be held responsible for whatever happens here.[1]

In order to show their determination to raise the population's consciousness for the need to equalize working conditions for rural workers, the cañeros (most of whom had never been in Montevideo), decided to bring their demands to the capital. Montevideo's urban population was indifferent and unaware of the sugar workers' living conditions.

The UTAA, led by Sendic, organized the first 'Marcha de los Cañeros.' The cañeros requested from Montevideo's authorities a legal permit to march. The first march was not authorized because the authorities invoked an 1896 law. After negotiations and the establishment of certain limits the permit was granted, and the sugar cane workers, with their spouses and children, marched from Artigas to Montevideo (600 km.) in order to voice their demands to the legislators. Once in Montevideo they camped outside of Congress. This peaceful march was brutally repressed by the armed forces. Despite two consecutive marches in 1964 and 1965 the sugar workers' demands were not met and they were violently repressed.

> On the advice of Raúl Sendic, we the hairy ones (cañeros), marched to Montevideo in order to demand the application of the existing law which was not being implemented. . . . Twice we went to Montevideo to demand responsibility from the authorities so that they should adopt policies that would stop starving our people. With what did they answer us? With sticks and bullets. In Congress they gassed us, they struck us with sabres, they shot at us and injured our Comrades. . . . The desire for justice can not be suppressed with violence.[2]

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[1]Ibid. [2]Ibid.

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As the UTAA's attempts to improve the cañeros' working and living conditions through peaceful, legal, and union channels failed, their demands and methods radicalized. They began voicing demands for the expropriation and redistribution of 30,000 hectares of unused lands. They prepared a specific list of lands to be expropriated. These lands were not being used by their absentee landowners. The cañeros began to clash openly with the landowners, factory managers, and local authorities. Their slogan 'Por la Tierra y Con Sendic' ('For the Land and with Sendic') reflected their aspirations for land reform.

> We understood that we could never be happy working for the land-owners. If the Fatherland belongs to all the Uruguayans, then each Uruguayan should have his part. And today our main objective is to fight for the expropriation of Silva y Rosas 30,000 hectares of land. The landowners do not take care of this land . . . These fields are the epitome of disorganization and abandonment. It is criminal that in Uruguay every night, thousands of persons should go to sleep hungry, while these rich fields where much food could be produced are being wasted. We want to own these lands in order to organize a large cooperative, work everything collectively, and where there would be neither exploiters nor exploited people.[1]

The sugar workers' demands were 'radical' but limited. They did not demand total land expropriation without indemnification as a matter of policy. The cañeros only demanded the expropriation of specific lands. They were also demanding the implementation of the national labor and welfare laws in the rural sector. The satisfaction of those demands would have guaranteed for themselves the same rights and benefits enjoyed by the urban workers since Batlle's times. These demands, however, were radical for Uruguay's countryside and their

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[1]Ibid.

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implementation posed a potential threat to the organization and stability of the rural sector which was the basis of Uruguay's economy.

Although the Congressional hearings, petitions, and marches failed to satisfy the workers' demands, they did, however, precipitate the workers' realization that the fulfillment of their demands could not be achieved by legal and peaceful means. The cañeros overtly withdrew specific support from the incumbent authorities that repeatedly denied their demands. They also overtly withdrew diffuse support from certain institutions, norms, and values of the regime (e.g., land tenure system). These frustrating experiences and violent incidents influenced Sendic's image about the need to 'arm' the organization. He felt this was necessary in order to protect UTAA against the armed forces' repression as well as to perhaps attempt a violent revolution that would satisfy the cañeros' demands, unachievable through peaceful means. This marked a clear shift in the strategy of support withdrawal.

> We the cane-cutters know that as long as the rich hold power, we will not be able to solve anything with elections. One government leaves and another one comes in, and we the workers are worse off every day. All the exploited have to be united, take power, and then yes, things will change . . . We want to be able to eat, dress, educate, and provide medical assistance to our children. Presently our children have to live even worse than the insects. . . . Violence is the solution that will end the lack of work and hunger that plagues our country's Northeast. . . . If the moment arrives and we have to dig up the weapons with which Mr. José Gervasio Artigas, chief of the Uruguayans fought, we will do so.[1]

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[1]Ibid.

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In this document the UTAA members acknowledged Sendic's importance in the genesis of their political consciousness and subsequent organization. They overtly expressed their specific and diffuse support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the regime and also pointed to the violent direction in which this withdrawal of support would be expressed.

Uruguay's labor union movement had a long tradition of collective bargaining. According to Lipset[1] the only three republics that had conditions for stable democracies were Uruguay, Switzerland, and the United States. Uruguay, apparently, had fulfilled the necessary conditions for a stable democracy but only during prosperous times. Uruguay's democratic process had strict covert guidelines and limitations. It accepted collective bargaining only to the extent that it did not compromise or question the existing distribution of political power and economic, social, and value resources. Uruguay's regime incorporated new members from the lower socio-economic groups, accepted their bargaining power and collective bargaining mechanisms, but only after assurances that they would not question the values upon which the existing regime was based.

The last cañeros marches did, however, question the political, economic, and value foundations of Uruguay's political system. As the

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[1]Seymour Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), p. 66. According to Lipset the stability of democracies depends upon the successful solutions of the conflicts that democracies have to confront: a) the place of the Church, b) the inclusion of the lower classes in the political and economic process of the nation through universal vote and collective bargaining, c) the continuous struggles for the distribution of the national product. See p. 71.

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political and socio-economic situation of the country continued to deteriorate, large sectors of the population as well as many unions' demands expressed a desire for radical changes in the foundations of Uruguay's regime. These demands were considered by the incumbent authorities as 'subversive,' 'threats against the legitimacy of our institutions,' 'communist sponsored,' etc. This justified political repression in the name of regime maintenance. Paradoxically, the incumbent authorities destroyed Uruguay's democracy while trying to maintain it. They were not ready to accept the consequences of the political dynamism which they themselves created when sectors of the population withdrew diffuse support from the existing political system.

Raúl Sendic and the cañeros failed in their peaceful, legal, and conventional attempts to produce a change in the distribution of political, social, economic, and value resources in Uruguay's society. They 'discovered' that the regime and its defenders (the incumbent authorities) were not as 'flexible' and 'open' as they had previously perceived it. This failure was symbolized by the arrest of Sendic and several cañeros. They spent several months in jail. Upon his release Sendic published an article "Esperando al guerrillero" ("Awaiting the Guerrilla Fighter").

After his release Sendic found himself isolated from most of the members of the Central Committee of the Socialist party. He was strongly criticized by those members opposed to the type of activities sponsored and organized by Sendic which led to violence. The Socialist party, for which Sendic was a candidate, was defeated in the 1962 national elections (see Table 8 and Chapter III).

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The inability of Uruguay's authorities to meet the workers' demands radicalized their struggle. Their demands shifted from the more conventional issues to those of 'expropriation' and 'redistribution' of lands.

> To the initiators of the Tupamaro movement this incident provided evidence of how useless the conventional and legal channels of political participation had become; evidence of how, in fact, political parties and the government as a whole would not listen to the people's demand for change--much less the existence of an uneven land distribution that heavily favored a few large landholders. So the plight of the peasants gave way to the rise of guerrillas, and from among the followers of Sendic the Tupamaros were born.[1]

Their slogan became 'There will be land for everybody or there will be no land for anyone.[2] This marked a further shift in the strategy of support withdrawal. Their demands and public appeals were no longer directed only to the cañeros, but to the political community at large.

The surprising and devastating defeat of the Socialist party, the frustration caused by the authorities' inability and/or unwillingness to meet the demands voiced by the sugar workers union through the UTAA, and the mounting police repression, had an important influence in Sendic's images about 'parliamentarism' and 'unionism.' After the 1962 electoral disaster he disappeared for about eight months. Very little is known about his activities in this period of time. He reappeared

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[1]Arturo Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 5.

[2]'Habrá tierra para todos o no habrá tierra para nadie.'

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with the first guerrilla activity in 1963.[1] It is assumed that after his consecutive frustrations, he decided that only through guerrilla warfare would it be possible to achieve social, political, and economic change in Uruguay. He devoted this period of time organizing the first guerrilla cell.[2]

It was during the first phase of the Tupamaros (1962-1965) that the basic ideological and strategic decisions were adopted (e.g., urban guerrilla, non-sectarian armed struggle, etc.). The initial membership of the movement was drawn from diverse sectors of the Left (Socialists, Anarchists, Maoists, and Trotskites) as well as from unaffiliated nationalists. The best known of these groupings was from the Socialist party, led by Raúl Sendic.[3] This ideological diversity was possible because of the Tupamaros' notion of 'non-sectarian armed struggle.' This notion enabled the Tupamaros to obtain the support from different ideological groups whose beliefs were at times contradictory.

From its creation, Uruguay's Socialist party adhered to a social-democratic position. Later, with the increased participation of students and young workers, the rank and file ideological position shifted toward Marxism-Leninism. During this process of ideological

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[1]A group of people raided the 'Swiss Shooting Club' in the State of Colonia. In the beginning it was considered to be a regular criminal act, but afterwards the stolen weapons were found in Tupamaros' hands.

[2]See "Reportaje a un Tupamaro," in La guerrilla Tupamara, ed. Gilio, pp. 141-153.

[3]James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1974), p. 185.

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confrontation between the leadership and its radicalized rank and file, many groups split from the Socialist party and formed small political groups. This 'atomization' of the left wing political parties was very common in Uruguay.

Some individuals[1] claim that after the disastrous returns from the 1962 national elections, the Tupamaros began as the 'armed branch' of the Socialist party. From all the studies about the Tupamaros this view is argued only by Carlos Aznares and Jaime E. Cañas.[2] The evidence demonstrates this view is inaccurate.

The Cuban Revolution as well as Fidel Castro's perception of a 'revolutionary party' influenced the Tupamaros. Guevara and Debray suggested that the revolutionary movement should be the 'armed branch' of the 'revolutionary party.' Although the origins of any clandestine organization are often unclear, it seems that the Tupamaros in their beginning agreed with the 'armed branch' philosophy. It was only in 1967 that the Tupamaros explicitly rejected this philosophy, maintaining that the 'revolutionary vanguard' should not operate as an armed branch of any existing legal political organizations.

The break from the Socialist party took place after the Tupamaros' first public, violent, and illegal activity (July 1963). This separation was completed by 1966-67 when the development and

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[1]Based on personal interviews with Tupamaros conducted in Argentina in 1976.

[2]Aznares and Cañas, Tupamaros, fracaso del Ché?

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maturity of the Tupamaros was accompanied by the armed forces' increasing repression. During this period of time it is believed that the Tupamaros approached most of the atomized left wing organizations in Uruguay[1] in an attempt to coordinate their guerrilla activities with those of the different militant and political organizations. These attempts failed due to increasing technical and ideological tensions.

The final break between the Tupamaros and the other left wing organizations, especially the Socialist party, was caused by the growing technical inability to maintain a link between an organization requiring absolute secrecy and a public political party. The Socialist party did not want to compromise its legality and the Tupamaros were unwilling to compromise their secrecy. This 'technical' problem reflected the growing political and ideological tensions between the Tupamaros and the Socialist party. This tension is also explained by the inner pressures inside the Tupamaro organization. The Tupamaros' ideological diversity allowed by their notion of 'non-sectarian armed

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[1]Especially 'Organización Populares Revolucionarios del 33,' 'Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Orientales,' 'Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario,' Frente Revolucionario de Trabajadores,' 'Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria,' 'Grupo 22 de Diciembre,' etc. The Tupamaros were aware that they could not approach the Communist party. Uruguay's Communist party and its leader Rodney Arismendi (exiled in the Soviet Union since 1973) would support only non-violent activities that they could directly control. Their newspaper, El Popular, continuously criticized and condemned the Tupamaros as 'irresponsible adventurers.' Uruguay's Communist party was condemned by the OLAS Conference as 'traitors' and for 'inhibiting the process of national liberation in Uruguay.' The Tupamaros' philosophies of 'armed propaganda' and 'non-sectarian armed struggle' were among the main reasons for the tensions with the traditional left wing parties and organizations. According to the Tupamaros the traditional left, especially the Communist party, never solved the inner contradiction between their revolutionary rhetoric and parliamentary participation.

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struggle,' precluded an exclusive relationship with the Socialist or any other political party. Also the Tupamaros' philosophy of 'armed propaganda,' i.e., every guerrilla activity in itself should be regarded as a political statement could have threatened the existing legal left wing organizations. After the final break the Tupamaros became a political and military organization completely independent from the existing legal parties.

Summary

Sendic tried to achieve the cañeros' collective aspirations within the system. The cañeros' hopes of fulfilling their demands in conventional forms failed. Sendic had acquired ideological and important organizational skills as a teenager as a member of the Socialist party. He began as a reformer, i.e., to bring about changes by working through the established institutions, values, and norms of the regime. The authorities as well as the regime could not fulfill the demands. Sendic turned revolutionary advocating guerrilla warfare. By turning to guerrilla warfare, Sendic highlighted the coercive and repressive nature of the regime, undermining its legitimacy. In order to translate his ideology into action, he had to organize the Tupamaro movement in order to mobilize certain sectors of the population.

Through this process, as evidenced in their documents, Sendic as well as the cañeros organized in UTAA lost affect for the values, norms, and institutions of the regime. They lost trust in the regime

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as well as questioned its legitimacy. Their level of support for the political community remained high at all times. Sendic and the cañeros also withdrew specific support from the incumbent authorities. They did not perceive that they were getting any specific benefit by supporting the authorities and the regime. On the contrary the level of frustration and powerlessness increased when their demands were not met and legal repression increased against them. This precipitated their shifting strategy of support withdrawal--from negotiations with the landowners to guerrilla warfare.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE SOCIAL SETTING

This chapter will analyze the social setting of the Tupamaro movement. As mentioned earlier, the social setting is one of the main components of the attitudinal prism. We will study what segments of the population are more likely to join the Tupamaro movement in their strategy of support withdrawal.

Societal factors are an important variable in the study of the attitudinal prism and the image formation process of the guerrillas. The analysis of societal factors includes the study of the social origins, occupation, age, and education, as well as the ideology of the Tupamaros. The study of the societal factors is necessary for further understanding the Tupamaros' decision to withdraw diffuse and specific support from the existing regime and incumbent authorities by means of guerrilla warfare, as well as the nature of their ideology, strategy, and organization.

Although it is difficult to obtain data concerning the Tupamaro membership due to the secret nature of their organization, some information was made available by the media and the armed forces. Data on the Tupamaro membership was primarily collected from public and official sources. Their information was derived mainly from captured

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guerrillas, sympathizers and collaborators. It is possible, however, that some 'class' of Tupamaros were more likely to be captured than others. The data presented in this chapter includes only Tupamaro members and not the periphery. The periphery performed important tasks for the Tupamaro organization, but were not considered members (see Chapter XI). The data, however, is considered to be quite accurate.[1]

The Tupamaro membership was not homogeneous. Its members belonged to different social groups and backgrounds. Although the authorities tried to give the public the impression that the Tupamaros were a group incited by foreigners, the evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of members were Uruguayans.[2] The level of education among the leadership and rank and file of the Tupamaros was very high.[3] Most of the captured Tupamaros were young in age (below forty).[4] The proportion of female participation was high.[5]

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[1]According to personal interviews with Tupamaros conducted in Argentina during 1976-77.

[2]"The 648 captured Tupamaros were overwhelmingly Uruguayan in national origin and citizenship. Only twelve out of the total, or about 1.8 percent, were foreigners--all of whom had a long residency record in Uruguay--five Spaniards, three Brazilians, two Argentinians, one Venezuelan, and one Egyptian. For a country such as Uruguay, whose population is about 40 percent of Spanish descent and is surrounded by Argentina and Brazil, the Spanish or Latin American background of Tupamaros of foreign origin is not at all surprising" (Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 31).

[3]Most of the captured top leadership were professionals. For example, Raúl Sendic, Jorge Manueras Lluveras, Marenales Saenz, Juan Almiretti, Héctor Amodio Perez, Raúl Bidegain, Alberto Candan Grajales, Lucía Topolanski, etc. (lawyers, architects, physicians, musicians, actors, etc.). See Tables 26-27.

[4]See Tables 28-29.

[5]See Tables 30-31.

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Students, teachers, and young liberal professionals were among the highly politicized Tupamaros' sympathizers. Tables 26-32 show the occupations, age, sex, and place of arrest of captured Tupamaros.

The social composition of the Tupamaros resembled that of the rest of the country (age, education, occupation, etc.) which also withdrew support from the incumbent authorities and the regime by means of strikes, demonstrations, etc. Students and professionals were among the most active against the authorities and the regime. As can be seen in Table 26 they represented approximately one-third of the captured Tupamaros. The number of professionals increased through the years and they occupied the top positions in the movement. The proportion of workers although fluctuating remained stable (roughly one-third). Although most of the Tupamaros were from urban origins, the cañeros continued to supply recruits. The breakdown of the occupation of captured Tupamaros in Table 27 supports the analysis that identified these as the groups most affected by the economic, social, and political crisis (see Chapter IV).

The data on the guerrillas' age points towards the 'youth' of the movement. Table 29 shows that while the largest age group of captured Tupamaros in Montevideo was the group from 21 to 25 years of age, in the Interior it was from 25 to 30. This phenomenon should be linked to the places where Tupamaros were captured (Table 32).

Even though the Tupamaros were an urban guerrilla group more Tupamaros were captured in the Interior of Uruguay than in Montevideo (during the period covered by the table). This is explained by several reasons. The period reported was the height of the armed forces'

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'counterattack' and many guerrillas sought temporary refuge in the Interior. The data in the tables does not include the approximately ten thousand Tupamaros suspected of being held by the armed forces since the military coup in 1973,[1] and the reported ten thousand that escaped from Uruguay mainly to Argentina, Brazil, Chile,[2] Venezuela, and France.

This period coincided with the Tupamaros' attempt to create a second front in the Interior of the country in order to ease the pressure in Montevideo by dispersing the armed forces. The second front, although located in the Interior of the country, did not diminish the urban character of the movement. The second front was also basically urban, located in the cities and towns of the Interior. The proportion of rural workers decreased when the Tupamaros decided on urban over rural guerrilla warfare. The creation of a 'second front' in the Interior failed to increase peasant participation.

Most of the Tupamaros captured in the Interior were found near the 'tatuceras' (see Chapter XI). The protection of the tatuceras required a higher level of commitment to the organization and more years of experience. These factors in part explain the larger number and age of Tupamaros captured in the Interior during this period of time.

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[1]Figure estimated by 'International Amnesty' and other organizations seeking information and the release of these political prisoners.

[2]When Allende was overthrown, hundreds of Uruguayans that previously sought political asylum in Chile were killed by the Chilean military. Many others were deported to Uruguay where in most cases they were imprisoned.

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Approximately one-fourth of the guerrillas were women. This proportion is considered very high, especially in a society such as Uruguay's where women performed 'traditional' roles. The proportion of women increased through the years and they performed important tasks in the organization (see Chapter XI).

The Tupamaros' experience constituted a serious challenge to Debray's 'rural foco theory' and the pattern of armed struggle in Latin America after the Cuban Revolution and the 'Bolivian fiasco.' Camilo Torres, Castro, Debray, Marighella, and Guevara influenced certain sectors of Uruguay's society to join the Tupamaros. But basically Abraham Guillén and 'Joe Baxter' became the main ideological leaders of the Tupamaros and of the Latin American guerrilla movements from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s.

Our findings about the societal characteristics of the Tupamaros corroborates in part the conclusion of other studies of revolutionary elites. Regai and Phillips'[1] comparative study of revolutionary elites concludes that almost 80 percent of revolutionary leaders were below the age of forty-five. In regard to the place of birth they find that only 39 percent were of urban origin, but more than 90 percent of the non-urban leaders spent four or more years in urban centers. The socio-economic status of over 50 percent of the leaders are middle class.

Educationally the Tupamaros resembled other revolutionary elites as well. Regai and Phillips point out that less than 20 percent

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[1]Mostafa Regai and Kay Phillips, Leaders of Revolution (Beverly Hills: Sage Library of Social Research, 1979).

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had only primary or secondary education, 18 percent attended graduate school, and 41 percent had postgraduate or professional training. Very few had prior military training.[1] Sendic's profile is also similar to that of other revolutionary leaders. Castro obtained a law degree, Guevara was a physician, but they never practiced their professions. About 64 percent of the leaders published at least one article, pamphlet, or book, usually devoted to discussions of revolutionary ideology, organization, tactics, or strategy. Of these leaders, 62 percent were arrested at least once for political agitation and over 60 percent spent some time in jail. Only 23 percent of these leaders did not travel abroad.[2]

The Tupamaros reversed the previous strategic importance of urban guerrilla warfare, acknowledging its supremacy over rural guerrilla warfare.[3] The fact that most of Uruguay's population was urban (as was most of the Tupamaro membership) had a great impact on the image formation process of the Tupamaros and their decision to choose urban over rural guerrilla warfare. This aspect will be dealt with in more detail when studying the Tupamaros' activities.

In this chapter we have looked upon the societal factors (age, occupation, sex, etc.) that influenced the Tupamaros' attitudinal prism. The next chapter will study the ideological component of the attitudinal prism.

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[1]Ibid. [2]Ibid.

[3]This was a redefinition of Guevara's 'rural foco' by which urban guerrillas will support rural guerrillas. See "Interview with Urbano" document.

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CHAPTER IX

THE TUPAMAROS' ATTITUDINAL PRISM

Ideology and Images

The Tupamaros did not create Uruguay's crises. They emerged as an alternative political answer to the overall crises facing Uruguay since the 1950s. The Tupamaros did, however, influence the pace of the crises. In Part II we studied the environmental circumstances that precipitated Uruguay's problems. The study of these circumstances was necessary for the understanding of the Tupamaros' emergence. Otherwise, the study of the Tupamaros would have been done in a vacuum and outside of its context. The Tupamaros as a product rather than the cause of Uruguay's crises were concerned with the framework for the solution of problems rather than with their analysis. In this chapter we will analyze the Tupamaros' ideology and their images.

This chapter will study one of the major components of the Tupamaros' attitudinal prism, i.e., their ideology, their understanding of Uruguay's present and past situations. We will also study their images of the escalating crisis since the 1950s as well as their strategies for the implementation of their proposed solutions to the country's problems. Their strategies, however, will be studied in more detail in conjunction with their activities in Chapter X. The

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Tupamaros' ideas will be studied by the analysis of their documents in order to discover the reasons for their support withdrawal from Uruguay's political system.[1] The combined Tupamaros' ideology, images, strategy, and programs were designed to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and the incumbent authorities. It guided their activities (see Chapter XI) and contributed to undermine support.

As studied in Part II, since 1950 Uruguay faced a severe socio-economic crisis that eventually penetrated the political system (e.g., stagnation of the rural and industrial sectors, increasing unemployment, galloping inflation, and output failure, and the like). For the Tupamaros the roots of the crisis were the political and socio-economic systems in themselves. Thus, the lack of capable authorities to lead the nation was not the main reason for the deep crisis, but rather it was the 'system' and its underlying ideology as well as its organization which did not allow for adequate solutions. As their documents stressed, the Tupamaros were more concerned with the causes of Uruguay's problems and the 'framework' in which they could be solved. They were not very specific in terms of which political and

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[1]Most of the Tupamaros' documents were either released by the press or directly distributed by the Tupamaros through their network of 'comités de apoyo,' or published by the armed forces. They would also leave pamphlets in the place of their activities explaining their reasons for those actions. Unless otherwise stated, the English version of the documents are my own translation. In the translation of documents my primary concern was with the context, idea, and concepts rather than the strict translation of the text. All the documents used in order to write this chapter are included in my personal files in the original Spanish version.

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economic policies should be followed in order to extricate Uruguay from its deep crises.

Some of the general solutions they proposed in their documents included land reform (expropriation and redistribution of large latifundia, but maintaining the small enterprises), expropriation of foreign interests (without compensation), state control of the means of production, and abolition of the 'ley de lemas' and the 'pacto del chinchulín.' Other changes in the areas of education, health, welfare, planning, and the legal system were mentioned, but in very broad terms. The main goal was the achievement of an egalitarian society in Uruguay, i.e., an equitable redistribution of socio-economic, political, and value resources. The Tupamaros also believed that these and other changes could never be achieved by peaceful means. Thus 'armed struggle' was the only means to implement these solutions.[1]

The Tupamaros' ideology was never developed in detail. They maintained that the ideology of the movement was to be consolidated in the process of armed revolution. Their ultimate goal was to achieve political and social revolution. This would be achieved by the creation of an independent, nationalist identity for Uruguayan society and the implementation of socialism as a socio-economic system for the nation. In order to implement their ideology they proposed to seize political power through urban guerrilla warfare.

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[1]See Tupamaros, "Carta abierta a la policía,' (CIDOC), Cuaderno No. 60 (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentación, 1971), p. 7.1.

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Ideologically, the seizure of power in order to implement a socialist revolution was the "objective and strategic task of the Tupamaros."[1] In the same document they stated that, "Socialism in Latin America will be nationalistic and vice-versa . . . For us the core of the issue is to apply Marxism-Leninism to our concrete conditions." The Tupamaros combined their socialist goals with strong nationalism. Socialism would be developed according to Uruguay's specific historical developments, thus it will not necessarily follow the pattern of other socialist countries. The Tupamaros' Marxist-Leninist nationalist ideology is similar to that of most other guerrilla groups in Latin America as well as in the underdeveloped world.[2] Although the Tupamaros' ideology was a 'foreign' ideology, through nationalism they adapted it to the local needs.

The ideology of the Tupamaros crystalized in the process of their armed struggle. During the course of their activities they made their ideology known. The Tupamaros' ideology and political platform were heavily influenced by their images of the socio-economic-political developments in Uruguay. Although the 'founding members' of the

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[1]See Tupamaros, "Analisis del MLN sobre la situación nacional y continental," in Los Tupamaros, by Omar Costa (Mexico D.F.: Ediciones ERA, 1971), p. 231.

[2]Regai and Phillips, Leaders of Revolution, p. 111.

> "Twentieth century leaders [revolutionary] are overwhelmingly nationalists of some form (63 percent), or Marxists of some shade (69 percent), or otherwise leftist (17 percent), or a combination of the three. . . . in underdeveloped countries they are more likely to be nationalist/Marxist-Leninist (61 percent)."

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Tupamaros had ideological inclinations, the ideology of the movement was developed in the praxis.[1]

The Tupamaros' guerrilla activities were designed and carefully considered in order to optimize the achievement of their revolutionary goal, i.e., to minimize the potential gap between their tactics and their strategy/ideology. They believed in the philosophy of 'armed propaganda,' i.e., that every guerrilla activity in itself constituted a political statement. Thus our analysis of the Tupamaros' ideology is based upon the examination of their written documents as well as their activities. The activities will be studied in more detail in the next chapter. They will be analyzed as documents and evidence for the further understanding of their ideology, targets, and strategy of support withdrawal. It should, however, be stressed that although the activities of the Tupamaros were a direct consequence of their ideology, they nonetheless constituted an integral part of it. They rejected the armchair revolutionaries, the struggle for the implementation of their revolutionary goal was to be immediate.

> The most effective means, if not the sole means, for the Tupamaros to achieve their legitimate objective, is revolutionary war . . . The Tupamaros use of urban guerrilla warfare is the concrete manifestation of their revolutionary war.[2]

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[1]The ideology of the Tupamaros is closely related to their images. Most revolutionary leaders in Latin America, for example, including Sendic, have a positive image about the 'nature' of human beings, a negative image about the present situation of their country as well as its future unless drastic changes in the regime occur soon. Their image of the international community is that of a polarized international system.

[2]Major Carlos Wilson, The Tupamaros, The Unmentionables (Boston: Branden Press, 1974), p. 75.

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It is this aspect of their ideology which we call the 'strategy,' i.e., urban guerrilla warfare. It was this strategy that basically differentiated the Tupamaros from other left wing organizations such as the Socialists, Communists, etc.

The Tupamaros had a very high level of support for Uruguay's political community. This was evidenced by their nationalistic ideology. Symbolically it was represented by their name, activities, and documents. The name 'Tupamaros' is associated with nationalistic tendencies and Uruguay's political community. The Inca Tupac Amarú (José Gabriel Candorcanqui--1740-1781) was the last leader of the Peruvian people to fight against the Spanish colonization. 'Tupamaros' ('the followers of Tupac Amarú') was the name given by the Spanish to the revolt movements that originated during this period. In the La Plata region (Argentina and Uruguay) the followers of the caudillo José Gervasio Artigas, hero of Uruguay's independence, were also called 'Tupamaros.' The Tupamaros' song (which was censored) was adopted from that used by Artigas' followers.[1] Thus the name Tupamaros directly linked the guerrillas to Uruguay's history and to an international struggle. They considered themselves the 'political vanguard' of Uruguay's political community, a continuation of the indigenous liberation movement, based upon the experience of their predecessors.

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1 "Cielo de los Tupamaros
cielo de Pampa y Fusil
cielo de los Tupamaros
flor de la Banda Oriental"

See Aznares, Cañas, Tupamaros, fracso del Ché?, p. 8.

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The Tupamaros tried to legitimize their organization through the linkage with Artigas, Uruguay's national hero. The name 'Tupamaros' also suggests 'liberation.' Just as Artigas has been instrumental in Uruguay's independence from Spain, the Tupamaros considered themselves instrumental for Uruguay's liberation from the existing authorities, regime, and foreign domination (especially from the USA). Thus they considered themselves a national liberation movement.

The Tupamaros also tried to associate themselves with José Batlle y Ordoñez's monumental reforms and influence in Uruguay's modernization (1903-1915). According to the Tupamaros, Batlle's reforms 'modernized' the country, but they did not achieve 'development.' This lack of development was due to the fact that the reforms favored only certain sectors of the urban middle class to the detriment of the rural sector. The Tupamaros tried to redress this imbalance by proposing to 'correct' the 'agrarian structure' purposedly left untouched by Batllismo and its successors (see Part II).

According to the Tupamaros' images, the main cause for Uruguay's weaknesses was that although the 'bourgeoisie' had succeeded in obtaining political control of Uruguay's political system through the 'democratic supra-structure' created by 'Batllismo,' it had failed to change Uruguay's economic base, i.e., the latifundia and feudal 'infrastructure.' Thus the 'welfare state' was created as a means of narrowing the increasing gap between the political and economic systems of the country. Batle developed the welfare state as an attempt to

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prevent the seizure of political power by those holding economic power. The welfare state coopted the workers' demands, kept the Colorado Party in power and minimized the risks of 'class struggle.' Thus the welfare state succeeded in delaying for about seventy years the solution to the basic problem, i.e., the desynchronization of the infra and suprastructure of Uruguay's society. Sendic and the 'marchas,' for the first time, symbolically confronted face to face the rural-urban dichotomy.

The Tupamaros attributed Uruguay's economic crisis to the failure and stagnation of the productive sectors (agriculture and industry). The Tupamaros did not analyze in detail the particular policies that aggravated the crisis. The main difference in the Tupamaros' and the authorities' images about Uruguay's crisis was in the analysis of its causes and the framework for its solutions.

The Tupamaros' images of Uruguay's crisis and its predicament were similar to those of the traditional left wing parties and organizations in Uruguay's political spectrum. The main difference with the traditional left was the Tupamaros' definition of 'praxis,' i.e., 'armed struggle' as a necessary and immediate condition for overthrowing the existing regime and incumbent authorities. For the Tupamaros any traditional form of political participation, even if theoretically anti-regime supported its maintenance. The Tupamaros, through their activities and declarations, tried on the one hand to create the conditions by which the 'people' could acquire a consciousness about the existing oppression, and on the other hand to show the

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vulnerabilities of the existing regime. The policies of the incumbent authorities are the result of the regime's organization. Thus their main object of support withdrawal should be the regime and not the authorities.

The Tupamaros agreed with Guevara, Debray, and Castro that it was not necessary to wait until all the objective and subjective conditions were ready in order to begin the revolutionary process. Thus an active revolutionary foco was the necessary vanguard that would accelerate the objective and subjective conditions necessary for a revolution. This would result in the support withdrawal from the existing regime by large sectors of the population.

The Tupamaros believed that the conditions for a mass-revolution in Uruguay were not yet ready. They were convinced that in the coming years Uruguay's critical situation would continue to worsen, thus increasing the level of popular frustration, alienation and discontent. This in turn would precipitate the objective and subjective conditions necessary for the outbreak of mass revolution. That is, although the majority of the population was not ready to launch a mass insurrection, they should have, however, withdrawn their support from the regime and authorities as they proved to be paralyzed by their inability to meet popular demands. The achievement of these conditions would considerably reduce the sources available to the regime for mobilization of support. In order to be able to maintain a minimum level of support for themselves and the existing institutions, the incumbent authorities would turn to the armed forces, thus

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'militarizing' the conflict. The militarization of the conflict was regarded by the Tupamaros as a necessary precipitant for the mass-revolution.

The Tupamaros explained their own emergence in Uruguay's political scenario as a consequence of

> the strong crisis that hit the country for the last decade--which pointed toward even worse days for the working class--the progressive gangrene that corroded the structure of the welfare state promoted by liberalism since the inception of the nation, the inefficacy of the electoral channels to break the supremacy of the dominant sectors and the surrender of the country by the oligarchy to the imperialist interests which they represent.[1]

The Tupamaros' image about Uruguay's political system was that of an oppressive elite, obsolete, and favoring the oligarchy. This alliance between the oligarchy and the traditional political parties hindered the possibility of any progressive systemic changes for the solution of Uruguay's crises. The authorities in face of the deteriorating socio-economic situation were unable to meet the demands of the majority of the people. The Tupamaros believed that these demands could not be met by reformist policies similar to those experimented with by the authorities in the past seventy years. Only the implementation of revolutionary 'deep structural changes' would provide the means and organization to satisfy these demands.

But the authorities, due to their alliance with the oligarchy, were unable to produce the necessary changes and meet the people's demands. "If the present government of Uruguay were to find an answer

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[1]Carlos Nuñez, "Los Tupamaros: Vanguardia armada en Uruguay," Tricontinental Bulletin (La Habana, Cuba) 10 (December 2, 1969): 43-66.

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to workers' demands, there would be no reason for conflict [between the Tupamaros and government forces]."[1] The systemic constraints that produced the authorities' inability to satisfy the workers' demands became evident in the cañero marches, as we have already studied. The Tupamaros also accused the authorities of ongoing corruption (some Tupamaro activities uncovered this corruption, e.g., 'Financiera Monty Operation'). Thus the 'system' that favored the oligarchy and the oligarchy itself (that not only oppressed the people, but also facilitated Uruguay's domination by foreign interests), were the main causes of Uruguay's problems and became the main target of Tupamaro attacks (see Part IV).

Since the war of independence Uruguay's political system was dominated by the two traditional parties. The minority parties, although devoting themselves to the 'preparation' and 'organization' of the working class, always performed a secondary role in the national elections (see Chapters II and III). According to the Tupamaros, the traditional parties secured their power monopoly by establishing themselves as the 'true defenders' of the nation because of the development of the welfare system, the patronage system, and a 'coercive-democratic electoral system.' The supremacy of the traditional parties was symbolized by the 'ley de lemas' and the 'pacto del chinchulín.'

> The traditional parties may continue to achieve electoral success, but unless they introduce basic changes in their policies, and it

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[1]From a Tupamaro document published in Tricontinental Bulletin 6, no. 58 (January 1971): 7.

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> is unlikely they will sponsor this type of change, they will finally be defeated by the political and socio-economic collapse of the nation. The ley de lemas can save the traditional parties from all potential threats to their power monopoly except economic collapse [and the consequences of its politicization and militarization].[1]

The constant atomization of the left wing political parties enhanced the power monopoly of the traditional parties. Among the main reasons for the constant atomization of Uruguay's left wing parties and organizations was their conviction that revolution in Uruguay could only happen in conjunction with revolutions in other Latin American countries, especially Brazil and Argentina. Also, the left-wing political parties and organizations believed that during the revolutionary process they would unify. But until the beginning of 'the revolution,' the left wing tendencies were involved with themselves in continuous ideological discussions in order to achieve "ideological enlightenment and clarification of schematical positions."[2] Instead of promoting unification of the left wing tendencies, these ideological discussions caused the opposite effect of further atomization and fragmentation.

The Tupamaros believed that it was not necesssary to wait for the unification of left wing revolutionary forces in order to begin the armed struggle against the regime. They were convinced that the end to the left wing atomization would come as a consequence of the revolutionary armed struggle. Once the revolutionary armed struggle erupted,

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[1]Mario Benedetti, "Posdata 1963," in Tupamaros, CIDOC, pp. 77-93.

[2]"Esclarecimiento ideológico y de posiciones esquemáticas."

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the traditional left wing organizations would face the choice of either joining the revolutionary 'foco' or disappearing.[1] The 'people' would be required either to give their support to the forces who wanted to maintain the existing regime or to support those that wanted change.

The Tupamaros never fully rejected non-violent types of activities that could positively contribute to the revolutionary process by accelerating the masses support withdrawal from the regime and the incumbent authorities. These activities (e.g., 'Comités de Apoyo') were referred to by the Tupamaros as the 'mass line.' They encouraged the development of mass line activities designed to enlist popular support for the revolution. These activities had to be subordinated to the revolutionary goal. This was also the position accepted by most of the guerrilla groups who participated in the OLAS Conference (Havana).

In sum, some of the main reasons elaborated by the Tupamaros to justify their decision to seek revolution in Uruguay by means of guerrilla warfare were the inability to obtain sizeable political influence due to the monopolistic 'ley de lemas' and electoral procedures; disillusionment with parliamentarism (especially after the 1962 national elections) and unionization (after the cañero experience); the increasing weakening of the left wing tendencies by constant atomization; the inability of the traditional parties to grasp

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[1]As it turned out, the left wing organizations that did not join the Tupamaros were also dismantled by the authorities.

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Uruguay's basic problems; the galloping deterioration of the socio-economic situation of the country; the urban-rural imbalance; the surrender of the country to foreign interests by the incumbent authorities; and the successful Cuban experience. According to the Tupamaros the juxtaposition of these and other variables taken with Sendic's dedication to defend the interests of the people against the oppressive regime and the repressive oligarchy, created the necessary conditions for their birth.

It was during Pacheco Areco's presidency that the interpenetration of the economic and political systems achieved its highest expression leading to the 1973 coup d'état (see Part II). Since 1966, the process of development and maturity of the Tupamaros was accompanied by the armed forces' increasing repression of Uruguayan society. The repressive measures adopted by the incumbent authorities (censorship, militarizations, emergency powers, and the like) increased the level of tension in Uruguay's political system and further polarized popular support.

The repressive policies of the incumbent authorities were designed to maintain the existing regime. The authorities' images about the strong unionization of most of Uruguay's economic sectors, the tacit alliance between workers of the private and public sectors, the high level of politicization of the economic crisis, the rapid fragmentation of the traditional parties and the increasing level of violence inhibited the adoption and implementation of policies, thus encouraging output failure. The systematic dismanteling of the

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dissenting sectors in the existing political system was considered a necessary condition for the solution of Uruguay's crises. The same policies that the incumbent authorities considered necessary for the solution of the crises enabled the Tupamaros to become a politically relevant force in Uruguay's society.

The Tupamaros' image of a high level of unionization in Uruguay played an important role in the Tupamaros' strategy of support withdrawal. The economistic tendencies of Uruguay's unions produced mostly economic demands. For the Tupamaros, ideologically however, unionization was not a goal in itself, but rather a tactical means to solidify the working class. It was a preparatory stage for political action. Although not all unions in Uruguay were ready to join the armed struggle against the regime, they nonetheless could weaken the regime and incumbent authorities. Even with their present limitations the unions could continue to mobilize the majority of the working population in a traditional frontal struggle against the regime and its policies. The Tupamaros attempted to radicalize the unions' struggle and subordinate their activities to the revolutionay movement.

It was hoped that the unions' frontal struggle against the regime and its policies, combined with the Tupamaros' armed struggle, would achieve the political and socio-economic polarization of Uruguayan society. This in turn would isolate the authorities, uncover the repressive nature of the regime and cause the 'masses' to withdraw support from the incumbent authorities and the regime. The 'we-them' polarization syndrome sought by the Tupamaros was intended primarily to

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obtain mass popular support for themselves and erode the bases of support for Uruguay's political system.

The Tupamaros thought that due to Uruguay's high degree of unionization, an urban revolutionary *foco* could count on the support of the working class. This conjunction of support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the regime by the labor unions and the Tupamaros would have added another difficulty to the policy-making process. Once support for the Tupamaros by strategic sectors of the population (and especially the labor movement) increased and support withdrawal from the authorities also spilled-over into support withdrawal from the regime, a direct assault on the regime could be launched.

The Tupamaros thought that this assault on the regime would trigger a military intervention by Uruguay's neighboring countries (Brazil and Argentina) or the United States. Uruguay's small and badly trained armed forces enhanced the potential threat of military intervention.

The confirmation of such a threat would have transformed the Tupamaros into the defenders of Uruguay's nationality against foreign intervention. This would have accelerated the process of support withdrawal from the existing regime and incumbent authorities. The Tupamaros favored such an intervention as a tactical device to gain mass popular support.

> All the conditions are present for escalating armed opposition to the government with the prospect that foreign intervention will

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> contribute to transforming a narrowly urban struggle into a full-scale war of national liberation.[1]

The Tupamaros tried to accelerate the process of support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime and simultaneously to obtain support for themselves by different sectors of the population. They expected to become the main recipient of the population's support withdrawn from the incumbent authorities and the regime. In order to facilitate this transition they performed certain activities designed to erode the 'myth' of Uruguay's democracy. Parallel to these activities the Tupamaros tried to establish the illusion of a 'dual power,' which would be in direct competition to Uruguay's present regime and incumbent authorities. This reasoning influenced their activities, especially those directed to uncover the corruption, inefficiency, and repressive nature of the regime. This was done in order to encourage a massive support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime (see Chapter XI).

The guerrillas also believed that in order for them to become the main depository of the population's support withdrawn from the regime and authorities, they would have to demonstrate to the people that the Tupamaros were indeed capable of ruling the country. For that purpose, the Tupamaros by means of their statements and activities tried to raise the 'level of consciousness' of the population and

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[1]See Tupamaros, "30 Questions to a Tupamaro," in The Latin American Revolutions: Politics and Strategy, From Apro-Marxism to Guevarism, by Donald C. Hodges (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1974), p. 195.

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demonstrate the duality of power in Uruguay's political system ('people's prison,' 'people's tribunal,' etc.).

The Tupamaros were not anarchists; they recognized the importance of the rule of the laws. They maintained diffuse support for the concept of the 'rule of law,' but withdrew support from the existing laws, the legislature, the institutions in charge of policy making, and implementation of the law. For the Tupamaros, 'the law' and its obedience were fundamental to the existence of the political community and society in general. It was the oligarchy's distortion and abuse of the law that prevented the establishment of an egalitarian national community. Thus the Tupamaros, by placing themselves outside the existing law did not consider themselves criminals. However, they found it necessary to place themselves outside of the existing law in order to be able to build an egalitarian and viable regime. Guerrilla warfare was necessary because those in power (political and economic) would not peacefully return to the people the power they had usurped from them.

> For these reasons, we have placed ourselves outside the law. This is the only honest action when the law is not equal for all; when the law exists to defend the spurious interests of a minority in detriment of the majority; when the law works against the country's progress; when even those who have created it place themselves outside it, with impunity, whenever it is convenient for them.
>
> The hour of rebellion has definitively sounded for us. The hour of patience has ended. The hour of action and commitment has commenced here and now. The hour of conversation and the enunciation of theory, propositions, and unfulfilled promises is finished.
>
> We should not be worthy Uruguayans, nor worthy Americans, nor worthy of ourselves if we do not listen to the dictates of conscience that day after day calls us to the fight. Today no one can deny us the right to follow this dictate, wherever it might lead. No one can take the sacred right of rebellion away from us, and no one is

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> going to stop us from dying, if necessary, in order to be of consequence.[1]

The Tupamaros not only challenged the authorities' monopoly of the use of force, but also the authorities' definition of justice and certain institutions. Thus the Tupamaros referred to 'popular justice' as different from 'legal justice' which defended the interests of the minority. They created institutions like the 'peoples prison,' 'revolutionary tribunal,' etc., with the combined purpose of discrediting the existing institutions and demonstrating to the population at large not only that an alternative exists, but also, their ability to soundly administer the country once they achieved power.

The Tupamaros avoided clashes with the armed forces not only from a tactical point of view, but also for its political implications. The guerrillas' image of Uruguay's armed forces was that of

> twelve thousand men precariously armed, they constituted one of the weakest repressive machines in Latin America . . . Those members of the armed forces that supported the repressive government and the power structure would be excluded from the definition of 'people' and included among the 'oligarchy.'[2]

After the publication of this document the Tupamaros felt free to attack the members of the armed forces who continued to defend the oligarchy. The Tupamaros attempted to either neutralize the armed forces or gain their support. "Our struggle is against the oligarchy

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[1]Excerpts from "Carta abierta a la policía," December 7, 1967, quoted in Weinstein, Uruguay, The Politics of Failure.

[2]See Tupamaros, "Open Letter to the Armed Forces," in The Tupamaros, The Unmentionables, ed. Wilson, pp. 74-75.

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and not against the police and army."[1] The Tupamaros performed certain activities against the armed forces in an attempt to decrease their incentive to fight the revolutionary cause.[2]

The major activities of the Tupamaros were not against the armed forces but rather against the institutions of the regime and prominent authorities that had a stake in the maintenance of the regime. They tried very hard to distinguish themselves from criminals.[3]

> When any guerrilla action is undertaken, its sole objective is to attack the interests of the ruling class. For that reason guerrillas must never attack the working class or damage their interests. Violence should be used only against informers and those serving the enemy and his interests.[4]

Thus, the Tupamaros sought to facilitate the populations' transfer of support from the repressive, brutal, non-selective, coercive regime to the human, just, selective, benevolent revolutionary struggle. They forced the repressive mechanisms to destroy the very legal apparatus that they were supposed to defend.

One of the tactical activities, guided by their ideology and oriented by their strategy with the above mentioned goals, was the

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[1]Ibid., p. 54.

[2]For example, the 'executions' of secret police chief Héctor Morán Charquero and of the American police advisor Dan Mitrione. Costa Gravas' film "State of Siège" deals mostly with the execution of Dan Mitrione.

[3]For example, the Tupamaros tried to minimize the number of victims. If during the course of an activity an enemy was wounded they will treat him; they returned the money for workers salaries after the San Rafael Casino robbery, etc.

[4]Wilson, The Tupamaros, The Unmentionables, p. 80.

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kidnapping of Mr. Ulyses Pereyra Reverbel. The Tupamaros left a communiqué at the location of his kidnapping that said, "we inform public opinion that today Mr. Reverbel was arrested according to the decision of the MLN." Thus the Tupamaros tried to show that this 'arrest' was not arbitrary. They also enumerated the reasons for this action. They challenged the incumbent authorities by stressing that Mr. Reverbel would be treated in the 'people's prison' in a similar fashion that the revolutionaries are treated in the 'oligarchy's prison.'

Mr. Reverbel was the 'ideal' victim. He did not have the sympathies of Uruguay's students, unionized workers, professionals, etc. He was the director of UTE,[1] owner of a large latifundia, lawyer by profession, a very close friend of President Pacheco Areco, and considered one of the major supporters of the government's strong-arm policy.

The implicit violence of this activity was presented by the Tupamaros as a response to the indiscriminate violence of the regime and its leaders. The President ordered a massive search for Mr. Reverbel. The University, unions, and left-wing organizations were the main targets. In this process a student, Liber Arce, was killed by the armed forces. Thousands of individuals participated in the student's funeral as a way of showing their rejection of the authorities' repressive policies. This episode radicalized many sectors which overtly withdrew specific support and became militant against the

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[1]UTE (Unión Telegráfica del Estado), government's utilities monopoly.

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authorities non-selective repressive policies and the regime they claimed to defend.

In this action the Tupamaros defied the authorities' immunity and monopoly not only in the use of force, but also in the definition of justice. In their documents, the Tupamaros referred to 'popular justice' as different from the 'legal justice' which defended the interest of the few. In this sense the selection of the target, a high ranking unpopular authority, contributed to the popular support for the Tupamaros and accelerated the process of indiscriminate use of violence by the authorities. This also radicalized the process and more individuals overtly withdrew specific support from the authorities' policies and diffuse support for the repressive regime. The Tupamaros' tactical implementation of their strategy will be studied in Part IV.

Ideologically, one of the main contributions of the Tupamaros to revolutionary thinking in Latin America was to consider urban guerrilla warfare as principal and decisive for the revolutionary takeover. Until the emergence of the Tupamaros, urban guerrilla warfare was considered only as tactical support for the rural guerrillas. The Tupamaros did not object to rural guerrillas in Uruguay. But it was only as supportive of the central urban guerrilla warfare. "For the first time the usual roles of urban and rural guerrillas were reversed by making rural guerrilla operations serve as support for the actions of urban commandos."[1] As mentioned earlier,

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[1]Hodges, The Latin American Revolution, p. 194.

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Guillén[1] replaced Marighella and Debray as the major ideological leader of Latin America's guerrillas from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s. "It was Baxter,[2] in turn influenced by Guillén, who helped transform the Tupamaros from a rural based organization centered on Uruguay's cane cutters into a primarily urban guerrilla movement."[3]

> As applied to urban guerrilla warfare, the highlights of 'Guillenismo' include the feasibility, desirability, and necessity of urban struggle; the integration of rural guerrilla warfare, urban guerrilla warfare, and mass-line organizing (combined struggle); continental revolution, and, of course, the socialism of workers' control.[4]

As mentioned earlier, the Tupamaros adopted the 'foco' strategy. In their first major public documents[5] published in 1968, they acknowledged the acceptance of Guevara's 'foco' theory. But while Guevara's theory proposed that the 'foco' should be established in the rural areas, the Tupamaros proposed the cities or an 'urban foco.'

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[1]Abraham Guillén was a Marxist-anarchist, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, who immigrated to Uruguay. He became an influential scholar in Uruguay's liberal circles. He wrote for the liberal Colorado newspaper Acción. He also wrote many books, among them Teoría de la violencia (1965), Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana (1966), Desafío al pentágono (1969). He was a very influential sponsor of urban guerrilla warfare throughout Latin America.

[2]'Joe Baxter' was also responsible for the transformation of 'Tacuara' into a primarily urban guerrilla movement in Argentina with socialist objectives. In 1963 Baxter shifted the operations of Tacuara to Uruguay where they gave military training to the Tupamaros.

[3]Hodges, The Latin American Revolution, p. 220.

[4]Kohl and Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America, p. 187.

[5]"30 Questions to a Tupamaro," in The Latin American Revolution, ed. Hodges, p. 190.

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The Tupamaros' decision to opt for urban guerrilla warfare rather than rural was in part based on Uruguay's geography and demographic characteristics. Uruguay does not have the minimum geographic conditions necessary for rural guerrilla warfare. "If our countryside can not be used to set up a permanent foco, it can nonetheless be used for maneuvers designed to disperse the repressive forces."[1] More than 80 percent of Uruguay's population resides in urban centers (more than 50 percent in Montevideo alone and the rest in smaller urban centers in the Interior and Coastal regions).[2] Montevideo not only offered a better geographical setting, but mainly it was the central nerve of the social and political struggle. "Montevideo is a city sufficiently large and polarized by the social struggles in order to cover and support a large contingent of commando activities."[3]

Although the Tupamaros challenged the 'rural foco' theory, they maintained their commitment to the 'continental revolution.' One of the basic premises of the Tupamaros' ideology was the existence of fundamental and irreconcilable contradictions between the country's national interest and those of 'imperialism' (especially the United States). They felt only a 'continental revolution' would succeed in achieving Latin America's liberation. The Tupamaros perceived their own urban guerrilla warfare as an integral part of the continental revolution. They believed that imperialism in Latin America relied on the alliance of corrupted national oligarchies. This alliance should

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[1]Ibid. [2]See Table 15.

[3]"30 Questions to a Tupamaro," in <u>The Latin American Revolution</u>, ed. Hodges, p. 190.

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be opposed by the unity of the Latin American people through armed struggle. The Tupamaros also developed a network of relationships with other guerrilla organizations in Latin America and performed certain activities to show their solidarity with the international revolutionary movement.[1]

The Tupamaros envisioned at least two stages in their revolutionary struggle. First, the creation of an 'urban insurrectional foco.' This would be accomplished by the armed actions of the political vanguard, i.e., the transformation from potential to actual guerrilla warfare. The second stage provided for the growth of the foco and its transformation into an 'army of national liberation' after foreign intervention had occurred. This stage required 'political work' in order to obtain the support of the masses and 'military strategy' to defeat the armed forces, ruling oligarchy and the regime. For the Tupamaros the transition from urban guerrilla warfare into an irregular army of national liberation capable of overthrowing Uruguay's incumbent authorities and produce radical changes in the regime was contingent on the internal polarization of forces and foreign intervention.

The Tupamaros believed that the 'internationalization' of the conflict ('many Vietnams') would create the necessary conditions for

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[1]For example, the occupation of Pando City was done on the day commemorating the second anniversary of Che's death; on International Women's Day, thirteen Tupamaro women prisoners were freed from jail; the explosion of Bayer's aspirin plant was performed in solidarity with the Vietnamese peoples' struggle against imperialism. The leaflet the Tupamaros left on the scene of the explosion ended with the slogan 'Viva Vietnam.'

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overthrowing Uruguay's oligarchy and for implementing the goals of the revolution. Until these conditions were present, the guerrilla foco ought to continue strengthening the political-military vanguard by accelerating the process of support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the regime by strategic sectors of the population.

Until the late 1960s Uruguay was presented as an 'exception' when compared to other Latin American countries (e.g., 'Switzerland of Latin America'). Uruguayans themselves enjoyed this distinction and 'Europeanization' of the country. The Tupamaros through different proclamations, activities, etc., tried to reintroduce Uruguay into the mainstream of Latin American political and socio-economic systems.

> The famous slogan of Uruguay as the 'Switzerland of Latin America' was purely an Uruguayan fabrication invented for precisely that end--to ostracize it from the whole of America, to make it appear as a rare case. Uruguay went through a reformative era which was the fruit of a certain economic prosperity that allowed its government to create a fictitious atmosphere of social welfare that kept us mesmerized for a long time. But it never ceased to be a dictatorship of class, and when the time of prosperity passed, 'Socialism' ended and the people were forced to bear the burden of the crisis.[1]

As mentioned earlier, the Tupamaros perceived Uruguay's welfare system as serving the interests of the 'oligarchy' and detrimental to the interests of the majority of the people. They wanted to change the 'capitalist welfare system' for 'socialism' that would guarantee a more equal distribution of resources. The nationalistic aspect of the Tupamaros' ideology ought to be understood in the Latin American context, namely a movement against economic and political dependency

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[1]From a letter of a Tupamaro, see Wilson, The Tupamaros, The Unmentionables, p. 16.

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and towards more regional integration. "Latin America should be a great nation."[1] For the Tupamaros, as well as for most guerrilla movements in Latin America, 'socialism' and 'nationalism' were viewed as complimentary to each other. These were the two overall goals of the revolution.

The other general propositions of the Tupamaros (land, monetary, fiscal, health, education, etc. reforms) were to be implemented and subordinated to the main ideological objectives of the revolution, i.e., nationalism and socialism. Nationalism has been a common goal for all kinds of ideological movements and to most of the 'libertadores' of Latin America. But the novelty of the Tupamaros' approach was to perceive nationalism as a necessary condition for the building of socialism and not merely as a theme of liberation.

> They claimed that total liberation from imperialist powers could not be achieved with political independence alone. Only through building socialism would total economic, political, and cultural liberation be possible.[2]

Summary and Conclusions

In Part II we studied the objective environmental setting that favored the creation of the Tupamaros. In Part III we analyzed the subjective environmental influences that account for the variance in political phenomena. These environmental influences, when politicized, had an impact on the level of support for Uruguay's political system.

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[1]See Tupamaros' document no. 5 in Costa, Los Tupamaros, pp. 228-250.

[2]Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 8.

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This process of support withdrawal was studied. We demonstrated that the gradual shift of support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime was accompanied by shifts in strategies of political participation. Political participation shifted from 'more traditional' toward more direct, violent, and unorthodox forms. This process led to guerrilla warfare.

In order to analyze the subjective environment we studied the Tupamaros' attitudinal prism as well as their images. In order to accomplish this we analyzed the Tupamaros' social setting, strategy, program, and ideology. These combined aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the regime. Specific support was withdrawn from the authorities when Sendic and the cañeros realized that they were not obtaining any benefits by being members of the present system. This was accelerated by the continuous inability of the authorities to satisfy their demands. Specific support withdrawal from the authorities spilled over into support withdrawal from specific values, norms, and institutions of the regime (e.g., land tenure system, urban-rural polarization, justice, etc.). The cañeros and Sendic lost trust in the ability of the system to satisfy their demands and questioned its legitimacy. The level of diffuse support for 'regimes' and the political community remained high at all times. This process was evidenced by the cañeros' documents as well as the Tupamaros' organization and earlier documents.

The Tupamaros' early organization based on the cañeros was an indication that support withdrawal from the authorities spilled over into support withdrawal from the regime too. The acceleration of this

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process enabled the Tupamaros to become a relevant contender for political power in Uruguay. As mentioned earlier, the activities of the Tupamaros were an integral part of their militant ideology. This distinguished the Tupmaros from other left wing organizations. The specific type of activities--tactics--were subordinated to the guerrilla warfare strategy. The strategy was an integral part of the Tupamaros' ideology.

The Tupamaros' ideology motivated their activities. In this sense their ideology contributed to undermine support for the authorities and the regime. However, in order to be able to translate their ideology into tactical activities, the Tupamaros needed an organization. The goal of this organization was to optimize the process of support withdrawal and to enable the Tupamaros to implement their ideology. The chapters of Part IV will study the Tupamaros' mechanism of transformation (i.e., the way their ideology and strategy of support withdrawal was implemented (Part IV). Chapter XI will study the output of this organization, i.e., the activities per se and their relationship to their ideology and strategy.

The UTAA and the cañeros with Sendic started as a moderate and legalistic interest group of rural workers demanding justice and the recognition of their rights. In the process they became an outright revolutionary movement mainly as a reaction to the intransigence of the incumbent authorities.

In the 1960s the struggle of the rural workers was influenced by socialist ideas as well as by the growing unrest of the urban labor movement. In Uruguay, as in many Third World countries, the struggle

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against foreign interests (Cainsa, Azucarlito) advanced from 'bread and butter' issues to revolutionary demands.

The increasing radicalization of the rural and urban labor movements was influenced by the authorities output failure and the escalating political, economic and social crises. After their initial experiences with the output failure of the authorities the cañeros withdrew specific support from the incumbent authorities. They did not experience any benefits or advantages from their membership in the current political system. Their overt specific support withdrawal from the authorities reflected their growing dissatisfaction with policies that failed to meet their demands.

When UTAA and Sendic realized that the legalistic approach had failed they prepared themselves to initiate more radical and non-legal actions (e.g., land seizures). The UTAA's struggle for concrete and moderate demands encountered a unanimous rigid and negative reaction from the landowners, the sugar companies as well as the regional and national authorities. This struggle made the sugar workers aware that these 'elites' were their 'class enemies.' This new awareness precipitated a further radicalization of their demands. In the following years (1960-1973) the reaction of the authorities to the workers' (rural and urban) demands became increasingly violent thus enabling the Tupamaros to grow considerably.

The Tupamaros overtly withdrew diffuse support from the regime and the incumbent authorities. This was confirmed by the Tupamaros' attempt at creating a 'power duality,' which included a new set of revolutionary values, norms, and institutions in direct challenge to

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those of the existing regime and the incumbent authorities. They not only questioned the legitimacy of the regime but completely rejected it.

Most of the Tupamaro membership (except for the cañeros) had withdrawn specific support from the authorities long before the creation of the guerrilla organization. Their overt support withdrawal reflected their dissatisfaction with the internal and foreign policies of the incumbent authorities. Ideologically they never truly supported the existing regime. On the contrary, they stressed the illegitimacy of the existing regime and incumbent authorities.

Guerrilla warfare was viewed by the Tupamaros as the most efficient means of political participation in order to overthrow the existing regime and incumbent authorities as well as to begin the process of revolutionary change, i.e., the reorganization, restructuring, and redistribution of economic, social, political, and value resources in the society.

To an extent the Tupamaros succeeded in linking the feelings of dissatisfaction, deprivation, frustration, and powerlessness, expressed by certain sectors of the population (students, professionals, workers) to the political system. Their membership was drawn from those sectors of Uruguay's population most affected by the crises since 1950. Due to their politicization, these feelings became an input of support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the regime. The escalation of the struggle before 1960 eventually led to the 1973 military coup.

In conclusion, this chapter dealt with the Tupamaros' attitudinal prism and their images about Uruguay's crises as well as with the

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general direction in which they wanted the society to change. The inability of the present system to cope with Uruguay's deep troubles, their dissatisfaction with the regime and the incumbent authorities as well as their previous experiences precipitated their organization and activism in Uruguay's political process. Support withdrawal in the form of guerrilla warfare in order to be able to implement the revolution was considered as the main strategic means for overthrowing the incumbent authorities and the regime. The next chapters will deal with the Tupamaros' means for achieving political power, i.e., the mechanism of transformation and their activities which were considered an integral part of their ideology.

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PART IV

TRANSFORMATION OF INPUTS INTO OUTPUTS

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CHAPTER X

MECHANISM OF TRANSFORMATION

Introduction

Chapter IX dealt with the ideology and images of the Tupamaros. This chapter will deal with the 'mechanism of transformation.' The mechanism of transformation represents the analytical link between the guerrilla's ideology and images about Uruguay's society and their political actions--the guerrilla activities. The guerrilla movement intended to provide a viable political alternative to the existing and traditional means of political participation. The mechanism of transformation is also the link between the subjective environment and the activities of the guerrillas. It is the process by which the inputs are transformed into outputs (activities). The analysis of the mechanism of transformation implies the study of the guerrilla's organization, the structure of their forces, their dependence or independence from some political party, their logistic problems, and recruitment of manpower and arms.[1] These mechanisms enabled the Tupamaros to implement their strategy of support withdrawal.

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[1]Many works on guerrilla warfare had centered on those specific aspects of guerrilla forces.

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As discussed earlier, the Tupamaro movement became independent from the directions of the existing political parties. They did not play the role of armed branch of the Socialist party. Practical as well as ideological reasons influenced this decision. The Tupamaros saw an irreconcilable contradiction between the secrecy required by an underground organization and the functioning of a legal and public political machine. Ideologically the major conflict centered around the strategy needed to achieve revolution. The Tupamaros' disapproval and frustration with parliamentarism and unionism was one of the main reasons for the creation of the movement.

The Tupamaros' ideology, program, and strategy aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the regime and the authorities. Their ideology and strategy guided their actions. Their strategy of urban guerrilla warfare differentiated them from other left wing political organizations. Consequently, in order to implement their ideology and strategy they organized as a group, organically independent from existing political organizations. Organization was a necessary element for the implementation of their strategy of support withdrawal. The organization was conceived as a means to optimize their activities of support withdrawal. The type, place, and timing of the Tupamaros' activities was directly influenced by their organization. Thus a brief study of the Tupamaros' organization is necessary to understand the nature of their activities.

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Organization

The information available regarding the guerrilla's organization is very sparse and fragmented. To minimize the dangers posed by traitors, infiltrators, and the potential disclosure of vital information by members caught by the police, the Tupamaros' organization was based on 'compartimentación' (compartmentalization), i.e., cells of five to seven members. This was probably the movement's principal 'mechanism of defense.' Not only was each cell compartmentalized from the others, but each individual member was in turn compartmentalized from his comrades (i.e., each member did not know the real name, address, profession, etc. of his fellow members). Each member knew only what was essential for the implementation of his activity. A very complicated and fragmented internal network of communication (upwards, downwards, sidewards) made possible the operation of this type of organization intended primarily to minimize the trade-off between secrecy and efficiency.

Even the central direction of the movement (Central Command) did not know all the details (place of meeting, names, etc.) of each one of the cells. In other words, the organization was conceived to be of such nature that none of its members would be able to disclose enough vital information to the enemy as to endanger the totality of the organization, even in the most critical and adverse circumstances.

It seems that the Tupamaros were organized in a form of 'piramide trunca' (truncated pyramid) (Figure 11). At the bottom were

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located the new recruits (periphery). The periphery, although performing important tasks such as the printing and distribution of propaganda, the initiation of the recruitment process, and the gathering of information, was not considered an integral part of the organization. This organizational level was the most vulnerable. They did not perform military duties which were assigned to the 'best' full-time Tupamaros. Urban guerrillas do not require as many 'full-time' members as do rural guerrillas. The members in the periphery usually allocated only part of their time to the Tupamaros. Although they were the least knowledgeable about the organization, they were the most exposed to the armed forces.

The second level was composed of the cells. Each cell was coordinated by one leader appointed by the Central Command. The leaders were the only cell members that communicated with the Central Command.

At the top of the pyramid were the political and military commands.[1] The tasks of the political command were to evaluate the political validity of the proposed activities and to maintain the internal political balance, i.e., the decision making core. The military command assessed the feasibility and implementation of the activity. Although it is difficult to verify the type of link that

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[1]See interview of the Tupamaro Urbano in Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, pp. 174-176.

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existed between the political and military commands, it seems[1] that the Tupamaros adopted Castro's thesis of 'unity of political-military commands' in order to avert the danger of inner-duality in the movement. Upward mobility in this pyramidal structure was achieved primarily by trust, merit, specialty, and seniority. The activities were approved and centralized by the Central Command, which assessed each individual activity in relation to the totality of the operations.

The organization provided for specialized 'columns' whose tasks were the provision of services (money, false documents, medical care, etc.) to all the cells. They were administrative in nature. The geographical location of the columns was significant. While the columns in Montevideo specialized in a certain type of service, the services provided by the fewer columns of the Interior were more generalized in nature. These services were made available to the cells only upon the request of the leader of each cell.

The columns were among the weakest links in the Tupamaros' organization--first, because of the concentrated amount of information about the cell leaders and members accumulated by those providing services, and secondly, because of the difficulties of mobility due to the equipment involved. It is interesting to observe that the first serious setbacks the Tupamaros suffered involved precisely the capture

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[1]Antonio Mercader and Jorge de Vera, Tupamaros: Estrategia y acción (Montevideo: Editorial Alfa, 1969), p. 99.

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of these columns by the armed forces. Ideally the organization should not have been that of one 'piramide truncada,' but many, i.e., that each cell would have its own column system (military, health, financial, technical, recruitment machinery, etc.) in order to guarantee self-sufficiency for each cell. This organizational goal to achieve self sufficiency for each cell to the point of being able to take leadership of the organization in the event of collapse of the Central Command, was not achieved by the Tupamaros.

It is speculated that once a year the Tupamaros held a meeting of the National Convention, where the leaders of each cell 'participated' with the instructions of their respective cells.[1] According to A. Labrousse, until 1968 the important decisions of the movement were adopted by this National Convention and implemented by the Central Command. Each cell had one vote. The periphery did not have a vote. After 1968, even with the increasing oppression of the armed forces the Tupamaros still tried to maintain the 'democratic majority principle' in the adoption of decisions. However, due to the circumstances the 'cell' vote replaced the 'individual vote.' With all of the Tupamaros' efforts to maintain an internal democratic structure, the obvious high risks of such Convention meetings resulted in fact in the Central Command becoming the overall ruling body dealing with broad ideological, strategic issues and the centralization of the activities.

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[1] Ibid.

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Recruitment

This was one of the most difficult tasks of the movement. In general, there were two main processes of recruitment. The first started when the organization was interested in a specific individual. After 'researching' the person, he was approached by a member of the organization in order to persuade him to join. The other was the process in reverse. When an individual tried to become a member, then he had to perform certain activities that would make 'visible' to the Tupamaros' 'activist hunters' his intentions of becoming a member.

The Tupamaros also enjoyed the support of the so-called 'spontaneous members.'[1] These were individuals who performed certain activities or services on their own without any link with the organization, e.g., the reproduction and distribution of leaflets. These types of independent activities were performed by sympathizers of the Tupamaros who were trying to be recruited as well as those individuals who supported the Tupamaro movement, but were not ready to become involved in the organization.

There were also 'spontaneous organizations' that performed similar activities or services. They were the so-called 'Comités de Apoyo' (Support Committees) organized by several legal organizations which also overtly withdrew diffuse specific support from the regime and the incumbent authorities, e.g., trade unions, students, etc. They constituted the 'mass-line,' and their support was considered by the

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[1]Ibid., p. 102.

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Tupamaros as necessary for the weakening of the regime through sustained support withdrawal, but subservient to the revolutionary goal.

After an individual was recruited, he was rigorously tested. However, he remained in the periphery of the organization until a final extensive report about his life, habits, friendships, previous activities, capabilities, time availability, etc. was affirmatively approved. The optimal age of a guerrilla fluctuated between twenty-five and thirty-five.[1] The Tupamaros preferred single people over married ones, and when married people became members they were asked not to have children.[2] After being accepted, the candidate was tested in different areas to determine the kind of training s/he needed.

> Among the character traits deemed most propitious were discipline, physical strength, obedience, technical abilities or skills, and the capacity to adapt to a hierarchical command system. The personality traits deemed most disastrous were the lack of caution and prudence.[3]

Training

The training was basically para-military, i.e., technical and physical preparation as well as ideological instruction. Ideological instruction was an integral part of the training program.

> In order to shift from rebel to revolutionary, one must take a big step forward. This step is called analysis and conscientization. If this step is not taken, then, in the best of the cases we can form a Pancho Villa, a magnificent rebel, but due to his lack of

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[1]Ibid., p. 130. [2]Ibid., p. 106.

[3]Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 35. For a more detailed account on the instructions given to the new recruits, see Mercader and de Vera, Tupamaros: Estrategia y acción.

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> revolutionary formation he became an instrument of the counter-revolution . . . For us the direct action (guerrilla) accomplished and accomplishes three objectives: to act against the regime, to propagandize our political line and form our men.[1]

The armed forces discovered many training centers located in different University buildings, especially in the laboratory facilities of the departments of chemistry, biology, etc., that were used for the training in the preparation of explosives. Other locations such as the sport installations of the 'Youth Community Eduardo Pinela,' were used for the training in the use of weapons. The main intention of the training was to provide self-sufficiency to the individual guerrillas.

The kind of training required by an urban guerrilla is different from that required by the rural guerrilla. Total discipline, obedience, promptitude, etc. are vital for such organizations. The way of life of the Tupamaros was very far from being comfortable, and their 'passions' were subdued (aocohol, for example, was forbidden). Their life was strictly regulated.

The role of women was similar to that of men, but they generally tended to specialize in inter-cell communication. Many women also performed military tasks. The percentage of female participation in the Tupamaro guerrilla movement ranged between 28 and 39 percent.[2] This level of participation in Uruguay was considered very high,

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[1]Interview with a Tupamaro, "No alcanza con ser rebelde," Marcha, September 5, 1969, pp. 12-13.

[2]See Table 31. Also see 7 meses de lucha antisubversiva.

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especially when compared with the percentage of female participation in the labor unions, army, and national elections.[1]

Research and Information

The division of labor according to specialized sectors (health, research, information, etc.) was one principle that ruled the different columns, whose center of activity could be compared to the 'bases' of rural guerrilla warfare. Different documents found by the armed forces at Tupamaro bases located in Sauce, El Pinar, Pando, and Pajas Blancas (suburban and resort areas)[2] show that the Tupamaros had 'research teams' whose role was to provide tactical information to the organization. The clearest example of their work was the master control the Tupamaros had of the sewer system in the city--one of their most efficient means of communication, escape, hiding, etc. Other documents found relate to research of the different types of weapons used by the armed forces, detailed maps about the topography of the country, about energy supply to Montevideo, etc.

A major reason for the success of the Tupamaro activities was their excellent information network which enabled them to have at their disposal complete and detailed information in order to prepare

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[1]See Paul M. Cohen, Men, Women, and the Latin American Political System: Path to Political Participation in Uruguay, mimeographed paper prepared for delivery at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1974.

[2]Mercader and de Vera, Tupamaros: Estrategia y acción, p. 109.

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effectively for their activities. The information network involved one of the most time-resource-consuming tasks of the organization, but was probably its greatest strength.

The way the Tupamaros organized their mechanism of transformation was not new. They adopted many of the ideas of Marighella and Guevara[1] for urban guerrilla warfare. But the Tupamaros were probably the best organized urban guerrilla movement in Latin America in the last thirty years, and in this sense they served as an example to other guerrilla and/or counter-guerrilla organizations.

At this time it is difficult to establish if they were totally defeated or if they are presently trying to reorganize their mechanism of transformation. The last activity they performed (the murder of the Uruguayan Counsul to Paris) after a long period of silence was intended primarily to remind the population that they still exist. Other activities continue to be performed, but anonymously and sporadically.

The Tupamaros had members and collaborators from most occupational sectors, thus as an organization they enjoyed a wide variety of expertise. The movement had recruited adherents from every sector of Uruguayan society, e.g., librarians, sugar workers, mechanics, students, engineers, clerks, police, ranchers, industrialists, military officers, teachers, drivers, etc.[2]

The main organizational principle of 'compartimentación' was used very efficiently by the Tupamaros in those activities performed by a single cell. But for activities that required cooperation among

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[1]Ibid., pp. 19-21.

[2]See Tables 26-27.

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several cells (e.g., the occupation of Pando City), the principle of 'compartimentación' was not as efficient, especially if the planned activity failed and regrouping was necessary.[1]

Summary

In sum, the Tupamaros' organization tried to optimize the resources at their disposal while minimizing the risks. Hierarchical compartmentalization was their main organizational principle. It was to insure secrecy, survival, and centralization of activities. In a sense it resembled the organizational model of 'democratic-centralism' with specific hierarchical and command lines in order to meet the requirements of continued armed struggle. 'Careerism' in the organization was discouraged. Promotion to higher levels in the hierarchy was achieved mainly through trust, degree of commitment, skills, and performance. Column specialization was to provide efficient services to the 'combat cells.' The organization provided for different tasks to be performed by individuals with different degrees of involvement and 'routines' that facilitated the continuous flow of new recruits. The establishment of an organization by the Tupamaros was a necessary condition for the implementation of their strategy of support withdrawal. One of the goals of the Tupamaros was to establish a dual power capability. The realization of this goal as well as the

[1]For an account of the limitations imposed by 'compartimentación,' especially after the failure of 'Operación Pando City' (October 8, 1969), see Gilio, La guerrilla Tupamara.

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frequency, type, etc. of activities is directly related to the strength of their mechanism of transformation. The next chapters will deal with the activities per se.

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CHAPTER XI

ACTIVITIES

Introduction

This chapter will deal with the activities performed by the Tupamaros during the period under study and their influence on the level of support for Uruguay's political system. The 'activities' constitute the output of the guerrilla movement. They are directed in the final analysis to the overthrow of the regime and incumbent authorities in order to implement the guerrilla's revolutionary goal. Violent political action towards one or a combination of political objects is an indication that the guerrilla's level of support towards that political object(s) fell below the 'minimum level of support' (see Chapter I).

The formulation and implementation of the Tupamaros' activities depends basically on the guerrilla's images, ideology, and 'mechanism of transformation.' The Tupamaros considered guerrilla activities as the primary means for eroding support and thereby achieving revolution. The concept of 'direct action' was an integral part of their ideology.

Although the final goal of the Tupamaros was to overthrow the existing regime and authorities, in the middle and short run while

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attempting to accomplish this, the guerrilla activities could be directed in the pursuit of other particular goals, e.g., to obtain certain political gain, to achieve support of certain segments of the population, to demoralize the armed forces, to disrupt the administrative system, etc. But, these interim objectives were always considered dependent upon the final goal and the establishment of a 'dual power' capability.

In the ten years of their active existence, the Tupamaros were involved in numerous and varied types of activities.[1] In order to maximize the validity of these interim objectives the guerrillas thought about their struggle process in terms of stages. Guevara and Mao, for example, outlined three stages. For Guevara:

> Guerrilla war or war of liberation will generally have three stages: first, the strategic defensive when the small force nibbles at the enemy and runs . . . After this comes a state of equilibrium in which the possibilities of action on both sides--the enemy and the guerrillas--are established. Finally, the last stage consists of overrunning the repressive army leading to the capture of the big cities, large-scale decisive encounters, and at last, the complete annihilation of the enemy.[2]

Guevara did not define who the 'enemy' was at each different stage. The ultimate enemy was, however, the regime and incumbent authorities. In the first two stages the specific targets could be peasants, landowners, etc. After renewal of the war against the Kuomintang in 1946, Mao elaborated the stages of the guerrilla warfare as: 1) movement warfare, 2) limited counterattack, 3) general counterattack.

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[1]For a detailed chronology of events (1962-1974), see Ernesto Mayans, ed., Tupamaros, (CIDOC) Cuaderno no. 60, March 1, 1964 (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centro Internacional de Documentación, 1971).

[2]Guevara, "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method," p. 101.

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The Tupamaros also elaborated a 'theory of stages.' According to them the major stages were: a) organization, consolidation, and preservation; b) expansion and propaganda; c) destruction of the enemy.[1] In the first phase most of the Tupamaros' activities were directed toward the strengthening of their 'mechanism of transformation' and the creation of a positive image. This stage ended in 1968 with the kidnapping of Mr. Pereyra Reverbel.

During the second stage the Tupamaros tried to establish an effective power-duality. This was a period of great expansion in the movement, and coincided with the politicization of the socio-economic crisis (Part II). The Tupamaros' most spectacular activities aimed at increasing the population's support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime were performed during this stage. These activities aimed at challenging the authorities as well as the norms, values, and institutions of the regime by disclosing their corruption, brutality, and inflexibility. Activities like 'Casino Carrasco,' 'Financiera Monty,' 'Pando City,' etc. were included in this stage. These activities contributed to strengthen the Tupamaro's 'Robin Hood' image. The second stage extended until the 'sentencing' and 'execution' of Mr. Dan Mitrione, the American CIA adviser to Uruguay's armed forces.

The third stage, the most violent of all, was characterized by activities designed to increase the pressure on the authorities in order to 'militarize' the conflict (Part II). Probably the

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[1]See Oscar Dueñas Ruiz and Mirna Rugnon de Dueñas, Tupamaros (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Mundo Andino, 1971), pp. 9-11.

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imprisonment of top Tupamaros like Raúl Bidegain and Candan Grajales as well as the heavy military setbacks suffered by the Tupamaros since 1970 precipitated the third stage. In this stage the Tupamaros achieved their 'middle objective' of militarization of the conflict which to an extent prevented the fulfillment of their final goal.

Although the Tupamaros defined three stages for their revolutionary war with specific objectives, these were not 'pure' stages. An overlapping existed in the interim objectives at each stage. The military importance of the stages should be viewed cautiously since the primary function of the stage was psychological, i.e., to encourage the guerrilla members. The stages tried to show the actual and potential guerrillas that 'success' is possible, even if the beginning is difficult and victory very far away. Thus psychologically shorter stages were more efficient for the 'immunization' of guerrilla members against frustration produced by tactical setbacks.

Most of the activities performed by the Tupamaros at all stages were very selective and influenced the population's level of support toward the political system. The Tupamaros were very careful in the planning of their activities. Even the targets of their military activities aimed at strengthening the mechanism of transformation of their organization had to have political significance. We will study the activities of the Tupamaros in relation to the 'political coyuntura,' place, terror, supply, propaganda.

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Activities and Political Coyuntura (Conjuncture)

Part III dealt with the Tupamaros' ideology. It analyzed their beliefs about Uruguay's crises, as well as the direction in which they wanted Uruguay to change. To attain and implement their revolutionary goals they proposed guerrilla warfare as a means to attain political power. The commitment to act upon the ideology was a sine-qua-non condition for the membership in the movement. The guerrilla activities were a direct output of their ideology. The Tupamaros' ideology outlined several tactics that would accelerate achievement of their final goal.

The tactics had to be flexible in order to continuously adapt to the changing conditions of the country and the Tupamaro organization. The analysis and evaluation of this dynamic relationship between the changing conditions in the country and the state of the guerrilla organization at each specific period of time was called coyuntura.[1] The Tupamaros not only believed that they could influence the coyuntura, but also that they could create the proper coyuntura if the minimum objective conditions existed.[2] The main task of the Tupamaro

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[1]See document by Costa, Los Tupamaros, p. 246.

[2]An example of the creation of a positive coyuntura by the Tupamaros is given by Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupmaros, p. 12. He examines the case of political kidnappings. If the guerrillas wish to apply political kidnappings as an effective weapon, but realize that it may arouse negative feelings towards the movement by large sections of the population, they must create a favorable coyuntura that will enable them to carry out the activity at a minimum cost. This may be done by publishing certain aspects of the victim's life (wealth, power, corruption, etc.) that will create a negative image of the victim, thus providing a rationale and legitimizing the kidnapping.

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leadership (political, military) was to recognize the proper coyunturas, to influence existing ones, and to create them when possible and necessary.

Based on the analysis of the coyunturas the Tupamaros designed a sophisticated set of military and political tactics. Most of the Tupamaro activities reflected a strong relationship between the military and political objectives. As studied in Part III, based on the analysis of Uruguay's existing coyunturas, the Tupamaros believed that only through the use of violence could they achieve political power and implement the revolution.

For the Tupamaros the use of 'revolutionary violence' in order to seize political power was efficient and legitimate.[1] The use of violence in order to overthrow the regime was legitimized by the constant use of 'official violence' by the incumbent authorities defending the status quo and their power positions. Political violence in this context was the expression of inner-societal struggles for power. Before the creation of the Tupamaros, 'violence' was only used as a legal instrument of governmental control. The Tupamaros legitimized the use of violence as a means for seizing political power. This was necessary, because historically the 'radical structural changes' they proposed could not be achieved by legal means in Uruguay's political system.

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[1]See O. Costa, "Carta abierta a la policía," pp. 100-102 and also "Tesis militar" and "Tesis económica," p. 246.

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Militarily and politically, the Tupamaros wanted to undermine the regime's and authorities' legitimacy, to disrupt their decision-making process, to reduce their ability to mobilize the citizens in their support, to eliminate their monopoly in the use of force, and mainly to create a situation where most of the citizens would not accept the authorities' decisions as binding. This intended massive support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime precipitated by the use of political violence would have weakened the regime and undermined the power of the authorities to such an extent, that the seizure of power by the Tupamaros would have been possible.

The Tupamaros also believed that political violence against the regime and authorities should not be sporadic and spontaneous, but on the contrary, should be well organized (Chapter X). Guerrilla warfare was seen as the most efficient way to optimize the use of political violence.[1] Through guerrilla warfare the Tupamaros tried to achieve specific objectives. Among them were to weaken the regime's coercive mechanism, to obtain mass popular support, and to prepare the cadres for the revolutionary takeover.

The destruction of the regime's repression mechanisms was to be achieved through guerrilla activities designed to demoralize the armed forces. Mass popular support was to be obtained through political activities that would undermine the credibility, trust, and support for the regime and authorities. Through the participation in the guerrilla

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[1]See O. Costa, "Tesis militar," p. 246 and 30 preguntas a un Tupamaro, pp. 68-77.

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foco[1] the revolutionaries were to receive the necessary training for the takeover. Political as well as military considerations influenced the Tupamaros to adopt urban over rural guerrilla warfare.

Place of the Activities

The formulation of 'urban' or 'rural' activities was one of the most debated issues within and between different guerrilla groups. Some guerrilla groups saw the rural guerrilla activities as a tactical aid to the urban guerrilla. Other groups perceived it inversely. This difference can be represented, for example, by the Tupamaros (urban) on the ond hand, and Guevara and Debray (rural) on the other. According to Guevara, in underdeveloped America, the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.[2] Debray complements Guevara's conclusions by adding that the probabilities of a prolonged urban guerrilla warfare are very limited because of the pressures (physical and psychological) to which the guerrillas are subject in the urban centers.[3]

> The city is the complementary area of fighting . . . and for this reason, the urban struggle always assumes the character of

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[1]The model of a 'guerrilla foco' is described by Regis Debray in his book, Revolution in the Revolution? (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967). The 'foco' model of guerrilla warfare was the strategy that led to Castro's success in Cuba, and Guevara's failure in Bolivia. It is an elitist approach to guerrilla warfare whereby a small group of guerrillas forming the nucleus or foco are responsible for creating the immediate conditions for the revolution. The Tupamaros adopted the foco model for an urban rather than the rural setting described by Debray.

[2]Guevara, "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method," pp. 89-104.

[3]Regis Debray, "Le Castrisme: La longue marche de l'Amerique Latine," Les Tempes Modernes 20, no. 224 (January 1965): 1215-1224.

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> tactical fighting . . . the decisive fighting is the fighting on the strategic area, i.e., in the rural area.[1]

But this does not mean that the activities of the urban guerrilla are not important. On the contrary, according to Marighella, the urban guerrilla must be transformed into an "instrument of disturbance, distraction, and retention of the armed forces to avoid their concentration in the repressive operations against the rural guerrilla."[2] But in Latin America many attempts to reproduce the 'Cuban model' failed, as for example in Panama, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Haiti, etc.[3]

In 1960 Salvador Allende (then Presidential candidate of the Socialist Communist Alliance in Chile) wrote:

> Cuba's fate resembles that of all Latin American countries. They are all underdeveloped producers of raw materials and importers of industrial products. In all these countries imperialism has deformed the economy, made big profits and established its political influence. The Cuban revolution is a national revolution, but it is also a revolution of the whole of Latin America. It has shown the way for the liberation of all our peoples.[4]

On January 27, 1959, Guevara outlined some of the implications of the Cuban Revolution for the rest of Latin America.

> The example of our revolution for Latin America and the lessons it implies have destroyed all the cafe theories: we have shown that a small group of resolute men supported by the people and not afraid to die if necessary can take on a disciplined regular army and

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[1]Marighella, "Sobre problemas y principos estratégicos," Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 11.

[2]Ibid., p. 12.

[3]See Tad Szulo, "Exporting the Cuban Revolution," in Cuba and the United States, ed. John Plank (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 79.

[4]Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 311.

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> completely defeat it. That is the basic lesson. There is another, which our brothers in Latin America in economically the same position agriculturally as ourselves should take up, and that is there must be agrarian revolution, and fighting in the countryside and the mountains. The revolution must be taken from there to the cities, and not started in the cities without overall social discontent.[1]

The Tupamaros represented a new approach to guerrilla warfare in Latin America. Their emphasis was on urban guerrilla warfare and they hoped it would be more successful than the rural pattern followed by Che Guevara. The reasons for Guevara's failure in Bolivia are numerous and were extensively studied by many authors, but his death (October 8, 1967) in certain ways symbolizes the failure of the strategy of rural guerrilla warfare and coincides with the peak of Tupamaro activities.

The Tupamaros' decision of urban over rural guerrilla warfare was reached in the early stages of their organization.[2] In their very early stages, Sendic's influence and contacts with the sugar-workers of Artigas (UTAA) and the rice-workers of the department of Trienta y Tres and other locations in the interior of the country, combined with the "spontaneous tendency of going in the direction of history ['foco' in the rural milieu]"[3] influenced the Tupamaros' decision of rural over urban guerrilla warfare (see Part III).

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[1]From a talk of Che Guevara to the Nuestro Tiempo Association in Havana, quoted in Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (Garden City NY: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972), p. 13.

[2]See Costa, 30 preguntas a un Tupamaro, pp. 68-71.

[3]Mercader and de Vera, Tupamaros: Estrategia y acción, p. 10.

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But in 1964 the Tupamaros shifted their activities to Montevideo.[1] Many speculations tried to explain this shift. Probably the positive response by certain segments of Montevideo's population to the Tupamaros' activity now known as 'Comando del Hambre'[2] in Christmas of 1963 as well as new recruits the movement gained from Montevideo's middle class (professors, students, civil servants, etc.) produced a shift in the internal balance of power of the Tupamaro organization. Due to this definite shift to Montevideo since 1964-65, the Tupamaros lost some rural members and Sendic lost the top leadership of the movement, but continued to be an active member.[3] A Tupamaro document made public in January 1967, explains their option of urban over rural guerrilla warfare.[4]

Geographically, the Tupamaros realized that Uruguay lacked the minimum necessary conditions for the establishment of a rural foco. Furthermore, they realized the importance of Montevideo. It was the real center of the regime's decision-making process and was a highly politicized city. It was also the largest city in Uruguay and housed close to one and a half million inhabitants in more than three hundred square kilometers of buildings, streets, etc. This represented about half of Uruguay's total population (Table 11).

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[1]Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 36.

[2]The activity consisted in the hijacking of a food truck and the distribution of the food in the poor neighborhoods in Montevideo. See Mercader and de Vera, Tupamaros: Estrategia y acción, p. 148.

[3]Ibid., p. 11 and Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 37.

[4]Mercader and de Vera, Tupamaros: Estrategia y acción, pp. 15-16.

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Montevideo's population had a high level of political participation with strong labor and student unions. It was the core of many segments of the population frustrated and active against the policies of the incumbent authorities.[1] The countryside lacked political participation.

> Latin American cities are growing faster than any in the world. Montevideo, which absorbs more than half of Uruguay's population, is an extreme example of the concentration of population and industry around a few major centers . . . But urbanization is taking place very much faster than industrialization, leaving a vast residue of unemployed slum dwellers camping on waste land.[2]

The urban guerrillas found support in the cities among the civil servants, students, professionals, radical elements in the clergy, trade unions (see Chapters VIII and XII). They tried to coordinate their activities with the continuous student, and worker's strikes and demonstrations in opposition to the authorities' policies.

The Tupamaros were convinced that an urban guerrilla movement would be able to produce the massive support withdrawal from the present regime and incumbent authorities by the urban masses. This was necessary for the revolutionary takeover. Their main bases of recruitment and supply were in Montevideo. Logistically they felt more secure in Montevideo's 'jungle' than in the almost uninhabited countryside. A revolutionary army in Montevideo had all targets within reach[3]

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[1]See Costa, "Analisis de los sectors fundamentales."

[2]Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," Conflict Studies, 8 (October 1970), p. 6. See also Abraham Guillén, Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana (Montevideo: Ediciones Liberación, 1969), pp. 85-89.

[3]Costa, "Analisis de los sectors fundamentales."

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(buildings, national and foreign officials, institutions, etc.). From the 'propaganda' perspective and their potential influence on different sectors of the population urban activities had the potential for more publicity and a larger audience than activities in remote parts of the countryside.[1] Finally, the Tupamaros also believed that in case of intervention from Brazil or Argentina, an urban guerrilla group would have been able to wage a war of national liberation.[2]

Although the Tupamaros shifted from a rural to an urban guerrilla movement, they never fully rejected the creation of a second front. During 1970-1972 the Tupamaros tried unsuccessfully to open a second front in the interior of the country ('Plan Tatú') as a complement to their urban guerrilla warfare. Plan Tatú tactically was conceived as a means of reducing the armed forces' concentration in Montevideo by diverting them to the countryside. The Tupamaros recognized this failure.[3]

From the strategic and political point of view, the Tupamaros through urban guerrilla warfare tried to achieve a power duality parallel to the existing regime. By means of this 'dual power' the Tupamaros wanted to facilitate the process of transfer of support from the existing regime and authorities to themselves. By providing an organization which included parallel institutions (legislative,

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[1]See Costa, "Sección continental," p. 246.

[2]Costa, 30 Preguntas a un Tupamaro, pp. 68-77.

[3]For a more complete description of 'Plan Tatú' see 7 meses de lucha antisubversiva.

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judicial, executive, military, penal, etc.) the Tupamaros further legitimized their activities. At an advanced stage of the revolutionary process this dual power strategy would have compelled the population at large to take a stand and polarize the political situation. The population would have been confronted with the choice of either supporting the 'official government' or the 'revolutionary government.'

In most of their activities and pamphlets explaining their activities, the Tupamaros were very careful to maintain and develop this 'dual power' image. For example, Dan Mitrione was 'sentenced by the revolutionary tribunal' and 'executed' by the 'revolutionary justice.' In this way the Tupamaros tried to show their integrity, coherence, purpose, direction, and centralization of their activities.[1] The Tupamaros in their different types of activites tried to maintain this image.

Types of Activities

The tactics of the Tupamaros derived directly from their strategy. The tactics were closely designed after their strategy whose goal was to achieve the seizure of power and the implementation of the revolutionary ideology. The activities of the cells were subordinated to the ideology and strategies of the Tupamaro movement. The elaboration of specific tactics was necessary in order to operationalize the

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[1]Costa, "Carta abierta a la policía," p. 103, and "Tesis militar," p. 246.

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ideology and strategies by means of specific activities. The specific tactics and activities were to insure the ideological and strategic victory of the Tupamaros. In this sense the role of the activities was dual: political/military. Thus most of the Tupamaro activities were not only designed to accelerate the population's support withdrawal from the regime and the authorities (through activities that would question the authority's claim to legitimacy, destroy their credibility, weaken their repressive apparatus, etc.), but also to increase the level of support for the Tupamaros. Ideally, such types of activities would have accelerated the parallel process of weakening the regime and strengthening the Tupamaro movement.

For the purpose of analysis I have divided the Tupamaro activities into several broad categories that could include most of the activities in the period under study. These categories are not mutually exclusive, i.e., certain activities could be included in more than one category.

Some of the activities performed by the Tupamaros were directed at different short term objectives. None of their activities was aimed at the physical control of certain portions of territory as is usually the case with rural guerrilla warfare,[1] but rather to the psychological 'conquest' of the population. Many efforts and activities were performed by the Tupamaros in order to strengthen their mechanism of transformation (food, medicines, money, etc.). This was often

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[1]Even 'Operación Pando' was not aimed at the physical control of the town, but mainly to use this short occupation of the town as a show of power capability.

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difficult for rural guerrillas to achieve. Montevideo provided the Tupamaros with a more intellectual milieu than the countryside, thus enabling a greater depth in information. Other sets of activities were directed at seeking allies among different segments of the population dissatisfied with the economic, political, and social situation of the country. Different activities were power-show capabilities, while yet others appealed to the nationalist feelings, etc. Those short-term goals activities were aimed at the preparation of the objective and subjective conditions that would enable the Tupamaros to achieve the long term goal of revolution.

The activities performed by the Tupamaros should not be viewed only as strategic-military operations, but primarily as instruments of politization, conscientization, and increasing of the level of support withdrawal among certain segments of the population. Some of their activities did have negative feedback on the population. In sum, guerrilla warfare for the Tupamaros was not only a military tool, but mainly a means of 'politization and conscientization of the masses.'

> Any guerrilla warfare, but especially urban guerrilla warfare, which fights inside the multitude, in an intimate contact with the masses, is a political warfare. Any mistake in the use of the tactical means, and activity which will not have its objectives very clearly explained may signify a great delay of the supreme strategic objectives. Thus the selection of the tactical means demands an exact evaluation of the socio-political, geographical, etc. conditions in order to avoid its use to turn contra-productive.[1]

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[1]MLN Tupamaros, Actas Tupamaras (Buenos Aires: Schapire Editor, 1971), p. 11.

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Terror Activities

The use of terror by the guerrillas was very common. "Terrorism is an arm that the revolutionary can never renounce."[1] The guerrillas, according to their objectives, used different kinds of terrorism. These types of terror activities could be used independently or simultaneously.

'Coercive Terrorism'[2]

This kind of terrorism is generally used by the guerrilla against the civil population. The principle objectives of coercive terrorism are to pressure the population to support the guerrillas and/or to prevent the population's cooperation with the authorities. It was also used to coerce the population to accept the guerrilla's commands. On the one hand this kind of terrorism tried to avoid the people's support for the government and simultaneously on the other hand, demonstrates to the people that the guerrillas know who among them (the people) are the 'traitors.'

This kind of terrorism is also used as a punishment-reward method in regard to the civil population, since the government has many means of punishment that the guerrillas do not have. Another use of

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[1]Marighella, "Minimanual del guerrillero urbano," Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 108.

[2]Brian Crozier, "The Study of Conflict," Conflict Studies (Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ltd., London) 7 (October 1970): 9-11.

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coercive terrorism by the guerrillas is for the purpose of recruiting members. Not always is coercive terrorism successful, however. Sometimes it resulted in a negative feedback to the guerrilla on the part of the population. The more selectively coercive terrorism is applied, the more effective it will be.

The Tupamaros did not perform many activities of the kind defined as 'coercive terrorism.' For example, in one instance they used this kind of terrorism as a 'punishment-reward' strategy but with the objective of 'disruptive terrorism.' The 'people's prison'[1] where the Tupamaros held the victims of their kidnappings is the best example of the very selective use the Tupamaros gave to this kind of terror. Their goal was to show their capability to establish a parallel judicial and penal system where the injustices of the regime could be brought to trial under the revolutionary justice.

One clear example of the use of coercive terrorism was provided by Guevara. He wrote in his journal (April 30), "the peasant base is still not being formed, although it seems that through planned [emphasis added] terror, we can neutralize most of them; support will come later."[2]

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[1]The term used to describe a prison where the Tupamaros held their prisoners. It was first thought to be used as a parallel to a regular government prison where certain people will spend their sentences after being convicted in the revolutionary court.

[2]*Ramparts* 7, no. 1 (July 27, 1968): 41.

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'Disruptive Terrorism'

The principle objective of this kind of terrorism is to disturb and destabilize the administrative system of the regime through the murdering, kidnapping, etc. of the authorities and representatives of the regime. This demonstrates to the population the extent of the guerrilla's operational arm. It also shows the corruption and vulnerability of the authorities and the regime. Some of the common targets of disruptive terrorism are government ministers, members of the Congress, directors of governmental offices, foreign diplomats, etc. "With the kidnappings of the American Ambassador, we want to show that it is possible to subdue the dictatorship."[1] Disruptive terrorism is also used as a means of exchanging 'prisoners' between the government and the guerrillas. The more selectively disruptive terrorism is used by the guerrillas, the greater the possibilities of being accepted at least by certain segments of the population.

Marighella clearly stated,

> They are actions directed against the interests of the great national and foreign bankers, against the American imperialism and his companies in Brazil, against the CIA's spies, against the property and patrimony of the Federal and State governments, against the repression apparatus of the dictatorship and his armed forces, public offices, etc. Those are tactical operations, and their effects consist in demoralizing the authorities and the American imperialism."[2]

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[1]Marighella, "Declaración de acción libertadora nacional (ALN) movimiento revolucionario de octubre," Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 62.

[2]Marighella, "Operación y tácticas guerrilleras," pp. 40-42.

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The Tupamaros used this kind of terrorism very widely, but even though their targets were extremely selective some of their activities had a negative impact on certain sectors of the population. The kidnapping of Victor Pereyra Reverbal[1] in August 1968 was an example of the Tupamaros' use of disruptive terrorism and was designed primarily to humiliate the authorities and show disapproval with their policies. In September 1969 the Tupamaros kidnapped Mr. Gaetano Pellegrini Giampetro.[2] This activity was timed with a general strike of bank employees with the intention to show cooperation with the demands of the strikers. Several other kidnappings were performed by the Tupamaros during 1970.

In July 1970 the Tupamaros performed their first kidnapping of a foreign diplomat, Mr. Aloysio Dias Gomide, the Brazilian Ambassador to Uruguay and an American police advisor, Mr. Dan Mitrione, followed by the American 'soil expert' Claude Fly in August 1970. Those activities were not aimed solely to gain national and international publicity, but also more important as evidence of American intervention in Uruguay's internal politics. Tactically the Tupamaros wanted to obtain the release of prisoners and to force publication of their political manifestos. The authorities' refusal to negotiate led to the killing of Mr. Dan Mitrione.

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[1]Very unpopular political figure, generally considered as an 'eminence gris' behind government policies, President of UTE (the government owned phone and telegraph company), and close friend of then President of Uruguay Pacheco Areco. See Mercader and de Vera, Tupamaros estrategia y acción, pp. 119-134.

[2]One of Uruguay's leading bankers. See Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," p. 18.

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The reasons for this murder were various, but mainly the Tupamaros wanted to maintain 'kidnapping' as an effective tactic as well as the credibility of their own threats.[1]

The killing of Mitrione was different from the previous 'executions' (e.g., Police Chief Héctor Morán Charquero). These previous 'executions' were in response to the torture of Tupamaro members, and Mitrione's case was a 'negotiated death.' While it demonstrated capability, etc., the public at large was not yet ready to accept a premeditated, negotiated death. According to Guillén the murder was premeditated, because the Tupamaro demands in exchange for Mitrione were excessive.

This 'execution' created negative feelings toward the Tupamaros by different sectors of the population opposed to murder. This activity became for the authorities a symbol of the bloody methods used by the Tupamaros and was widely publicized.

> We predicted a negative response to the execution, but we are not interested only in public opinion . . . Many times we have seen public opinion shift from adverse to favorable. Do not forget that in the beginning everyone . . . including most of the left . . . considered us a 'band of delinquents.' Now it is different . . . we brought Mitrione to a fair trial and found him guilty. It was a just verdict. We tried him and Pacheco [President] and the establishment executed him. We are aware that we paid a price in public opinion, but we are not interested in sympathy based on a false basis. We do not want people to think we are Santa Claus.[2]

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[1]See "Gramma: Reportaje completo a un Tupamaro," in Dueñas Ruiz and Rugnon de Dueñas, Tupamaros, pp. 145-157.

[2]Interview with a Tupamaro, "We Do Not Want People to Think We Are Santa Claus," CIDOC, p. 153.

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Other major kidnappings were performed by the Tupamaros in 1971-72. They were the British Ambassador Mr. Geoffrey Jackson, the Attorney General Mr. Guido Berro Oribe, Mr. Pereyra Reverbal (a second time), and Mr. Frick Davies, former Minister of Agriculture. The Tupamaros were very selective in the choosing of the individuals for kidnappings. For example, Mr. Frick Davies was chosen due to his part in the misuse of public funds.[1] Mr. Guido Berro Oribe was abducted for the purpose of cross examination in relation to irregularities during his term as court prosecutor. Mr. Mitrione was selected to show the American presence and their role in the 'repressive state.' The Brazilian Ambassador was kidnapped to 'show' Pacheco's government that it is possible to negotiate with the guerrillas as the Brazilian government did and also to create diplomatic tensions. Dias Gomide was accused by the Tupamaros as being the representative in Uruguay of a repressive dictatorship which had frequently tortured and murdered scores of Brazilian patriots. The Uruguayan government refused to negotiate with the guerrillas thus escalating the level of violence.

By the use of disruptive terrorism the Tupamaros also tried to intimidate and demoralize the armed forces through the selective killing of police agents. "The execution of Morán Charquero consequently must be understood as the first application of revolutionary justice against the abuses perpetrated by the regime."[2] This

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[1]He was found guilty of corruption in the scandal that followed the Tupamaros' activity 'Financiera Monty' that led to his resignation.

[2]See Carlos Nuñez, "El turno de los verdugas," CIDOC, p. 16. This document describes the activity in detail.

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selectivity was drastically reduced as violent clashes between the guerrillas and the armed forces increased. The Tupamaros achieved for a certain period of time the demoralization of the armed forces.

> The attack against the repressive forces of the regime is certainly the most direct way of implementing the 'harassment.' It strikes precisely in the regime's support, in the apparatus that serves to maintain it. The crumbling of the armed forces could bring as a consequence the automatic downfall of the regime. But because the revolutionary war is a political warfare, the consequences of this tactic must be analyzed before it is used. For example, if there is a well-found hope that certain sectors of the armed forces will shift to the patriotic cause, it must be well measured if harassment will help this process or to the contrary it will throw these sectors into the arms of the enemy. Harassment when brought to the urban centers, has an enormous psychological effect over the members of the armed forces. When they receive the enemy's lead in their own skins, they begin to reason politically and to think if it is really worth being killed for the regime. Sometimes they even begin to inquire about the guerrilla programs and see themselves as mere instruments of certain policies. In reality they enlisted, i.e., became members of the police or the army, because they had the need to work somewhere. They believed that they would defend their homeland or fight against delinquency . . . Thus when they stop being passive agents to become active agents of the regime they begin to acquire consciousness of their role in the social struggles and then one of two things can happen: either they accept to continue to defend the oligarchic regime . . . or they will refuse to do so and will shift to the guerrilla.[1]

Even in these types of activities the Tupamaros tried to be very selective. Whenever possible they used the tactic of 'indirect approach,' i.e., to attack the enemy's objectives that are being safeguarded and not the individual(s) (police, soldiers, etc.) safeguarding the place. Thus the 'enemy' or 'target' is the place and not the individual. By following this tactic with limited success they were able to mobilize some armed forces' members and intimidate

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[1]MLN Tupamaros, Actas Tupamaras, pp. 13-14.

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others. In the long run this approach regarding the armed forces failed. Uruguay's armed forces not only did not disintegrate, but were drastically increased.[1]

An important aspect of the Tupamaros' selectivity was the targets they chose not to attack. They tried to avoid activities that although would have the potential of causing great disruptions by affecting a large number of people, could also disrupt the lives of the masses (e.g., bombing of telephone centrals, factories,[2] bus stations, etc.). They tried to minimize the fear among the population at large, but to increase the fear among their enemies.

> Our enemy must spread itself thin trying to guard thousands of potential targets. The representatives of the existing regime have to turn to living almost an underground life . . . restricting their movements, being constantly protected by bodyguards even in their own homes.[3]

One of the main strengths of the Tupamaros' use of disruptive terrorism was the excellent timing of their activities and the clever combination of their 'criminal' activities with the claim of 'revolutionary justice' achieved by highly selecting their targets. This in part also explained the support they were able to obtain from certain segments of the population.

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[1]See Chapter VI and Tables 23-25.

[2]On very few occasions they perpetrated terrorist acts against factories. In both instances there were no casualities, only property damage. June 20, 1969 arson in General Motors installations and October 10, 1970 arson against Sudamtex textile factory warehouse. This was the largest textile factory in Uruguay, mostly owned by American investors. Only offices and warehouses were affected--not the factory, thus labor was not affected.

[3]MLN Tupamaros, Actas Tupamaras, p. 16.

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'Disintegrating Terrorism'

This kind of terrorism is applied more anonymously without being as selective in its objectives as the coercive and disruptive terrorism. This kind of terrorism is directed toward the disintegration of the society as such, usually after the society's general security has been undermined. Examples of disintegrating terrorism are: explosion of grenades in supermarkets, explosion of cars in heavy traffic areas, and highly concentrated areas or theaters, shopping centers, etc.

> The urban guerrilla is not afraid of dismanteling and destroying the actual Brazilian economic, political, and social system, because his objective is to help the rural guerrilla and to collaborate for the creation of a totally new and revolutionary social and political structure in the country, with the armed people in power.[1]

The Tupamaros used disintegrating terrorism only in 1970 for their activity the 'Hot Summer.' Their goal was to destroy the tourism season in order to foster the economic crisis. Tourism represented the third most important source of income of Uruguay's economy. The timing of this type of terrorism used by the Tupamaros produced an all-out publicity campaign by the authorities determined to save the tourist season. The authorities proclaimed: "Criminals's Hot Summer Fails," "Country Lives in Absolute Normality," etc. In order to back up these proclamations, the authorities provided free transportation for tourists. They temporarily lifted the censorship of the seven words

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[1]Marighella, "Minimanual del guerrillero urbano," Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 67.

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forbidden since July 4, 1969 (cells, political and social delinquents, guerrillas, commands, extremists, terrorists, Tupamaros). The executive temporarily nullified the 1967 decree that declared illegal the Socialist party, Anarchist Federation, Revolutionary Left Movement, Uruguayan Movement of Popular Action, Revolutionary Oriental Movement, and the Revolutionary Workers Party.[1] Yet, with all these measures, the authorities could not save the tourist season. On the contrary, it was interpreted as a sign of strength of the Tupamaros that they were able to obtain such concessions from the authorities.

The Tupamaros did not favor the extensive use of disintegrating terrorism, however, they recognized its importance in the process of revolutionary takeover.

> Only when the revolutionary war enters its last stage of 'generalized struggle' or if the country is occupied by a foreign power, sabotage activities [blowing up telephone lines, railroads, bridges, etc.] can be justified. But even in these circumstances it must be used with great discretion and caution so that the population could consider them legitimate and valid. The objective must be clear . . . Another secondary disadvantage of [non-selective] terrorism is that it tends to reinforce the false image of the 'terrorist' that the government and its press try to create regarding the guerrilla, . . . and it may create a feeling of fear about the guerrilla activities within the population at large.[2]

Thus they concluded to use 'sabotage' in very selective manners only when they had available a sophisticated communication network to counteract the regime's media exploitation of the potential negative effects caused by these types of activities.

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[1]See Chapter III.

[2]MLN Tupamaros, Actas Tupamaras, p. 12.

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Anti-Terror

This kind of terrorism is generally applied by the armed forces, but it can also be used by the guerrilla forces as an 'answer' to the terror applied by the armed forces. "To the terror applied by the dictatorship against the people and the revolutionaries, we respond with the revolutionary terror."[1] The Tupamaros called this type of activities 'reprisals.'

> The explanation to the agents of the regime and the public at large becomes much easier when certain activities are implemented as an answer to certain cruel, arbitrary and unjust acts committed by the enemy (e.g., torture, murder, failure to bring to justice certain crimes, etc.). But the use of reprisals must be well measured and proportionate to the crime performed by the enemy . . . But besides trying to erradicate the tortures and murders, an urban guerrilla through the use of reprisals could set a more ambitious objective: To punish the police, army, authorities, oligarchy, representatives of imperialism and hateful regimes for each prisoner they take, for each revolutionary they kill . . . and to punish the judges for each prosecution, the journalists for their offenses, the witnesses and informers for their declarations against the revolutionaries, the representatives of the government and capitalism for their unpopular policies.[2]

The Tupamaros thought that this type of harassment by reprisals was political in nature, because it made it difficult for the authorities to implement anti-popular policies.

This kind of terrorism was used by the Tupamaros especially against the armed forces. Once an agent of the armed forces was identified as responsible for the killing or torture of a guerrilla, he automatically became a Tupamaro target. The 'no-negotiation' policy of

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[1]Marighella, "Operaciones y tácticas guerrilleras," Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 42.

[2]MLN Tupamaros, Actas Tupamaras, p. 12.

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the authorities was in a sense one form of coercion which led to increasing violence and the murder of Dan Mitrione.

Terrorism, like other kinds of guerrilla activities, is the arm used by the weakest against the strongest. An individual's agreement with the guerrilla's values does not preclude him from being a potential victim of the guerrilla's terrorism, especially when 'disintegrating terrorism' is applied. Terrorism, actual or potential, is one of the different violent techniques used for political purposes. The success of terrorism is difficult to assess. Terrorism for the Tupamaros was a useful auxiliary weapon rather than a decisive one. In Uruguay, terrorism had proved itself effective for the Tupamaros only against a badly trained, disorganized and inefficient armed forces. When the armed forces were reinforced (quantity, training, weapons, etc.) it became even less decisive, but imposed a burden on the national budget and a high price in Uruguay's quality of life (see Chapter VI). This created favorable conditions for other kinds of activities and precipitated the specific support withdrawal from the authorities' non-selective anti-terrorist campaign.

Activities to Strengthen the 'Mechanism of Transformation'

In the period up to 1968 the Tupamaros' activities were mainly aimed at securing supplies of arms, money, equipment, medicines, etc. These kinds of activities can be described as 'defensive' and/or preparatory. Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish regular criminal activities performed by delinquents and similar activities performed by

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the guerrillas. To avoid this confusion the Tupamaros tried to explain by different methods the purposes of their activities, and wherever it was possible they tried to simultaneously do justice or disclose corruption.

The break-in of the 'Financiera Monty' was one of the best examples of how the Tupamaros succeeded in financing themselves while disclosing corruption in order to discredit the incumbent authorities. They compelled the authorities to bring to trial some executives and prominent businessmen. These kinds of activities were usually called 'armed propaganda' (see "Propaganda Activities" below). Many activites were performed with the main purpose of financing the movement, especially bank-robberies. "The urban guerrilla has to purchase its own 'Sierra Maestra.'"[1] The most spectacular ones were 'Operación Casino Carrasco' and 'Operación Casino San Rafael."[2] Those activities also had a political goal of showing one of the corruption centers of the regime and were performed without bloodshed. After the robberies they returned part of the money to the Casino's payroll office, thus trying to obtain the sympathies of the workers while embarrassing the armed forces.

Many other activities were aimed at the seizure of weapons such as the 'Operación Tiro Suizo' and 'Operación Centro de Instrucción de la Marina."[3] Most of these spectacular bloodless activities

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[1]Ibid., p. 17.

[2]Ibid., pp. 101-109 and 123-129, respectively.

[3]Ibid., pp. 55-63 and 215-229, respectively.

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contributed to the creation of the image of the Tupamaros as being a very well organized movement with a high regard for humanity. The armed forces in most cases were unable to find any clues. Usually, the Tupamaros left behind pamphlets explaining their goals and/or explaining their motivations and reasons for a specific activity. The Tupamaros were successful in achieving self-sufficiency by the so-called 'expropriation' methods and simultaneously in gaining publicity and new recruits, and even admiration from certain segments of the population.

Many small scale activities were performed in order to obtain basic necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, information, vehicles, medicine, repairs, etc. While the attainment of such supply items are easier for the urban than the rural guerrilla, the costs involved in the maintenance and expansion of the organization are much higher for the urban than the rural guerrilla.

In order to distinguish themselves from common criminals, the Tupamaros obtained most of their supplies by the method of 'expropriations,' i.e., the supplies were obtained from their ideological enemies--authorities and oligarchy.

> From the moment the guerrilla prepares himself to act he has to expropriate money in large quantities, because with money the urban guerrilla buys its 'Sierra Maestra,' i.e., the security places, workshops, technical equipment, etc., and sometimes even the weapons. But these activities usually performed by criminals have to be explained as legitimate revolutionary activities whose purposes are neither criminal nor for self-improvement and benefit. To obtain the public understanding for these type of activities it is important . . . to expropriate only the capitalists or the regime, underlying this principle with the

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> return of goods or the reparation of damages in case they affected the interests of the workers.[1]

The expropriations method was also the system used by Carlos Marighella in Brazil. In the "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," he wrote:

> Most of the expenses of the revolutionary struggle must fall on the hands of the capitalists, imperialists, and landowners, as well as federal and state governments, because all these are exploiters and oppressors of the masses.

Following Marighella the Tupamaros expressed a similar viewpoint: "We do not go outside the country to seek financing for our revolution, but we must seek the finances to mount the necessary revolutionary campaign from our ideological enemies."[2]

> We must make a clear distinction between what the bourgeoisie's property and the workers' property really is. The former is without doubt the outcome of worker's exploitation; the latter is the result of work and individual effort. Therefore the bourgeoisie's property is our natural fountain of resources and we have the right to expropriate it without compensation. Our revolution puts to use the surplus of the privileged.[3]

With this expropriations philosophy the Tupamaros performed some spectacular activities aimed at the attainment of financial supplies. Through expropriations they robbed many private and

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[1]Ibid., p. 17.

[2]See Tupamaros' Communiqué published in Tricontinental Bulletin (Havana) 5, no. 46 (January 1970): 44.

[3]See Tupamaro document, "Rules of the Organization, in Los Tupamaros, ed. Costa, p. 92.

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government banks,[1] casinos,[2] private residences, [3] private financial institutions,[4] large department stores,[5] etc. These activities were performed with a high degree of ingenuity. They were mostly bloodless activities based on very accurate information and involving a very small number of Tupamaros.[6]

In general the diverse 'supply activities' had political meaning, fostering the image of the 'good guys' and aimed at the

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[1]Very few banks didn't suffer from 'expropriations.' Most of the main branches or affiliates of the banks were robbed by the Tupamaros, including the Banco de la República safe deposit boxes (November 12, 1970). This activity gave the Tupamaros an entrance to the Guinness Book of World Records, ed. N. McWhirter and R. McWhirter (New York: Bantham, 1971), p. 359 as the largest jewelry robbery in modern times. For a more detailed account of various bank robberies see Costa, Actas Tupamaras.

[2]The most spectacular robbery was that of the government owned Casino San Rafael (February 18, 1969) in the most luxurious resort area in Uruguay (Punta del Este).

[3]One of the most spectacular was the robbery in the mansion of the Mailhos family. This family, one of the richest in Uruguay, had the largest interest in the tobacco industry.

[4]The most spectacular one in this category was the robbery of Financiera Monty. They stole a large amount of money and also released to the press 'black books' of 'dirty' business conducted by the Financiera. The involvement of some government officials was confirmed resulting in their convictions.

[5]'Manzanares'--the largest food chain retailer in Uruguay was one of the Tupamaros' favorite targets. One of the first Tupamaro activities was the hijacking of a 'Manzanares' delivery truck and the distribution of the food in the poor neighborhoods (cantegriles).

[6]Inside collaboration was reported in the most spectacular activities. This collaboration was mostly based on ideological rather than financial rewards. 'Confusion' and 'indifference' were the favorite Tupamaro approaches. They posed as repairmen, policemen, delivery people, etc. This required a high level of ingenuity and sensitivity.

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attainment of popular support. While showing their own responsibility, capability, restraint, and ingenuity they tried to disclose the vulnerabilities and corruption of the existing regime and authorities. In a sense it provided the moral meaning to the 'dual power.'

The supply of weapons was achieved by different means. Many weapons were purchased in the national and international 'black market.' Others were obtained by robberies of rifle clubs[1] or specialty weapons stores. A large percentage of the weapons used by the Tupamaros were 'expropriated' from the armed forces.[2] The Tupamaros also manufactured some of their own weapons and explosives used in their activities. The chemicals needed for the manufacture of explosives were obtained from the University as well as 'expropriations' from laboratories and chemical companies. Many times the purchase of these needed chemicals was done legally. There is no evidence of foreign money or weapons supplied to the Tupamaros.

The supply of transportation vehicles is of extreme importance to urban guerrillas. The Tupamaros developed a very sophisticated system for the theft of automobiles. Usually they would 'borrow' a vehicle for a few hours. They would return the car in perfect

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[1]'Club Tiro Suizo,' first official activity, 1963.

[2]Activity of May 29, 1970 at Marine barrack with collaboration of Sailor Mr. F. Garin. See in Costa, Los Tupamaros, p. 166, the letter published by Mr. Garin when going underground after his collaboration with the Tupamaros was disclosed.

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condition and pay the owner for the gasoline and the use of the car. They would encourage the owner to report the incident to the police.[1]

Many activities were performed by the Tupamaros in order to supply information to the Central Command and different cells. The Tupamaros through these kinds of activities (usually bloodless) obtained complete sets of aerial maps of Uruguay, maps of the telephone, electrical, sewer, etc. systems as well as blueprints of government buildings. This information was obtained either by 'direct action' or by the underground 'committees of support' organized by the Tupamaro sympathizers in private and government agencies.[2] The Tupamaros also had their own research and field work teams whose main objective was the attainment of tactical information. The availability of accurate information was one of the main reasons for the Tupamaros' success.[3]

The Tupamaros established their own documentation center based on equipment and materials obtained from government offices. Their 'duplication center' and the availability of 'legal' false documents implied inside cooperation and highly trained personnel in the falsification of documents. They also obtained police, firemen, ambulance,

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[1]Many times they would abduct the attendant of a parking lot and 'borrow' several cars at the same time. Often they would borrow cars while the owners were on vacation or at a movie theater. If the car became disabled during an activity they would 'reimburse' the owner for the necessary repairs.

[2]Many official documents were stolen and disclosed to the media. In many instances stationary from government and private organizations was used for 'internal' communications.

[3]See Chapter X.

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etc. uniforms and vehicles that were successfully used in several operations.

As discussed earlier, it was very important for the Tupamaros to supply themselves with new recruits. They performed many activities to free imprisoned guerrillas which included some spectacular jail-breaks.[1] These activities were usually bloodless. Their main techniques were either disguise or the building of tunnels from the sewer system into the designated jails. These tunnels were the product of great engineering, planning, and implementation.

While this resupply of members was an important psychological support for the guerrillas, reassuring them that the movement would not forget them if they were captured, they were also a tactical mistake from the military point of view. Some Tupamaros while in jail became police informers. The freed Tupamaros were reintegrated into the cell structure. Much effort had to be devoted to keeping these Tupamaros 'underground' thus exposing the internal secrecy of the organization. But as the number of Tupamaros identified by the police grew, it became increasingly difficult to keep all of them 'underground.' So an 'open army' was in effect created comprised of those identified Tupamaros for whom anonymity was no longer possible.

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[1]Freeing imprisoned guerrillas:

Jailbreaks--the most spectacular:

March 9, 1970	Women's Prison	13
July 20, 1971	Women's Prison	38
September 6, 1971	Maximum Security	106
April 12, 1972	Maximum Security	15

Freeing of individual leaders:

May 26, 1971	J. Almiratti
July 18, 1971	Raúl Bidegain

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This open army performed frontal activities against the armed forces. These frontal activities were the bloodiest ones. Their main purpose was to demoralize the armed forces. They were not very selective and produced a negative impact on the population at large. Through these type of activities the Tupamaros soon began to lose their 'Robin Hood' image.

Propaganda Activities

The goals of propaganda activities were to publicize the existence, ideology, actions, and power capabilities of the guerrillas. The Tupamaros tried to persuade the public at large that they were a real and responsible alternative to Uruguay's present corrupt, inefficient, and cruel regime. They tried to avoid the population's fear of the Tupamaros. They achieved these goals by different types of propaganda activities. Until 1968 the Tupamaros utilized very effectively the mass-media communication network. They obtained full coverage of their activities, wrote free-lance articles and letters to the editors, and gave several interviews to newspapers.

Urban guerrilla warfare has a great potential to utilize the mass-media communication network. "It is easier to win headlines by kidnapping a diplomat than by subverting a village in a remote provincial backwater.[1] Carlos Marighella once estimated that the press

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[1]Moss, "Urban Guerrillas In Uruguay," p. 14.

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coverage he received from one activity his group performed[1] amounted to approximately $400,000. In a country with a free media network, as was the case of Uruguay, before the imposition of censorship, the guerrillas could achieve the communication of their message to the population with limited manpower and resources.

In countries with strong censorship in relation to guerrilla activities as was the case in Uruguay since 1967-68, the guerrillas needed to expend many resources and large amounts of manpower trying to communicate with the population. To overcome the government's censorship the Tupamaros tried different propaganda operations. One kind of activity could be categorized as 'armed propaganda.' The intention of these activities was to show the population through successful and 'revolutionary just' operations that the authorities and the regime were vulnerable and that there was an option, i.e., a 'dual-power' capability in the first stages until the liquidation of one side--the 'old regime.' The best example of this type of activity was the 'Pando Operation.'[2] This operation consisted of the occupation of the town of Pando (located about forty miles from Montevideo) on October 8, 1969, in memory of the second anniversary of Che Guevara's death.

A second set of activities with similar objectives could be categorized as 'underground' or 'counter' media. For the purpose of

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[1]The activity he was referring to was the hold up of a payroll truck in 1968. In this activity they 'expropriated' about $10,000.

[2]For a detailed account of this activity, see Gilio, La guerrilla Tupamara, pp. 103-141.

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broadcasting their own version of their activities they used a mobile radio transmitter. They also produced leaflets that were circulated by hand. Many times they took over public meeting places (churches, theaters, etc.) to deliver short and quick messages to the surprised audiences. Probably the best example of this type of activity was provided by the 'Operación Radio Sarandi.'[1]

This operation consisted of the take-over of a radio station and the transmission of their own broadcast for forty minutes. It was performed on May 15, 1969 at the same day and hour of the final soccer game between Uruguay and Argentina. This radio station was the most popular for soccer games and was also broadcasting to Argentina. This activity was a great success for several reasons. They not only transmitted their message when a large percentage of Uruguay's population was listening to this specific program, but it was also broadcast to the exterior. It showed the great ingenuity and technical skills of the Tupamaros, ridiculed the armed forces, and was a bloodless operation. Even people that opposed the Tupamaros praised this activity.

Through the direct and/or the indirect use of the mass media, the Tupamaros waged a type of psychological warfare. These 'intellectual activities' attempted to raise the consciousness of the masses to gain support among the population as well as to demoralize the authorities and accelerate the process of repression by the authorities in order to militarize the conflict (see Part II).

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[1]For a detailed account of this activity, see Mira, <u>Actas Tupamaras</u>, pp. 109-115.

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The authorities used censorship to combat this kind of 'psychological' warfare. Censorship was harmful to the credibility of the mass media communication network. The imposition of censorship weakened the guerrilla's propaganda effort because they used the media to inform, express their ideas, demoralize, etc. Simultaneously the imposition of censorship was also detrimental to the authorities. "It creates a climate of neurosis, loss of reputation, insecurity, uncertainty, and intranquility for the government."[1]

One method used by the Tupamaros to overcome the official censorship included direct mailings to offices and homes. For this purpose they utilized mailing lists of private and public institutions (e.g., social security, payrolls, etc.). The Tupamaros also performed several activities of such magnitude that they could not be neglected by the national media, and obtained international coverage. Censorship became inefficient because the public demanded information from local sources.

The Tupamaros' most extensive coverage in the international media (making national censorship inefficient and producing popular demand for free information), was obtained by the extremely selective and politically oriented kidnappings of national and international representatives.[2] In most cases the Tupamaros did not demand money

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[1]Marighella, Teoría y acción revolucionarias, p. 110.

[2]Partial list of Tupamaros' kidnapping victims:

Ulyses Pereyra Reverbal (1969, 1971, 1972)
Chairman of UTE and close friend of President Pacheco Areco

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for themselves. Rather they attempted to negotiate directly with the authorities. In the case of the abduction of foreign diplomats, the Tupamaros tried to negotiate directly with the foreign authorities involved. This strengthened the image of the existence of a dual-power in Uruguay. For example, the release of the Brazilian Aloyso Dias Gomide was achieved through direct negotiations with the Tupamaros despite Pacheco's cabinet refusal to deal with the guerrillas.

With very few exceptions the kidnapping victims were released after a short period of time after the Tupamaros obtained the necessary

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G. Pellegrini Giampetro (1969)
Banker and newspaper owner
D. Pereya Manelli (1970)
Judge most often involved in the prosecution of captured Tupamaros
Dan A. Mitrione (1970)
Official of Agency for International Development, security expert and advisor to armed forces
C. L. Fly (1970, 1971)
US soil expert and advisor to Uruguayan government
G. J. Jackson (1971)
Great Britain Ambassador to Uruguay
G. Berro (1971)
Uruguay's Attorney General
R. Ferres (1971, 1972)
Wealthy industrialist and conglomerate owner
C. Frick Davies (1971, 1972)
Landowner and former Minister of Agriculture; forced to resign, he was neither prosecuted nor convicted after corruption information disclosed by Tupamaros following one of their activities
J. Berembau (1971)
Owner of large textile business
H. Farina (1972)
Newspaper editor and president of state water company
N. Bardesio (1972)
Police photographer--as witness of armed forces and Ministry of Interior corruption.
H. G. Ruiz (1972)
President of Uruguay's House of Representatives

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information and/or recorded their conversations, etc. The longest 'imprisonment of a kidnap victim was fourteen months. The victims were held in the people's prison and usually they were treated very well. Only Dan Mitrione was killed following the authorities' refusal to negotiate with the Tupamaros.

The selection of victims for kidnapping was highly scrutinized. In addition to being considered ideological enemies in general, the victims were also selected because of specific charges. For example, the kidnapping of a foreign diplomat would be justified on the basis of his country's imperialist interests in Uruguay. Through kidnappings the Tupamaros tried to escalate international tensions, achieve the release of imprisoned Tupamaros, influence labor disputes as well as government policies. Several of the abductions were perpetrated in order to obtain information or to bring to trial officials accused of corruption, torture of Tupamaro prisoners, etc.[1]

The positive aspect of kidnapping was that it did not threaten the population at large, but only those in certain positions of power considered enemies of the revolution. It made censorship less efficient by obtaining international coverage for the Tupamaro activities. It discredited the authorities and armed forces while enhancing the dual-power capability (people's enemies, people's prison, people's tribunal, etc.). The Tupamaros showed responsibility in the selection, questioning and treatment of their victims and enemies.

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[1]The Tupamaros usually released taped interviews with their victims. For the transcripts of a taped interview with Mitrione, see <u>Gramma</u> (Havana), September 13, 1970, p. 11.

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> Kidnappings are, among other things, a demonstration that the Latin American Revolution is now capable of creating jails for its traitors and oppressors, depriving them of their liberty as they deprive us of ours, holding them hostages as they hold us . . . this is part of the people's struggle against the regime that oppresses them.[1]

Kidnappings also produced several ministerial crises around the question of how to deal with the new kidnapping phenomena in Uruguay.

Following the abduction of Mr. Fly, the American soil advisor to Uruguay, the guerrillas offered to free him in exchange for the publication of a manifesto in which they expressed the objectives of their struggle as well as certain immediate policies that could result in a cease-fire if followed by the authorities. The authorities refused to publish the manifesto, thus accepting the continuation of the struggle. It is believed that the Tupamaros suggested this compromise because they were weakened by several blows suffered after Mitrione's execution. Some believe that the execution was premature and based on the Tupamaros' false sense of strength, feeling strong enough to undertake the implementation of a non-popular measure. Others like Guillén believe that the Tupamaros trapped themselves through their demands, and that the execution was unfortunate, undesired, and irresponsible, but had to be carried out to maintain the Tupamaros' credibility.

When the authorities refused to publish the Tupamaros' manifesto, they circulated it themselves among the population. It was later published by Dueñas.[2] It is an important document for the

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[1]Salazar Lisandro, CIDOC, p. 153.

[2]Dueñas, _Tupamaros_, pp. 32-36.

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understanding of the Tupamaros' ideological goals as well as an indictment of the authorities, their policies, and the regime. It is also a summary of the Tupamaros' reasons for their support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime. The authorities had violated the basic norms and values of the regime.

The Tupamaros to the Uruguayan People

The government has finished one more stage in the establishment of its tyranny. For more than a year [based on emergency powers] it has exercised its depotism. Now, confronted by our exchange proposal--made with the desire to free our freedom fighters and trying to avoid pain and sacrifice--they unleashed the most irresponsible repression.

The government has sent troops to the street, it has imprisoned thousands of Uruguayans, violated the homes, hospitals, churches, educational centers; it has now also formally ended the few individual guarantees that the people still had. Through its highest authorities, the government has asked for torture against our militants. It has legitimized accusations and bribes, offering for this purpose the millions it refuses for workers' salaries, education and housing.

Politicians and personalities of all persuasions unveiled the hypocritical mask and have all united: rulers and 'oppossitors,' Blancos and Colorados (right and left wing), in order to repel this new attack against the people, an attack that was neither the first nor will it be the last.

For this purpose the government has also used the press, which it absolutely controls, in a campaign of lies and propagandistic terrorism without precedent.

It has done all of this in the name of a pretended 'order' and 'lifestyle,' which is no more than <u>their</u> order and <u>their</u> life-styles. The order of a handful of <u>priviledged individuals</u> who enjoy the fruits of the country thanks to the exploitation of the majority. The order of the few which become fat with the sweat, hunger, and misery of the many. The order of the sticks, bullets, tortures, and cowardly murder of the people's sons who protest. The order of the orgy and of waste. The order of the banks, of the infidelity and bribery of ministers and supervisors, of the deceit, corruption and lie.

The order of the persecution of culture and salaries freeze. The order of the slums, of those which die hungry in the hospitals

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and asylums. The order that wallows in the misery and forgetfulness of the farm peons and old retirees. The order that treasons the country, giving it away to foreigners. The order of the sold-out and frightened press which spills thousands of crocodile tears for a spy [reference to Dan Mitrione] who came to teach the latest torture and massacre techniques. A press which has not raised even one single voice for the crimes that are committed against the people and the fatherland. The order of the unproductive 'latifundia' and unemployment.

The benefactors of this order are exactly those that come once more to attack us, and obviously they do so in the name and defense of this 'order'--exclusively theirs.

Mister rulers, all exploiters, once more you have been irresponsible; once more you have been mistaken. The present situation is not solved either with troops in the streets or with deceiving speeches. It is neither solved with Pentothal nor with huge official briberies for the public denunciations. It is not solved with the police. The present situation demands political solutions.

The National Liberation Movement is a genuine and authentic son of our people. A natural product of the situation in which the country lives. With him the fatherland's most precious valued reserves emerge. With him it is being demonstrated daily that the capacity for terrorism and sacrifice of the present generations is at the same level as for those of our best historical traditions.

Yesterday the fatherland was in the tip of the spear sweeping the hills. Today it is in the mouth of our clandestine weapons. Yesterday victory was swindled from us. Today you won't be able to do this. Now the struggle is clear and definitely against you and your 'order.' Now the issue is the conscious entrance of the popular masses into the fatherland's history.

The Liberation Movement is the armed political organization of the workers, students, salaried rural workers, unemployed, small rural producers, small merchants, of all the social sectors that suffer from your 'order.' They are the true owners of the fatherland, because they built it with their toil, their misery, their sacrifices and paradoxically they are the ones who least enjoy it. In the name of all these social classes, in the name of all the marginals we say to you: yesterday we asked for the freedom of our friends from jail and you answered with war, with new attacks that went very far. Today we demand:

1) the freedom of all political prisoners

2) the restitution to their position of all those destitute

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3) the lifting of wage freezing

4) the lifting of all the interventions, especially those against the learning institutions

5) the restitution of all the personal and collective rights as well as the liberties snatched from the people

6) the lifting of all the unpopular and reactionary policies adopted by this government.

We are conscious that these measures are not enough to solve the problems of the country. To do that it will be necessary to eliminate the large industrial, commercial, and bank monopolistic capitals; to practice a patriotic policy in our international relations, eliminating all the compromises that exploit us; to place the workers in the government positions and in the direction of all the large state and private enterprises; to make a reality the right of all to work; to have the benefits of culture, housing, and health, in sum, a popular government.

At the present time, only the fulfillment of the six points demanded will be a demonstration that you want to pacify the country, respecting at least the opinion and most elemental interests of the social sectors we represent. Otherwise, the war you have declared on us will have the only possible answer: our war.

Our patience has definitely ended. We have absorbed the shocks. Now we will answer them. We do not accept your 'order' any more. Now we demand weapons, in our hands and the right to participate. We are not ready to continue being marginal. Otherwise there will not be any order.

There will be a fatherland for everybody, or there will be no fatherland for anybody. TODAY IS FREEDOM OR DEATH!

In this document the Tupamaros made it explicit that although maintaining a high degree of support for the political community, they withdrew support from the regime and the authorities. The Tupamaros expressed long range as well as immediate political demands. They stress the fact that their struggle is not only against the authorities, but more so against the regime. That the organization, institutions, as well as the values of the regime could not be supported. A

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change in the regime--political solutions--rather than regime maintenance by repression, was being demanded from the authorities. This was a 'bargaining' document trying to establish moderation by the Tupamaros in an attempt to become the main bargaining unit for the 'people's' demands. Dan Mitrione was just a tool to begin negotiations for the fulfillment of their demands.

Activities designed to disclose corruption (e.g., 'Financiera Monty,' February 14, 1969) also served propaganda purposes. In this particular activity, besides supplying themselves with large amounts of national and foreign currency, they also obtained a set of 'black books' which detailed the misuse of public funds, currency speculations, and illegal lendings performed by Financiera Monty. These transactions involved several incumbent authorities and important figures. Among those who were partners and/or involved with the company's illicit operations were Mr. C. Frick Davies (Minister of Agriculture, later kidnapped by the Tupamaros); Mr. Jorge Batlle, former presidential candidate of 'List 15' of the Colorado party; Pereyra Reverbal, UTE (National Telephone Company) president and presidential advisor (he was kidnapped three times by the Tupamaros); Mr. Nieto Rizzo and Perez Noble, two of the most famous architects in Uruguay who obtained many government contracts for public constructions and held several government posts. Although none of these and other individuals were prosecuted, the scandal produced by the Tupamaros' disclosures caused the resignations of Frick Davies and other public officials. The company did not report the robbery to the armed forces and the Tupamaros delivered the books to the house of a judge.

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Following the delivery of these books, a fire at the Financiera Monty's main headquarters destroyed the remaining books and evidence. No one was prosecuted for the fire which the investigating team declared 'accidental.'

The 'Robin Hood' type of activity that the Tupamaros used on several occasions in the beginning of their open activities were discontinued. These bloodless activities of 'taking from the rich and delivering to the poor' were considered detrimental by the Tupamaros.[1] The Tupamaros were aware that the final takeover will not be bloodless and wanted to prepare the population for such an eventuality.

Rural Activities

The Tupamaros made serious efforts to create a rural front in Uruguay's countryside as a complement to their main urban front. Their intention was to distract the armed forces concentrated in Montevideo. Although Montevideo was the political and financial center of Uruguay, the countryside was in essence the nation's main economic support. Thus the authorities could not afford to lose control or allow disruptions in the rural sectors. The 'tatuceras'[2] were supposed to create the basic infrastructure network of the 'second front.' The rural

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[1]See Costa, Los Tupamaros, p. 134. Reprinted from the monthly magazine Al Rojo Vivo (Montevideo) (March 18, 1969), no. 18.

[2]The word 'tatucera' refers to the tatú burrow. The tatú is a specie of armadillo that inhabits Uruguay's countryside.

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cells and columns would operate from the tatuceras. The development of this second front was known as 'Plan Tatú.'

The tatuceras were literally underground holes of different dimensions located in the rural areas. They served as hideouts, training grounds, etc. Some of the tatuceras were very large and displayed highly sophisticated architectural designs. The tatuceras were intended to be semi-permanent and permanent in nature. They were the basic locational structure for the second front as well as the logistical support for the urban front.

> Tactically the tatucera functions like the Sierra Maestra, like the jungle for the Vietnamese that although inaccessible was secured even more by making many holes. The tatuceras were used by the 'worms' in Cuba in order to substitute for the popular support that they did not enjoy. They were used on the island of Cyprus with half the area of the Tacuarembó department, with a population of 500,000 inhabitants and a British occupation army of 5,000 soldiers. The tatuceras in the rural areas were the most effective weapons of the Eolia groups. In order to take over the power in South Yemen, a small state like Canelones, the revolutionaries also used tatuceras in the desert.[1]

Plan Tatú, which called for the establishment of seven columns in the interior of the country[2] failed. Most of the tatuceras were captured by the armed forces in 1972. The second front was dismantled.

Summary

The activities of the Tupamaros were directed in the final analysis to overthrow the incumbent authorities and present regime.

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[1]From a Tupamaro document published in 7 meses de lucha antisubversiva, p. 154.

[2]See document, "Resoluciones del comando general ampliado del interior." This document was found by the armed forces on the 'Caragua' tatucera. 7 meses de lucha antisubversiva, pp. 154-163.

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This was to be achieved by activities designed to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and incumbent authorities. We studied the relationship between the Tupamaro activities and the political coyuntura. We also studied the Tupamaros' choice of urban over rural guerrilla warfare as well as their different types of activities. The different types of activities to strengthen their mechanism of transformation, their use of terrorism, armed propaganda, and rural activities were highly selective and attempted to establish a dual power capability.

Guerrilla activities were a direct output of the Tupamaros' ideology. The Tupamaros, following the foco theory, believed they could influence the political coyuntura. Political violence in the form of guerrilla warfare was used in a highly selective manner. From 1964 through 1969 the Tupamaros avoided any direct confrontation with the armed forces. Their activities created the image of a 'Robin Hood' type of organization. It appears that during this period of time, segments of the population looked upon the movement, if not with approval, at least with sympathy. Political violence was used by the Tupamaros with such selectivity that the population at large was neither terrified nor strongly against the movement. Even the 'expropriation' activities to strengthen their mechanism of transformation were politically motivated.

The Tupamaros' urban guerrilla warfare changed the original composition of the movement. Most of its support came from Montevideo's metropolitan area (see Part III). In Montevideo the Tupamaros tried to establish a dual power capability to facilitate the

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process of transfer of support from the existing regime and authorities to themselves. The Tupamaros' activities were designed to foster this process of support withdrawal from the authorities and the regime. They tried to achieve this goal by discrediting and exposing the incumbent authorities. The dual power capability was also intended to show their ability to become a real alternative for political power. This dual power and their very selective activities aimed also at legitimizing their activities by portraying the movement as the true defenders of the Constitution whose basic ideals and rights were being violated by the authorities. Thus not wanting to alienate the population the Tupamaros' activities were highly selective in their use of terrorism.

The Tupamaros achieved the militarization of the conflict (see Part III). This tactic of militarization aimed at obtaining the support of the passive population.

> It is necessary to turn political crises into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation in the country into a military situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and blame them for the state of things.[1]

This tactic of militarization allowed little room for compromise with the authorities. The breakdown of the institutions, values and norms of the regime was the goal. They had to prove to the population that the existing conflicts could not be solved in the present framework. The political kidnappings precipitated a strong

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[1]Quoted from Marighella in Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," p. 7.

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response by the authorities. By 1971 the Tupamaros' activities escalated.

> It is awful, but no one goes out at night anymore. They are afraid of the police looking for the Tupamaros.[1]

The socio-economic and political situation of the country continued to deteriorate (see Part II) as the Tupamaros escalated their activities.

> There has been a very great degree of concentration on maintaining order in the face of threats from small subversive groups, and the promotion of economic development has been assigned a lower degree of priority.[2]

The activities of the Tupamaros succeeded in undermining the legitimacy of the present regime and incumbent authorities. This in turn will accelerate the process of the military intervention in the decision making process. The authorities were exposed by the Tupamaros' activities. The inefficiency as well as the corruption within the ruling elite became evident by a series of Tupamaros' activities. But the traditional parties still maintained a high degree of legitimacy as expressed by the results of the last national elections (see Part II). The main effect that the Tupamaros achieved was to disclose the inefficiency, corruption, and inability of the regime

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[1]"Shabby Montevideo Looks for a Scapegoat," New York Times, July 10, 1971, p. 4.

[2]Aristobulo Baitz, "Uruguay--An Analysis of the Current Situation," Bank of London and SA Review 4, no. 48 (December 1970): 671. An example of the MLN's influence on Uruguay's economy was the decline in tourism that the country experienced during the 1971 tourist season when the Tupamaros launched the 'Hot Summer Campaign' (see Part II). Tourism, which earns 25 percent of the country's foreign exchange, was well below the norm with a loss of over $15 million for the 1971 season. See also "Uruguay's Tupamaros Hurting Tourism," New York Times, March 7, 1971, p. 3.

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and authorities to respond to the people's demands. The gradual coup was a response to the decline in the level of support for the authorities and the regime.

The activities of the Tupamaros did succeed in polarizing the society and militarizing the conflict. The fact that the causes for the political and socio-economic crisis were largely the result of authorities' policies due to the interpenetration of the political and socio-economic system (see Part II) produced a drop in specific support for the authorities due to output failure. This will enable the Tupamaros to implement their tactic of sectoral mobilization (see Chapter XII).

The dual power capability developed by the Tupamaros as well as their ability to utilize force in a restrained, disciplined, controlled, and planned manner contributed to their gaining of respectability. The Tupamaros' efficiency and selectivity contrasted with the authorities' inefficiency and indiscriminate use of violence. The extent of governmental corruption disclosed by the Tupamaros weakened the authorities' claim to legitimacy. This was reflected by the populations' unwillingness to cooperate in the struggle against the Tupamaros. "They [the people] stood as mere spectators in a struggle that they considered to exist between the authorities and the Tupamaros."[1] In the next chapter we will study the political tactics of the Tupamaros and the sectors of the population they tried to

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[1]Colonel Sergio L. d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," Military Review 53, no. 4 (April 1973): 27.

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mobilize in their support through their activities. The authorities' reactions to the Tupamaros will be studied in the conclusions to Part IV.

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CHAPTER XII

POLITICAL STRATEGIES

Political Tactics

The Tupamaros' ideology and praxis called for the simultaneous and coordinated use of their political and military tactics in order to create the appropriate coyuntura for the seizing of political power and the implementation of the revolution. Activities that had only a military purpose and/or military strategy in itself were condemned. The Tupamaros perceived military tactics as subordinate to and directed by their political philosophy and strategy of guerrilla warfare. Therefore the activities of the Tupamaros ought to be studied in the context of their political tactics. Power duality in the military field ('revolutionary violence,' 'revolutionary tribunal,' 'people's jail,' etc.) could only be legitimized if it was a part of a 'dual ideology.' This dual ideology challenged the dominant status-quo ideology. This was the context that provided meaning to the theory of dual-power.[1]

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[1]See "Tesis Política," no. 1 in Costa, Los Tupamaros, pp. 228-250.

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Basically the Tupamaros developed a three-pronged political tactic. The three prongs of the tactic had to have a high level of relationship at all periods of time. In effect the Tupamaro political tactic consisted of a) aggregate mobilization, b) sectoral mobilization, and c) el salto. The Tupamaros recognized the need for 'mass popular support' and mass mobilization. But they did not consider 'mass popular support' as crucial for their success. They accepted the idea that at times mass mobilization could only be achieved after the seizure of political power (see Part II).

Aggregate Mobilization

Aggregate mobilization was an attempt to influence the 'masses' in general. Activities that were part of this tactic were designed to gain for the Tupamaros undifferentiated mass popular support and/or sympathy that will give them the ability to interact with the masses. These activities were intended primarily to attract recruits, receive information, and publicize the movement's actions and ideology. These were activities undertaken to show the existence of an alternative to the support withdrawal from the regime and authorities.

The final goal of aggregate mobilization types of activities was to create a bridge between the masses and the Tupamaros through the creation of a broad front of opposition to the authorities and the regime. The Tupamaros would have been a part of this broad front of national liberation. They believed that this front needed to be

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flexible enough to win, organize, and mobilize all potential friends without alienating anyone.[1]

Through aggregate mobilization, the Tupamaros attempted to polarize the ideological forces in the country and compel the masses to take a stand. This polarization in turn would have helped the central command to better evaluate the conyuntura. The creation of a climate of confrontation, the acceleration of radicalization of attitudes would have provided a greater acceptance of the Tupamaros as a political contender for political power. This was one of the main complements to power duality.

The Tupamaros realized that the mobilization of popular support was not an easy task. They were determined to try to attain this, however, even if their efforts failed. They were convinced that even if they failed, they would have at least created in the mind of the masses a clear distinction between criminals and Tupamaros, i.e., the creation of a framework for the understanding and interpretation of their activities. The Tupamaros recognized a dialectical relationship between their movement, mass struggle, and the mobilization of masses.[2]

Sectoral Mobilization

Through sectoral mobilization the Tupamaros tried to mobilize and influence those organized groups in Uruguay's society that could

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[1]Costa, Los Tupamaros, pp. 228-250.

[2]Ibid., pp. 228-259 and also 30 preguntas a un Tupamaro, pp. 68-77.

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cooperate with them.[1] The Tupamaros also sought to mobilize international groups that could support the cause of the Uruguayan people as represented by the Tupamaro vanguard. Simultaneously they tried to neutralize the societal groups that could have adversely affected or oppossed their movement.

Among the sectors that the Tupamaros tried to mobilize were the armed forces, ruling class, labor unions, students, political parties, the church, other revolutionary groups, and some Latin American revolutionary regimes.

Armed Forces

The Tupamaros tried to mobilize the armed forces. They published communiqués and letters specifically addressed to the armed forces. In 1972 arrested Tupamaros helped the armed forces directly in the identification and prosecution of many speculators and corrupt politicians. Several activities performed by the Tupamaros were designed to obtain information for the armed forces in the prosecution of corrupt businessmen (Mailhos, Monty, and the like).

The Tupamaros were convinced that they could mobilize in their support at least certain sectors of the armed forces. The Tupamaros treated the armed forces as a political organization and not only as the military branch of the oligarchy. Several times they offered individual members of the armed forces the opportunity to become

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[1]Costa, "Analisis sectores fundamentales," pp. 228-250.

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Tupamaro members. Many members of the armed forces did indeed become Tupamaro members and/or sympathizers. To an extent the Tupamaros did influence the armed forces at least theoretically. The first communiqués by the armed forces after the coup d'état included many ideas and programs proposed originally by the Tupamaros. Although by that time the Tupamaros were militarily defeated, some of their ideas had been publicly coopted by the new military regime.

Ruling Class

Although the Tupamaros considered the landowners, industrialists, merchants, wealthy individuals, and incumbent authorities their ideological enemies, they nonetheless felt the importance of establishing links with them.[1] Some prominent politicians and individual members of the ruling class did indeed join the Tupamaro movement.[2]

Labor Unions

Labor unions were traditionally dominated and led by the left wing political parties. Most of the country's labor force, including the public sector, was unionized. This provided for the Tupamaros a potential positive conyuntura. "It is not the same thing to attack a state that is in the plentitude of strength as to attack a state semi-paralyzed by strikes."[3]

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[1]Costa, "Tesis política," pp. 228-250. [2]See Chapter VIII.

[3]Costa, 30 preguntas a un Tupamaro, pp. 68-77.

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Although the Tupamaros realized the difficulties in bridging the gap between 'syndicalism' and 'guerrilla' they were nonetheless determined to obtain support from organized labor.

> Of course we have a good portion of the way paved already when we begin to work with a comrade that has experience in the union struggles . . . but at the same time there is a difficult obstacle to overcome. Our worker became used to fighting for economic objectives and insensibly he's transformed this into his god. We, on the contrary, understand that the struggle for better salaries and similar economic objectives is only a means. A means to unite the workers. From there on if the struggle continues with the correct orientation, and if each day the programs take on a more radicalized tone, then the moment will arrive when the workers will realize that the labor movement as it is structured today cannot confront the violence of the government and that the syndicates cannot function efficiently unless under conditions of legality. When the workers reach this point the syndical action will be converted into the antechamber of political action.[1]

During 1968-1972 the authorities escalated the level of repression against the labor unions and its leaders. This was a period of high militancy for most labor unions. Daily demonstrations and strikes became a routine. Often during this period alliances between unions almost paralyzed the country through simultaneous and co-ordinated strikes.[2] The authorities severely curtailed the activities of the unions, considerably limiting their rights (including the right to assemble), jailed its leaders, and drastically reduced union representation in bargaining procedures.

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[1]Interview with a Tupamaro, "No alzanza con ser Rebelde," pp. 2-13.

[2]During this period six concerted general strikes paralyzed the country. The demands of the striking workers were 'bread and butter' issues as well as demands for political change. Before 1968, no labor concerted activity was able to paralyze the country and the workers' demands were economic.

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The union demands shifted from 'bread and butter' issues to the demand of radical changes in the regime, land tenure system, etc. "The union leaders are being convinced that only by means of a revolutionary struggle whose objective is to achieve power, will it be possible to change the exploited conditions of the workers."[1]

During this coyuntura the Tupamaros' organization grew with union members politicized during the syndicate struggles. As the avenues for traditional political participation narrowed, the Tupamaros' membership increased.[2] As the legal and traditional opposition to the authorities and the regime was censored, persecuted, and destroyed by the authorities, the Tupamaros were slowly becoming the only remaining pocket of organized resistance.

Students

Since 1963 the Tupamaros tried to mobilize the unions and students. They considered the students' support very important.

> They [the students] are the social sector that help us in the strongest manner . . . They are an expression of the more general problem of an unemployed youth without good prospects, living in a country in crisis.[3]

Students comprised a high percentage of the Tupamaro membership and were very active in the organization of 'Comités de Apoyo.' It was with the student body that the Tupamaros' mobilization efforts obtained the highest rate of return.

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[1]Ibid. [2]Costa, Los Tupamaros, pp. 228-250.

[3]Ibid.

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Political Parties

The Communist party did not support the Tupamaros and followed an orthodox Moscovite line. "Their attitude towards us [the Tupamaros] both in theory and publicly is one of respect and disagreement only as tactics are concerned."[1] When the Communist party was made illegal by decree, the 'open door' policy adhered to by the Tupamaros allowed former members of the Communist party to join them.

The mobilization effort of the Tupamaros among the smaller opposition parties was productive. During the period of polarization many of these fragmented miniscule parties disappeared from the political scene. Their membership either joined the Tupamaros or other opposition parties. The Tupamaros criticized the fragmentation of the left wing parties. They were convinced that similarly to what had happened in Cuba the revolutionary action would unify the left wing whether by choice or by force, "since they can only choose between giving their support to the guerrillas or disappear."[2] This process of unification was precipitated by the mounting repression and limitations imposed on the left-wing organizations.

The Church

The Church was another sector that the Tupamaros tried to mobilize. The Tupamaros precipitated a division in the hierarchy of the Church. The lower clergy, which was in constant contact with the

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[1]Ibid. [2]Costa, 30 preguntas a un Tupamaro, pp. 68-77.

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people tended to support the Tupamaros.[1] In fact, many 'curas rojos' admitted being Tupamaro members.

After the kidnapping of the British Ambassador, Geoffrey Jackson, the Church high hierarchy in a letter to the newspapers condemned the activity. The lower clergy supported the Tupamaros. They sent a reply to the highest Church authority in Uruguay disassociating themselves from the Church high hierarchy's anti-Tupamaro declaration concerning Jackson's kidnapping.

> Only the misfortunes that affect the 'big' in this world produces the afflicted and angry reactions as well as the public interventions by some of the hierarchy . . . They are disturbed by the discomfort suffered by a high ranking personality. But they abstain from opposing in any way the daily injustices perpetrated against the people.
>
> The Church has always expressed its obstinance against the radical protest forms of the oppressed. Yet the Church does little about the systematic oppression exercised by those responsible for the established disorders, thus using a double standard. We have to break this attitude that historically has made us accomplices of the exploitations of the have-nots and marginals. The death of a child in a slum (Cantegril), of a student in the street, or that of a tortured political prisoner, have as much transcendency as that of an ambassador.
>
> What we have already expressed previously on similar occasions is of interest here: the people must be conscious that the real confrontation taking place in our country is not the one that opposes the 'established order' or 'our traditional lifestyle.' The true struggle is the one that the hungry popular masses, persecuted, punished, and denied of all rights, confront until the end against the dominant class. This is the class economically strong that uses the institutionalized violence and the enormous repressive apparatus in order to preserve their privileges.[2]

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[1]Costa, "Analisis sector fundamentales, Los Tupamaros, pp. 228-250.

[2]Ruiz and de Dueñas, Tupamaros, libertad o muerte, pp. 18-19.

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The clergy's support that the Tupamaros gained in this activity was incremented by popular support and the inability of the armed forces, in the early stages, to obtain any information from eyewitnesses to the operation.

Other Latin American Revolutionary Groups

The Tupamaros showed concern and attempted to mobilize other revolutionary groups throughout Latin America which maintained an independent line (nationalism-socialism). Although the Tupamaros considered it important to maintain and develop such relationships and "establish alliances against the common enemy . . . we must maintain our obvious differences and autonomy."[1] In their attempt at mobilizing these groups, the Tupamaros performed certain activities of solidarity with other Latin American revolutionary groups.

Other Latin American Governments

The Tupamaros expressed their support and tried to mobilize those regimes in Latin America whose official ideologies included nationalism.[2] The Tupamaros were convinced that complete power could never be attained by electoral triumph.

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[1]Costa, "Analisis situación nacional," pp. 228-250.

[2]See document by the Comité de Asuntos Internacionales of the Tupamaros, published by the armed forces ("Comunicado 118"), 7 meses de lucha antisubversiva, pp. 134-140.

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> The electoral triumph there [Chile under Salvador Allende] has demonstrated the feasibility of a strategy of alliances and elections to gain certain positions of authority and thus come closer to having gained power.[1]

The Tupamaros were aware that having gained some positions of power (authorities) would not automatically change the regime. Chile under Salvador Allende became a sanctuary for Uruguay's political refugees. Many of them were killed after Pinochet's coup d'état.

Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia (before the 1971 coup) "have shown the range of possible ways of trying to achieve power."[2] The Tupamaros were sympathetic to these regimes and tried unsuccessfully to mobilize them on their behalf. In regard to Cuba the Tupamaros declared that "[Cuba] maintains a <u>purely</u> political support for all fighting forces, but as of today it is not a leader in strategies for armed struggle in Latin America."[3] The Tupamaros on several occasions were able to mobilize political support from Cuba and Fidel Castro.

United States

The Tupamaros considered the United States as the core of imperialism in Latin America. They tried to mobilize the United States for the achievement of some of the Tupamaros' interim goals. The Tupamaros did not seriously consider the possibility of direct intervention in Uruguay by the US. They expected the US to encourage Brazil

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[1]Costa, "Analisis situación continental," pp. 228-250.

[2]Ibid. [3]Ibid.

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and/or Argentina to intervene in Uruguay. From the Tupamaros' viewpoint, this was considered a positive coyuntura.

> Foreign intervention may mean an immediate military defeat, but at the same time an enormous political challenge that would in turn generate unified military action from all nationalist forces. Imagine the city of Montevideo occupied by foreign troops with the inevitable consequence of people's feelings about their country . . . and given that, an armed revolutionary group with good bases throughout the city.[1]

The Tupamaros would then be considered a true and genuine national liberation movement. Many activities performed by the Tupamaros against American interests in Uruguay were aimed at obtaining this 'negative mobilization' from the US.

Other Sectors

The Tupamaros also tried to 'negatively mobilize' the Argentinian and/or Brazilian armed forces to precipitate a military coup and the establishment of a military regime in Uruguay. The militarization of the conflict resulted in an escalation of violence between the Tupamaros and the armed forces. The Tupamaros reasoned that even if they were defeated militarily, the long-range political implications and the potential massive anti-regime mobilization would transform their guerrilla struggle into a popular war against the military regime. The military coup was precipitated, and the Tupamaros were militarily defeated. However, the massive anti-regime mobilization that the Tupamaros anticipated never occurred.

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[1]Costa, _30 Preguntas a un Tupamaro_.

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In one of the last Tupamaro documents printed in Montevideo,[1] they expressed the need to establish a foreign relations policy. This document reaffirmed the Tupamaros' present autonomy though it ironically coincided with the most severe military setbacks suffered by the Tupamaros. This document can be considered as a 'desperation' appeal for foreign help. The 'new revolutionary foreign policy' aimed at obtaining weapons and financial assistance from abroad, at facilitating the movement of guerrillas across the borders and establishing an inter-American revolutionary intelligence network. The Tupamaros appealed for help to Cuba, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Algeria, China, and the Soviet Union, but they failed to mobilize support from these regimes.

El Salto

The ideology, activities, interim objectives of the Tupamaros converged into what they called 'El Salto' (the hop). El salto was the last stage before the seizing of political power by the Tupamaros. For the 'salto' to be successful, a very specific coyuntura was needed. Militarily and politically the 'salto' meant to escalate the struggle to higher levels,

> to go to a greater and higher level of armed struggle, a definite spreading of the war, the direct harrassment of the authorities and destruction of the regime and armed forces, and therefore a greater degree of polarization, a radicalization of the revolutionary process, and a fuller use of available human resources and arms.[2]

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[1]Marcha, May 5, 1972, pp. 22-23.

[2]Costa, Tesis militar, pp. 228-250.

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The popular coyuntura for the implementation of the 'salto' would be created by the struggle of the Tupamaros' mechanism of transformation, the existence of a strong and recognized power duality, a high intensity of popular discontent, and massive diffuse support withdrawal from the regime and authorities, a high level of support and mobilization for the Tupamaros, low morale of the armed forces, a fluid interaction between the Tupamaros and the population at large as well as the possibility of foreign intervention.

The Tupamaros thought that when these political and military conditions would be present then the minimum necessary requirements for the implementation of the 'salto' would have been met. This proper coyuntura would have enabled the Tupamaros to transform their struggle into a popular uprising.[1]

For the Tupamaros the 'salto' was the natural conclusion of their military and political strategy, i.e., an almost total identification by most of the population with the guerrillas. It would mean the acceptance as a legitimately viable and desirable alternative to the existing regime. This mass insurrection they hoped for would have led the Tupamaros to seize political power and to implement their revolutionary goals and ideology.

Summary

The Tupamaros realized that in Uruguay's socio-political coyuntura, urban guerrilla warfare and not constitutional means, was

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[1]Ibid., and Costa, 30 preguntas a un Tupamaro.

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the only feasible means of attaining their ideological goals. The use of 'political violence' against the 'official violence' was legitimized as the means of attaining political power. In order to optimize the use of political violence and attain their ideological objectives, the Tupamaros devised political-military strategies. Political violence in the form of urban guerrilla warfare was to be planned, highly selective, strictly scrutinized, and directed at specific objectives.

In order to attain their goals, the Tupamaros were strong believers in a tightly organized movement. A strong mechanism of transformation was a necessary condition not only to attain power, but also to manage it once attained (see Chapter XI). A strong mechanism of transformation was to enable the Tupamaros to implement their military strategy and their activities (see Chapter XI). The activities of the Tupamaros were designed to accomplish basically three objectives. First, self sufficiency, but these military activities had also a political purpose. Second, to foster the process of support withdrawal from the regime and the authorities. By breaking the authorities' monopoly in the use of force and establishing a dual power capability, the Tupamaros tried to curtail the authorities' claim of legitimacy. Power duality was to serve as a depository for the Tupamaros of support withdrawn from the authorities and the regime (see Chapter XI). The military strategy was linked and subordinated to the Tupamaros' mobilizational political strategy (see Chapter XII).

The aim of the political strategy was to broaden the Tupamaros' base of support among the population and to widen their claim of legitimacy. The attainment of power was viewed by the Tupamaros not as

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a military conquest, but rather as a political process. Military success in the guerrilla activities was to facilitate the attainment of political power. The Tupamaros aimed not only at the replacement of the existing authorities by military means, but to a rather radical change in the regime (Chapter I). In sum, the Tupamaros' urban guerrilla warfare represented the unity of their military-political strategy that would have transformed Uruguay's crises (Part II) into a popular uprising. After the final 'salto,' the Tupamaros' ideological goals (nationalism, socialism) would have been implemented. The next section will draw conclusions from Part IV of the dissertation.

Conclusions Part IV

In Part IV of the dissertation we analyzed the Tupamaros' mechanism of transformation activities and political strategies. The activities representing the output of the Tupamaro movement followed their military political strategies. The activities were designed to implement their overall strategy. The final goal of this political process was the attainment of political power and the implementation of the revolution. Many of the activities of the Tupamaros were directed at short and middle run objectives in order to strengthen their mechanism of transformation, widen their basis of support, etc.

The Tupamaros' ideology (Chapter IX) aimed at an overall revolution in Uruguay's political system. This revolution could only be achieved by the use of political violence in the form of guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla activities aimed at the authorities, the

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institutions of the regime, the oligarchy, and foreign imperialist interest. Against these targets the Tupamaros used different degrees of political violence. The use of violence by the Tupamaros was highly selective. The victims of the Tupamaros' activities were members of these selected groups (authorities, landowners, police, foreign diplomats, etc.). Very few members of the popular classes ('the people') were victims of Tupamaro activities. The popular classes were mostly victimized by the general and non-selective official violence.

The Tupamaros were convinced that given the present conditions in Uruguay's objective environment their ideological goals could not be achieved through the use of legal, peaceful, and constitutional means. They considered political violence and especially urban guerrilla warfare as a legitimate and efficient way to overthrow the authorities and the regime as studied in Part III.

Their political-military strategies were designed to accelerate the population's support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the regime. This is evidenced by their published documents (Chapter IX) as well as the unprecedented turmoil and the political threat of the Frente Amplio as studied in Part II, especially Chapter III. The Tupamaro activities tried to discredit, weaken, disclose corruption, destroy the authorities' monopoly over the use of force[1] and legitimacy and expose the regime's vulnerabilities and coercion. The 'dual power' philosophy was designed to create a concrete 'object' that would

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[1]Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 155-156.

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act as a recipient of support and legitimacy toward the new order. The political success of the Tupamaro activities helped to legitimize some of the Tupamaro charges against the authorities and the regime. This process is evidenced by the continuous parliamentarian crises, the prosecution of several authorities, and the constitutional reforms triggered by the Tupamaros' politicization of the economic crisis and the subsequent militarization of the political confrontation as studied in Part II.

The seizure of political power was not considered to be only a part of the military strategy, but more so a part of a holistic political process represented by the 'salto.' At that particular coyuntura the Tupamaro foco would be transformed into the vanguard of a popular uprising and a total revolutionary experience. This would allow the attainment of socialism and nationalism. Until the necessary conditions for the 'salto' were present, the Tupamaro activities had intermediate goals. These intermediate goals were preparatory to the 'salto,' therefore, the activities were highly selective. In general most of the different types of activities performed by the Tupamaros followed their strategic and ideological goals very closely. They showed a high degree of ingenuity, creativity, ideological commitment, and personal restraint.

As defined by the Tupamaros' ideology, their enemies were the authorities, the regime, foreign imperialist powers, etc. In their activities, violence was used only against their enemies and not against the population at large. The Tupamaros' use of violence was highly selective as evidenced by their targets and victims. But even

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against their enemies the level of indiscriminate violence was low and carefully measured (see Chapter XI).

The Tupamaros' bloodless, selective, and politically sophisticated activities produced a high level of specific support toward the Tupamaros by different segments of the population (see Chapters X and XI). Even those ideologically opposed to the Tupamaros admired their activities. The specific support toward the Tupamaros was enhanced by the increasing 'legal' repression. However, this high level of specific support did not produce a high level of diffuse support except by certain segments of the population (Chapter III).

The Tupamaros withdrew their own specific support from Uruguay's authorities and diffuse support from the regime. Yet their level of support toward Uruguay's political community remained high at all times. The Tupamaros withdrew specific support when they perceived that they were not receiving any return and were not benefiting from their membership in the political system. Diffuse support for the present regime was withdrawn as a consequence of the Tupamaros' loss of affect for the norms, values, and institutions of the regime. They questioned the legitimacy and trust of the regime. This was studied in Part III, especially Chapter IX. But the Tupamaros did not withdraw support from 'regimes' in general. This was evidenced not only by their documents, but also by their strategy of dual power. The attainment of political power and the implementation of the revolution would have meant the establishment of a new regime and a new set of authorities. However, the new authorities and the new regime would have been legitimate and trustworthy, based on a new set of values,

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norms, and institutions. The political community would have remained practically unchanged. The new revolutionary regime would have commanded a high level of specific and diffuse support from the majority of the population. The 'salto' would have enbled the successful completion of this process (Chapter XII).

The Tupamaros, through their activities, succeeded in increasing the level of stress in Uruguay's political system by hindering the regime's capacity to allocate values. This was achieved by activities that disrupted the decision-making process and also by offering an alternative power to the existing regime (Chapter XI). Other activities attempted to reduce the authorities' capacity to mobilize the population and accept its allocations as binding (Chapter XII). The Tupamaro activities drastically reduced the level of effectiveness and increased the level of tension in Uruguay's political system (Part II). The 'gradual coup' that culminated in 1973 was in part precipitated by the Tupamaros' activities (Chapter III). While the militarization of the conflict represented a political victory for the Tupamaros, it ironically accelerated their military defeat.

In a relatively short time the Tupamaros, even though they never achieved their final goals,[1] obtained certain 'successes.' They forced the authorities to adopt repressive measures thus polarizing the population's feelings toward the legitimacy of the regime (spill-over effect). They precipitated several cabinet crises. They

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[1]See Dueñas Ruiz, "Tupamaros: Programa de gobierno revolucionario," pp. 181-185.

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deepened the economic, social, and political crises, thus disrupting the democratic process and contributed to the introduction of the military in the regime's decision-making machinery. But the ideological 'successes' also precipitated their military failure.

Through most of their activities the Tupamaros have shown the act of killing is less efficient in obtaining generalized support than the symbolic act of humiliating the authorities and of attempting to create the bases for a 'dual power.' The concept of 'revolutionary justice' and the ingenuity of most of their activities added a romantic aspect to the Tupamaros that helped them to produce a positive image about their organization. Probably one of their tactical mistakes was to precipitate the 'third stage' when the population was not yet ready to accept the 'annihilation' of one side. The more or less open warfare against the armed forces that climaxed in 1972 was their main strategic mistake (Chapter XI). They over-evaluated their own capabilities and became distant from the population including those segments that supported them.

Certain changes in the societal environment, as for example, the improvement of the armed forces and their network of information, were also crucial to the Tupamaros' defeat (Chapter VI). Notwithstanding these changes that eventually proved detrimental to the Tupamaros, they still demonstrated that urban guerrilla warfare could pose a threat to the regime. They confirmed that violence as a means of political change could be used even in a democratic-coercive regime like Uruguay's (Chapter II and III).

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For the guerrilla, actual success or failure of certain activities is not as important as the overall success in convincing the public that his violence is justified and just, and that final political victory is possible through the use of violence. It is improbable that urban guerrilla warfare per se will ever achieve revolution in Uruguay. However, when combined with societal and ideological conditions, urban guerrilla warfare can accelerate the process toward revolution and probably assume the leading role in the take-over of the government and its aftermath. In this kind of setting one of the main roles the Tupamaros played was to change the political climate and to make visible the repressive character of the regime, disguised behind the 'democratic façade' as studied in Parts II and III.

In Uruguay the 'legitimacy gap' of the regime was not as wide as the Tupamaros felt. A greater proportion of the population than the Tupamaros predicted still supported the regime as evidenced in the last elections. But in the same elections a greater dissatisfaction with the traditional parties was felt as never before. Probably the fact that most of Uruguay's population still perceived the regime as legitimate (even the opposition parties) was the strongest weapon against the Tupamaros (Chapter III). Since 1964, due to the Tupamaros' appearance on Uruguay's political scene and the repression of the government, the legitimacy of the regime began to be questioned as analyzed in Parts II and III.

While the Tupamaros were very selective in their targets, the government and the armed forces were not, thus deteriorating the quality of life (curfews at certain hours, forbidding political and

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social gatherings, 'medidas prontas de seguridad' censorship, indiscriminate searching of people in the streets, etc.). This chain reaction in the use of violence was detrimental to the confidence in the democratic institutions of Uruguay and to a certain extent provided legitimization of the violence applied by the Tupamaros. This was true when the Tupamaros succeeded in combining their activities with demands on the government from certain segments of the population, which were not coopted by the government.

The fact that the Tupamaros were able to create an excellent network of information made it possible for them to perform bloodless activities. But here they found themselves in a dilemma: the less bloody the activities they performed the greater the popular support they gained, but were these activities enough to overthrow the regime and authorities? (Chapter XI). The resolution of this dilemma was important for the population's support for the Tupamaros. The Tupamaros did succeed in changing the political climate of Uruguay in the direction of accepting the use of violence as a means of political change. Evidence of this is provided in the results of a public opinion poll organized in 1970 by the Statistical Institute of the Department of Economics at the University of Uruguay. The results were that 31 percent of the interviewed approved the Tupamaros' activities and 48 percent opposed.[1] The groups that were apt to support the violence applied by the Tupamaros were not yet ready to fully support the radical measures implied in the revolutionary take-over of the

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[1]In Labrousse, <u>Les Tupamaros</u>, p. 173.

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government. Instead, they supported the Frente Amplio (Chapter III). This was one of the major errors in the Tupamaros' interpretation of public feelings that precipitated the 'third stage.'

The low level of diffuse support enjoyed by the Tupamaros in Montevideo produced changes in their military strategies. These changes eventually contributed to their military defeat. The population at large was not ready to provide the basic logistic support to the Tupamaros. Therefore they even had to rent housing that became semi-permanent bases of operations. This drastically reduced the mobility of their front and exposed entire cells and columns to the secret services. According to Abraham Guillén the lack of mobility in the military front exposed the organization and individuals to bourgeois tendencies and influences. "When promotion through the ranks is facilitated by owning a big house, a large farm or enterprise, the guerrillas become open to bourgeois tendencies."[1]

> Because the Tupamaros immobilized many of their Commandos in fixed quarters, they were exposed in 1972 to mass detentions; they lost a large part of their armaments and related equipment and were compelled to transfer military supplies to the countryside for hiding.[2]

In fact, the tatuceras were still in the formation stages when the armed forces moved against them. The security of the tatuceras during this gestation period was very difficult and could not support the added stress of 'urban guerrilla refugees' (Chapter XI).

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[1]Abraham Guillén, "Urban Guerrilla Strategy," in The Guerrilla Reader: A Historical Anthology, ed. Walter Lacqueur (New York: Meridan Books, 1977), p. 232.

[2]Ibid., p. 233.

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Some[1] believe that the Tupamaro strategy of 'dual power' also contributed to their military defeat and loss of popular support. The Tupamaros' strategic concern for and devotion to the creation of a 'dual power' diverted them from their main task of creating a revolutionary army capable of overthrowing the existing regime. The Tupamaros' 'dual power' capability focused on the existence of a parallel repressive system (people's prison) especially during Mitrione's kidnapping. "In a country where the bourgeoisie has abolished the death penalty, it is self-defeating to condemn to death even the most hated enemies of the people."[2]

The strategy of 'dual power' widened the gap between the Tupamaros and the people.

> In their endeavor to create a state within a state through highly disciplined guerrilla columns, secret barracks, 'prisons of the people,' underground arsenals, and a heavy logistical infrastructure, the Tupamaros have become overly professionalized, militarized, and isolated from the urban masses. Their organization is closer to resembling a parallel power contrasting the legally established one, a microstate, rather than a movement of the masses.[3]

A direct by-product of the strategy of 'dual power' and the pyramidal organization of the Tupamaro movement was the establishment of a permanent and centralized leadership (Chapter X). This leadership became distanced from their own organization and members, their decisions became irrevocable, and the leaders became immune to internal

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[1]From private conversations with Tupamaros in exile, July 1972. This viewpoint is corroborated by several public lectures and articles by Abraham Guillén.

[2]Guillén, "Urban Guerrilla Strategy," p. 233. [3]Ibid.

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criticism. While a 'personality cult' developed towards the top leadership, a power struggle developed in the second echelon. This inner-power struggle resulted in the defection of Héctor Amodio Perez.[1] His defection, the first of a major leader, had an important impact on the Tupamaro membership and organization. It is believed that Amodio Perez directed the armed forces to the 'safehouse' where the top Tupamaro echelon held its meetings.

Internal dissensions caused by ideological and strategic differences further weakened the Tupamaro organization. Several groups split from the Tupamaros.[2] Other newly formed guerrilla groups[3] began to challenge the Tupamaro leadership in the revolutionary struggle. The 'microfaction,' one such group that split, had an anarchist tendency. Another group that split, '22 de Diciembre,' attempted to mobilize mass organizations (labor unions) independent of the military and political directives of the Tupamaro Central Command. The 'OPR-33' and the ROE were also created as a challenge to the Tupamaro 'moderation.' Neither the OPR-33 nor ROE joined the Tupamaros in supporting the 'Broad Front' in the 1971 national elections.

OPR-33 tried to operate as the 'armed arm' of Uruguay's labor unions. They coordinated their activities with workers' demands in several factories. On several occasions they kidnapped either the

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[1]For a more detailed account of this defection, see Kohl, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America, p. 194.

[2]'Micro-facción,' '22 de Diciembre.'

[3]OPR-33 (Organización Popular Revolucionaria), ROE (Resistencia Obrero Estudiantil).

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president or the relative of a board member of factories that refused to negotiate with the workers. OPR-33 tried to compel the factory to negotiate directly with the workers. Once the company would start negotiations with the workers, the victims were released unharmed.

These splits in the rank and file of the Tupamaro movement were in part precipitated by the increasing rigidity of the organization as well as the ambiguously defined political ideology. This ambiguity ('non-sectarian') which proved to be an asset in the early stages of the organization, later became detrimental and produced significant internal dissensions (Chapter IX). The Tupamaros wanted to postpone internal ideological discussion until after the final takeover. 'Atomization' of the left-wing parties has historically weakened the power position of the left in Uruguay (Chapter II). Once again, internal ideological and power struggles proved to be self-defeating for the left-wing. While this process of atomization was weakening the guerrillas, the armed forces were being strengthened through increasing internal unity and military capabilitity (Chapter VI).

The Tupamaros suffered the heaviest military losses in 1972. At the height of the open struggle between the guerrillas and the armed forces, the Tupamaros had a favorable political coyuntura that they could not fully exploit for their benefit. The armed forces' indiscriminate repression against the Tupamaros and the entire left, house searches, etc. and complete disregard for civil and political liberties, produced a radical polarization of feelings towards the regime and authorities. This was the coyuntura that the Tupamaros hoped for. However, they were so militarily weak and internally

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divided at this point, they were completely unable to use this coyuntura in their favor.

It was instead the armed forces who capitalized on this situation. Their gradual coup which began in 1964 was finally successfully completed by a military take-over of the civil institutions and the defeat of the Tupamaros in 1972 (Chapter III). Ironically, it was the Tupamaros' activities that were intended to produce for them 'el salto' that in the end precipitated and facilitated for the military their coup d'état.

Finally, the success or failure of guerrilla activities are important psychologically for the guerrilla group itself as well as for other existing or potential guerrilla groups. A favorable 'national or international public opinion' for example tends to encourage guerrilla activities and to increase the number of recruits. The success or failure of the guerrilla activities has a feedback influence on the subjective environment of the guerrilla group. This feedback can be interpreted by the guerrilla group in different ways. For example, the failure of the activity can be attributed either to lack of training, insufficient information[1] (i.e., failures in the mechanism of

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[1]This information is one of the key factors for the guerrillas. It is the element that enables the guerrilla to surprise the enemy and avoid being surprised by him. It also enables the guerrilla to a certain extent to choose the most comfortable place and time to fight. The greater the amount and accuracy of information gathered by the guerrilla before the activity, the greater the possibility of success. The same is true regarding the armed forces. But there is a difference in the quantity and quality of information required by the guerrilla and the armed forces. Generally, one of the principle bases of information for the guerrillas and armed forces is the local population. In this sense, the guerrillas have an advantage over the armed forces only to the extent that they enjoy popular support.

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transformation), or to the guerrilla's distorted images about the objective setting, i.e., to a big gap between the subjective and objective settings.

This gap can be total (including all variables) or partial (including one or more variables). If the failure is attributed to the guerrilla's distorted images, this can mean questioning of their leaders, ideology, and the activities themselves. I will assume a priori, that generally the failure will be attributed first to a bad implementation, then to distorted images, and lastly to the attitudinal prism (and only after 'fatal' failures in their activities). To give one example, Che Guevara had admitted many failures of implementation and images, but he had never questioned (even while failing in Bolivia) the 'foco' theory itself. He did not consider that perhaps all his failures were due to and dependent upon 'foco's' theory.[1] The case of the Tupamaros is similar.

Guerrilla groups try to create different 'mechanisms of defense' to face, cope, and rationalize their failures. This avoids and/or postpones the questioning of their attitudinal prisms and images. "For a revolutionary, failure is a springboard. As a source of theory, it is richer than victory; it accumulates experience and knowledge."[2] With the same spirit, Guevara finished his letter to the Tricontinental Conference.

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[1]For some critical analysis of the 'foco' theory, see Clea Silva, "The Errors of the Foco Theory," and William J. Pomeroy, "Questions on the Debray Thesis," in Regis Debray and the Latin American Revolution, ed. Leo Huberman and Paul Swezi (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), pp. 18-44.

[2]Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, p. 23.

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> Whenever death may surprise us it will be welcomed, provided that this, our battle cry, reach some receptive ear, that another hand be extended to take up our weapons, and that others can come forward to intone our funeral dirge with the staccato of machine guns and new cries of battle and victory.[1]

The guerrilla activities also have feedback influence on the objective setting, for example, in the armed forces, in the authorities' policies toward foreign owned companies, etc.[2] The guerrilla activities in some cases have the influence to 'force' the authorities, the population, political parties, etc. to be aware of and to deal with the problems of social, economic, political injustices, etc. which could be ignored otherwise.[3]

At the present time it seems that the Tupamaros have been totally defeated or are in a process of reorganization after the very heavy setbacks they suffered since 1970 and especially in 1972. If indeed not all the cells were destroyed, it is possible that they will try to perform certain sporadic activities to acknowledge the continuation of their existence. After 1972, many Tupamaros left the country especially to Argentina, Chile,[4] and France.

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[1]Guevara, "Message to the Tricontinental," p. 182.

[2]For example, on July 22, 1965, the New York Times (p. 10), reported that the guerrilla activities of the National Liberation Army in Peru were responsible for the pressures that led to the government's resolution to nationalize the International Petroleum Company (American property).

[3]Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, pp. 30, 33-34, 50-53.

[4]After Allende's overthrow many Tupamaros were killed in Chile by the 'junta' and most of them left Chile probably to Argentina.

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PART V

CONCLUSIONS

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CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSIONS

In our study we attempted to conceptualize guerrilla warfare as a means of violent political change more so than a military strategy. We studied the influence of the environmental effects in the input of support for Uruguay's political system (Parts II and III). During the period under study Uruguay's regime and authorities changed drastically, however, the political community remained almost unchanged. Uruguay's political system confronted with a 'systems maintenance' type of problem was able to persist, namely, it was able to keep the societal capacity to provide the processes through which some kind of political decisions can be made. Uruguay's political system, although unable to maintain its democratic regime and civil authorities, persisted over time, i.e., it kept the ability to authoritatively allocate values for the society, regardless of the specific type of authorities and regime. Uruguay is an example where the persistence of processes for the authoritative allocation of values in the society was contingent on the changes in the objects (authorities/regime) of the political system.

Fluctuations in the input of support, throughout the period under study, caused stress in Uruguay's political system. We studied

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the different sources of stress that we considered relevant for the understanding of guerrilla warfare in general and the Tupamaro phenomena in particular. We basically studied two sets of variables. The 'objective variables' (Part II) and the 'subjective variables (Part III). These two sets of variables are related by the communication process which we dealt with throughout the dissertation. The 'output' of the Tupamaros was their activities (Chapter XI) which followed closely their political strategies (Chapter XII). The 'mechanism of transformation' (the way inputs are transformed into outputs) was studied in Chapter X.

The facts and changes in the different variables of the two settings are relevant to the image formation process of the potential or actual guerrillas only to the extent that they are communicated to them (Chapter IX). After the guerrillas decide to start their activities, their decision passes through a mechanism of transformation (Chapter X) which connects the Tupamaros' subjective setting with the activities of the guerrillas. By definition, the final goal of the guerrilla activities is to achieve revolution in the political system and society of the country under study (Chapter I). But in the short and middle run, their activities are directed toward the achievement of specific goals (Part IV). These activities provide the link between the guerrillas and the objects of the political system.

The variables studied are dynamic in the sense that they can be modified at least in two ways: a) endogenously, by the process of feedback among variables that were already affected in the process; b) exogenously, independently from the process studied. The success or

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failure of the guerrilla activities has a feedback effect on the mechanism of transformation as well as on the images of the guerrillas (Chapters XI and XII). These feedback influences link the activities with the mechanism of transformation and the guerrillas' subjective setting. The authorities' output (policies and actions) in reaction to the guerrilla activities also influence the process of support withdrawal as discussed throughout the dissertation. These feedback effects link the regime/authorities with the Tupamaro activities and the objective setting.

Following the study of the different variables we proceeded in steps. First we analyzed the relationship between support withdrawal-political violence-guerrilla warfare. We particularlized guerrilla warfare among the range of possible alternative strategies of support withdrawal through the use of violence (Chapter I).

Secondly, Part II dealt with the objective setting that favored the creation of the Tupamaros. In Chapter II we discussed the influence that the inner coercion in Uruguay's political system had in the level of stress in Uruguay's political system. We concluded that the system of coparticipation engineered by the traditional majority parties de facto excluded the minority parties from sharing political power. This organizational scheme increased the level of systemic coercion favoring a drop in the level of support from the regime and the authorities leading to the development of the Tupamaros. In Chapter III we dealt with the effect of the electoral coercion in Uruguay's political system in the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. We concluded that the perceived electoral coercion precipitated the

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outbreak of the Tupamaro activities. The Tupamaros perceived that through conventional political participation they will not be able to obtain any sizeable political influence.

In Chapter IV we analyzed the economic setting and its interpenetration with the political system. We also studied the development of the welfare state and its influence on Uruguay's society and the politicization of the socio-economic crisis. We concluded that the politicization of the socio-economic crisis increased the level of stress in Uruguay's political system. This stress was translated politically in a decrease in the level of support for the incument authorities and the regime as well as favored the expansion of the Tupamaro movement. The deteriorating economic situation and its social repercussions became a factor in the growth of the Tupamaros only after its politicization reflected in a decreasing level of support for the authorities and the regime. The economic crisis politicized mainly through the channels of the welfare system.

In Chapter V we dealt with the effect in the level of support of the economic crisis and the different policies implemented by the authorities. We concluded that the interpenetration of the economic and political systems achieved by deliberate policies of the traditional parties produced high levels of support for the authorities and the regime during prosperity times. However, during periods of economic recession the authorities resorted to repression as a means of coping with the decreasing level of support. This background of increasing political repression enabled the Tupamaros to grow into a significant political force in Uruguay's political system. The

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analysis of Uruguay's military capacity and its influence on the Tupamaro activities is closely related to the increasing level of political violence (Chapter VI).

Thirdly, in Part III we dealt with the 'subjective setting' that favored the creation of the Tupamaros. We dealt with the effect of support withdrawal in the transformation of potential guerrilla warfare into actual guerrilla warfare. The existence of objective conditions by themselves are not sufficient for the outbreak of guerrilla warfare unless matched by a favorable subjective setting. We observed that the politicization of the economic crisis and the subsequent militarization of the political crisis drastically reduced the range of conventional forms of political participation. This process accelerated the shift of support withdrawal from the authorities to the regime and favored the growth of the Tupamaros. We concluded that the Tupamaros lost affect for the values, norms, and institutions of the regime, causing a shift in their strategies of support withdrawal (Chapter VII). The Tupamaros' elite and membership basically corresponds to those segments of the population that suffered the most from the political and economic crisis and depended heavily on the crumbling welfare state (Chapter VIII). The increasing radicalization of the rural and urban labor movements was influenced by the authorities' output failure and the escalating social and economic crisis. The labor struggle advanced from 'bread and butter' issues to revolutionary demands. This process increased the level of stress in the political system mainly because of the welfare state and the role of the government in the economy as the major single employer (Chapter

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IX). The authorities and the regime became the target of the radicalized labor struggle.

Finally, we studied the relationship between the ever increasing pressure on the military to participate in the political process as the Tupamaros' 'dual power capability' increased (Chapters X and XI). The political strategies (Chapter XII) symbolized the complete support withdrawal from the incumbent authorities and the existing regime. However, when the conditions for the 'salto' appeared favorable for the Tupamaros they were unable to take advantage of it due to their internal weakness caused by tactical mistakes and their inability to gather mass popular support (Chapter XII).

Uruguay's political system, highly intertwined with the economic sector, achieved democracy and stability only during periods of economic prosperity. In times of recession or stagnation, overt force and repression overtakes the democratic institutions. However, while force can suppress guerrilla warfare and silence the opposition, it can not and did not eliminate the roots of the crises that produced political and economic stagnation and decay. It is not a surprise that the Tupamaros emerged in Uruguay, a country with a rate of literacy above 90 percent and with a very large middle class. The solution proposed and attempted by the Tupamaros failed to materialize. Today an alternative solution is being attempted as a response to the Tupamaro program. The new policies attempt to drastically reduce the welfare system, to separate the economic and political systems. These policies, unprecedented in Uruguay, are being implemented by a fearful, oppressive, and torturing military dictatorship. An attempt by the

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military to legitimize their control constitutionally failed when the armed forces did not obtain a simple majority in the November 1980 referendum that would have granted them the constitutional powers that they obtained by force. Eight years after the military coup, the armed forces were unable to create enough support for the 'new regime.' The free market place of ideas, so predominant in Uruguay until the late 1960s has disappeared.

The future of political development and change can neither be predicted nor computerized. We attempted only to reach some tentative explanations of past and current political phenomena by analyzing the available relevant data. This was the narrow goal in our attempt at explaining the Tupamaro's guerrilla warfare in Uruguay and its effect on the level of support in Uruguay's political system. The Tupamaros although failed to implement the revolution, they had proved that urban guerrilla warfare can become a real contender for political power and precipitate changes in the authorities and the regime. I realize that the task of conducting empirical research is difficult and complicated because of the great number of variables. But any study of guerrilla warfare that attempts to approach the subject systematically must, at the least, take into consideration those variables. I will consider this paper a success if it is used as a basis for reformulation and new analyses.

In order to be able to understand in a more comprehensive way the effect of support withdrawal in the formation and growth of the Tupamaros, a study of Uruguay's labor movement is urged. The study of the development of Uruguay's organized urban labor movement and its

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relationship to Uruguay's unique welfare system should focus primarily on the role of organized labor as a means of systemic political change. The relationship between organized labor and the authorities shifted from cooptation to confrontation and repression. This shift was in large part the result of the continuous and increasing interpenetration of economic and political conflict in Uruguay.

Since 1940 the Uruguayan government became the country's major single employer and organized labor grew into large, national, and relevant political force in Uruguay's society. Unfortunately I found that there exists no basic theoretical and historic research of Uruguay's labor movement and that labor statistics pertinent to Uruguay are unreported in standard statistical sources. To accomplish the objectives of this needed study requires some knowledge of the characteristics of Uruguay's political system. Hopefully, our study on Uruguay's political system from 1960 to 1973 provided some insights that may facilitate the study of Uruguay's labor movement. Such a study should also contribute to understanding labor/government support relationships in countries with expanded welfare systems. The reasons for Uruguay's 'exclusion' in most of the labor studies are varied. To an extent it may be explained by the fact that urban organized labor in Uruguay represented an 'exception' when compared with other Latin American countries because of the early and highly developed welfare system, the concentration of most of Uruguay's population and industries in a single urban area, the peculiar organization of Uruguayan democracy, and the government's large role in the economy. Unfortunately, lack of data made it difficult to incorporate in our

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study the effects of the labor movement in the input of support during the period under study. Hopefully, at some future time, the Uruguayan authorities may allow field research in Uruguay and release some information unavailable at the present time. However, the bibliography used in this study is extensive and up to date. Future research in guerrilla warfare may also benefit from the extensive bibliography included in this work, fruit of many years of interest in the field.

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APPENDIX A

TABLES

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TABLE 1

STATES OF SUPPORT WITHDRAWAL

	Overt	Covert	Overt/Covert
Diffuse	1	4	7
Specific	2	5	8
Diffuse/Specific	3	6	9

Each number (1 to 9) in the matrix corresponds to a different state of support withdrawal.

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TABLE 2

STRATEGIES OF SUPPORT WITHDRAWAL

A(3, B)	R(1, B)	PC(2 S)	A(3, B)	R(1, B)	PC(2 B)	A(3, B)	R(1, B)	PC(2 M)
A(3, B)	R(1, M)	PC(2 S)	A(3, B)	R(1, M)	PC(2 B)	A(3, B)	R(1, M)	PC(2 M)
A(3, M)	R(1, S)	PC(2 S)	A(3, M)	R(1, S)	PC(2 B)	A(3, M)	R(1, S)	PC(2 M)
A(3, M)	R(1, B)	PC(2 S)	A(3, M)	R(1, B)	PC(2 B)	A(3, M)	R(1, B)	PC(2 M)
A(3, M)	R(1, M)	PC(2 S)	A(3, M)	R(1, M)	PC(2 B)	A(3, M)	R(1, M)	PC(2 M)
A(3, S)	R(1, S)	PC(3 S)	A(3, S)	R(1, S)	PC(3 B)	A(3, S)	R(1, S)	PC(3 M)
A(3, S)	R(1, B)	PC(3 S)	A(3, S)	R(1, B)	PC(3 B)	A(3, S)	R(1, B)	PC(3 M)
A(3, S)	R(1, M)	PC(3 S)	A(3, S)	R(1, M)	PC(3 B)	A(3, S)	R(1, M)	PC(3 M)
A(3, B)	R(1, S)	PC(3 S)	A(3, B)	R(1, S)	PC(3 B)	A(3, B)	R(1, S)	PC(3 M)
A(3, B)	R(1, B)	PC(3 S)	A(3, B)	R(1, B)	PC(3 B)	A(3, B)	R(1, B)	PC(3 M)
A(3, B)	R(1, M)	PC(3 S)	A(3, B)	R(1, M)	PC(3 B)	A(3, B)	R(1, M)	PC(3 M)
A(3, M)	R(1, S)	PC(3 S)	A(3, M)	R(1, S)	PC(3 B)	A(3, M)	R(1, S)	PC(3 M)
A(3, M)	R(1, B)	PC(3 S)	A(3, M)	R(1, B)	PC(3 B)	A(3, M)	R(1, B)	PC(3 M)
A(3, M)	R(1, M)	PC(3 S)	A(3, M)	R(1, M)	PC(3 B)	A(3, M)	R(1, M)	PC(3 M)
A(3, S)	R(1, S)	PC(4 S)	A(3, S)	R(1, S)	PC(4 B)	A(3, S)	R(1, S)	PC(4 M)

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<u>EXPLANATIONS</u>: The page of computer print-out presented shows but a few examples of the 19,683 possible range of alternative strategies.

Objects of the Political System:
- A - Authorities
- R - Regime
- PC - Political Community

Levels of Support:
- S - Above Minimum
- M - Minimum
- B - Below Minimum

Type of Support:
- 1 - Diffuse Overt
- 2 - Specific Overt
- 3 - Diffuse Specific Overt
- 4 - Diffuse Covert
- 5 - Specific Covert
- 6 - Diffuse Specific Covert
- 7 - Diffuse Overt Covert
- 8 - Specific Overt Covert
- 9 - Diffuse Specific Overt Covert

Strategies: In the computer print-out each line of the three columns represents one strategy.

Examples: A(1,B) R(1,B) PC(1,B) or A(1,M) R(1,M) PC(1,M)
[A(1,B)] [R(1,M)] [PC(1,S)]

Each bracket corresponds to one "component" or "part" of the single indicator. The brackets do not appear in the computer print-out.

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TABLE 3

'LEY DE LEMAS' AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

	Lema I		Lema II		Lema III		Lema IV	All lemas
Sub-lema	a)	250,000	A)	280,000	A')	230,000	31,000	
Sub-lema	b)	200,000	B)	150,000	B')	90,000		
Sub-lema	c)	50,800			C')	45,000		
TOTAL		500,800		430,000		365,000	31,000	1,326,800

The system of proportional representation used in Uruguay since the 1920s until the military takeover in 1973 was based on the 'law of lemas.' This law assured that factionalism within the two major parties will not destroy each party's strength. According to this law, votes cast for 'sub-lemas' (factions) within each 'lema' (party) are added together to determine which lema has the most votes. In the same manner, votes for distinct lists of candidates within a sub-lema accumulate for that sub-lema. A voter selects both the lema of his choice and a list of candidates within a sub-lema. The process of election was the same if either a President or a National Executive Council were to be elected.

The hypothetical case of an election for the National Executive Council illustrated in this table illustrates the method by which seats are allocated after an election. This example illustrates the mechanics of seats allocation for the National Executive Council.

The election returns will be divided among four lemas and several sub-lemas.

Lema I received the most votes, and sub-lema (a) received the most votes within Lema I. Therefore, sub-lema (a) wins the majority position on the National Council, even though sub-lema (A) of Lema II received a greater number of votes. Sub-lema (b) is eligible for one seat on the Council, since it received more than one-sixth of the votes of Lema I. The three minority seats go to Lema II, two to sub-lema (A) and one to sub-lema (B). Lemas III and IV are not represented on the National Council even though sub-lema (A') of Lema III received a greater number of votes than sub-lema (B) of Lema II. In the case of an election for President, the candidate of sub-lema (a) of Lema I will be elected even though sub-lema (A) of Lema II received more votes.

SOURCE: <u>Uruguay, Election Factbook</u>, p. 47.

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TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FOR THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES

Year	Total Votes in Election	Total Votes Traditional Parties	Percentage
1938	357,265	340,304	95.2%
1942	574,703	526,864	91.7%
1946	649,405	581,571	89.5%
1950	823,829	750,989	91.1%
1954	879,242	786,588	89.4%
1958	1,005,362	878,487	87.3%
1962	1,171,020	1,066,260	91.0%
1966	1,231,762	1,104,143	89.6%
1971	1,754,721 (approx.)	1,350,446	81.5%

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TABLE 5

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS, 1950

Department	Colorado Party sub-lemas				National Party sub-lemas			Indep. National	UCU [2]	Communist	Socialist	Other [3]	TOTAL
	Martinez Trueba	Mayo Gutiérrez	Blanco Acevado	Colorado Total [1]	Herrera	Estradé	National Total [1]						
Montevideo	70,927	62,424	46,407	179,832	88,398	—	88,522	12,708	18,828	14,986	13,075	236	328,187
Canelones	8,152	24,834	4,655	37,669	26,068	—	26,082	2,483	2,397	512	404	7	69,554
Maldonado	4,851	3,579	4,952	13,455	5,058	—	5,058	2,024	800	161	140	1	21,639
Rocha	4,420	4,112	5,560	14,100	6,573	—	6,580	5,208	471	184	131	4	26,678
Treinta y Tres	4,330	995	4,075	9,410	6,591	1,409	8,017	992	237	83	55	17	18,741
Cerro Largo	4,490	1,262	5,814	11,575	10,366	12	10,399	2,411	570	111	226	—	25,292
Rivera	4,830	3,231	7,757	15,824	9,708	—	9,731	1,010	412	264	180	5	27,426
Artigas	3,608	2,789	4,165	10,569	4,076	—	4,086	768	775	51	66	1	16,316
Salto	7,566	6,179	2,009	15,757	8,136	—	8,136	2,307	1,502	276	830	—	28,808
Paysandú	5,534	5,453	2,976	13,967	7,458	—	7,458	4,163	1,428	303	225	3	27,547
Río Negro	1,103	3,196	1,732	6,043	3,590	—	3,596	1,751	285	316	255	2	12,248
Soriano	8,720	2,790	2,897	14,423	10,142	—	10,142	4,517	1,014	380	423	2	30,901
Colonia	4,199	8,322	8,149	20,705	11,109	—	11,150	7,391	1,705	325	588	10	41,874
San José	4,563	3,642	4,540	12,751	11,354	—	11,363	1,912	1,850	276	143	10	28,305
Flores	1,871	2,328	689	4,893	4,994	—	4,994	1,069	704	38	79	2	11,779
Florida	5,643	3,712	5,345	14,719	11,730	—	11,745	2,137	831	172	139	1	29,744
Durazno	4,367	3,634	2,257	10,266	8,390	—	8,410	3,804	686	113	142	5	23,426
Lavalleja	3,759	5,314	4,051	13,152	10,003	—	10,019	3,846	824	214	162	5	28,222
Tacuarembó	8,284	3,134	2,919	14,344	9,333	—	9,346	2,270	781	261	138	2	27,142
Total	161,262	150,930	120,949	433,454	253,007	1,421	254,834	62,701	36,100	19,026	17,401	313	823,829

[1] Totals for Colorado and National Parties include votes counted for the party but not for any one sub-lema.
[2] UCU is the Civic Union of Uruguay.
[3] Other includes five parties.

SOURCE: Uruguay, *Election Factbook*, p. 38.

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TABLE 6

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ELECTION RETURNS, 1954

Department	Colorado Party sub-lemas[1]				National Party sub-lemas[1]				Indep. Nat'l.	UCU	Socialist	Communist	Other[2]	TOTAL
	Batlle Berres	Lanza	Other	Colorado Total	Herrera	Fernández Crespo	Other	National Total						
Montevideo	112,304	63,919	3,160	179,383	41,253	48,442	10,111	99,806	5,038	25,872	22,967	16,247	135	349,448
Canelones	18,061	24,371	139	42,571	14,024	12,240	1,172	27.436	1,717	2,608	582	570	19	75.575
Maldonado	7,373	4,830	1,403	13,606	2,840	3,268	439	6,547	1,844	908	235	100	—	23.240
Rocha	7,051	6,323	215	13,589	5,625	1,356	136	7,117	4,913	551	160	184	—	26,514
Treinta y Tres	4.380	2,540	88	7,008	5,624	3,919	879	10,422	396	233	91	73	—	18,223
Cerro Largo	5,902	6,251	15	12,168	5,929	4,271	2,924	13,124	409	557	257	96	—	26,611
Rivera	10,114	6,447	169	16,730	10,337	868	903	12,108	340	584	237	249	—	30,248
Artigas	6,758	5,055	13	11,826	2,302	2,027	822	5,151	149	1,085	51	32	—	18,294
Salto	8,664	7,175	644	16,483	5,543	4,003	826	10,372	1,360	1,366	962	185	—	30,728
Paysandú	10.313	4.363	690	15.366	4.861	3.510	2,110	10,481	2,806	1,548	430	264	—	30.895
Rio Negro	4,597	2,790	120	7,507	2,328	2,224	715	5,267	919	327	541	232	—	14,793
Soriano	9,925	2,927	1,624	14,476	8,623	3,261	573	12,457	4,237	1,042	617	270	—	33,099
Colonia	10,460	10,769	267	21,496	11,904	2,832	3,988	18,724	2,791	1,856	656	287	—	45,810
San José	9,268	4,499	7	13,774	7,864	4,135	1,461	13,460	697	1,782	160	163	—	30,036
Flores	2,727	1,721	63	4,511	3,218	3,014	176	6,408	430	714	80	28	—	12,171
Florida	5,913	8,461	270	14,644	6,845	5,123	1,906	13,874	1,111	812	167	156	—	30,764
Durazno	5,761	3,323	370	9,454	5,908	3,471	3,409	12,788	804	833	145	85	—	24,109
Lavalleja	6,427	6,956	162	13,545	7,766	1,419	3,078	12.263	1.172	792	189	148	—	28.109
Tacuarembó	8,650	7,444	198	16,292	7,944	2,741	1,328	12,013	1,208	713	177	172	—	30,575
Total	254,648	180,164	9,617	444,429	160,738	112,124	36,956	309,818	32,341	44,255	28,704	19,541	154	879,242

[1] The names indicating each sub-lema are the names of the first candidate on the list for the National Council of that sub-lema. Other in both parties includes one sub-lema and the votes counted for the party but not for any one sub-lema.
[2] Other includes two parties.

SOURCE: Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 40.

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TABLE 7

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ELECTION RETURNS, 1958

Department	Colorado Party sub-lemas [1]				National Party sub-lemas [1]				UCU	Socialist	Com-munist	Other [2]	TOTAL
	Rodriguez Correa	Batlle Pacheco	Other	Colorado Total	Echegoyen	Ferrer Serra	Other	National Total					
Montevideo	80,976	62,870	4,360	148,206	69,132	96,754	10,840	176,726	20,041	27,904	22,196	13,436	408,509
Canelones	12,628	26,721	526	39,875	29,237	12,439	286	41,962	2,288	752	948	619	86,444
Maldonado	7,528	4,172	128	11,828	5,962	6,660	64	12,686	651	299	136	898	26,498
Rocha	6,830	2,808	97	9,735	7,749	8,598	309	16,656	436	238	207	1,839	29,111
Treinta y Tres	4,451	2,398	4	6,853	6,878	5,554	250	12,682	246	184	130	1,515	21,610
Cerro Largo	7,086	1,131	65	8,282	12,256	6,203	608	19,067	519	355	103	1,451	29,777
Rivera	9,548	5,184	15	14,747	9,625	2,447	3,837	15,909	567	623	334	653	32,833
Artigas	6,463	5,288	20	11,771	2,705	4,439	108	7,252	1,348	125	43	234	20,773
Salto	8,628	5,255	29	13,912	8,114	8,960	139	17,213	1,738	1,236	308	1,319	35,726
Paysandú	9,344	5,652	15	15,011	4,971	10,335	2,372	17,678	1,598	413	340	547	35,587
Rio Negro	4,780	2,213	207	7,200	3,333	5,780	82	9,195	446	446	373	—	17,660
Soriano	11,836	2,080	25	13,941	6,060	8,775	6,125	20,960	1,019	752	365	—	37,037
Colonia	8,099	7,638	675	16,412	17,375	12,444	250	30,069	1,601	807	418	1,299	50,606
San José	5,928	2,795	2,488	11,211	13,308	6,311	189	19,808	1,550	244	321	139	33,273
Flores	2,870	985	20	3,875	3,979	4,127	67	8,173	707	135	46	192	13,128
Florida	5,705	6,568	18	12,291	9,746	8,709	743	19,198	685	222	172	672	33,240
Durazno	6,167	1,937	18	8,122	7,712	9,001	101	16,814	705	216	127	561	26,545
Lavalleja	7,338	3,726	344	11,408	13,518	5,712	151	19,381	641	227	211	860	32,728
Tacuarembó	9,676	4,689	17	14,382	10,279	7,401	316	17,996	839	300	302	458	34,277
Total	215,881	154,110	9,071	379,062	241,939	230,649	26,837	499,425	37,625	35,478	27,080	26,692	1,005,362

[1] The names indicating each sub-lema are the names of the first candidate on the list for the National Council of that sub-lema. Other in both parties includes one sub-lema and the votes counted for the party but not for any one sub-lema.
[2] Other includes the votes of the Reformist Democratic Union, which totaled 19,979, and the votes of five very small parties, which totaled 6,713.

SOURCE: Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 41.

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TABLE 8

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ELECTION RETURNS, 1962

Department	Colorado Party sub-lemas [1]				National Party sub-lemas [1]				PDC	(Comm.) Fidel	(Soc.) UP	Other [4]	TOTAL
	Batlle Berres	Gestido	Michelini	Colorado Total [2]	Fernández Crespo	Arecena	Other [3]	National Total					
Montevideo	108,736	59,772	53,591	222,232	125,169	64,799	669	190,637	18,172	32,658	19,677	669	484,045
Canelones	19,032	29,519	2,637	51 210	14,480	36,816	11	51,309	2,248	1,554	981	128	107,430
Maldonado	8,697	4,936	2,123	15,788	8,202	6,531	37	14,770	722	383	327	4	31,994
Rocha	8,869	4,789	435	14,114	11,400	5,913	13	17,326	373	291	301	3	32,408
Treinta y Tres	4,231	2,658	1,981	8,886	8,971	5,185	186	14,342	296	180	307	1	24,012
Cerro Largo	7,591	2,832	781	11,216	11,858	9,072	40	20,970	487	201	363	26	33,263
Rivera	9,607	7,082	589	17,294	14,526	5,015	21	19,562	737	415	498	7	38,513
Artigas	8,115	5,271	186	13,588	7,081	1,388	20	8,849	1,008	93	255	30	23,463
Salto	12,692	6,348	703	19,760	15,625	3,904	11	19,540	1,340	615	687	55	41,997
Paysandú	14,279	5,345	620	20,247	12,999	5,210	4	18,213	1,739	600	713	96	41,608
Rio Negro	6,735	1,827	740	9,307	6,555	3,211	11	9,777	367	486	452	32	20,421
Soriano	10,596	6,344	1,239	18,185	10,935	10,322	10	21,267	1,095	589	501	30	41,667
Colonia	12,123	7,779	2,434	22,348	18,470	13,589	33	32,092	1,507	837	514	12	57,310
San José	8,781	1,425	3,259	13,469	10,990	10,023	5	21,018	1,968	522	227	4	37,208
Flores	3,528	1,502	219	5,261	5,258	3,392	14	8,664	710	95	83	5	14,818
Florida	5,841	6,383	2,946	15,176	8,055	11,614	12	19,681	601	312	239	2	36,011
Durazno	7,883	2,578	693	11,167	9,766	7,026	153	16,945	661	213	214	5	29,205
Lavalleja	10,627	3,814	689	15,156	7,608	12,764	18	23,390	639	374	296	—	36,855
Tacuarembó	9,296	6,881	645	16,827	8,585	11,429	23	20,037	1,033	468	406	21	38,792
Total	277,259	167,085	76,510	521,231	316,533	227,205	1,291	545,029	35,703	40,866	27,041	1,130	1,171,020

[1] The names indicating each sub-lema are the names of the first candidate on the list for the National Council of that sub-lema.
[2] The total of the Colorado Party includes the votes counted for the party but not for any one sub-lema.
[3] Other National sub-lemas includes two sub-lemas and the votes counted for the party but not for any one sub-lema.
[4] Other includes seven small parties.

SOURCE: Uruguay, Election Factbook, p. 42.

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TABLE 9

VOTE PERCENTAGE OF SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES

	1942	1946	1950	1954	1958	1962	1966
Communists and FIDEL	14,332	32,680	19,026	19,541	27,087	48,887	69,750
Socialists and Unión Popular	9,036	15,731	17,401	28,704	35,478	27,041	11,559
Percentage of votes (combined)	4.6%	7.2%	4.3%	5.4%	6.2%	5.9%	6.5%

SOURCE: Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 23. For the results of the 1971 elections see p. 123, note 2.

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TABLE 10

GROWTH INDEX OF PARTIES AND FACTIONS: 1954-1962

Year	Total Voting	Socialist Party	List 15 Colorado	List 15 & 99 Colorado	Colorado Party	Blanco Party	Christian Democracy	Communist Party
1954	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1958	114	121	83	83	84	140	82	134
1962	136	90	110	141	119	160	82	207
Base 1958 = 100								
1958	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1962	119	74	133	170	142	114	100	155

SOURCE: Solari, Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya, II: 156.

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TABLE 11

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO THE SIZE OF POPULATED CENTERS

Population Intervals	Number of Centers	Number of Inhabitants	%	Accumulated % of Inhabitants
100,000 and more	1	1,158,632	44.6	44.6
50,000 - 99,999	2	109,359	4.2	48.8
25,000 - 49,999	7	232,649	9.0	57.8
20,000 - 24,999	4	87,601	3.4	61.2
10,000 - 19,999	14	194,104	7.5	68.7
5,000 - 9,999	12	75,475	2.9	71.6
2,500 - 4,999	22	76,473	3.0	74.6
2,000 - 2,499	12	27,276	1.1	75.7
1,000 - 1,999	40	57,649	2.2	77.9
500 - 999	63	44,686	1.7	79.6
250 - 499	125	42,248	1.6	81.2
Less than 250 and rural dispersed	--	486,411	18.8	100.0

SOURCE: Dirección general de estadísticas y censos.

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TABLE 12

ENTERPRISES AND EMPLOYEES

	1938	1948	1951
Number of enterprises	11,470	20,122	26,515
Number of workers and employees	90,128	150,000	202,000

SOURCE: Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 16.

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TABLE 13

STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Upper Class	Middle Class	Lower Class
6%	64%	30%

An examination of the years 1959-1960 on 'stratification and social mobility of Montevideo' gives the above results.

SOURCE: Labrousse, *Les Tupamaros*, p. 16.

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TABLE 14

URUGUAYAN PERCENTAGE OF WORLD EXPORT

	1934-1938	1961-1963
Frozen meats	7.4%	4.3%
Preserved meats	18.2%	2.2%
Wool	4.3%	3.8%

In effect, no technological improvement was introduced in the last twenty years, and the production was not augmented since 1930. This table gives an idea of the relative deterioration of the situation.

SOURCE: Labrousse, Les Tupamaros, p. 19.

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TABLE 15

URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION

Year	Urban Population Montevideo and some small villages of the interior	Rural Population
1930	80.70%	20.30%
1940	83.60%	16.40%
1964	87.20%	12.80%

SOURCE: Labrousse, *Les Tupamaros*, p. 21.

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TABLE 16

CIVIL SERVICE AND SOCIAL SECURITY

	1938	1948	1959	1969
Civil Service Estimate of the Retirement Funds	58,000	168,000	193,000	213,000
Retirees (Jubilados y pensionistas)	n/d	45,470	196,700	346,800

NOTE: In 1970 for 2,900,000 inhabitants, Uruguay computed more than 300,000 Civil Service personnel and nearly one-half million retirees.

SOURCE: Carlos Quijano, "Una economía en crisis," suplemento del 20 aniversario de Marcha 1959), y Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto, quoted in "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 102, and Labrousse, _Les Tupamaros_, p. 21.

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TABLE 17

QUANTITIES OF LIVESTOCK
(in millions of heads)

Year	Cattle	Sheep
1852	1.9	0.8
1860	3.6	2.0
1900	6.8	18.6
1908	8.2	26.3
1930	7.1	20.6
1951	8.2	23.4
1970	8.5	19.8

SOURCE: Censos Generales Agropecuarios, "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 42.

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TABLE 18

LAND ALLOCATION
(in percentages)

Year	Livestock	Agriculture	Forests and Unproductive
1913	92.52	5.29	2.19
1930	90.84	6.97	2.19
1956	88.62	9.19	2.19
1966	90.13	7.09	2.78

SOURCE: Censos Generales Agropecuarios, "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 81.

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TABLE 19

GOLD AND DOLLAR RESERVES
(in millions of dollars)

Year	Gold	Net Foreign Currency	Total Reserves
1946	199.6	93.5	293.1
1950	235.7	76.1	311.8
1955	125.6	- 74.5	
1960	179.6	- 96.5	83.1
1965	154.9	-104.8	50.1
1970	161.5	-136.7	24.8

SOURCE: Banco Central del Uruguay, in "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 92.

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TABLE 20

COEFFICIENT OF FIXED GROSS INVESTMENT
FOR THE ENTIRE ECONOMY

Years	Coefficient %
1950/52	23.3
1953/55	19.6
1956/58	15.7
1959/61	14.9
1962/64	14.1
1965/67	11.0
1968/70	14.1

SOURCE: Banco Central del Uruguay, in "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 99.

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TABLE 21

PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
IN THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
(average per period)

Period	% of GNP
1956/58	19.4
1959/61	16.6
1962/64	23.1
1965/67	21.8

SOURCE: Banco Central del Uruguay, in "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 103.

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TABLE 22

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE TYPES OF WAR

	Guerrilla War	Conventional War	Nuclear War
Amount of violence per unit of time:	Small violence, sporadic, discontinuous.	"Average" longlasting violence.	Great violence and concentrated over a short period.
Length of the war:	Very longlasting, patient struggle.	Long, but the tendency is to become shorter.	Short.
Starting of the war:	The war grows more and more.	The war breaks out.	Sudden.
Geographical confrontation:	Undefined borders, fluid contact, but in combat, the combat is close.	Along the front lines; close contact between the parties.	Well over the front lines; long-distance hits.
Man vs. machine:	Emphasis on human factor.	Man and machine.	War of machines; man is alienated.
Professionalism vs. popular basis:	Involvement of civilians.	Regular army and reserves.	High professional level.
Symmetry and asymmetry among the conflicting parties:	Asymmetry: insurgency against the regime--internal war (however, guerrilla can also be used in external war.	Symmetry: nation against nation--external war.	Symmetry: one power against another--external war.
Symmetry and asymmetry in the fighting technique:	Asymmetry, but both sides can use a mixed fighting technique, using both regular units and guerrillas.	The system is quite symmetric.	The system is quite symmetric.
The battle and the war:	Until the last stages of the war, an accumulation of battles, generally small.	The war includes a few battles.	The war is like one battle.
Change in the characteristics of the forces:	Become regular forces.	No change.	No change.
Trend:	Attrition.	Decision.	Destruction.
The results to the parties:	Disappearance of one side.	Coexistence.	General destruction.
Degree of centralism in command:	Decentralization of authority.	Commanders of the different fronts.	Head of the State.

SOURCE: Arkabi, On Guerrilla Warfare.

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TABLE 23

URUGUAY: MILITARY EXPENDITURES[1] IN CURRENT PRICES IN RELATION TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) AND FISCAL SECTOR EXPENDITURES, AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON A CONSTANT PRICE BASIS, 1967-71

Values in Millions of Pesos and U.S. Dollars

Year	GDP	Expenditures		Military expenditures as:		Military expenditures on constant price basis (1967 = 100)	
		Fiscal sector	Military	% of GDP	% of fiscal sector	Pesos[2]	US$[3]
	—In current pesos—						
1967	166,415	25,552	3,299	2.0	12.9	3,299	16
1968**	366,410	48,871	5,564	1.5	11.4	2,473	12
1969	499,678	74,462	9,331	1.9	12.5	3,456	17
1970	[4]596,158	93,528	[5]12,450	2.1	13.3	3,927	20
[6]1971	[4]828,600	145,000	22,780	2.7	15.7	5,826	26

[1] Data are based on expenditures of the Ministry of Defense plus social security expenditures for the armed forces.
[2] Current prices converted to constant prices by using the consumer price index from International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, August 1972.
[3] Values in constant pesos converted at 200 pesos to the U.S. dollar, the official selling rate at the end of 1967.
[4] Estimated on the basis of the reported rate of growth in the gross national product.
[5] Preliminary data.
[6] Estimated data.

Sources: Data on GDP as follows: 1967-70 from Banco Central del Uruguay, Departamento de Investigaciones Economicas, *Producto e Ingresos Nacionales 1971*; 1971 estimated on the basis of data in Agency for International Development, Division of Statistics and Reports, *Economic Data Book*, Uruguay: Revision sheet No. 311, June 1972.

Expenditure data as follows: Total expenditures, 1967-70, from Banco Central del Uruguay, Departamento de Investigaciones Economicas, *Boletin Estadistico Mensual*, August-November 1971, and 1971 from American Embassy, Montevideo, A-021, February 11, 1972, "Economic Indicators"; military expenditures from *Economic Data Book, op. cit.*

**See Mercadar, Tupamaros: Estrategia y Acción, p. 127, for an explanation of the 1968-69 increase in expenditures.

SOURCE: Gertrude E. Heare, Latin American Military Expenditures 1967-1971 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State Publications, 1972), p. 21.

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TABLE 24

RELATION TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING

Country	% of GDP	% of total government expenditures
Bolivia	1.6	15.1
Costa Rica	0.4	2.3
Dominican Republic	2.1	12.1
Ecuador	2.1	12.9
El Salvador	0.8	6.2
Guatemala	1.0	8.4
Guyana	1.2	3.5
Haiti	1.1	9.9
Honduras	1.7	10.4
Jamaica	0.6	2.0
Mexico	0.6	4.6
Nicaragua	1.1	9.6
Panama	1.5	7.2
Paraguay	2.2	18.8
Trinidad and Tobago	0.4	2.0
Uruguay	2.7	15.7

In the majority of the 16 countries defense spending remained less than 2 percent of GDP. The exceptions were Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Only these countries, plus Bolivia and Honduras, spent more than 10 percent of national appropriations on defense. In 1971 military expenditures in relation to GDP and total government expenditures were:

SOURCE: Heare, Latin American Military Expenditures, 1967-71, p. 4.

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TABLE 25

22 LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, IN US DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS OF CONSTANT PRICES (1967 = 100), 1967-71

In Millions of US$

Country	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Argentina	418	411	430	388	392
Bolivia	12	12	11	15	15
Brazil	756	740	825	1,018	1,102
Chile	187	169	175	239	317
Colombia	65	86	78	96	[a]176
Costa Rica	3	3	3	3	4
Dominican Republic	31	32	30	29	30
Ecuador	29	32	32	36	37
El Salvador	10	10	[a]11	[a]11	[a]8
Guatemala	16	15	16	28	18
Guyana	2	2	2	4	3
Haiti	6	6	6	6	5
Honduras	7	7	[a]7	[a]9	12
Jamaica	5	5	4	5	6
Mexico	138	155	182	190	187
Nicaragua	7	7	7	8	9
Panama	8	9	13	15	16
Paraguay	11	12	12	13	13
Peru	136	124	118	144	169
Trinidad and Tobago	3	2	2	4	4
Uruguay	16	12	17	20	26
Venezuela	162	161	156	174	227
Total	2,028	2,012	2,137	2,455	2,776

SOURCE: Heare, Latin American Military Expenditures, 1967-71, p. 22.

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TABLE 26

OCCUPATIONS OF CAPTURED TUPAMAROS, 1966-72

Year	Student	Professional Technician	Worker or Employee	Other	Sample Total
1966-69	21 38.9%	12 22.2%	17 31.5%	4 7.4%	54 100.0%
1970	27 35.1%	18 23.4%	27 35.1%	5 6.5%	77 100.1%*
1971	22 36.1%	19 31.2%	16 26.2%	4 6.6%	61 100.1%*
1972	29 20.1%	60 41.7%	49 34.0%	6 4.2%	144 100.0%
Total	99 29.5%	109 32.4%	109 32.4%	19 5.7%	336 100.0%

*Due to rounding.

Student covers both secondary-school and university students.

Professional or technician includes anyone with a university degree or anyone likely to have completed a course of study at a trade or technical school (such as nurses, priests, artists, mechanics, journalists, and carpenters).

Worker or employee covers farm and factory workers and employees and, generally, anyone employed in the services sector who cannot be classified as a technician (such as salesmen, secretaries, and clerks).

Other includes housewives, soldiers, policemen, businessmen or land-owners, and the unemployed.

SOURCE: Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 29.

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TABLE 27

OCCUPATIONS OF CAPTURED TUPAMAROS: MARCH 1 TO AUGUST 31, 1972

University Professional:	Physicians	36	
	Dentists	11	
	Engineers	8	
	Architects	6	
	Lawyers	4	
	Accountants	3	
	Veterinarians	2	
	Notaries	2	
	TOTAL	72	
	Percent in relation to total Tupamaros captured in this period.		5.6%
Other Activities	Advanced Students	143	11.0%
	Education (teachers, professors)	111	8.7%
	Employees (private)	111	8.7%
	Employees (public)	55	4.1%
	Workers	92	7.3%
	Commerce-Industry	51	4.0%
	Banking	43	3.4%
	Landowners-Farmers	28	2.2%
	Priests	10	
	Soldiers/Police	7	
	Artists/Musicians	6	
	Journalists	9	
	Other technical professions	54	4.1%
	Not classified (lack of info.)	484	38.0%
	TOTAL captured	1276	97.1%

NOTE: The statistical data was based on complete information of 66% of Tupamaros captured in the interior of the country and 44.8% of those captured in the capital. Thus the figures presented ought to be accepted with a high degree of representativeness.

SOURCE: 7 Meses de Lucha Antisubversiva (March 1 to September 30, 1972), República Oriental del Uruguay, Ministerio del Interior, October 16, 1972, pp. 343-45.

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TABLE 28

AGES OF CAPTURED TUPAMAROS, 1966-72

Year	Mean	Mode(s)	Median	Range	Sample Total
1966-69	26.7	22.27	30.5	18-43	72
1970	27.1	21	33.0	18-48	83
1971	25.2	21	35.5	18-53	112
1972	28.3	21	38.5	18-59	248
TOTAL					515

SOURCE: Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 30.

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TABLE 29

AGES OF CAPTURED TUPAMAROS,
MARCH 1 - AUGUST 31, 1972

By Age Groups	Montevideo	Interior
18-21	11.0%	7.5%
21-25	31.0%	18.0%
25-30	23.5%	25.0%
30-35	9.0%	23.0%
35-50	24.0%	23.0%
50 and above	1.5%	3.5%
	100.0%	100.0%

SOURCE: 7 Meses de Lucha Antisubversiva (March 1 to September 30, 1972), República Oriental del Uruguay, Ministerio del Interior, October 16, 1972, pp. 340-42.

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TABLE 30

SEX OF CAPTURED TUPAMAROS, 1966-72

Year	Male	Female	Sample Total
1966-69	60 89.6%	7 10.5%	67 100.1%*
1970	60 70.6%	25 29.4%	85 100.0%
1971	101 71.6%	40 28.4%	141 100.0%
1972	240 73.9%	85 26.2%	325 100.1%
TOTAL	461 74.6%	157 25.4%	618 100.0%

*Due to rounding.

SOURCE: Porzecanski, _Uruguay's Tupamaros_, p. 31.

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TABLE 31

SEX OF CAPTURED TUPAMAROS,
MARCH 1 - AUGUST 31, 1972

	Interior	Montevideo
Male	619 77.6%	306 64.0%
Female	179 22.4%	172 36.0%

SOURCE: 7 Meses de Lucha Antisubversiva (March 1 to September 30, 1972), República Oriental del Uruguay, Ministerio del Interior, October 16, 1972, pp. 337-38.

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TABLE 32

CAPTURED TUPAMAROS: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
MARCH 1 - AUGUST 31, 1971

States (Departamentos)[a]	Total
Montevideo	478
Paysandú	102
Tacuarembó	94
Salto	74
Treinta y Tres	68
Durazno	64
Artigas	51
Colonia	45
Rivera	44
Soriano	42
Río Negro	39
Cerro Largo	28
Canelones	28
Florida	26
Maldonado	24
Flores	20
San José	19
Rocha	18
Lavalleja	14
TOTAL Captured Tupamaros	1,276
TOTAL Captured Tupamaros Interior[b]	798
TOTAL Captured Tupamaros Montevideo[c]	478

[a]See Figures 1 and 2.

[b]Interior includes the coastal regions, excluding Montevideo. The interior encompasses 44 percent of Uruguay's population, 50 percent of the electorate and 97 percent of the national territory.

[c]Montevideo State which also includes the city of Montevideo. Montevideo encompasses 56 percent of Uruguay's population, 50 percent of the electorate and 3 percent of the national territory.

SOURCE: <u>7 Meses de Lucha Antisubversiva</u> (March 1 to September 30, 1972), República Oriental del Uruguay, Ministerio del Interior, October 16, 1972, pp. 337-40.

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TABLE 33

VOTES FOR WINNING PARTY AND PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FOR LEADING SUB-LEMA, 1950-1966

Year	Party	Total Vote	Votes for Winning Party	Percentage of Votes for Leading Sub-Lema
1950	Colorado	823,829	433,454 (52.6%)	19.5%
1954	Colorado	879,242	444,429 (50.5%)	28.9%
1958	Blanco	1,005,362	499,425 (49.6%)	24.0%
1962	Blanco	1,171,020	545,029 (46.5%)	27.0%
1966	Colorado	1,231,762	607,633 (49.3%)	21.3%

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TABLE 34

INDEX OF SALARIES IN SELECTED ACTIVITIES, 1957-1967
(1957=100)

Year	Industry and Construction	Public Employment	Commerce	Total
1957	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1958	97.3	97.2	95.2	96.9
1959	90.5	89.3	88.3	89.7
1960	90.0	89.5	86.9	89.7
1961	94.8	73.0	95.9	84.6
1962	97.1	72.8	103.8	86.5
1963	96.3	65.8	102.8	82.7
1964	90.2	67.1	97.0	80.1
1965	85.0	61.8	89.9	74.6
1966	94.5	52.6	89.0	73.8
1967	91.4	60.2	90.9	76.5

SOURCE: Instituto de Economía, *El Proceso Económico del Uruguay* (Montevideo: Universidad de la República, 1969), pp. 274, 330.

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TABLE 35

REAL WAGE AND MEDIAN REAL RETRIBUTION OF RETIREES
Base 1963 = 100

Years	Real Wages: Public Sector	Private Sector	Total	Median Real Retribution Retirees
1961	95.6	91.8	96.0	s/d
1962	101.5	97.0	101.5	s/d
1963	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1964	101.5	89.2	96.4	88.2
1965	98.0	84.7	92.0	66.0
1966	87.0	89.4	91.3	60.1
1967	101.9	90.9	97.6	53.5
1968	81.8	79.9	83.0	39.4
1969	108.7	88.1	98.2	47.1
1970	100.8	88.1	95.4	47.9

SOURCE: Instituto de Economía, "Estudios y coyuntura," no. 2, Montevideo, 1971, p. 104.

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APPENDIX B

ILLUSTRATIONS

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

Fig. 1. Regions of Uruguay

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Fig. 2. Departments and Capital Cities of Uruguay

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

Fig. 3. Inflation Rate 1949-1971

SOURCE: International Financial Statistics (Washington DC: International Monetary Funds, 1972), pp. 172-175.

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

Fig. 4. Income per Capita in Dollars (USA)

SOURCE: <u>International Financial Statistics</u>, pp. 172–175.

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

Fig. 5. Real Income per Capita in Pesos

SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, pp. 172-175.

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

Fig. 6. Exchange Rates: Official Pesos per US Dollars

SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, pp. 172-175.

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

Fig. 7. Money: Rate of Change

SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, pp. 172-175.

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

Fig. 8. Structure of Uruguay's Export

SOURCE: Eduardo Acevedo, "Anales de la universidad," Historia del Uruguay, 7 vols. (Montevideo: Barriero y Ramos Editorial, 1933-34), II: 213; Banco Central del Uruguay, in "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 46.

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

Fig. 9. Imports: Machinery and Industrial Equipment

SOURCE: Elaborated with data from Banco Central del Uruguay and Instituto de Economía, in "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 87.

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

Fig. 10. Type of Exchange Rate and Consumer Prices

SOURCE: Banco Central del Uruguay and Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos, in "Una economía Latinoamericana," p. 109.

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

Explanation: a) Central Command (political-military)
b) periphery
c) cells
d) cell leader
e) columns

Fig. 11. Pyramidal Structure

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